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ABSTRACT 
Reconstituting Representation: The Supreme Court and the Rhetorical Controversy over 
State and Congressional Redistricting.  
(December 2008) 
Jeremiah Peter Hickey, B.S., St. John Fisher College; 
M.A., SUNY Brockport  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune 
 
Constitutive rhetoric focuses on the idea that in times of historical crisis, speakers 
possess the ability to repair the language of the community and reshape the identity of the 
community. This dissertation relies upon the concept of constitutive rhetoric to examine 
the Supreme Court’s reapportionment and redistricting decision. By employing 
constitutive rhetoric, the Supreme Court reacts to the crisis of representation because of 
malapportionment and redistricting to transform our Constitutional republic to a 
Constitutional democracy and, further, to debate competing visions of representation and 
democracy necessary to sustain political life and the democratic experience.  
Chapter I offers readers a literature review on constitutive rhetoric, a literature 
review on reapportionment and redistricting, and presents readers with an outline of the 
dissertation. Chapter II provides a brief history of redistricting in the United States since 
Colonial times, the development of apportionment and redistricting law at the state court 
level, and the Supreme Court’s invention of a rhetorical tradition in apportionment and 
districting law before the Reapportionment Revolution. In the last section of Chapter II, I 
 iv 
argue that the Pre-Revolution Supreme Court cases weakened the authority of the 
rhetorical tradition of judicial deferment. Chapter III examines the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Baker v. Carr, which reconstitutes the authority of the judiciary in 
apportionment and redistricting law by redefining the meaning of voting rights and the 
political questions doctrine, as well as reconceptualizing the law behind voting rights. 
Further, this chapter outlines the new role of the judiciary in American society and the 
ethos of judicial restraint that is to guide apportionment and redistricting cases.  
Chapter IV examines the development of the new rhetorical tradition in 
apportionment law from the Reapportionment Revolution cases of Gray v. Sanders, 
Wesberry v. Sander, Reynolds v. Sims, and the rest of the Supreme Court cases form the 
1960s. In this new rhetorical tradition, the Supreme Court reconstitutes the American 
republican to create a legal and moral American democracy, a form of government that 
rests on the development of the democratic experience and the expansion of the right to 
vote at the local, state, and federal level. Chapter V examines the Supreme Court cases 
during the 1970s and the 1980s where, because of their ideological divisions, the Justices 
offer the American people competing visions of representation and democracy in an 
attempt to gain interpretive dominance for their visions. Finally, Chapter VI examines the 
Supreme Court’s decisions from the 1990s and 2000s. In these decisions, the Justices 
debate the best means to achieve racial reconciliation through apportionment and 
redistricting law and the best formation of democracy to secure that reconciliation.  
 v 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this text to the development of the democratic experience and the fulfillment of 
the American promise. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 
 
“I Hear America Singing, the Varied Carols I Hear,”  
 
I HEAR America singing, the varied carols I hear;   ` 
Those of mechanics—each one singing his, as it should be, blithe and strong;   
The carpenter singing his, as he measures his plank or beam,   
The mason singing his, as he makes ready for work, or leaves off work;   
The boatman singing what belongs to him in his boat—the deckhand singing on the 
steamboat deck;  
The shoemaker singing as he sits on his bench—the hatter singing as he stands;   
The wood-cutter’s song—the ploughboy’s, on his way in the morning, or at the noon 
intermission, or at sundown;   
The delicious singing of the mother—or of the young wife at work—or of the girl sewing or 
washing—Each singing what belongs to her, and to none else;   
The day what belongs to the day—At night, the party of young fellows, robust, friendly, 
 
Singing, with open mouths, their strong melodious songs. Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
This dissertation follows the style of the Quarterly Journal of Speech. 
 
1 Walt Whitman, “I Hear America Singing, the Varied Carols I Hear,” Whitman: Poetry and Prose, (New York: 
Library of America College Edition, 1996), 174.  
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“I, Too, Sing America,”  
 
I too, sing America. I am the darker brother. 
They send me to eat in the kitchen 
When company comes, 
But I laugh, 
And eat well, 
And grow strong. Tomorrow, 
I'll be at the table 
When company comes. 
Nobody'll dare 
Say to me, 
"Eat in the kitchen," 
Then. Besides, They'll see how beautiful I am 
And be ashamed— 
 
I, too, am America—Langston Hughes, The Collected Poems of Langston Hughes2 
 
 
The Politics of Democracy  
 
 In June of 2006, the Supreme Court released its decision in League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). The decision by the High Court ended a 
four-year legal battle over a redistricting plan and provided a temporary reprieve into an 
area of law politicized by citizens, state legislators, special interests, and the Justices 
themselves. Back in 2002, the Texas State Legislature failed to complete its constitutional 
duty of redistricting the state and Congressional legislative districts as the state Democrats 
believed that the plan was too partisan, drastically favoring the Republican Party. Since the 
political balanced legislature could not secure a redistricting plan, the responsibility for 
the plan transitioned to the Texas State Courts as required by state law. However, 
                                                
2 Langston Hughes, “I, Too, Sing America” The Collected Poems of Langston Hughes, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
2002), 46. 
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Republicans at the state or national level despised the results of the court-ordered plan as 
it retained a Democrat advantage in the state and did not reflect the change in the state’s 
demographics and voting record. Since a changed occurred in the voting behavior of the 
citizens, then a change should occur in the electoral districts that would reflect that 
behavior. Tom Delay (R- Sugar Land), the Congressional Republican House Leader, 
stated, “Democrats lost their majority, and they can’t stand it.”3 Like Delay, most 
Republicans, at the state and national level, desired a “proportional” plan that reflected 
the political beliefs and practices of the citizens of Texas.  
The reapportionment plan for Texas not only focused on local politics as the plan 
constituted an attempt by one political party to gain and maintain power nationally. 
According to Rep. Richard Raymond (D-Laredo), the redistricting plan by Tom Delay was 
part of a national plan: “If he [Delay] could get Texas, the other states would domino.”4 
The Texas effort was one of three states in which Republicans attempted to advance their 
power through districting as efforts in Pennsylvania, which was successful, and in 
Colorado, which was not, helped to create and advance a Republican advantage in 
Congress. The implication here is clear: if Republicans could grab power and more seats 
in Texas, then they would be able to push through more of their legislation nationally. 
                                                
3 R.G. Ratcliffe, John Williams, Melissa Drosjack, Armando Villafrance, “On the Lam in Oklahoma: 
Fugitive Democrats, GOP Point Fingers Across Red River,” The Houston Chronicle, 14 May 2003 A1. 
 
4 R.G. Ratcliffe, John Williams, Melissa Drosjack, Armando Villafrance, “On the Lam in Oklahoma: 
Fugitive Democrats, GOP Point Fingers Across Red River,” The Houston Chronicle, 14 May 2003 A1. 
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Republicans held these sentiments as well. Phil King, (R-Weatherford), author of the 
House map, stated "I would like to do that to help President Bush with his agenda."  
 Even though Texas Republicans tried to steamroll the Democrats, the Democrats 
in Texas attempted to fight back. “This is not about Democrats. It’s about democracy,” 
Sen. Leticia Van de Putte, (D- San Antonio) declared in July of 2003 after Texas State 
Democrats evacuated Texas— for a second time, the first to Oklahoma and the second to 
New Mexico—in order to protest and prevent the Texas Republicans from enacting a mid-
decade redistricting plan in Texas.5 The Democrats cried “foul” over the actions of the 
Republicans. Rather than saying the plan is unfair, the Democrats attacked the 
Republicans for altering the foundation of the country—the electoral process.  The 
Democrats believed that the Republicans altered the districts of Texas not to serve the 
interests of the citizens, but rather to serve the interests of the party. This act of 
redistricting was purely of political motives.  
 Furthermore, Democrats questioned the motives of the Texas Republicans, 
attempting to associate this plan within the history of racial discrimination in Texas.  
When she explained the actions of Democrats, Van de Putte stated, “When the 
congressional districts of those Democrats targeted by Republicans are eliminated, over 
1.4 million minority Texans will have no advocates because their home will be drawn into 
districts in which they will have no voice in choosing their members of Congress.”6 In 
                                                
5 Clay Robison and Janet Elliot, “Texas Democrats on the Run Again: Senators Launch Redistricting 
Boycott,” The Houston Chronicle, 29 July 2003 A1.  
 
6 Clay Robison and Janet Elliot, “Texas Democrats on the Run Again,” A1. 
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addition to losing minority voters, Representative Martin Frost—one of the four 
Democrats who would later find himself drawn out of office—believed that the 2003 plan 
would decrease representation of Anglo—Democrats in Texas. According to The New York 
Times, Frost stated that the Texas Republicans wanted to redefine the political parties 
ensuring that “white voters will not identify with the Democratic party.”7 Bob Stein, a 
professor of political science at Rice University, claimed that the Republican strategy in 
the redistricting process was to put a black and Hispanic face on the Democratic Party.8  
Of course, Stein added, that he hesitated to declare the redistricting process as being 
purely racial since the packing of minorities in districts would reduce the influence of 
Democrats throughout the state.9 Further, Stein added, that when the Democrats were the 
majority party in Texas, they were “hardly averse to their own racial manipulation. Why 
else . . . were so many white Democrats representing blacks?”10 
 Soon after the Democrats returned from their trip to New Mexico and Governor 
Rick Perry called for the state’s third special legislative session of 2003, the State 
Representatives passed a redistricting plan only after the Republicans changed the 
procedural rules to ensure the vote required a majority and not a supermajority. After the 
political parties “agreed” on the new redistricting plan, the Democrats filed suits in three 
                                                
7 Ralph Blumenthal, “Texas Democrats Look at New Map and Point out Victims,” The New York Times, 14 
October 2003 A14. 
 
8 Ralph Blumenthal, “Texas Democrats Look at New Map and Point out Victims,” A14. 
 
9 Ralph Blumenthal, “Texas Democrats Look at New Map and Point out Victims,” A14.  
 
10 Ralph Blumenthal, “Texas Democrats Look at New Map and Point out Victims,” A14.  
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cases throughout the state, claiming that the newly created districts were unconstitutional 
political and racial gerrymanders. After months of litigation in the court system, which 
consisted of three appeals to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and one petition to the 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court remanded one of the cases, Sessions v. Perry, back to 
the State Court, affirming the 2003 redistricting plan. At first, the fate of the 2003 
redistricting plan rested with the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision of Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 
U.S. 267 (2004), in which a plurality of the Court ruled that political gerrymandering 
cases were no longer justiciable. In light of Vieth, the Court in Sessions ruled that the Texas 
redistricting case was a political but not racial gerrymander as the plaintiffs failed to 
establish a case under §2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).11 In 2006, the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the lower court in part, ruling that two districts violated §2 under 
the VRA but refused to rule the redistricting plan presented an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander. After years of four years of fighting, the Texas State Republicans, according 
to Justice Stephen Breyer, were able to entrench themselves through redistricting without 
regard the consequences of the political process.12 According to this vision of democracy, 
the Texas State Republicans subverted the democratic experience and a majority of 
Justices on the Supreme Court possessed little desire to ensure citizens could elect 
representatives of their choice.  
                                                
11 Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 (2004). 
 
12 L.U.L.A.C. v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 492 (2006). 
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 In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville credits the Supreme Court for 
preserving the peace, prosperity, and existence of the United States.13 He wrote that the 
“peace, the prosperity, and the existence of the Union are vested in the hands” of the 
justices of the Supreme Court.14 The reasons? The Supreme Court provides meaning to 
the Constitution and defends the Constitution against internal threats: 
Without their active cooperation the Constitution would be a dead letter: the 
Executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the 
Legislative powers; the Legislature demands their protection from the designs of 
the Executive; they defend the Union from the disobedience of the States, the 
States from the exaggerated claims of the Union; the public interest against the 
interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting 
innovations of democracy.15  
By acting as a guardian, the Supreme Court protects the rights of citizens in the 
democratic process and protects the competing branches of government from one 
another. Tocqueville believes that as long as the Justices clothe their decisions in the 
authority of public opinion and remain prudent men, then the Court preserves the Union 
before it plunged into anarchy.16  
                                                
13 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), 170. 
 
14 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 170.  
 
15 Alexis de, Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 171. 
 
16 Alexis de, Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 171. Note: there is subtle irony in de Tocqueville’s discussion 
of the Court. De Tocqueville remarks that, “If the Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent men or 
bad citizens, the Union may be plunged into anarchy or civil war,” (171).  
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 Throughout its history, some of the most important and most controversial 
decisions center on the Supreme Court’s ability to shape the democratic experience in its 
reapportionment and redistricting cases. In 1962, the Supreme Court initiated the “The 
Reapportionment Revolution” when it released its decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962). Rather than following precedent or allow the state legislators to deny the voting 
rights of citizens, the Supreme Court redefined its authority and the “political questions” 
doctrine to relieve the gross malapportionment throughout the country. Since its decision 
in Baker, the Supreme Court institutionalized an ideology of political equality at the 
Congressional, state, and local level in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). After a majority 
of the justices discovered that political equality alone would not provide relief, the Justice 
debated the extent to which the judiciary could determine political fairness, especially for 
political and racial minorities, in such cases as Allen v. State Board of Education, 393 U.S. 
544 (1969), Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 722 (1973), Beer v. United States 425 U.S. 130 
(1976), Gingles v. Thornburg 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 
(1986). During this time, an ideological struggle between the Conservative and Liberal 
Justices resulted in a conflicted redistricting jurisprudence, especially in regards to the 
meaning of democracy and the development of political institutions. Finally, in addition 
to the contested meanings of democracy, the Justice on the Supreme Court debated the 
extent to which state legislators could develop districting plans on the basis of race and 
political interests, especially in regards to political equality, political fairness, and political 
 9 
and racial reconciliation in Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993), Miller v. Johnson 512 U.S. 
997 (1995), and Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
Between 1910 and 2006, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 91 cases 
dealing with apportionment and districting. Throughout these decisions, the Justices on 
the Supreme Court negotiate competing visions of democracy that form the constitution 
of the democratic experience. The purpose of this work it to examine the role of the High 
Court in the redistricting process, especially in regards to how the public address of the 
Justices constitute the meaning of American democracy. By addressing reapportionment, 
the Supreme Court Justices provide the connection between “the nature of ‘good speech’ 
and the ‘best regime,” allowing for an examination between competing theories of judicial 
review and competing visions of democracy.17 Building upon the connection between the 
discipline of public address and political theory, this work seeks to examine the meaning 
of American democracy through the development of the Supreme Court’s 
reapportionment and redistricting decisions.18 Since the Supreme Court possess the power 
                                                
17 James Arnt Aune, “Public Address and Rhetorical Theory,” Texts in Context: Critical Dialogues on Significant 
Episodes in American Political Rhetoric, (Davis: Harmagoras Press, 1989), 43 – 51.  
 
18 James Arnt Aune and Jennifer R. Mercieca, “A Vernacular Republican Rhetoric: William Manning’s Key 
of Liberty,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92 (2005): 119 – 143.  For addition work on the idea of 
republicanism, see James Jasinski, “Rhetoric and Judgment in the Constitutional Ratification Debates of 
1787 – 1788: An Exploration in the Relationship between Theory and Critical Practice,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 78 (1992): 433 – 457; Zoltan Vajda, “John C. Calhoun’s Republicanism Revisited,” Rhetoric 
and Public Affairs 4.3 (2001): 433 – 457; Stephen Howard Browne, “‘The Circle of Our Felicities: Thomas 
Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address and the Rhetoric of Nationhood,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 5.3 (2002): 
409 – 438, and, Jefferson’s Call for Nationhood, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003); Michael 
William Pfau, “Time, Tropes, and Textuality: Reading Republicanism in Charles Sumner’s ‘Crime Against 
Kansas’” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 6.3 (2003): 385 – 414; M.N.S. Sellers, American Republicanism, Roman 
Ideology in the United States Constitution, (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Philip Petit, 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and J.G.A. 
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to alter legal and political questions, in general, and representation and citizenship 
questions in particular, this dissertation seeks to explain how the Supreme Court 
reconstitutes the meaning of representation and, consequently, the meaning of democracy 
within its reapportionment and redistricting decisions.  
Before examining the Supreme Court’s constitution of American democracy, this 
chapter examines the theoretical background of this dissertation. First, the chapter reviews 
the literature on constitutive rhetoric and legal rhetoric to develop the ways in which 
language constitutes identity and community, generally, and the way in which the 
opinions by the Supreme Court creates authoritative texts shaping our legal discourse. 
Second, this chapter examines redistricting as a heresthetical device used to create a 
specific electoral result. Additionally, this chapter briefly reviews the literature to connect 
the implementation of redistricting on political deliberation. Finally, in this chapter, I 
preview the chapters forming the basis of this dissertation.  
The Supreme Court, the  Law, and Constitutive  Rhetor ic 
In Federalist #78, Alexander Hamilton argued that the proposed Constitution 
would make the Supreme Court of the United States of America the “least dangerous 
branch” of the Republic since “it will be least in a capacity to annoy or to injure.”19 While 
the Executive “dispenses the honor” and holds the “sword of the community” and the 
                                                                                                                                           
Pocock, “Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia Americana,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 48 (1987): 325 – 246. 
 
19 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #78: The Judiciary Department” in The Federalist ed. William R. Brock 
(London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 398. 
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Legislative branch “commands the purse,” and “proscribes the rules by which the duties 
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated,” the Judiciary posses neither “the sword or 
the purse,” nor will they “have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and 
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgment.”20 Yet, while Hamilton describes the Court as the “least dangerous branch”—a 
branch that can only become tyrannical if in concert with one of the other two and one 
that will most likely be overpowered by one of the other two— he assigns the Court two 
important roles within the government and American society. First, the Court would act 
as a guardian, keeping representatives “within the limits of their authority;” second, the 
Court would act as an interpreter since, “the interpretation of the laws is the proper and 
peculiar province of the courts. According to Hamilton, the judges must regard the 
constitution as fundamental law: “It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as 
well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.”21  
In the process of ascribing meaning to legislative acts and saying “what that law is,” 
the Supreme Court creates its own authority and power to define the social world for the 
citizens and its government.22 For better or for worse, the Supreme Court protected slavery 
and constituted African Americans as non-citizens, desegregated public schools and public 
                                                
20 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #78: The Judiciary Department,” 398 – 399.  
 
21 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #78: The Judiciary Department,” 398 – 399. 
 
22 Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
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space, and consecrated a “right to privacy” and a “wall of separation.”23 When political 
bodies refused to act or chose not to act, such as in the desegregation cases, the Supreme 
Court answered and addressed some of the most important legal, political, and moral 
questions that faced the United States. To study legal argumentation is to study the 
legitimacy for judicial review, to examine the relationship between the Court, citizens, and 
the law, and to analyze how the political and legal actors constitute the social world 
around them—all of which is done through the judicial opinion. The judicial opinion, 
therefore, has two entailments. First, it is constitutive in the sense that it will create and 
reaffirm the social world for citizens. Second, it acts as the authority and justification for a 
legal decision.  
The Law as Constitutive  Rhetor ic 
 The rhetorical study of law is the study of culture, community, identity, and 
authority. It encompasses not only what is legal or constitutional, but also what comprises 
“legality” or “constitutionality.” The rhetorical study of the law searches for ways in which 
communities develop and disintegrate, regulate and relinquish ideas within competing 
communities. It seeks to understand how individuals and groups have the power to 
declare that an idea or practice is legal or illegal, constitutional or unconstitutional. In this 
sense, it is not only a study of forensic rhetoric but also of epidictic rhetoric. As Chaim 
Perelman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca write in The New Rhetoric, the purpose of epideictic 
rhetoric is to gain adherence to “values held in common by the audience and the speaker. 
                                                
23 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 394 U.S. 294 (1955), 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), Everson v. Board of 
Education 330 U.S. 1 (1947).   
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The epidictic [sic] speech has an important part to play, for without such common values 
upon what foundation could deliberative and legal speeches rest?” 24 The rhetorical study 
of the law not only focuses on how a Courts resolve an issue, but how a Court recreates 
the ethos and values of a community. The rhetorical study of the law allows for the 
development of a language for the community by which citizens can address values and 
premises for the electoral practices necessary for a democracy.25 
In the rhetorical study of the law, rhetoric is constitutive. According to James Boyd 
White, rhetoric is the “central art by which culture and community are established, 
maintained, and transformed. This kind of rhetoric . . . ‘constitutive rhetoric’ . . . has 
justice as its ultimate object.”26 For White, discourse calls communities into being. When 
                                                
24 Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 52 – 53.  
 
25 Karl Wallace, “Rhetoric and Politics,” The Southern Speech Journal 20 (1955): 195 – 203 at 195.  
 
26 James Boyd White, “Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life,” in Heracles’ Bow: Essays 
on Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (Madison: The University of Wisconsin, 1985), 28. Studies in constitutive 
rhetoric examine how communities develop together and in opposition to other identities. In “Constitutive 
Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois,” Maurice Charland examines the independence movement of 
French Canadians in Quebec to determine “how those in Quebec come to experience themselves as 
Québécois.” In her analysis, Charland shows how the Québécois constituted themselves, and their 
opponents, by their discourse. See Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple 
Québécois,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 72.2 (1987): 133 – 150. In “Contested Collectives: The Struggle to 
Define the ‘We’ in the 1995 Quebec Referendum,” Alissa Sklar examines the struggle between rhetorical 
communities in Quebec by focusing on a 1995 Separation Referendum. Building on the work of Charland, 
Sklar examines closely the discursive techniques that the Federalists and the Separatists used to constitute 
themselves and their position during the separation referendum; and, in addition, she pays close attention 
to the ways in which the Federalists and Separatists used each other dialectically. See Alissa Sklar, 
“Contested Collectives: the Struggle to Define the 'We' in the 1995 Québec Referendum.” Southern Journal of 
Communication. 64.2 (1999): 106-122. In “Reinventing and Contesting Identities in Constitutive 
Discoursees: Between Diaspora and Its Others,” Jolanta A. Drzewiecka examines how Dispora collectives 
constitute themselves in discourse, which aims to “legitimate certain forms of collective power and action in 
between national cultural formations.” In terms of constitutive rhetoric, Drzewiecka wants to know how the 
collective “we” emerges as a “shifting formation as the identity of the dispora, its boarders, and who counts 
as its members,” as the collectives position and contest each other, and then adapt and reposition themselves 
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individuals speak or when the Supreme Court releases decisions, the language of the 
Court constitutes individuals and communities, values and cultures. Yet this process is not 
forced onto individuals as individuals always posses the means by which they can use 
language to gain meaning or lose meaning, to constitute or reconstitute their identity, 
community, and culture. As White states, “To use language is always to change it, for one 
constantly makes new gestures and sentences of one’s own, new patterns or combinations 
of meaning. Language is in part a system of invention, an organized way of making new 
meaning in new circumstances.27 When using language, individuals ought to ask 
themselves who they want to be with their speech. He writes that he wants to ask each of 
us, “who we become, individually and collectively—who we can become—in our 
conversations with one another. What kind of selves, what kind of communities, do we 
establish with each other in our speech, especially in our persuasive speech?”28 This type of 
rhetoric focuses on justice, ethics, and politics.29 
With the view that the law is constitutive rhetoric, there are three main themes. First, 
human agents use communicative acts to create the law, which in turn creates a social 
universe whereby individuals possess authority and relationships to one another.30 For 
                                                                                                                                           
in response to the other. See Jolanta A. Drzewiecka, "Reinventing and Contesting Identities in Constitutive 
Discourses: Between Diaspora and Its Others." Communication Quarterly 50 (2002): 1-24. 
 
27 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, 
and Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 8.  
 
28 James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow, 4.  
 
29 James Boyd White, “Cultural and Communal Life,” Heracles’ Bow, 28. 
 
30 James Boyd White, Justice as Translation, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 96.  
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Kenneth Burke, a constitution provides agents with “substance” and “motives”; the 
Constitution of the United States preserves the “substance” and “motive” as it records 
traditional customs into law and allows agents to transform new customs into law.31 
Second, to understand this calculus of motives, individuals must understand the 
dialectical tension between the Constitution and its scene.32 The constitution, the law, or 
a judicial opinion cannot be understood outside of the social context in which it occurs. 
In this sense, the constitution is dialectical in nature as it points to an external referent for 
comprehension. In this sense, the law is not just a system of rules but instead a series of 
consequences resulting from the values, beliefs, and faiths within a community.33 Third, as 
human agents develop the law, there is no one sure-fire way to complete the 
communicative enactment of the law. Even though Supreme Court Justices write as if the 
                                                
31 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1969), 342. In the 
United States, the constitution creates a country for its citizens, three branches of government under the 
sovereign people, and provides each branch of government with roles to fulfill. Further, it creates limitations 
to those roles, or “Though Shalt Nots.” Finally, while working under the roles of the Constitutional Wish, 
the members of the three branches of the government recreate the Constitution and the “substance” and 
“motive” of the American people. Acts of Congress, the President or the Courts reconstitutes the identity of 
the American people and their institutions. Especially concern for this project is the development of 
Constitutional Law, decisions from the Court that alter the American political body and alter the American 
Constitution even though it does not alter the Constitution. 
 
32Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 357. In A Grammar of Motives, Kenneth Burke posits that 
constitutional wishes or constitutional clauses refer to external sources for their meaning. First, Burke writes 
that Constitutions are agonistic instruments: “they involve an enemy, implicitly or explicitly.” Second, Burke 
writes that as constitutions propound certain wishes or commands, they do so from one group of individuals 
to another and, overtime, the meaning behind these wishes change as the overriding situation or context 
changes. Third, constitutional wishes dialectically point to an external element in such a way that that one 
wish inside the constitution that mandates equality represents a situation outside of inequality outside of the 
constitution. 
 
33 Anthony G. Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law: How Courts Rely on Storytelling, and How 
Their Stories Change the Way We Understand the Law—and Ourselves, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000), 6.  
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law commands them, the Justices choose their arguments. Further, they engage in a 
conversation with the two parties pleading their case and the other justices listening to the 
case, allowing them to be open to persuasion as they persuade one another.34 In the 
deliberation about the law and the enactment of the law, voices compete; and, in the 
process, while one individual or community tries to persuade another, they must also be 
open to persuasion themselves. In addition, because of the competition and potential 
cooperation between the voices, a myriad number of worlds are possible as cultures collide 
and law develops. In a free society, the discussion of the law and the development of the 
community must occur; it can never be imposed on individuals.  
 To summarize, constitutive rhetoric involves the study of the development of the 
law through the development of identity and community.  Through the rhetorical process, 
individuals and communities form and maintain their identities. As a result of the 
process, the individuals and communities invent the law. In this law, there is the 
development and maintenance of the social world. In this social world, individuals adapt 
the language of the community and choose their own role for the community. As the 
                                                
34 In “Cultural and Communal Life,” James Boyd White writes that we “must accept the double fact that 
there are real and important differences between cultures and that one is in substantial part the product of 
one’s own culture,” (23,29). Further, he develops the rhetorical nature of the law as he states the law is a 
rhetorically activity where first, the lawyer must speak the language of his/her audience and, therefore is 
culture specific; second, there is a creative process to the law where the lawyer, judge, or citizen is always 
trying to change the law through an argumentative process, “to add or to drop a distinction, to admit a new 
voice, to claim anew source of authority;” and third, there is an ethical or communal character since every 
time a lawyer or judge speaks, he or she is establishing an ethical identity, or ethos, for oneself and one’s 
audience. White writes that, “the lawyer’s speech is thus always implicitly argumentative not only about the 
result—how should the case be decided?—and the language—in what terms should it be defined and talked 
about?—but about the rhetorical community of which one is at that moment a part.” James Boyd White, 
“Cultural and Communal Life,” Heracles’ Bow, 33 – 34. 
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language adapts, so do the rules and regulations that maintain the community. One of the 
most important documents to the community is the judicial text that creates the terms of 
the society and the relations of society.  
The Supreme Court: Defining the Social World through Communication 
 By interpreting a controversy and creating a judicial opinion, the Supreme Court 
plays a unique role in the United States as it constitutes the social and political realm in 
which legal discourse occurs. Through the observation and creation of the law, the 
Supreme Court performs a unique role that no other branch of government can fulfill: 
“the development, over time, of a self-reflective, self-correcting body of discourse that will 
bind its audience together by engaging them in a common language and a common set of 
practices. It is a claim to constitute a community and a culture.”35 While the other two 
branches of the federal government are by definition political in nature and in practice, 
and while the State governments are local and political, the Court offers the American 
people an impartial interpreter of the fundamental values in society that, in theory, binds 
all of society. Acting as the moral authority of “the people,” the Court gives voice to 
communities, and in the process, both creates communities and allows them to recreate 
themselves. 
In the judicial opinion, the Justices interpret and constitute the world around 
them with a specific cultural, legal, and political meaning. According to James Boyd 
White, the “activity of the law is the interpretation and composition of authoritative 
                                                
35 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning, 251. 
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texts.”36 At the heart of this activity is the judicial opinion, which serves as a “claim of 
meaning;” it describes a case, tells a story in a particular way, explains a result, connects 
the case with earlier cases, and connects the facts of one case with general concerns.37 
Further, the judicial opinion “engages in the central conversation that is for us the law . . . 
it makes two claims of authority: for the texts and judgments to which it appeals, and for 
the methods by which it works.”38 These texts will shape cultural ideals about citizenship, 
democracy, or the role of the courts in the political process.  
First, the text of a judicial opinion grants authority to a specific decision and a 
specific vision of the social world. The decision by the majority or the plurality provides 
the social world with a legal language filled with set of rules and regulations, which invite a 
response by other social actors.  The judicial opinion validates, authorizes, and creates an 
ethos for one form of life, one type of community, one kind of argumentation, one set of 
values of social goods, and one style of authority over another.39 It serves as a rhetorical 
text and an authoritative text by which Justices resolve disputes and communicates their 
decisions and the entailments of its decision to the parties involved in the case, to the 
government, and to the public.40 The opinion contains both ratio decidendi, the point in a 
                                                
36 James Boyd White, Justice as Translation, 95.  
 
37 James Boyd White, From Expectation to Experience: Essays on Law & Legal Education, (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1999), 40.  
 
38 James Boyd White, From Expectation to Experience, 40. 
 
39 James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism, 101.  
 
40 Sanford Levinson, “The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion,” in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the 
Law, ed. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 187; Guyora Binder and 
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case that determines the judgment, and obiter dicta, “statements in opinions wherein 
courts indulged in generalities that had not actual bearing upon the issues involved,” but 
may be used by courts in the development of future legal principles.41  Further, these 
decisions are transcendent in that they provide a precedent for future cases that are not yet 
before the Court.42  
Even dissenting decisions provide interpretive clues to the audience, especially in 
how to handle future controversies. According to John Hollander, “Dissenting opinions 
are more like moral essays, or theoretical analyses, or literary criticisms, than they are like 
effective instrumental opinions.”43 Furthermore, dissenting opinions show that the Court 
is fallible, through a public declamation.44 This reading of the dissent diminishes the 
Court’s legitimacy as being the final arbitrator of the Constitution at a point in time while 
it grants authority to a future Court to readdress these issues. While the majority’s or 
plurality’s decision seeks to gain authority, the dissenting opinion refuses to grant this 
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authority and offers a future Court the means by which precedent ought to be rejected. As 
Stanford Levinson asserts, “Whatever presumptions operate in favor of precedents, they 
are in fact refutable, which means that they can be overridden in the name of some other 
important value.”45 
In the process of granting one rhetorical vision over another, the Court establishes 
a sense of authority for that vision. This authority rests upon a sense of legitimacy, 
especially in terms of public acceptance. Judicial opinions are distinctive because they are 
not policy statements or political judgments from despotic rulers, “but judgments made by 
actors with limited authority, an authority that is governed by texts external to themselves 
to which they must look to determine both the proper scope of their power and the 
standards by which it is to be exercised.”46According to legal scholar Philip Bobbitt, there 
is a necessary legal grammar by which the Supreme Court, lawyers, and the American 
people follow. What is important is that the Court “hears arguments, reads arguments, 
and ultimately must write arguments,” and that through these arguments, the Court, 
lawyers, and the American people create legitimacy for the legal system in the United 
States.47 The institutional legitimacy of the Court, according to Lawrence Douglass, 
develops through its “hermeneutic function: its task of constitutional exposition.”48 
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Douglass argues that perception of legitimacy remains if the Court remains faithful to 
offering readings of the written text.49 James Boyd White offers a similar sentiment in 
regards to the authority of the Court, as well as the law or the church, when he states that 
authority is constituted in one’s writing.50 In addition, Robert A. Prentice examines the 
decision of Brown v. Board of Education to exemplify the rhetorical strategies inherent 
within a decision by the Supreme Court. For Prentice, the written decision for the court 
provides the legitimacy of the holding since, “if the opinion is to be truly effective, it must 
also persuade the Court’s various audiences that the rationale is sound and, more 
importantly, that the results are in the best interest of the nation.” 51 Furthermore, 
Prentice writes that the key for the legitimacy of the decision rests with how the author of 
the decision (and the authority of the Court) rests with how effectively the justice 
identifies with and responds to, “the most important exigencies to be resolved, adapts to 
the most important audiences, and copes with the most significant constraints.”52 
In the process of engaging in the activity of the law, the Supreme Court develops 
its own authority. The Supreme Court not only relies on its Constitutional power that 
“extends to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution,” it grants itself 
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authority in its own opinion. 53 While the Court possesses the power “to say what the law 
is,” the Court must proceed carefully as it renders a decision that adheres to 
Constitutional standards. In each aspect of the decision, whether it responds to the 
exigence, audience, constraints, or develops its own argument, the Supreme Court writes 
itself into a very peculiar and precarious position each time it places its words and 
decisions to place. With each case, the justices on the Court face multiple constraints of 
authority. Is the Court to defer its authority and decide not to rule on a case because it is 
not justiciable? Is the Court to live by its own Constitutional authority or should it adopt 
the authority of former Chief Justice John Marshall or any previous Court? Shall the 
Supreme Court respect the authority of stare decisis or shall it create a new precedent that 
will bind future Courts to the past where it will not reside? In addition to the decisions of 
the Court, each legal topos and each legal argument that the justices use in their 
translation of the case correlates to a philosophical authority that the Justices believe exists as 
a valid source of authority inside or outside of the constitution. For example, the “original 
intent” argument finds authority within the documents of constitutional composition and 
ratification: the Constitutional Convention Debates, the Ratification Debates in the 
States, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, and the private letters of the individual 
actors. The “textual” argument places its trust with the common and present day 
understanding of the text itself. The “structural” argument balances the competing 
authoritative positions of the Constitution. The “doctrinal” argument falls under the 
                                                
53 U.S. Const, Art. III. §2. 
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authority of precedent and Constitutional tests. The authority of the “prudential” 
argument rests with the judge or justice’s ability to too rationally calculate the 
consequences of a legal issue. Finally, the “ethical” argument finds authority with the 
ethos of the American people within the Constitution.  
For example, in the redistricting debate, the Justices lack a clear mandate from the 
historical record, which called for political equality while it denied people the right to 
vote,54 or the text of the constitution, which allows for state discretion and calls for 
apportionment according to the number of inhabitants.55 In the face of conflicting 
evidence, the Justices engage themselves in an interpretive debate as to which argument 
conforms best to the Supreme Court’s role in the redistricting process. Should the Justices 
follow a prudential argument, knowing that the actions of the Supreme Court may 
threaten the stability of the political process? Conversely, should the Justice employ ethical 
arguments to fulfill the ideals of the American promise of democracy, political equality, 
and political fairness? 
In addition to examining how a decision constitutes authority, the decision 
provides interpretative clues as to how justices examine a conflict in front of them.  
Within a decision, the rhetorical canons of invention, arrangement, and style play an 
important role in the development of the judicial opinion and the resolution of the case at 
hand. The Justices themselves are aware of their power and their ability to constitute the 
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 24 
world through words. Before Samuel Alito Jr.’s confirmation to the Supreme Court, 
Justice Stephen Breyer discussed, with a reporter, his fear of language:  
“I was frightened to death for the first three years….I was afraid I might 
inadvertently write something harmful," Justice Breyer said. "People read every 
word. Everything you do is important. There is a seriousness to every word, and 
you really can't go back. Precedent doesn't absolutely limit you. In almost every 
case, you're in a wide-open area. The breadth of that opening, getting up to speed 
on each case, constitutional law as a steady diet, the importance to the profession. 
..." His voice trailed off, and he shook his head. "My goodness!" he exclaimed.56 
Breyer is not the only Justice to share his views on the power of the decision. Consider 
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s words in regards to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education: 
“the opinions [in Brown] should be short, readable by the lay public, non rhetorical, 
unemotional, and, above all, non-accusatory.”57 Furthermore, in the spirit of Warren’s 
Brown decision, Joseph Goldstein argues that the decisions ought to be written for the 
primary audience of “We the People” since, the primary task of the Court is to “maintain 
the Constitution as something comprehensible to the People.”58 
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 The selection of the most important facts and the presence the justice provides for 
the facts in relation to the Constitutional wish shape the resolution to the case at hand. As 
Kenneth Burke suggests, the observations humans make are just implications of the 
particular terms a person uses: “In brief, much that we take as observations about ‘reality’ 
may be the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms.”59 Social 
actors “know” a situation by “making indications to themselves. To indicate something is 
‘to extricate it from its setting, to hold it apart, to give it meaning, or, in Mead’s language, 
to make it into an object.’”60 Definitions, according to Perelman, can either be quasilogical 
or dissociative; they either bring one term in connection with another concept or separate 
a term by giving presence to the real meaning of the term.61 In terms of the law, one 
commonplace about the Common Law is “treat like cases alike.”62 By doing this, the 
Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, provide regulatory stability for all citizens and 
other branches of government, and it provides an element of fairness and equal 
treatment.63 Yet, in the process of deciding a case, the Court must, define the situation 
and then prioritize the facts of the particular case in relation to prior decisions, which 
developed from other particular facts. In this process, the Justices apply presence to certain 
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facts and to certain values in a case in relation to past facts and past values. The invention 
and arrangement process within a judicial decision will reflect the presence of the 
argument at hand.  
In addition to the presence given to facts, the selection of terms and definitions 
will alter the perception and decision of a case. Rhetorical theorists have long advocated 
the study of definitional arguments in legal and public debate.64 Definitional argument, 
according to Jeffrey St. John, is a mode of rhetorical inquiry that examines how rhetors 
wield “control, redirect, undermine, validate, support, qualify, or otherwise influence the 
development and suasiveness of specific arguments.”65 According to Brian R. McGee, 
studying definitional arguments serves an important role in the examination of the social 
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world and to discursive or rhetorical communities in which the definitions are 
commonplace.66 Furthermore, the use of one definition does not exclude other 
definitions; for example, seeing the “law as rhetoric,” does not necessarily exclude the 
trope “the law as power” or the “law as fiction.” These definitions depends on the 
circumstances in which a rhetor uses the term, which will be very apt in terms of the 
Court’s use of a “political question.”67 There are many forms of arguments by definition 
or argument from definition. For Schiappa, the argument from definition is when a rhetor 
tries to find a better definition in a context that will help resolve a dispute; an argument 
by definition is the use of argument based on well-established definitions. As Steve 
Schwarze demonstrates, judicial opinions rely on two types of arguments, definitional 
arguments and institutional arguments; furthermore, justices often employ definitional 
arguments in their opinions that rely on institutional authority.68 As J.M. Balkin suggests, 
the study of topics, or commonplaces, is the study of social practices of argumentation and 
this, “the study of a shared form of social life.” 69 To study how communities use certain 
topics is not enough. Balkin suggests, “To be critical about legal topics, we need to play 
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various topical approaches off against each other; for example, we might play off the 
language of efficiency and transaction cost reduction against the language of moral 
responsibility and desert. That is because we can often see the limitation of topics by 
means of other topics that we bring to bear.”70 
In addition to the invention and arrangement process, style plays an important 
role. Majority or plurality decisions require impartiality, especially in terms of maintaining 
the authority of the Court through legitimacy. To avoid any perception of an arbitrary 
decision, according to Robert Ferguson, the judge must write as if the resolution is an 
inevitable conclusion and the judge lacks freedom of choice in the process of reaching a 
decision.71 As with the decision in Brown, the holding should be clear and understandable. 
However, while the holding of the Court may require simplicity, the dicta and dissent 
require eloquence and, certainly, amplification. According to Ron R. Le Duc, a general 
rule of opinions is that “the more vigorous the passage being quoted, the less likely it is to 
be an expression of existing law.”72 By adding amplification to either dicta or to a 
dissenting opinion, the justice seeks to persuade a future court with more force, even if it 
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offers nothing to the holding, especially in regards to a clear understanding of the 
question under debate.73 
By engaging in the law, the Supreme Court creates a text that will provide form 
and meaning to the community. The Supreme Court uses the judicial opinion to create 
authority for a specific social world and to grant authority to a way to create this world. 
This text of constitutional or common law, will serve as a set of rules and regulations for 
the people and for future courts to follow. The Courts constitution these decisions 
through argumentation and provide audiences with reasons as to why it modified or did 
not modify an exigence.  
Constituting Democracy: Representation as a Communicative  Act 
 The ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America initiated a 
new era of representation in world politics. The experiment of the American Constitution 
altered the participatory nature of the republican form of government.  No longer were 
the people to be subject to the divine rule of kings, nor the imperial right of parliament. 
Instead, the government would be subjected to “We the People,” a vast and unknown 
sovereign. The goal of the new republic would be to “guard the society against the 
oppression of its rulers,” and “guard one part of society against the injustice of the other 
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part.”74 In order to accomplish this goal, elections would provide a necessary check against 
governmental tyranny. 
After the ratification of the Constitution, the people would engage in the 
democratic experience through the ability to choose their representatives. According to 
The Federalists Papers, elections were the fundamental characteristic of representation, and 
representation was the fundamental characteristic of the republic.75 Rather than rely on a 
form of direct democracy, the republic would demand representatives “assemble and 
administer” government for the people throughout the country; the republic would 
feature representatives who would provide a “substitute for a meeting of the citizens in 
person.” 76In Federalist #57, Madison argues that in order for the Republic to succeed, the 
people would need to select rulers who would, possess the “most wisdom to discern, and 
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the 
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their 
public trust.” 77  
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In order for the elections to work properly, certain institutional factors would be 
necessary to ensure the health and vitality of the republic. First, to ensure the 
responsibility and quality of the representative and, hence, representation, the people 
would need to limit the term of appointments.78 Second, while the representatives would 
refine the opinions of the people, representatives need to possess common interests with 
the people; they need “immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the 
people.”79 Third, since the House of Representatives would be the branch of government 
devoted to the people and would control the “purse” of the country, it would be necessary 
to create a system of legislative supremacy to ensure a government of the people; however, 
a system of checks and balances between branches would be required to provide a remedy 
for unchecked power.80 Fourth, the safety of the republic and the control of the republic 
by the people would develop through short-legislative appointments and frequent 
elections, which would reinforce the dependence of the representative to his/her 
constituency.81 Frequent elections would provide relief for tyranny and accountability. 
Even though a politician may possess ambition, the electoral process would check that 
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ambition and force him/her to respond to the public. Fifth, to control factions, the 
republic would need to be large in scope, which would create competition by increasing 
the number of interests in society, increasing the number of voters of society, and 
increasing the number of enlightened and impartial statesmen in society.82 According to 
Madison, large electoral districts were ideal because they would produce the most refined 
representative who would listen, reflect, and pursue the diverse opinions in the district, 
and they aid rational discourse in that there will be few representatives deliberating, 
causing reason to prevail over passion.83   
While this discussion focuses on the importance of representation to the health of 
the democratic experience, it fails to consider the ways in which electoral design can 
strategically manipulate the democratic experience. Jean Yarbrough writes that, according 
to the Federalists, representatives were to possess no distinct interests in society, 
depending on the quality of their representation to ensure reelection and employment.84 
Yet, representatives found ways to secure employment without depending on the votes of 
the people by manipulating the lines of electoral districts to ensure a favorable 
constituency. By having the elected select the electors, the basic system of self-government 
becomes a system of unrepresentative-government as the elected seek to fulfill their wishes 
rather than the wishes of those in their districts. 
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As a process, redistricting emerges similarly to William H. Riker’s concept of 
heresthetics. In redistricting, the ability to “define the situation” or “define the district” 
serves as a way in which those in control of the redistricting process attempt to create the 
most desirable result by ensuring that the terms of an election will be the terms that the 
majority of the people accept.85 Rather than risk an election in a competitive district, 
redistricting plans attempt to maximize safe districts while minimizing competitive or 
oppositional districts. By relying on the perceived social wisdom within a community and 
strategically placing voters within a district, elected officials decrease a candidate’s need to 
persuade voters to support causes and diminishes potential debate with political 
opponents over controversial issues affecting the lives of citizens.  
 Done well, at least through the eyes’ of politicians, a good redistricting map 
represents an argumentative fallacy within a political institution whereby the lines on a 
map diminish, if not cut-off, the need for citizens to engage one another in debate over 
the direction of the community since the winner of an electoral decision is known by the 
citizens and the political parties before the election. Though citizens still vote, the chance 
that the vote, especially favoring a candidate expected to lose, possesses meaning to swing 
an election decreases in a gerrymandered district. While the terms of any election will be 
fought over the beliefs and communal wisdom of the majority within a district, the effect 
of a political debate between political factions decreases and the ability of the losing 
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citizens to elect a candidate of choice deceases as well. With a well-planned redistricting 
map, elections, and the debate thought necessary to develop a beneficial electoral process 
in our constitutional republic, diminishes the necessity of some elections though not all 
redistricting plans will be completely successful.  
Representation and Communication: Redis tr ict ing as  a Heresthetical Strategy  
 In terms of heresthetics, redistricting is a communicative strategy through which 
state legislators seek to alter representation at the local, state, and, possibly, national level 
if one party can win enough states. The purpose of redistricting is twofold:  first, 
representatives and political parties desire to gain the maximum amount of security for 
politicians and parties by establishing safe districts; second, legislators create redistricting 
plans to gain the maximum amount of seats in a state.86 Of course, in the redistricting 
process, these may be competing goals. As legislators devise plans to gain additional seats 
in a state, they risk the total number of safe seats and, consequently, the legislators may 
develop competitive races. Furthermore, to achieve the maximum amount of security for a 
party, the party must control the state legislature and the governor’s office. If one party 
controls both the House and the governorship, then that party will benefit as it sees fit; if 
one party controls the House but faces a governor’s veto, then the party will need to 
compromise with the other party.87 Furthermore, the incumbents may benefit more from 
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a partisan bias, or single party control over the redistricting process, rather than a bi-
partisan bias.88 If two parties create a bi-party redistricting plan, then the goal of the plan is 
to protect incumbents for both parties. This will reduce the total number of competitive 
races in the state as well as diminish the number of new seats anyone party can pick up.   
Additionally, studies suggest that the partisan construction of the Court will alter whether 
or not redistricting plans are constitutional or unconstitutional.89   
 While the purpose of a redistricting plan seems straightforward, the consequences, 
especially in regards to political deliberation, are anything but straightforward. First, the 
redistricting process may create an “eye for an eye” political strategy for all political issues 
and future redistricting plans, weakening the trust necessary for deliberation.90 In the 
process of redistricting, legislative activity may stop while legislators compromise about 
neighborhood boundaries; if the major parties are feuding over boundary lines, then the 
parties may poison the political well for all political issues or for future acts of redistricting 
whereby one party seeks revenge on another.91 For example, in the Texas redistricting plan 
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of 2003, Republicans argued that they were only doing to the Democrats what the 
Democrats did to the Republicans in the 1990’s. The Republicans argued that when the 
Democrats possessed control of the redistricting process in the 1990’s, the Democrats 
created district lines to entrench their power even though they were not the dominant 
power in the state.  
Second, state legislators attempt to employ a districting plan to develop 
deliberative legitimacy by creating an apparent “natural” majority. By redrawing the lines, 
a political group can maximize its power at the state and federal level, even if the party 
creates artificial majorities that may not reflect the demographics of the population, as was 
the case in the “original” gerrymandering of Massachusetts back in 1812 when the 
Federalists polled 51,766 and the Democrats polled 50,164, resulting in an outcome of 
twenty-nine Democrats representatives and eleven Federalists representative in the state 
senate.92 In the 1990 redistricting in Texas, Republicans argued the Democrats were no 
longer the majority party and did not deserve the amount of seats they redrew for 
themselves. Here the Democrats entrenched themselves into power while not reflecting 
the “will of the people.” This argument assumes that a “majority” is discernable, it 
possesses similar interests, and it is shut out of the political process. Furthermore, it 
neglects the individual characteristics of candidates and issues, and neglects other 
contextual factors such as money or scandals.  
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Third, redistricting threatens democratic accountability and diminishes 
deliberative means to achieve accountability. One alarming trends in elections is 
incumbent retention. Currently, over 98% over incumbents retain their seats in Congress, 
which may defy James Madison’s belief that frequent elections would ensure that the 
House of Representatives would share the interests of the people and that the House 
would be the “numerous and changeable body.”93 While this country still holds frequent 
elections, it remains to be seen if politicians still share the same interests with the 
American people since they reside in “safe districts” of their choosing. When politicians 
create “safe” districts, they weaken competition in a state and develop an incumbency 
advantage.94 These safe districts may threaten a core tenet of democratic legitimacy, 
“accountability to shifting voter preference,” since legislators reduce the competitiveness 
of elections, which reduces the accountability politicians, have to voters.95 Furthermore, if 
a lack of competition exists, the representatives may no longer be accountable to the 
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people but rather to the special interests groups and lobbyists; as a result.96 Furthermore, if 
one party controls the redistricting process and possesses enough votes locally and 
nationally, then there is no need for party cooperation or compromise.97  
Fourth, redistricting may lead to the under-representation of ethnic minorities, 
which diminishes the effectiveness of the political process and excludes voices from the 
political process.98 Ethnic groups closely examine the census figures to ensure that they 
receive fair representation according to their size of population.  Since most non-white 
immigrants tend to live in overcrowded urban areas where census workers may not be able 
to gauge accurately the size of the population accurately, certain ethnic groups may receive 
less representation. Furthermore, redistricting plans may not be proportional to the 
population of the State. If a proportional representation system were adopted, then 
constituencies that would lose election in a single-member district based on a geographical 
system of voting would gain voice and representation.99 Because they possess the ability to 
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create geographical districts in an arbitrary fashion, state legislators can divide and 
submerge the voice of political minorities, diminishing the full range of democracy. 
Consequently, if minorities do not possess a legislative voice, they will be unable to 
persuade the legislators to adopt necessary political reforms they desire because the voices 
of the political majority will drawn out the political minority.  
Fifth, redistricting practices alters the quantity and quality of voices in public 
deliberation. Redistricting may lead to the decrease in voter turnout since voters will not 
vote if their votes will not count. In addition, since there are fewer competitive seats then 
the focus of the race turns from election day to primary day, and as a result, there is the 
election of candidates who are more extreme in their views. According to Representative 
Jim Leach, (R-IA), “In House politics, if your district is solidly one party, your only 
challenge is from within that party, so you have every incentive for staying to the more 
extreme side of your party. If you are a Republican in an all-Republican district, there is 
no reason to move to the center. You want to protect your base.”100 Primaries are a means 
by which ideologically driven voters choose who will run for office and sit in the “safe 
district.” However, only a few eligible voters participate in this process. Since the 
candidate that runs for a safe-seat does not need to possess a wide-spread appeal among all 
voters, the candidates can continue to show the characteristics that allowed him/her to 
win the primary, and have no responsibility to voters in the district that do not share the 
interests of the primary voters.  
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 Of course, while some scholars argue that the consequences to the redistricting 
process threaten democracy accountability and the republic, competing studies show that 
the redistricting process is not as powerful as critics suggest as other contextual factors 
prevent the desired outcome of a redistricting plan. First of all, in the process of creating 
“safe districts,” politicians may thin out their advantage and create potentially competitive 
seats. According to Bruce E. Cain, when planning a redistricting, a party must examine 
the number of seats it possesses and the number of seats it thinks it can achieve without 
hurting the party in the future; the advancement of one representative in the state may 
ultimately hurt the party.101  In this sense, redistricting is a self-regulating or self-limiting 
enterprise by which a party can only gain so much of an advantage. Of course, Cain’s work 
appears before the widespread introduction of technology that enables politicians to 
redistrict with pinpoint accuracy. According to Nathanial Persily, computer software 
allows representatives to use census data along with data such as party registration, voting 
patterns, property-tax records, roads, railways, and old-district lines to create districts that 
will still follow Supreme Court rules in redistricting; now, the technological means makes 
partisan redistricting too powerful and diminished the self-regulating aspects of 
redistricting.102 
Second, and closely related, a partisan bias may develop as parties try to strengthen 
their position and incumbency with a state. However, the advantage a party tries to 
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achieve in a state rests on multiple factors, such as control of the state legislature, control 
of the governorship, which possesses the power to veto a plan if the governor is not a 
member of the party, political compromises in the redistricting process, court involvement 
in the plan, court-ordered redistricting tests, and the voter’s allegiance to incumbents.103 In 
effect, any one redistricting plan will not have effect nationally. In order for national 
politics to alter, multiple redistricting plans need to occur in the favor one party and those 
challenges must stand up against judicial scrutiny. While one party may redistrict in a state 
and gain power for that party locally, the party may not be able to win control 
nationally.104  
Third, the long-tem consequences of redistricting are uncertain. For a powerful 
gerrymander to occur, voters need to act in a predictable manner that would almost 
violate their agency as voters. Since party identification is not as high as it once was, it may 
be hard to predict whether a change in district lines will lead to a change in partisan 
composition.105 In addition to the Court rules that legislators must follow in the 
redistricting process, state legislators must create a plan leading to the “greater haul of 
seats” and voters must then behave at the polls according to that plan, regardless of the 
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quality of the candidates whom are running.106 Of course, as States face population 
changes and as parties face political corruption, then these plans may not yield the 
expected outcomes. For example, during the 1970’s, Republicans in New York redistricted 
the state to try to gain control of the State. However, the Republicans received partisan 
backlash after President Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal and, as a result, the 
Democrats gained back control of both Houses in the State of New York.107  
Fourth, scholars question whether or not redistricting makes a difference either at 
the local or national level. Redistricting may make a difference depending on the election 
examined, the state or district examined, whether or not state returns should be examined 
according to national returns, and the terms used in the analysis. For example, in Peverill 
Squires’ studies of redistricting plans during the 1970’s, Squire finds that parties that 
controlled the redistricting process won 74% of the election seats whose districts’ lines 
were drawn to achieve an advantage; however, the “advantaged parties did not gain more 
seats than they held before redistricting nor win more than the percentage of seats to 
which the vote would entitle them. Any advantages to these parties appear to have been 
washed out over the 10 years examined.”108 This study is similar to others that show that 
partisan control of a redistricting process tends to wash out over the during of the 
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redistricting plan and that the partisan control of redistricting may not lead to 
congressional control of districts.109  
Fifth, according to Mark E. Rush, redistricting, especially partisan redistricting, 
does not make a difference. First of all, Rush argues that previous studies on redistricting 
are flawed since they are riddled with internal contradictions and inconsistencies that are 
nurtured by the flaws in the prevailing paradigm of political science analysis.”110 Second, 
Rush argues that determining political gerrymandering is difficult since denial of partisan 
representation needs an identifiable group with discernible interests; however, this 
identifiable group is difficult to define when party affiliation is not always clear, when 
party affiliation is on the decline and when staunch party constituencies, in 
neighborhoods, states, or towns may not exist.111 Furthermore, other factors may be 
involved in the election process, such as candidate funding or candidate desirability. 
Similarly, lost in the debate over redistricting are other factors which would determine 
races such as returns from the national elections, scandals with politicians (either in the 
white house or with the party), the quality of the candidate, the state of the economy, 
                                                
109 Peverill Squire, “Results of Partisan Redistricting in Seven U.S. States During the 1970s,” 264; See also 
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issues of the election, and the individual preference of party and candidate.112 Rush claims 
that partisan redistricting claims may be viable if the following conditions are 
ascertainable: (1) there is an identifiable party cohesion in a given area; (2) the group is 
cohesive and the “group’s size and representational entitlement are measurable;” and (3) 
“the voters are party voters. That is, a Democratic vote in one district will be a Democratic 
vote in another, regardless of the candidates, and party votes in one part of a state are 
equitable with party votes in other parts.”113 However, as of now, measures of partisan 
fairness by measuring seats-vote ration and swing ratios are “grounded on inaccurate 
assumptions about partisan behavior and are, therefore, of little practical use.”114  
Finally, redistricting may lead to representational responsiveness as incumbents try 
to both retain their seats and increase party support, meaning incumbents will lose some 
security in order to gain party dominance.115 In the first election after redistricting, there is 
a great deal of uncertainty. With this uncertainty, representatives try to maximize their 
advantage as they create districts with smaller likely victory margins.116 In order to seek out 
votes, politicians will need to reach out to new voters in these districts, especially to voters 
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who voted for other representatives in the past or to voters that voted for politicians in 
another party. As the margins of victory become smaller and smaller, candidates will need 
to be responsive to the people and the needs of the people to ensure election.   
The literature on redistricting suggests that, as a heresthetical strategy, redistricting 
attempts to procure a specific electoral result though the attempt may not always lead to 
the desired result. The attempt, and especially the success, of districting alters the way in 
which citizens engage in public deliberation and experience democracy. While some 
scholars argue that the effects of redistricting are not as severe and disappear over time, 
the volume of research, as well as evidence from the Supreme Court decisions, suggest 
there are dire consequences at stake, especially in regards to the constitution of the 
democratic experience.   
Visions of Democracy: The Supreme Court, Constitutive  Rhetor ic and the 
Reapportionment Puzzle   
Constitutive rhetoric focuses on the moments of historical crisis. In times of crisis, 
as James Boyd White suggests, words lose their meaning. When this occurs, individual 
actors reshape the lost view of language in light of the historical crisis to develop a new 
language, which in turn, develops a new conception of the social world. In terms of the 
Supreme Court and representation, the judiciary faces a historical crisis of the meaning of 
representation and democracy, hears oral arguments, and responds by writing judicial 
opinions, which reconciles older and newer meanings of representation and democracy.117 
                                                
117 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning, 3 – 4.  
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Since the Supreme Court’s initial refusal to decide a reapportionment case in Richardson v. 
McChessney, 218 U.S. 487 (1910) to its most recent decision in L.U.P.A.C., the Justices on 
the Supreme Court have possessed the ability to decide whether or not to rule on an 
apportionment or redistricting case, who does or does not possess the ability to challenges 
cases, whose vote should or should not count in an election, whether or not an elections 
should adhere to political equality and political fairness, whether or not the states possess 
the discretionary ability to limit the representation of the people, and to what degree 
partisan or racial characteristics can dominate the apportionment and districting process. 
The balance of these questions concerns the meaning of the democratic experience and, 
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson, the Justices have been able to shape the 
meaning of this democratic experience.  
The history of voting in the United States concerns the political struggle to 
contract and expand the right to vote for citizens in society. The Supreme Court’s voting 
rights jurisprudence is no different.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
reapportionment and redistricting cases concern the constitution, and the negotiation, of 
the meaning of the democratic experience for the American polity. From a communicative 
standpoint, the act of constituting democracy is important to study for two reasons. First, 
the dissertation explores the linguistic constitution of democracy through the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. In the apportionment and districting decisions, the Justices on the 
Supreme Court debate the meaning of democracy through their own ideological 
perspective, which alters the way in which citizens can participate in self-government. This 
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dissertation examines how the justice intellectual grapple with the meaning of democracy 
and attempt to persuade others that their view is the best vision for the American people. 
Second, this dissertation examines the ways in which political institutions, such as 
electoral districts, state legislators, political parties, and the Supreme Court, enhance and 
constrain the way in which citizens can engage in political deliberation. Throughout the 
apportionment and districting decisions, the Justices on the Supreme Court invented its 
own authority to expand the electorate or allow the state legislators to employ rationality 
to pursue legitimate interests. Consequently, the discretion of the Supreme Court justices 
allow for the development of a constitutional republic or a constitutional democracy, 
legislative discretion or political equality, political equality or political fairness, an 
individual right to vote or a group right to vote, and racial reconciliation on the basis of 
the individual or racial reconciliation on the basis of political equality for groups. Further, 
the Justices on the Supreme Court must examine these issues and develop an ethos of 
judicial restraint where the judiciary protects the constitutional rights of citizens to engage 
in the political process but allow state legislators to follow their constitutional 
responsibility in creating voting requirements.  
In order to proceed with this analysis, I shall focus on the following topoi by James 
Boyd White in When Words Lose Their Meaning, which I adapt for this topic.118 First, how 
does the Supreme Court depict the social world, especially in terms of the practice and 
concept of representation? Second, how do competing opinions in the decisions present 
                                                
118 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning, 10 – 12; James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination, xii.  
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different languages of representation and competing ideologies behind representation? 
Third, how does the Supreme Court constitute political institutions responsible for the 
enactment of representation? Fourth, what forms and methods of reasoning are held to be 
valid in the judicial opinion?  
Chapter II examines the history of redistricting form a legal and political 
standpoint. First, it shows how pervasive redistricting as a heresthetical strategy has been 
in the United States since Colonial times. Second, it examines the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence as a rhetorical tradition. The Supreme Court first hears an apportionment 
case in the 1910 case of Richdson v. McChessney and refuses to decide the case because of 
the “political questions’ doctrine. By the time of its decision in Colegrove v. Green, 
dissenters to the Supreme Court’s decisions rely on empirical evidence to diminish the 
credibility of the Supreme Court’s rhetorical tradition, allowing for the development of a 
new rhetorical tradition that the Supreme Court would adopt in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.  
Chapter III examines the invention of judicial authority to hear reapportionment 
decisions in Baker v. Carr. In Baker, a plurality of the Justices seek to reclaim legitimacy in 
the political process on behalf of “the people” by redefining the scope of judicial power in 
the “political questions” doctrine and redefining the meaning of the right to vote. Further, 
because of the Supreme Court’s definition arguments, the Supreme Court justices reshape 
the meaning of the law on which our political institutions rest.  Rather than focus on the 
formalistic rules of the laws, the opinion by Justice Brennan argues that the law must 
follow the experiences of the people.  
 49 
Chapter IV discusses the Supreme Court’s enactment of the democratic 
experience under the U.S. Constitution. In reapportionment decisions after Baker, a 
majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court institutionalize the ideology of political 
equality to enhance the ability of citizens to participate in self-government. In the process, 
the Justices engage in a debate over the extent of political equality should exist at the local, 
state, and federal level, especially in relation to the practical considerations of its 
implementation and the discretionary power of the state legislators to conduct 
reapportionment and redistricting.  
In Chapter V, I examine the turn from political equality to political fairness as the 
basis of the reapportionment and redistricting decisions during the Court’s decisions in 
the 1970s and 1980s. After the implementation of political equality as the guiding 
ideology of reapportionment, the Justices on the High Court engage in a debate over 
interpretive dominance: which vision of representation and which vision of democracy 
should guide the reapportionment process. On one side of the divide, the Conservative 
Justices define political fairness in terms of the ability of state legislators to conduct 
representation and define representation as authorization, leading the constitution of an 
individual right that privileges state legislators. Further, the Conservative Justices envision 
a political process that protects a majoritarian conception of democracy and an elite 
conception of democracy. Conversely, for the Liberal Justices, political fairness concerns 
the enactment of representation in terms of a group right to vote and the cultivation of 
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communities of interest. In this vision of representation, groups must possess the ability to 
compete in the political process and the judiciary must act to protect that right.  
Finally, Chapter VI examines the Supreme Court’s decisions during the 1990s and 
the 2000s. During this era of reapportionment and redistricting jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court Justices debate one another over the best means to achieve racial 
reconciliation through redistricting. Similar to the decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Justices divide themselves on this question according to their political equality. The 
Conservative Justices desire the attainment of racial reconciliation by treating citizens as 
individuals rather than as members of racial or ethnic communities. To preserve this 
ideology of representation, some of the Supreme Court Justices seek to alter the 
constitution to incorporate a substantive right of color-blindness, especially in the 
reapportionment process. Conversely, the Liberal Justices advance an ideology of 
reconciliation that argues reconciliation between competing ethnic and racial groups can 
exist only of the divergent groups possess political equality. If groups possess political 
equality, reconciliation may occur though it may not be necessary to occur in a pluralistic 
democracy.  
Before turning to Chapter II, it is important to note that there are a few 
limitations with this project. First, this dissertation covers only one aspect of the 
democratic experience for the American people. It does not include the way in which 
politicians run campaigns or the way in which the American people perceive campaigns. 
Unfortunately, other aspects of the American democracy, such as campaign finance or the 
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quality of campaigns or candidates, which alter our perceptions of the political process, 
can not be discussed in this dissertation. Second, the work examines the vision of 
American democracy through multiple Supreme Court Justices over a ninety year period. 
Our understanding of the democratic experience varies with the Justices’ conception of 
American democracy. One of the most important choices the Chief Justice or senior 
Associate Justice can make in terms of the development of the American democracy is 
through the selection of who will write the judicial opinion. One Justice is not responsible 
for the American democracy. Instead, the democratic experience develops through 
competing facts and an amalgamation of vision about what democracy means. Even the 
same Justice over a period of time can alter their own perception of what democracy and 
political deliberation means as Justice Thomas C. Clarke and Justice Anthony Kennedy 
did during their tenure on the Supreme Court.  
Throughout the Supreme Court’s reapportionment and redistricting decisions, the 
Justices engage one another over the meaning of the democratic experience that sustains 
the American polity. This work traces the development of American democracy through 
the decisions of the Supreme Court. By connecting the fields of public address and 
political theory, the goal of the dissertation is to understand and strengthen the 
democratic experience for political groups within society. As Whitman writes, “the greatest 
lessons of Nature through the universe are perhaps the lessons of variety and freedom, the 
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same present the greatest lessons also in the New World politics and progress.”119 The 
strength of American democracy rests with the expansion of the democratic experience to 
citizens and groups. This work examines the expansion of that experience as well as the 
threats to that experience with the hope that the democratic experience will find new ways 
to expand and progress. 
                                                
119 Walt Whitman, “Democratic Vistas,” Whitman: Poetry and Prose, (New York: Library of America College 
Edition, 1996), 953. 
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CHAPTER II 
PARTISAN REDISTRICTING AND THE INCONGRUITY OF THE “POLITICAL 
QUESTIONS” DOCTRINE IN PRE-REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION CASES 
In the Supreme Court decision of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), Chief 
Justice John Marshall provides the first attempt to establish the legal authority of the 
judiciary and to differentiate the power of the judiciary from the powers of the political 
bodies.1  Since the Congress repeatedly failed to demarcate the power of the judiciary, the 
voice of Chief Justice Marshall constitutes the ethos of the judiciary as the independent 
voice of the nation: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must 
decide on the operation of each”2 As James Boyd White states in When Words Lose Their 
Meaning, the words of Chief Justice Marshall offers the American people a branch of 
government like no other, “the development over time, of a self-reflective, self-correcting 
body of discourse that will bind its audience together by engaging them in a common 
                                                
1 Chief Justice John Marshall’s view of judicial review was not a revelation on the power of the Court. 
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the delegates interpreted the Court’s power in many 
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would decide the legality of the laws. When discussing James Madison’s Reversionary Council, John Francis 
Mercer “disproved of the Doctrine that the Judges [act] as expositors of the Constitution” and that they 
“should have the authority to declare a law void,” (462). Gouverneur [sic] Morris feared the encroachment 
by the judiciary on the popular branch of government (463). While John Dickinson believed the Courts 
possessed not the power to set aside law, he knew of no other substitute. Further, Roger Sherman 
disapproved of the mixture of judges, parties, and politics. When the First Congress discussed the Bill of 
Rights instead of the power of the judiciary, the political bodies missed another opportunity to demarcate 
the power of the legislative bodies and the power of the judiciary. 
 
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
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language and a culture.”3 Yet, even though the Chief Justice sought to establish the 
necessary ethos to decide cases and controversies, White argues that Marshall establishes 
this authority in the name of the people and, if the people desire to revoke the voice of the 
Supreme Court, they possess the ability though they would the voice of self-correction and 
the branch of government which provides it.   
The creation of judiciary’s independent voice relies upon the distinction between 
that which is political and that which is legal. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall writes 
that if legal controversies acts were to be examinable in a court of justice, the judiciary 
must find a principle to guide the Courts “in the exercise of jurisdiction.” When 
discussing the appointment of William Marbury, Marhsall states that, constitutionally, the 
president “is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he 
is to use his own discretion and is accountable only to his country in his political 
character, and to his own conscience.”4 Further, Marshall writes that, except for elections, 
there is no way to control the use of discretionary power since these subjects are political: 
“they respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the 
decision of the executive is conclusive,” though there is a limit to this discretion as the 
elected official cannot, “at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.”5 Marshall 
states that the conclusion to this dilemma is:  
                                                
3 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, 
and Community, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 251.  
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That where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the 
executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in 
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be 
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where 
a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the 
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers 
himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.6 
The judicial conceptualization of a political question refers to the authority of elected 
officials to employ the explicit powers from the Constitution. Yet, that discretionary 
powers exist unchecked by the judiciary until it violates the Constitutional rights of 
citizens. When a conflict exists between the government and the citizens Constitutional 
rights, Chief Justice Marshall declares that the judiciary stands as the final arbiter of the 
constitution, discerning whether a legal right is at stake and the impact of the law on those 
rights. Channeling the authority of distinguished jurist William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, Marshall states that the focus of the judiciary is to provide a remedy 
“whenever [a] rights is invaded…. The government of the United States has been 
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to 
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested 
legal right.”7 To achieve farness, the law must apply equally to all, the laws must protect 
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the rights of the people, and the judiciary carries the weight with discerning the violation 
of rights and the enforcing the protection of those rights. 
 The original distinction between a political question and judicial questions 
balances the ability of political bodies to perform their duties and the ability of the 
judiciary to protect the rights of citizens from being infringed upon by politicians. If 
citizens object to the discretionary power of the political bodies, then they need to enact 
change through elections or pursue protection through the courts. If the politician uses 
discretionary power wisely, then they remain in office; if the politician uses discretionary 
power foolishly, then the people should revoke the politicians from office. Additionally, 
the judicial ethos of guardian offers the citizens a venue for remedy if the political 
branches become unaccountable to the people, reinforcing Constitutional principle of 
checks and balances. It is through the role of guardian of the people that the judiciary, 
especially the Supreme Court, protects the political process when partisan forces prevent 
the people from proclaiming their voice as true sovereigns. The effects of this process may 
be seen best when the judiciary fails to maintain its ethos as a guardian of the rights of the 
people as it did in the early reapportionment decisions.  
In order to examine the crisis in representation I will, first, discuss political 
apportionment as a heresthetical tool whereby representatives alter electoral boundaries to 
ensure a desired result through an election. To examine this concept, I will explore 
redistricting techniques from the early colonies until the political to show how political 
parties employed their discretionary power to alter the institutional aspects of elections, 
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such as the manipulation of district boundaries and population requirements within 
states, to preserve the protection of their interests at the expense of the citizen. By doing 
this, I highlight the overwhelming desire of political actors to create districts by which 
their motives for partisan gain exceed their desires for equal representation for citizens. 
Further, this chapter foreshadows the challenges in front of the judiciary as it searches for 
judicial standards that balance the political process with fair representation. 
Second, I will discuss the development of apportionment and districting decisions, 
as well as the “political questions” doctrine, as a rhetorical tradition, providing state 
legislators the federal judiciary with legal guidelines to create districting maps and discern 
judicial challenges. This section argues that the competing positions at the state and 
federal level provide an exigence that needs universal response by the Supreme Court. 
While lower courts establish equal representation in one state, the need for this to develop 
in all states, especially for Congressional representation, becomes an imperative that the 
Court cannot overlook. 
Third, this chapter examines the pre-Reapportionemnt Revolution cases. In these 
cases, the contradiction of the Supreme Court’s argument allows the dissenters to  create 
discursive space for a new rhetorical tradition governing apportionment and redistricting, 
challenging the “political question” doctrine. As the Supreme Court hears cases, provides 
answers to some reapportionment questions but refuses to engage fully in 
reapportionment, it diminishes the power of the “political question” doctrine, especially 
as it relates to the separation of power. As the power of the “political question” 
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diminishes, the dissenters of the Supreme Court’s opinion, circa 1947, provides the 
authority by which the Supreme Court, circa 1962, can decide reapportionment cases.  
 Redis tr icting in the Colonies and the Early Republic 
 In the United States, redistricting combines competing visions and traditions of 
the political process, with competing values of equality, liberty, and fairness, and the 
competing conceptions of the role of the judiciary and state legislators and the 
constitutional rights of citizens. Politically, elected officials relied upon redistricting to 
balance, or in some cases overbalance, political and material interests in opposition to the 
establishment of political quality for individuals or between competing factions. 8 Before 
the ratification of the United States Constitution, political bodies employed redistricting 
to balance interests and achieve partisan ends regardless of protecting political boundaries 
or political communities. For example, the first known partisan redistricting in colonial 
times occurred in Pennsylvania at beginning of the 18th century when a rivalry developed 
between the growing cities and the rural counties. In order to retain their power, the rural 
counties of Bucks, Chester, and Philadelphia received the same representation as the city 
of Philadelphia though the population of the urban area increased beyond that of the 
rural area due to immigration.9 It was not until 1771 that the smaller, rural counties 
relinquished their hold on power and Philadelphia increased its representation. In New 
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political advantage and ensure political victory prior to elections. 
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York, governors would refuse to establish new election districts if the governor believed 
those districts would not support his policies.10 In North Carolina, governors divided 
precincts, which had been established though law, to suit their own political ends. In 
1732, one governor altered old precincts and created new precincts, even if those precincts 
contained 30 families, to ensure that legislation would pass through the legislative branch   
In Georgia, as soon as the colony was established, the governor created districts in an 
arbitrary manner to aid his preferred faction in the legislative body and ensure that his 
desired legislation would pass without fail.11  
Even after colonists fought the American Revolution to ensure fair representation 
and the ratification of the Constitution preserved a system of checks and balances, 
legislative bodies employed districting plans to secure partisan advantages. In Virginia, 
Patrick Henry attempted an act of partisan redistricting to ensure the electoral defeat of 
his political rival, James Madison. When creating the electoral district, Patrick Henry 
examined the results of the Virginia Ratification, determined which counties opposed the 
new constitution and then created a district filled predominantly with anti-Federalists in 
which Madison needed to run because of residency requirements.12 In an act of political 
pragmatism, Madison secured his election through a campaign pledge to introduce and 
support a Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution, nullifying Henry’s attempt at 
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political redistricting. In New Jersey, Federalists supported a 1798 apportionment bill that 
diminished the power of Republicans in such a manner that a Republican state elected a 
majority of Federalists.13 In 1802, the voters of Pennsylvania elected all Democrats to 
office, even though one-third of the state declared themselves to be Federalists.14 Almost 
immediately after the ratification of the Constitution, politicians in New York created 
districts to minimize the strength of the anti-Federalists in 1801, 1802, 1808, and 1809.15  
The Gerrymander of 1812 
While elected officials throughout the colonies and early republic employed 
redistricting to serve political ends and avoid debate, the legacy, and ultimate triumph or 
tragedy of the savagery of this political strategy within the electoral process, occurred 
under the Supervision of Elbridge Gerry in Massachusetts for the 1812 elections and 
provides the representative anecdotes for all later redistricting successes or failures. The 
elections and the redistricting plan occurred at a time of great party agitation and strife in 
the New England region of the United States. The plan developed by the state 
Republicans, and signed into by the Governor Gerry, exacerbated those partisan tensions 
and reduced the need and desire for the Federalists and Republicans to reach consensus 
on the type of economy, commercial or agrarian, and the desired foreign alliances, Great 
Britain or France, necessary to sustain the Republic. With the heightened partisan 
tension, the parties exacerbated this tension as they declared the fight between Federalist 
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and Republicans as the fight between good and evil. Politicians and citizens were no 
longer constituted as citizens of a state, but conceived as agents in a Manichean struggle 
for authority. Elections were no longer elections, but epic struggles of war and without 
drastic redistricting measures, no defeat of the enemy could materialize. Even before the 
Elections of 1811, both parties knew that the result of those elections would provide the 
power to reconstitute the State of Massachusetts and the Congress of the United States in 
its own image. Ten months before the Republicans enacted the redistricting plan, the 
Federalist’s paper, the Columbian Centinel, described a “secret plan” to form districts, 
which will “give a perpetual preponderance to the democratic interest,” and will “defy all 
principle usage, for the sake of consolidating their plan of a complete and lasting 
possession of the power of the State.” 16 Redistricting concerned more than just the 
interests of the party or the state; it provided a psychological, and almost pathological, 
advantage of worth that reinforced character, attitudes, and beliefs, especially for the 
Republicans, who at the same, believed that they lived in an area of Federalist “elitism” in 
Massachusetts. 
One of the most egregious acts of districting developed in Essex County—the basis 
of the Gerrymander map. Under the traditional districting plan, the County of Essex 
correlated to five senators—all of whom would have been Federalists; however, since the 
Republicans created districts by uniting and dividing counties, the Republicans sliced and 
diced Essex into two separate district, and in the election of 1812, the people elected three 
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Republican Senators and two Federalist senators. 17 The term “gerrymander” entered the 
public vernacular in March of 1812 with The Boston Gazette’s publication a political 
cartoon titled, “Gerrymander: A New Species of Monster,” in response to the newly 
enacted senatorial districts in Massachusetts. After viewing the new redistricting map, one 
commentator noticed that one of the districts appeared to be the in the shape of a 
Salamander, to which a Federalist newspaper editor replied: “"Salamander! Call it a 
Gerrymander." The Boston Gazette developed a then published a political cartoon, which 
featured the odd-shaped district in the form of a salamander, complete with a head, wings, 
and talons. In addition, the left side or west side of the district possess a caricature of 
Elbridge Gerry. Four days after the Boston Gazette published the photo, the paper printed 
a clarification on the likeness of Gerry. This article stated that though “some good 
democrats have gone so far as to say that Mr. Gerry never did look so frightfully ugly, and 
that it is unfair to draw such a picture of him—we were willing to correct the 
misrepresentations of mistaken honesty but now declare that the Gerrymander is not 
intended as a personal insult upon the Governor but represents by exact lines and 
boundaries the new district in the Country of Essex.”18  
In one single act, the paper’s cartoon created both an ad personam against 
Governor Gerry and provided the Republic with a new criterion by which citizens judge 
redistricting. By highlighting the “deviations,” whether exaggerated or not, in the electoral 
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18 “The Gerrymander Explained,” Boston Gazette, 10 March 1812 Vol. 36 Issue 28 p 2.  
 
 63 
boundaries, the Federalists attacked the irrationality of the plan and the invidious 
discrimination that a political party used against citizens of Massachusetts. The visual 
argument provided a powerful argument to vote the Republicans out of office, if possible, 
since, as the Federalists claimed, the party threatened the basic civil liberties as it denied 
citizens the right to vote.  
In addition to employing the visual argument, when attempting to oppose the 
plan, the Federalists invented a rhetorical repertoire of six arguments to fight the 
redistricting plan that other elected officials would rely upon long after the consequences 
of the 1812 plan disappeared. By employing these arguments, the Federalists attempted to 
convince the voters of Massachusetts that the “unjust” redistricting effort contradicted the 
American ideals of a just, constitutional government and reinforce the notion that 
partisan politics ought not violate the state Constitution or the ideals and values that 
established the Revolution or the state Constitution.  
First, Federalists argued that certain districts failed to meet the Constitutional 
threshold for a valid district, especially in relation to a fixed conception of political 
equality. During the Senate debate, a Federalist Senator implied that the districts were not 
only unfair to the Federalists but, more importantly, unconstitutional.19 And, while the 
                                                
19 The Constitutional standard for representation was based on tax revenue, where $25.00 equaled one 
Senator. According to The Weekly Messenger on February 21, under the 1811 district standards, the 
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districts would have an assessed value of $93.70, which was $6.30 short of the 4 senator mark, and these 
districts were to be divided into three separate districts, receiving one senator each. One Federalist senator 
then stated that under the proposed districting bill, the district of Berkshire, which was assessed at $41.97, 
would receive two representatives even though it was $8.03 short of the Constitutional standard. See 
“Debates” The Weekly Messenger, 21 February  1812 Vol. 1 Issue 18 p. 1. 
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Federalists lost representation unfairly, the Republicans gained representation unfairly. In 
this case, the Federalists argued on a basis of equality in the form that the republican 
property and republican citizens received more representation than Federalist property 
and citizens. One hundred and fifty one years later, the Supreme Court invented the 
“One Person, One Vote” that provided that equality.  
 Second, the Federalist created arguments that centered on the violation of 
tradition.  In this strategy, the Federalists focused on how the redistricting bill violated the 
“spirit” of the Constitution as the Republicans ignored the use of traditional practice—
using county lines as boarders— and, in the process, split counties and divided neighbors.  
The tragedy of the bill, according to this view, was that it divided political bodies and 
eliminated the “local” from receiving representation. During the Senate debate, Col. Flint 
of Reading proclaimed, “It never before was supposed, that under these words of the 
constitution, districts might be formed in which no regard is to be had to county limits, to 
neighborhoods, or to amount of taxes paid.”20 Another Federalist examined how the 
Republicans attacked this idea of community: 
For what, sir, is a district? Under the present order of things, Heaven only knows 
what it is; but in any other times I think we should all agree in saying a district was 
a tract or territory, comprising towns lying in the vicinage and contiguity of each 
other; whose citizens were, from local situation, necessarily intimate in the duties 
and business and friendships of life; most likely, therefore, to be acquainted with 
                                                
20 “Debates” The Weekly Messenger, 21 February  1812 Vol. 1 Issue 18 p. 1. 
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the character and talents of those, to whom they might delegate public trusts. Now 
sir, a district I suppose should be defined, a project for forcing together people the 
most remote and disconnected from each other, a chart traced by a jack-o-lantern; 
a plan worked out by the course of the wind, the flight of a bird, or the wanderings 
of a maniac. For what else, sir, are the lines which your committee have drawn 
through the state; skipping in one place, crossing in another, running into this 
corner and taking a democratic town, escaping from a federal town there and with 
infinite pains going precisely wrong in almost every instance—twisting along like 
the trackings of a serpent’s course through the county of Worcester, and joining 
together Bristol and Norfolk, in most unholy wedlock, though the friends of both 
counties forbid the bands! 
Historically, in Massachusetts, appeals to community were of high value. In pre-
Revolutionary Massachusetts, juries, and not judges, “decided the law applicable to 
litigated cases…. In a legal system in which juries have the power to find the law, whatever 
disputes arise cannot be resolved by mere majoritarian fiat but must be resolved by a 
process of consensus building that produces legal rules acceptable to a broad base of 
society of a whole.”21 With this reliance on deliberation and consensus, if an individual or 
group were to violate those community standards then the community must punish those 
few. Even though by 1810 the community standards, which were largely imposed through 
an established church, were not as cohesive as they were in the pre-Revolutionary times, 
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1760 – 1830, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 3.  
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the elders of the districting generation relied on this notion of community to resist the 
Republican suggested districts.  
In addition to arguing that the 1812 redistricting act violated traditional notions 
of representation, the Federalists argued that this plan defied the “spirit of the 
Revolution.” In the post-Revolutionary world, Americans believed that the object of law 
was the preservation of liberty and, further, Americans were prepared to struggle against 
any doctrine that “tended to destroy the liberties of the people.”22 By relying on traditional 
violations of liberty, such as “No Taxation without Representation,” Federalists attempted 
to persuade Republicans and voters that redistricting efforts that eliminated actual 
representation and perpetuated economics harm contradiction political norms within 
American culture. According to the The Massachusetts Spy, the Federalists charged that 
Republicans violated the basic tenants of the social compact and public virtue: “When we 
reflect that the grand principle of our social compact, as declared in our Bill of Rights, is 
‘that government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety, and 
prosperity, and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honour [sic], or private 
interest of any one man, family, or class of men,” we are astonished at the boldness of this 
measure.”23 The Weekly Messenger declared that Republicans “consulted no other document 
than the returns of votes for governor” in order to create the districts. 24 And, according to 
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the Federalists, the reason why the Republicans created an unconstitutional act, divided 
communities and neighbors, and disregarded the principles of the revolution, in order for 
the rulers of Massachusetts to “secure power by depriving the people of their rights. This 
monstrous system of usurpation, may be seen… [as a] direct violation of the Constitution, 
and for no other possible preference than to secure the election of two democratic 
senators.”25 
Third, Federalists argued that the redistricting act violated the economic liberties 
of the people to engage in commerce. On one level, the Federalist charged that the 
Republicans altered the Massachusetts vision of liberties, especially in relation to 
commerce, to establish a Jeffersonian vision of the agrarian life. The Columbian Centinel 
declared that the threat to commerce and, hence freedom, occurred through the reign of 
Jefferson and the planters of the South, who “own slaves but no ships.”26 The paper called 
upon the Federalists to prevent Republican redistricting and to save the Union. On a 
second level, the transformation from a commercial life to agrarian life threatened to 
irritate political and economic relations between the United States and Great Britain. 
According to The Weekly Messenger, the redistricting effort crated a “reign of Terror and 
Proscription,” that “drained the Country of Wealth and rendered us less prepared for 
War.”27 Building upon the anxiety of American foreign policy, the Federalist believed that 
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26 “The Voice of Patriotism,” The Columbian Centinel, 27 April 1811 Issue 2023 p1. 
 
27 “To The Free and Independent People of Massachusetts,” The Weekly Messenger, 14 February 1812 Vol. 1 
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the redistricting attempt would not only weaken commerce but to further corrode the  
relationship between the United States and Great Britain to expand a Jeffersonian-Jacobin 
plot the destroy the United States. 
Fourth, the Federalists argued that the Republicans violated the basic principle of 
majority rule and self-government, even though the Republicans won the elections of 
1811, which placed the minority party in position to control the districting process. 
During the Senate debate, Senator Brown of Boston conceded that officials ought to be 
elected into office by the will and opinion of the majority; however, this bill would create 
a false majority for the next ten years and violate norms of proportionality:  
This bill seemed to him to be so formed as to be an attempt to fetter public 
opinions full effect; and to continue this effect for ten years, let what might 
happen in the mean time as to other branches of the government; that is this was 
the design, those to who the public are indebted for this ingenious contrivance 
ought to come out with their reasons that the public may judge of them.28 
If the Republican were unable to “win” elections naturally, they could only obtain victory 
if they manipulated the districts to “win” an artificial majority. Further, the Federalists 
argued that the bill prevented representation as the plan manipulated the true political 
character of the state as it would represent neither the property nor the people of 
Massachusetts.29 Additionally, the redistricting bill would change the nature of 
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government, causing democratic reforms that threatened the ruling elites. According to 
the Columbian Centinel in April of 1811, “We are then to expect that the valuation is also 
to be managed so as to aid the cause of democracy,-- In other words, federal towns are to 
be punished for their political sins, by paying a greater portion of the public burdens than 
their democratic neighbors.”30  
 Finally, while Federalists relied on the topos of majority rules, they employed also 
the “Heads I win, tails you use” strategy.31 As they argued that Massachusetts was a 
Federalist state and, therefore, they should have more representation, they also argued that 
minority rights, especially the minority rights of Federalists, should be protected, though 
historically, it is not clear that the Federalists followed this view with Republicans. One 
common argument by the Federalists focused on the fact that while Jeffersonians insisted 
on the rights of minorities within a county to “enjoy some representation, critics noted 
that no similar solicitude was shown for Federalist minorities.”32 Furthermore, while they 
supported the “will of the majority” they tried to restrict the increase of the voting 
population in the State, calling into question of their definition of a “majority.” 
 In defense of the plan, the Republicans argued that they possessed the authority to 
enact the legislation since they controlled the House, the Senate, and the Governor’s 
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Office. For the Republicans, redistricting presented itself as a legislative act that coincided 
with the normal function of government. The act is neither just nor unjust; it is the “mere 
continuation of politics by other means.”33 One senator from Marblehead seemed content 
with the bill since it reflected a district from 1802.34 A second senator provided a more 
humorous, and literal, defense of the bill: 
Mr. Adams has exhibited to us a map, but he nevertheless seems to be ignorant of 
the nature of lines. When geographers lay down lies, we all know, sir, that such 
lines do not really exist, that gentleman seems to be afraid that he shall not be able 
to get over these lines; but I can assure him, that he will not be stopped by these 
lines—he will not even have to jump his horse over them…I am sure, and I wish 
that gentleman might feel the same confidence that I do of his future ability to get 
to meeting, or to the court-house, as he has been accustomed to do.35  
When making this comment and reducing the debate to the literal, Senator Austin of 
Charleston advanced this idea that the proposed districts would not prevent the Federalist 
Senators from traveling from district to district and, more importantly, from doing their 
jobs—representing the people. Further, he argued that the lines on the map were arbitrary 
and not natural, meaning that the Federalist vision that the Republican vision violated the 
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natural order of representation for Massachusetts was incorrect and the “natural” was as 
arbitrary as this plan. Even though under this bill Republicans would have gained seats 
over the Federalists, there still would be representatives to represent the people and their 
property.  
As a result of the elections, twenty-nine Democratic senators were elected from 
50,164 votes; Eleven Federalists were elected from 51,7666 votes; the Federalist candidate 
for governor, Caleb Strong, received 51,326 votes while the Republican candidate, 
Elbridge Gerry received only 51,321.36 Though the majority of votes in the two elections 
show a Federalist majority in the state, the Republicans seized control of the Senate, 
altering not only the representation at the state level—the representation of the State 
legislature was 429 – 321 in favor of the Federalists—but also at the Federal level since the 
Republicans gained power to elect federal senators.  
After the Republicans enacted the redistricting bill, the Federalists continued their 
assault on the plan and constituted it, in Federalist newspapers, as an attack on “the 
people.” On February 19, 1812, the Massachusetts Spy printed an article that said the rulers 
of Massachusetts engaged themselves in an inquisition in order to project and “secure 
power by depriving the people of their rights. This monstrous system of usurpation, may 
be seen… [as a] direct violation of the Constitution, and for no other possible preference 
than to secure the election of two democratic senators.”37 Another article in the paper, 
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under the heading “‘The Zig-Zag Progress of Democracy, or ‘The Acts of Able’—
Legislatures,’ stated that they [the authors], “can’t but admire” the districting efforts that 
secured power and punished “the incorrigible rebelliousness of the federal county of 
Worcester.”38 The article continued: “All ‘friends of the government’ must allow that this 
was highly proper and necessary; that the people if left to themselves are their own worst 
enemies’ and that the paternal interference of the Legislatures was necessary to secure 
against the mischief they are in danger of doing.”39 A week later, the paper again printed 
an article against the redistricting plan:  
We commence debate on one of the most remarkable measures, that every 
occurred in a free, elected republick [sic]. When we reflect that the grand principle 
of our social compact, as declared in our Bill of Rights, is ‘that government is 
instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety, and prosperity, and 
happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honour [sic], or private interest of 
any one man, family, or class of men,” we are astonished at the boldness of this 
measure. The federalists have said (and have been severely reproaches for doing so) 
that if our republic should be destroyed, it will be done by the violence of 
democracy. The most despondent among us could not have imagined such rapid 
                                                
38 “Worcester,” Massachusetts Spy, 19 February 1812. 
 
39 “Worcester,” Massachusetts Spy, 19 February 1812. 
  
 73 
progress in the career of destruction, as has been seen by ever man since 
Governour [sic] Gerry’s reelection.40 
According to Federalists, in free republics that utilize elections, elections need to secure 
the wishes of the people and not the wishes of the Party. Yet, at the same time, the 
Federalists warned against the danger, violence, and vulgarity of democracy as a form of 
representation, which diminished the party’s call for virtuous restraint in the districting 
proces. The Federalists protested the way in which the Republicans violated the natural 
order of representation in Massachusetts. Consequently, the concern over redistricting in 
1812 focused on the arbitrariness of electoral practices and the ability to protect the right 
to vote for those who identify with your party.  
 While the original Gerrymander was to be seen as the final victory of Republicans 
over the Federalists, the districting lasted one year and, in 1813, the Federalists reclaimed 
control of all three branches of government, allowing the party to create a new electoral 
map. After the death of the first “Gerrymander,” the Boston Gazette, a Federalist 
newspaper, lamented its passing with the following report: 
The Gerrymander expired on Monday last, leaving, we trust, but few mourners to 
lament its loss, and inspiring joy among all the friends of rational liberty and just 
principles of representation. Immediately after its birth, we had the pleasure to 
present its likeness to the public, together with an account of its genealogy and its 
relationship to Gov. Gerry. Its monstrous deformity bearing no small resemblance 
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to the political creation of its parent, had strongly excited public attention as well 
as universal disgust. The term Gerrymander is now used throughout the United 
States, as synonymous with deception, as when a man has been swindled out of his 
rights by a villain, he says he has been Gerrymandered, in allusion to the to the cheat 
practices upon the people’s rights in the creation of the present senatorial districts. 
Peace to its ashes; we hope the legislature at the next session will quiet its ghost, by 
giving its unburied body the “the rites of sepulture.”41  
In only a year’s time, the Republicans’ “End-All Victory” disintegrated, leaving the 
Federalists in control of Massachusetts. During the 1812 election, the Gerrymander 
developed into a prominent political issue and helped the Federalists reclaim office. Even 
though Federalists deathly feared the “Gerrymander,” and believed the Republic lived in 
its last throes, Massachusetts survived. Since the citizens of Massachusetts changed their 
vote and elected Federalists, the Federalists possessed the power to counteract the 
Republicans.  
Gerrymandering After 1812 
 After the infamous gerrymander of 1812, the politicians continued the practice 
throughout the states as political parties launched regional campaigns to protect interests. 
In the decade after the initial Gerrymandering, the practiced continued not only in 
Massachusetts, but also in New Hampshire, Maryland, Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio, 
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Pennsylvania, and Virginia.42 While for a time, popular sentiment declared 
gerrymandering as a political evil, as long as district elections determine representation, 
the ambition to win elections determines the use of the gerrymander as a political weapon. 
Yet, during the “Era of Good Feeling,” the partisan politics throughout the country 
decreased; and as a result, Congress and state legislators introduced legislation aimed at 
limiting the partisan creation of districts. For example, the Alabama constitution 
prevented the practice of dividing up counties and required districts to be of contiguous 
territories.43 During a constitutional convention in Massachusetts, the delegates agreed 
that districts were to be comprised of counties. During a constitutional convention in New 
York, delegates introduced the idea of using single-member districts that were to be 
contiguous and infringe, as little as possible, on the integrity of the counties; however, this 
objection to the partisan gerrymander did not pass.44 In Maine, delegates to a 
Constitution Convention sought to end partisan gerrymandering by eliminating the use of 
single-member districts and believed that the people of the state would reject the 
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Constitution if it allowed for single-member districts.45 In a move to reduce the probability 
of gerrymandering, Congress passed the Apportionment Act of 1842, which stated that 
Representatives must be elected from contiguous single-member districts.46 In 1862, 
Congress retained the contiguity standard and added an additional requirement, “as 
nearly practicable an equal number of inhabitants.”47 By 1901, Congress added 
compactness as a standard and, in 1911, Congress renewed those four requirements 
though it would do so for the last time.48  
By examining the historical practice of the gerrymander, certain conclusions 
demonstrate the use and, at times, the acceptance of the practice as an essential political 
strategy to secure votes and interests within a state even if those practices conflict with 
American ideals or Constitutional requirements. First, since colonial times, politicians 
employed gerrymanders to gain votes, secure interests, and diminish the power of the 
oppositional party prior to the election. The concept existed well before the infamous 
Gerrymander of 1812 and, for better or worse, its use developed as a political tradition, 
especially during times of extreme partisanship. Second, Legislative reform attempted to 
limit the consequences of the practice and protect minority voices though, as I will discus 
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in the next chapter, the legislation did not persuade the legislators to pursue partisan 
interests through districting. Third, while the gerrymander can be an effective political 
strategy, the effects of the strategy vary from election to election. However unfair, 
gerrymandering works best when one party controls all three branches in a state as well as 
both Houses in the legislature. Further, a districting plan may not be able to consistently 
win seats for one party throughout a state on a regular basis, though securing a majority 
may be all that is needed. The infamous Gerrymander of 1812 lasted only one year and 
allowed Republicans to elect two senators to Congress but Massachusetts Federalists 
regained control of the legislative and executive branches and employed gerrymanders for 
the next ten years to diminish the strength of the Republicans. In addition, positive gains 
by a party one state, such as Massachusetts in 1816, may be offset by negative losses in 
another state, such as New Hampshire and Maryland in 1816. Also, for a gerrymander to 
be successful, it requires a populace to maintain its political views without change from 
issue to issue or politicians to politician. Finally, while states employed such tactics as 
prohibiting the division of counties and creating contiguous districts sough to prevent the 
possibility of gerrymandering other strategies to diminish the strength of the gerrymander, 
these tactics need enforcement and if the political bodies choose to ignore these tactics or 
reapportionment altogether, little could be done.  
Pre -Reapportionment State  Court Challenges  
 Before the Reapportionment Revolution, advocates for the judiciary’s entrance 
into the political thicket petitioned the judiciary through the state courts. However, the 
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results of those cases, first, varied from state to state and, second, received no recognition 
by the Supreme Court until 1910. At the state level, the authority of the state courts rests 
with the “judicial function” as determined by the state constitution, which reduces the 
likelihood that the state court follows the federal separation of power doctrines and allows 
the court more opportunity to decide “political” cases.49  Furthermore, in apportionment 
cases, the state courts must follow constitutional guidelines not present in the U.S. 
Constitution of the United States such as institutional requirements such as fixed ceilings 
on the size of the legislature and fixed rations between the size of the state senate and state 
lower house, redistricting requirements such as equal population, contiguity, and 
compactness, and other political interests such as traditional political boundaries, political 
party impact, and bicameralism.50 Even though two states constitutions may possess the 
same requirements for the protection of political subdivisions, compactness, or equal 
population, the judiciary in one state may decide that it is the judiciary’s role to decide 
districting cases while a judiciary in another state may decide districting is a political 
question. In these cases, some state courts held that redistricting was a political and not 
judicial issue51 while other state courts argued that the state courts possessed the authority 
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to hear and decide redistricting cases if the redistricting bill violated constitutional 
provisions.52 In select cases, state legislators designated reapportionment as a judicial 
question and authorized the Courts to examine the constitutionality of reapportionment 
cases.53 At the very least, the courts’ involvements in these cases suggest that Baker v. Carr 
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440, N.W. 724, (1892) and The State Ex Rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90; 53 N.W. 35, (1892). 
 
52 Robert G. Dixon, Democratic Representation, 104. 
 
53 See Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398, Opinion of the Justices in 3 Me. 477; 18 Me. 458; 33 Me. 587; 7 Mass. 
523; 15 Mass. 537; 3 Pick. 517; 23 Pick. 547; 6 Cush. 575; 10 Gray, 613; Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312; 
Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray 84; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214.  
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was not a novel decision and there was a minimal level of precedent to provide judicial 
guidelines on how to handle apportionment cases.54 
 In the cases where the State Supreme Courts intervened into state 
reapportionment, the courts followed textual arguments via the state constitutional 
requirements to resolve redistricting cases. By doing this, the judiciary maintained an 
ethos of judicial restraint, which minimized the arguments that the state judiciary violated 
its judicial role as it answered political questions. For example, in the cases of Attorney 
General v. Cunningham (Cunningham I) and The State Ex Rel. Lamb v. Cunningham 
(Cunningham II), the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that 1891 and 1892 
reapportionment plans violated the state’s constitutional requirement of respecting 
political subdivisions (Cunningham I) and equal population (Cunningham II). 55 Even 
though the redistricting plan resulted in partisan consequences, as press reports focused 
on a belief that Democrats attempted to gerrymander the Republicans out of power, a 
move that disrupted the historic nature of the Republicans hold on power in the State of 
Wisconsin,56 the judiciary focused on the higher, constitutional violations.   
                                                
54 Robert G. Dixon, Democratic Representation, 104.  
 
55 The State Ex Real. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, N.W. 724, (1892) and The State Ex Rel. 
Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90; 53 N.W. 35, (1892). 
 
56 “The Wisconsin Gerrymander,” The New York Times, 30 June 1892 p4. The article notes that, historically, 
while the Republicans controlled both Houses of Wisconsin for 30 years, the Democrats won the 1890 
elections, “ due to many causes, principally the raising of the English compulsory education issue.” When 
the Court decided the issue, The Washington Post remarked that even honest Democrats would believe that 
Court’s decision resulted in good government and both parties should be willing to the necessity of judicial 
checks and balances to “prevent encroachments upon fair expressions of the popular willing the choice of 
legislative representatives.” See “The Wisconsin Gerrymander,” The Washington Post, 26 March, 1892 p4. 
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In Cunningham I, the Wisconsin Supreme Court maintained that it possessed the 
authority to interpret the laws and declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional 
because of the voice of the constitution itself. Since the state constitution required 
redistricting efforts to protect political units and the redistricting effort of the legislature 
divided political units, the legislature violated the state constitution. 57 In Cunningham II, 
the Wisconsin State Supreme Court declared the 1892 apportionment plan 
unconstitutional because of extreme variances in population within legislative districts.58 
The majority of the Court interpreted the requirement that apportionment is to be based 
on inhabitants as, first, meaning that this means districts ought to be “as close an 
approximation to exactness as possible and this is the utmost limit for the exercise of 
legislative discretion,” and second, the inhabitants criterion is to be the controlling factor 
in apportionment, more important than contiguity and compactness.59If the court or the 
legislature were to subordinate the equal population requirement to compactness, there 
                                                
57 The State Ex Real. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 484 - 486,  N.W. 724, (1892) 
 
58 The State Ex Rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 143 - 156; 53 N.W. 35, (1892). The Court stated that 
no defense was made for the variations of assembly districts. Based on the population from the 1890 census, 
the ideal district was 16,868 and the 1892 reapportionment plan created districts with a population of 8,626 
and another of 25,111. The ideal Senatorial district was 51,117 and the plan called for districts of 30,732 
and another of 65,952. 
 
59 The State Ex Rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 143 - 156; 53 N.W. 35, (1892). In a dissent, Justice 
Winslow argued that the equal population requirement was one of many requirements and the focus of the 
constitutional command for the state legislators should not be on “according to population,” but the 
qualifier, “as reasonably practicable.” The other requirements were, in the assembly, no country, town, or 
ward shall be broken, the districts should be of contiguous territory, and they should be compact; for the 
senate, no assembly district should be divided and each district should be convenient and contiguous. These 
requirements made equal representation impossible and to focus on equal representation you will need to 
neglect compactness. What is needed is a “latitude of action” and this discretionary power falls to the 
legislative bodies and not the Courts,  (162). 
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would be no criterion to define how compact is compact, reducing the need for the equal 
population requirement in the first place.  
In these redistricting cases, the Wisconsin State Supreme Court acted on the 
premise that the judiciary possesses the authority to strike down legislative acts that violate 
the text of the constitution especially if those acts diminish the rights of the people. In 
Cunningham I, The Court’s argued that an “apportionment law is like all other laws which 
this court has declared unconstitutional,” meaning that even if there were political and 
partisan implications to the redistricting measure, that bill is a matter of law and subject to 
explicit constitution requirements. If the judiciary possessed the authority of judicial 
review for one law then it possessed it for all laws; if a law contradicted the requirements 
of the constitution, then the judiciary possessed the power to strike down that law.60 In 
Cunningham II, the State Supreme Court acknowledged the discretionary power of the 
legislative branch but ruled that its discretionary power cannot violate other textually 
commands. Similar to the arguments in Marbury v. Madison, the Wisconsin State Supreme 
Court ruled that the legislature cannot threaten the people’s state constitutional right to 
representation by disregarding the constitutional requirements of representation of 
inhabitants.  
Yet, while the Wisconsin Court struck down reapportionment cases based on 
Constitutional provisions, the State Supreme Court of Nevada upheld a reapportionment 
plan because the Nevada Court believed that the state’s legislature possessed the necessary 
                                                
60 The State Ex Real. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 480 N.W. 724, (1900).  
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discretionary power to reapportion the state without judicial scrutiny. At the time of the 
case, the Nevada Constitution required that apportionment would be based on the 
inhabitant of the state as determined by the census. In 1899, nine years after the last 
census, the state legislature reapportioned the state based on the 1890 census, a move that 
the plaintiff, W.E. Winnie, the district attorney of Storey County, argued was 
unconstitutional since the redistricting bill could not have been based on population but 
partisan interests and, since the districts were not based on population, then the districts 
were unconstitutional. 61 Though the judiciary stated that neither party questioned the 
ability of the judiciary to hold an apportionment act, “in a proper case,” unconstitutional 
and that this authority was, “so well established as not to require discussion or citation of 
authorities to support it,” the court ruled that the legislature relied upon its discretionary 
power to redistrict the state and, unless a clear constitutional violation was presented, the 
judicial branch must follow the discretion of the legislative branch.62 The decision states 
that the presumption of judicial skepticism of legislative acts is unwarranted: “It is 
fundamental that every law passed by the legislature and approved by the governor is 
presumed to be constitutional; every intendment is in its favor and it should be sustained 
                                                
61 State ex rel. Winnie v. Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 456 (1900). In 1899, the state legislature altered the state’s 
districting scheme, reducing the number of representatives in Storey County received. W.E. Winnie argued 
that since the redistricting measure was not based on “inhabitant,” the state ought to reverse back to the 
1891 districting plan. Further, he argued that the judiciary in other states struck down redistricting plans 
because they violated the constitution. This case is similar to the 2004 Texas redistricting when Texas 
Republicans initiated a redistricting effort in 2003 after the Texas Democrats finalized a plan in 2002. The 
Texas Democrats argued that the redistricting by the Texas Republicans was unconstitutional because of the 
unusual time in which they redistricted, though there is no legal or constitutional requirement as to when a 
party can redistrict.  
 
62 State ex rel. Winnie v. Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 456 (1900). 
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unless there are specific constitutional restrictions upon the power of the legislature, and 
the law is shown to be within those restrictions.”63 Since the state constitution failed to 
provide strict requirements as to the frequency of redistricting, regardless of whether or 
not the number of inhabitants changed in nine years, the legislative branch was free to use 
its discretionary power “as often as it wills.”  
Further, the Court noted that if it were to find this redistricting act 
unconstitutional because it was not based on the number of inhabitants, then it would 
need to find prior redistricting acts unconstitutional. Relying on a redistricting decision 
from the state of Indiana, the Nevada court reasoned that if the present plan were not 
based on population, then the prior plan would no longer be based on population, 
especially if new towns were created after the enactment of the old plan.64 If the judiciary 
cannot reinstate a prior redistricting plan, then the plaintiffs do not possess standing to 
bring forth a legal claim there can be no remedy. By adhering to the authority of the 
Indiana decision, the Nevada State Supreme Court held that no clear constitutional issue, 
the decision would be a detriment of the case, and there is no clear right to be protected.65 
Rather than striking down the redistricting plan based on the textual requirement of 
number of inhabitants, the Nevada Supreme Court argued that this redistricting act 
presented no legal questions and was subject to the discretionary power of the state.  
                                                
63 State ex rel. Winnie v. Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 456 (1990). 
 
64 The Indiana case is Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836, (1892). 
 
65 State ex rel. Winnie v. Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 464 (1990). 
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  The Wisconsin cases and the Nevada case provide examples of how State Courts 
answered the reapportionment cases based on their respective constitutions, the 
constitutional powers of the judiciary and legislative branches, and the reliance on other 
precedents. While some states possessed constitutional restraints such as needed electoral 
districts that were to be equal in population, state Courts interpreted those provisions 
differently, especially in light of the legislature’s discretionary power. Without any form of 
universal standards for representation, the state courts invented their own solutions to the 
cases at hand and would continue to do so until Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
Without universal standards, redistricting would be subjected to local prejudices and 
tensions, especially with challenges to Congressional districts.  
Even after the Supreme Court first heard and decided reapportionment cases, 
states continued to take divergent paths in order to find the correct solution to 
reapportionment. Between Richardson v. McChesney in 1910 and Baker v Carr in 1962, the 
state and federal courts heard oral arguments over redistricting and reapportionment cases 
in 26 separate cases. Similar to the preceding cases the results varied by state. In Illinois, 
citizens petitioned the state and federal courts over malapportionment, hoping to force 
the legislators to act but failed nonetheless. As a result, advocates initiated other strategies, 
such as petitions to mandamus the legislature, restrain payment of salaries to legislatures, 
initiate quo warranto proceedings against legislatures, to bar the governor from certifying 
elections, to avoid federal taxes pending federal enforcement of the “republican form of 
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government,” and to invalidate laws made by the malapportioned legislature.66 In 
Massachusetts, cases aimed at declaring reapportionment plans unconstitutional; however, 
as a result of the case, the Court initiated a return to a pervious reapportionment plan, 
which further increased the inequities in the ratio between representatives and 
represented.67 Without further action or help from the legislature, the Court decided it 
could not reduce the disparity through judicial enforcement. Without judicial standards 
from an authoritative body, reapportionment varied from state to state, leaving a citizen’s 
right to equal or fair representation varied as well. 
The Pre -Revolution Seven: Judicial Deference and the I llus ion of Se lf -Government 
 In 1910, the United States census revealed, for the last time, the dominance of 
rural America. According to the 1920 census, and in each subsequent census, urban 
demographics dominated the census, as the majority of America’s population resided in 
urban areas. While a change in demographics occurred in the early part of the twentieth 
century, a change in representation failed to occur until the 1960s. Politicians, at both the 
state and federal level, ensured that the change from a rural nation to an urban nation 
would not occur by their hands until those hands were forced by the decisions of Supreme 
Court.  
 Between 1910 and 1960, the Supreme Court heard arguments on seven 
reapportionment cases. The issues in these cases range from can the Courts interfere with 
the work of the political branches, which political branch has the power to contribute to 
                                                
66 Robert G. Dixon, Democratic Representation, 106. 
 
67 Robert G. Dixon, Democratic Representation, 107. 
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the reapportionment process, what is the correct interpretation of the “legislature,” what is 
the intent of Congress in reapportionment, and to what extent a state can reapportion 
black citizens out of a township. In these cases, the Courts created a contradictory ethos in 
terms of its involvement in reapportionment and redistricting an failed to provide a 
coherent demarcation between a political question and a legal question. While it 
attempted to define redistricting as a political question and deferred judgment to the state 
legislature, a majority of the Supreme Court appropriated Congressional power on a case-
by-case basis, allowing for some judicial involvement even as it argued for the separation of 
the political from the legal. Yet, because of the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 399 (1960), the Supreme Court contradicted its previous 
arguments involving redistricting and political questions and provided a future court with 
argumentative grounds to decide reapportionment and redistricting cases. Though the Pre-
Reapportionment Revolution decisions fail as a communicative act in so far as they 
present conflicting approaches to the Court’s involvement in reapportionment, these 
decisions provided a later Supreme Court with the authority to act during the 1960’s.   
Rhetorical Traditions, Political Questions, and Judicial Restraint 
 The Supreme Court’s apportionment jurisprudence provides the justices with a 
rhetorical tradition from which rules and guidelines to decide present and future cases. 
Thomas Farrell writes that, “Social knowledge comprises conception of symbolic 
relationships among problems, persons, interests, and actions, which imply (when 
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accepted) certain notions of preferable public behavior.”68 John Murphy writes that 
rhetorical traditions “consist of common patterns of language use, manifest in 
performance, and generative of a shared means for making sense of the world,” and 
provide speakers and their audiences with a “cultural grammar” of understanding.69 
Rhetorical traditions organize the social knowledge for communities and allow speakers 
with a source of invention of arguments, “aimed at authoritative public judgments.”70 
Murphy writes that “invention becomes the orchestration of the resources of the 
rhetorical tradition,” and authority develops from the “reaacentuation of the rhetorical 
tradition in a performative display of practical wisdom.”71 This discussion of a rhetorical 
tradition relates to the legal concept of stare decisis,72 where prior decisions of the 
Supreme Court guide the future decisions of the court as well as the lower courts. Even if 
a justice or judges believes that the law is bad, precedent binds the court and givers justices 
and judges the inventional source to decide the decision until the law is changed.  
                                                
68 Thomas B. Farrell, “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 62 (1976): 
4. Farrell uses social knowledge to refer to a normative agreement, presumed by communication acts, which 
generalizes human interests and is applicable to practical questions. See Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 
(Toronto: Beacon, 1975). Also note John Murphy relies the quote by Thomas Farrell to discuss the function 
of rhetorical traditions in the aggregate. See John Murphy, “Inventing Authority: Bill Clinton, Martin 
Luther King Jr., and the Orchestration of Rhetorical Traditions,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 83 (1997): 72.  
 
69 John Murphy, “Inventing Authority,” 72. 
 
70 John Murphy, “Inventing Authority,” 72. 
 
71 John Murphy, “Inventing Authority,” 74 - 75. Murphy notes that in an authoritative performance, a 
speaker adapts the wisdom of the past to the present situation. Further, an authoritative decision  “evolves 
out of the cultural grammar,” develops aesthetics principles and shows the community the “appropriate ways 
to move in the realm of appearances,” and requires reflection of the represent to not “degenerate into either 
uncritical acceptance of custom,” (75 – 76).  
 
72 “To stand by things decided.” 
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In 1910, the Supreme Court decided its first reapportionment case, Richardson v. 
McChesney 218 U.S. 487 (1910) and provided the foundation for its rhetorical tradition, 
arguing for judicial abstinence in the reapportionment and redistricting process.73 In an 
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court provided a narrow decision as it argued that the 
case presented a moot controversy since the challenged elections of 1908 were held, 
representatives were elected, McChesney was no longer the Secretary of State, and “the 
thing sought to be prevented has been done, and cannot be undone by any judicial 
action.”74 By focusing the decision on the narrow, procedural grounds, the Supreme 
Court avoided the larger issue as to whether or not reapportionment cases were justiciable 
and decided against providing “judgment upon abstract questions.75 Though the Supreme 
Court refused to consider “the question of the authority for judicial interference in 
respect to congressional apportionment, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in the 
                                                
73 The facts of the case combine the facts of the Wisconsin and Nevada cases discussed earlier. Charles 
Richardson filed a suit against H.V. McChesney, the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
over the Kentucky Act of 1898 and its amendments, which reapportioned Kentucky’s Congressional 
districts. Richardson alleged that this act did not conform to Kentucky’s Constitutional standards of 
apportioning representatives to the States because the districts failed to contain an equal number of 
inhabitants; further, since the 1898 Act violated the state constitution because of “gross inequality of 
inhabitants,” Richardson alleged that Kentucky should follow the standards set by an act passed in 1882. 
The Court did not share Richardson’s beliefs.  
 
Further, missing from the Supreme Court’s decision is the political nature of the controversy. The Court of 
Appeal of Kentucky’s decision provides a glimpse into another distinct social world whereby 
reapportionment is political in nature. In the Court of Appeals decision, Richardson is a Republican, trying 
to gain equal representation for the Republican Party, which the reapportionment plan denies. Further, in 
the Court of Appeal’s decision, the Court argued that the reapportionment plan was not “grossly unequal,” 
as the ideal district population would have be 149,881 inhabitants per district and only three of the districts 
possessed a population over 10% of the average established later by the Supreme Court (368 – 369).  
 
74 Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U.S. 487, 492 (1910). 
 
75 Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U.S. 487, 492 (1910).  
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case presented an extensive case against judicial involvement within redistricting, arguing 
that it is not the duty of the courts to assume the legislative authority, for if it did, there 
would be no end to that authority, and that he people, and not the courts, secured the 
rights of the nation.76 To remedy this violation, it is the responsibility of the people to act 
and secure proper legislation: “The protection against unwise or oppressive legislation, 
within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the 
representatives of the people. If this fails, the people in their sovereign capacity can correct 
the evil; but courts cannot assume their rights. The judiciary can only arrest the execution 
of a statute when it conflicts with the Constitution.” 77 
  Twenty-two years after it decided Richardson v. McChesney, the Court decided four 
reapportionment cases that examined the number and structure of Congressional districts 
in three states, the meaning of “legislature,” the relationship between the states’ 
legislatures and the states’ governors, and the interpretation of Congressional intent. On 
April 11, 1932, the Supreme Court handed down decisions in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 
355 (1932), Koenig v. Fylnn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932), and Carroll v. Bcker, 285 U.S. 380 
(1932). On October 18, 1932 the Court handed down its decision in Wood v. Broom, 287 
U.S. 1 (1932). While the Court tried to remain neutral in reapportionment claims to 
protect the separation of powers, these cases suggest that the Court failed to separate the 
legal language and authority of reapportionment from the political language and authority 
of reapportionment. While the Supreme Court can upholds its rhetorical tradition on 
                                                
76 Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U.S. 487, 492 (1910). 
 
77 Richardson v. McChesney, 128 KY 363, 368 - 369; 108 S.W. 322 (1908). 
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abstaining from providing rulings on districting cases themselves, the Supreme Court 
weakened its authority as it ruled on the validity of the process of creating a districting 
plan.   
 Of the first three decisions, the opinion in Smiley provided the only substance as 
the other two cases deferred to its holding. In each of these three cases, Minnesota, 
Missouri, and New York faced a change in the number of representatives after the 
decennial census, with Minnesota receiving two fewer representatives, Missouri receiving 
one fewer representative, and New York receiving two additional representatives. The 
issue in these cases concerned how state legislatures developed reapportionment plans 
when proper reapportionment plans were not in place. In addition, in Smiley, the Court 
faced a question as to whether or not the Minnesota state legislature enacted a valid 
apportionment plan since the proposed districts were enacted but vetoed by the Governor. 
In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court declared that Minnesota’s redistricting act was 
unconstitutional since the legislature, which was passed by the legislature and then 
returned by the governor to the legislature, did not reconsider the bill nor provide it the 
necessary 2/3 vote to supersede the veto.78 If, as the Court argued, the Minnesota 
Legislature engaged in its authority to “make laws,” then that authority is subject to the 
                                                
78 In its decision, the Minnesota State Supreme Court ruled that when creating the redistricting plan, the 
Minnesota Legislature acted as an agency under Article 1, 4 of the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, did not 
create a law subject to the governor’s veto.  This differs from the commands of the Minnesota State 
Constitution, which states that the Legislature possesses the authority to make laws but must submit it to the 
Governor for consideration. After providing a thorough review of the meaning and use of “Legislative” in 
the U.S. Constitution to rule that the when making laws for the state, the Minnesota Legislature must 
follow the prescribed rules for the state; hence, it is subject to a Governor’s veto. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 
U.S. 355, 363 – 369 (1932).  
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Governor’s veto and, in a system of checks and balances within Minnesota’s constitution, 
the state legislature cannot enact laws without impunity.  
 In addition to striking down the reapportionment plan on the grounds that the 
Legislature exceeded its authority, the Supreme Court determined the proper recourse to 
voting within the states when legislatures failed to develop reapportionment plans and 
gain or lose representation in Congress as a result of the census. According to the fifteenth 
decennial census, Minnesota lost one representative; however, since the Court struck 
down the State’s reapportionment plan because the legislative branch ignored the 
Governor’s veto, no plan existed that incorporated one fewer district. Section 4 of the 
1911 Reapportionment Act stated that if there were an increase of representation in a 
State without a redistricting plan in place, the representatives would be elected at an at-
large basis, until the state shall be redistricted; in Smiley, the court stated that in the 
absence of new districts, representatives would be elected at an at-large basis, in order to, 
“afford the representation to which the state is constitutionally entitled.”79  
 Six months after it announced its decision in Smiley, The Supreme Court released 
its decision in Wood v. Broom, which examined electoral practices in the state of 
Mississippi.80 In this decision, the Court reaffirmed that Congress provides the definitive 
                                                
79 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 374- 375 (1932). 
 
80 Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, (1932). According to a 1929 Congressional Reapportionment, the state of 
Mississippi was allocated seven seats in Congress instead of its previous eight. In 1932, the state legislature 
passed a redistricting bill creating those seats.  A citizen challenged the apportionment plan on the basis that 
it violated article 1, 4 and the fourteenth amendment as it failed to meet Congressional standards of equal 
population, contiguity and compactness established in a Congressional redistricting bill in 1911 but omitted 
in subsequent bills. After reviewing the case, the District Court declared the districts “were not composed of 
 93 
voice for representation and if Congress failed to include standards of compactness, 
contiguity, or equal population as nearly practicable, as the Reapportionment Act of 1929 
omitted those practices, then those requirements expired with the Reapportionment Act 
of 1910. The Court stated that, “It was manifestly the intention of the Congress not to re-
enact the provision as to compactness, contiguity, and equality in population with respect 
to the districts to the reapportionment under the act of 1929. This appears from the terms 
of the act and its legislative history shows that the omission was deliberate.”81 If there were 
no Congressional standards to violate, then this case failed to raise constitutional 
standards.   
Fourteen years after it provided an authoritative reading of the 1929 
Congressional Redistricting Act, the Supreme Court released its decision in Colegrove v. 
Green, which presented another redistricting challenge under the 1929 Redistricting Act.82 
Though, as the plurality of Court stated that the decision in Wood controlled the actions 
of the Court in Colegrove, the plurality attempted to provide citizens, legislatures, and the 
judiciary with a definitive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ethos in the 
                                                                                                                                           
compact and contiguous territory, having as nearly as practicable the same number of inhabitants.” The 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District Court and remanded it back for dismissal, 1 – 7.  
 
81 Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, (1932). Author’s note: To clarify its position, the Court traces the history of 
the bill through both the House and Senate, showing where it passed, where it failed, and what changes 
were made.  
 
82 In Colegrove, three residents and voters of Illinois challenged Illinois Congressional districts that contained 
a higher number of inhabitants than other Congressional districts, which violated the Reapportionment Act 
of 1911 that called for equal population, compactness, and contiguity. In Wood v. Broom, the Supreme Court 
refused to overrule the 1929 Reapportionment Act for lacking the three requirements found in the 1911 
Act. Previously, the District Court of Northern District of Illinois dismissed this case.  
 
 94 
reapportionment and redistricting rhetorical tradition. While the concurring decision by 
Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge serves as the controlling decision in Colegrove, it is the 
decision of Justice Felix Frankfurter that expounds the Supreme Court’s authority in cases 
that concern “political questions.”83 
Throughout his decision, Justice Frankfurter’s argues that the proper 
characterization of representation, and of a constitutional democracy, depends on 
legislative supremacy, judicial restraint, and a vigilant people. First, by stating the 
controlling decision in this case is Wood v. Broom, he argues that Congress, not the courts, 
possesses the authority to control the requirements of reapportionment.84 Additionally, 
the Court cannot engage in “verbal fencing about ‘jurisdiction’” and must remain faithful 
to its refusal to intervene in certain controversies since “due regard for the effective 
working of our Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and 
therefore not meet for judicial determinination.”85 Third, the wrong in this case concerns 
the polity of Illinois and not individual citizens. If the Supreme Court were to intervene 
                                                
83 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550 - 552 (1946). The Colegrrove decision is a 4 – 3 decision. Justice 
Robert H. Jackson took no part in this case as he served as the Chief Prosecutor for the United States at the 
Nuremburg Trials and Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone did not join either side in this case before he died 
on the bench on April 22, 1946 while reading Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Even as he 
noted that the complaint was strong, Justice Routledge concurred with the result on prudential grounds as 
he feared that the “Cure sought may be worse than the disease,” meaning he did not desire the responsibility 
of altering the relations between the judiciary and the state legislatures by forcing the state legislatures into 
action that they did not want to partake in on a voluntary basis. Further, Justice Routledge believed that 
there would not be enough time to draft redistricting plans between the time of the Supreme Court’s 
decision and the fall elections and that the alternative of at-large elections would be worse than elections in 
malapportioned single-member districts.  
 
84 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550 - 552 (1946). 
 
85 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946). 
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and alter the failures of the Illinois Legislature, the Supreme Court would not be able to 
remap the state into districts, resulting in state-wide elections, which counters 
Congressional requirement of single-member districts.86 Further, this controversy would 
involve the judiciary in party conflicts, which diminishes the ability of the judiciary to 
remain neutral and the ability of the people to engage in self-government. “It is hostile,” 
Justice Frankfurter writes, “to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics 
of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially 
political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law.”87 Concluding, Justice 
Frankfurter notes that the Constitution presents a textual solution to this problem and, if 
Congress fails to act to resolve this problem, then the people must act.  
In Justice Frankfurter’s view of democracy, the legislative branch must reign 
supreme and the judiciary must entertain political questions so not to interfere with the 
ability of the people to provide the reapportionment correction. Justice Frankfurter writes 
that, “The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will 
apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”88 To do this, it is “the 
people” that must act as if they have not attempted to act to secure this own their own. By 
incorporating “the people,” Justice Frankfurter creates a system of government that sees 
unity in the people as well as disunity between the people and the legislature. Yet, the 
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87 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 - 554 (1946). 
 
88Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
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reason for the malapportionment occurs because of the divisions between segments of the 
population and the control and allocation of representatives with the allocation of 
representatives reinforcing that division. By stating that the “Courts ought not to enter 
this political thicket,”89 and discussing the role of “the people” as the reapportionment 
corrective, Justice Frankfurter deflects attention away from the control of the state by 
partisan interests. To assert that “it is hostile to a democratic system to involve the 
judiciary in the politics of the people,” Justice Frankfurter means that it is hostile for the 
judiciary to assume the power of the legislature, especially the parties in control of the 
legislature, to select its form and method of representation since “a study of the history of 
Congressional apportionment is its embroilment in politics, in the sense of party contests 
and part interests.”90 In this view, representation remains at a social or political right and 
the ability of citizens to receive representation correlates to their ability to persuade the 
legislatures to recognize that a certain constituency possesses a desirable interest to the 
legislature.  
To remedy the malapportionment in the state, Justice Frankfurter believes that the 
people bear the responsibility to persuade the legislature that their cause of interest is 
important. Yet, without a conception of political equality, not all individuals, groups or 
interests possess the same importance and those who receive recognition would may not 
desire to share that recognition.  The remedy of “the people” would not be possible as the 
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90 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946). 
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malapportionment in the Congressional districts would occur in the state legislative 
districts and, with the division in the states, Illinois Congressional Representatives would 
not want other Representatives interfering with the politics in Illinois just as other 
Congressional Representatives would not want Representatives from Illinois to interfere 
with the local political of their states. While malapportionment may self-correct over 
longer, generation shifts, it will not occur because “the people” will tire of 
malapportionment but rather that the legislature chooses to remedy the situation for 
political gain. As Justice Black noted in his dissenting opinion, the State Legislature 
follows an apportionment plan that is similar to the 1901 apportionment and that it is in 
the interests of the State Legislature, not “the people” to follow the apportionment from 
1901.91 While Frankfurter attempted to reaffirm the ethos of the people, his decision 
reaffirmed the ethos of the State, which declined to follow the interests of the people.   
Consequently, while “the people” serves as an important trope to the psychological 
power of the meaning of self-government, democracy, or representative government, 
Justice Frankfurter does not base his decision on the grounds of political equality but 
rather the idea that political equality is but one of many considerations that legislatures 
can employ. In The Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander M. Bickel expands the reasoning of 
Justice Frankfurter as he explains that American democracy concerns more than just 
                                                
91 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 568 (1946). 
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individuals but interests, groups and regions.92 Drawing on Justice Frankfurter’s decision 
in Colegrove, Bickel writes:  
The principle of equal representation of qualified voters, is surely an aspiration of 
American democracy, and yet consistently throughout our history, the political 
institutions have found it necessary or expedient to modify the principle and to 
represent, not only problem, but interests, groups, and regions. In a diverse 
federated country extending over a continent, organized as a representative, not a 
town-meeting, democracy, we strive, after all, not only for responsive, but for truly 
representative government, which reflects the electorate and is at the same time 
stable and effective.93 
Bickel’s argument is that citizens and voters matter yet they matter only in relation to 
other concerns within the Republic such as groups and interests. While designing and 
fostering deliberative systems that incorporate equality is one goal, the American system 
relies on the incorporation of competing voices, some of whom play a more vital role 
through the accumulation of wealth and command of media or persuasion.94 While 
Government needs to be responsive to the people, effective government refers to the 
notion that government is responsive to the most important constituencies within the 
                                                
92 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1962), 192. Bickel notes that decision “does not state that the Court may never interfere 
with the election process, or that there are no judicially enforceable constitutional principles that apply to 
elections,” (190).   
 
93 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 192. 
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94 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 193. 
 
 99 
state, a notion that only the legislative branch can discern. Consequently, Bickel notes 
that it’s best for the judiciary to defer to the local experts in the legislature who can 
balance those interests.  
For the dissenters in Colegrove, the system of American government ought not to 
be determined before all citizens possess the opportunity to voice their opinion on the 
matter through elections. Instead of favoring classes of citizens before elections, state 
government ought to be neutral, at least until all of the citizens possess an equal 
opportunity to cast their ballot and develop habits of self-government. In his dissent, 
Justice Black writes that though State Legislatures possess the power to determine the 
“Times, Places, and Manners” of elections, state legislatures cannot employ that 
requirement to control and maintain policy decisions by eliminating the voice of all of the 
people. For the citizens in the malapportioned districts, since the state legislatures 
perpetuated, for over forty years, the inability to possess an equal voice in government, the 
state legislature willfully discriminates against them as voters as it creates classes of voters, 
some of whom possess 1/9th of the representation of other voters.95 Complicating matters 
is the fact that there are more districts with smaller population than there are districts 
with larger population, meaning that legislatures can work together according to their 
interests to preserve representation in rural areas. If a citizen possesses a vote and if that 
vote is to count, then, as Justice Black argues, there needs to be a principle of equality 
                                                
95 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 568 (1946). As Justice Black notes in his dissent, the districts vary in 
population from 112,000 to 900,000. On its face, the disparity here could not even satisfy an  
as nearly practicable” standard let alone “equal population” standard.  
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behind the vote to ensure all votes possess meaning and can influence an election, which 
means that the fourteenth amendment’s requirement that “Representatives shall be 
apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers,” eliminate a 
“nation wide “rotten borough” system.96  
By focusing on the rights of citizens, Justice Black diminishes the meaning of the 
“political questions” argument, treating it as a slight of hand. Justice Black’s dissent sites 
the Supreme Court’s decision of Nixon v. Herdon, which the declared judiciable question 
and, as a result, protected a voter’s right to cast a ballot in a state primary.97 Justice Black 
further attacked the rational of the majority as he mentioned that, in Smiley v. Holm, the 
Supreme Court declared a reapportionment plan invalid as it sorted out the political 
power of the legislative and executive branches in Minnesota. The point Justice Black’s 
position is that the plurality values the judicial tradition of a “political question” above the 
constitutional rights of citizens. If a federally protected right, such as the right to vote, 
were violated by the states or by Congress, then the Supreme Court ought to enter the 
debate and protect the citizens, who unwillingly surrendered their rights to state 
discretion. Since the Courts protect other rights dealing with property and liberty, the 
Courts should step in to decide cases that concern the right of citizens to choose 
                                                
96 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 570 (1946). 
 
97 Nixon v. Herdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1926). In Nixon v. Herdon, the Supreme Court declared that a Texas law 
that prevented blacks from voting in the Texas Democratic Primary violated the fourteenth amendment. In 
an unanimous decision, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that the political questions was nothing more 
than a “play upon words.” At the time, the Democratic Party constituted the only competitive party in the 
state and the exclusions of blacks from the primary meant that those voters possessed no voice in selecting 
representatives.  
 
 101 
representatives that create laws affecting property and liberty.98 “A state legislature,” Justice 
Black writes, “cannot deny eligible voters the right to vote for Congressman and the right 
to have their vote counted. It can no more destroy the effectiveness of their vote in part 
and no more accomplish this in the name of ‘apportionment’ than under any other 
name.”99 Even if the Supreme Court were to declare the Illinois redistricting plan invalid, 
as the Supreme Court did in Smiley v. Holmes, then the resulting at-large elections would 
be preferable to these districts as it would allow all individuals the ability to elect 
candidates on the same political ground rater than being subjected to different political 
elevations.   
 Within these seven pre-Reapportionment Revolution cases, the majority of the 
Supreme Court creates a position that political equality is not essential to the American 
Republican under the constitution. However, instead of political equality, the legislature 
must possess the freedom to determine the proper allocation of resources in the state from 
an assessment of individuals, groups, and interests. As Alexander Bickel notes, the 
Supreme Court’s position in Colegrove does not concern the Supreme Court’s role in 
elections or apportionment but that the debate over political equality concerns a political 
question since political equality is but one of many choices that a legislature must consider 
as it allocated resources. For the dissenters in Colegrove, there is little consistency in the 
majority’s “political questions” doctrine as the Supreme Court protect the right for 
citizens to cast a ballot, and presumably a meaningful ballot, the Supreme Court struck 
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99 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 571 (1946). 
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down an apportionment plan prior to Colegrove, and that the text of the Constitution 
requires political equality as apportionment concerns the allocation of representation 
according to the people.  Even with Justice Routledge proclaiming that the facts of the 
case present themselves as creating a role for judicial intervention, the dissenters failed to 
persuade him. Leary of entanglement between the two branches, Justice Rutledge would 
not sign on to judicial intervention in apportionment, providing Justice Frankfurter with a 
victory. However, this victory, and the first rhetorical tradition for redistricting, lasted 
until 1960.  
 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court ruled that the 28-sided 
district, created by the State of Alabama to eliminate “all but four or five of its 400 Negro 
voters without eliminating white voters,” deprived their right to vote, guaranteed by the 
fifteenth amendment.100 In his case, the State argued that it possessed the unrestricted 
power to establish, destroy, or reorganize by contraction or expansion its political 
subdivisions, to wit, cities, counties, and other local units.”101 It believed that its “political” 
discretion in redistricting allowed its members to draw lines as it saw fit. As a 
consequence, the State deprived black residents the ability to vote in municipal elections 
and to receive the social services from the municipality. While the citizens still possessed 
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101 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 364 (1960). By the time the Supreme Court decided Gomillion, only three 
justices who were on the Court in Colegrove remained. Of those three, only Justice Frankfurter remained 
from the plurality.  
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the right to vote they no longer possessed a right to a meaningful ballot in the 
municipality in which they lived due to legislative discretion.  
What is significant about this case is not the Supreme Court entered this debate, 
but that the Justice Frankfurter relies on an incorrect Constitutional principle in order to 
prevent more reapportionment cases, diminishing the Supreme Court’s of judicial 
restraint in regards to the topos of “political questions.” Examining the precedent 
concerning the State and its relations to political subdivisions, Justice Frankfurter notes 
that the Supreme Court has never acknowledged that the State possesses the 
unquestioned ability, “to do as they will with municipal corporations regardless of the 
consequences.”102 If a state does not have the power to evade responsibility with contracts, 
it does not have the power to do so under the fifteenth amendment, which “forbids a 
State from passing any law which deprives a citizen of his vote because of race.”103Further, 
the defendants in Gomillion argued that Colegrove affords the Alabama State Legislature the 
political discretion necessary to create districts free from judicial control; however, Justice 
Frankfurter differentiates these cases since the state legislators’ actions in Gomillion 
features affirmative discrimination through debasement of minority voters and the state 
legislators’ actions in Colegrove features passive resistance to reapportion.104 Accordingly, a 
                                                
102 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 364, 344 (1960). To make his point, Justice Frankfurter reviews the cases 
that discuss how States alter political boundaries to evade responsibility for contracts. TO review the cases, 
see 343 – 346.  
 
103 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 364, 345 (1960). 
 
104 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960). 
 
 104 
state legislature can debase votes through neglect and select a group of voters to enhance 
their representation but a state legislature cannot select a group of voters to dilute their 
votes. No state possesses the absolute authority to redistrict if it denies representation to 
citizens and the “advantages that the ballot affords.”105 While state legislative bodies 
control the redistricting process, the state legislative body cannot deny rights: “When a 
State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from 
federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as 
an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.”106  
 Yet, while Justice Frankfurter reached the correct decision, his reasoning about the 
meaning of a vote in Gomillion contradicts the meaning of a right to vote in Colegrove in 
order to defend the Supreme Court’s previous reapportionment decision. In Colegrove, 
Justice Frankfurter does not concern his opinion over the meaning of a vote, in particular, 
but on the right to vote, in general, since the citizens of Illinois could vote though 
malapportionment diminished the meaning of the ballot for those in urban areas. In 
Colegrove, state legislatures could rely on their discretionary power to diminish the 
meaning of a ballot for any individual or group if that individual or group did not 
constitute an important interest for the state or if that interest needed to be 
counterbalanced by another interest. In Gomillion, Justice Frankfurter stated that when a 
state legislature singles out and isolated a “segment of a racial minority for special 
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discriminatory treatment, it violates the fifteenth amendment.”107 While the Alabama 
State Legislature certainly denied a racial minority the right to have their vote counted in 
the district the minority wanted the vote counted, the legislature did not deny the citizens 
the right to vote, especially in relation to the meaning of the right to vote in Colegrove. The 
problem does not concern voting but of stripping the vote of meaning and excluding the 
residents of a city from residing in the city and treating groups of citizens in different and 
unequal manner, which refers to a violation of the fourteenth and not fifteenth 
amendment.108 If Justice Frankfurter were to follow the Colegrove decision, then he ought 
to allow the lower court’s decision in Gomollion, which allows the Alabama State 
Legislature the discretionary power to redistrict so long as it dies not prevent the citizens 
from voting. Yet, by rejecting the “political question” argument in Colegrove, Justice 
Frankfurter implies that discretionary power cannot deny the Constitutional rights of 
citizens and, in terms of apportionment and districting, the constitutional right to vote 
means the right to cast a meaningful ballot. Yet, this reading of Gomillion requires a 
rejection of Colegrove as an authoritative text, allowing the Supreme Court to begin the 
Reapportionment Revolution.  
 In Colegrove and Gomillion, Justice Felix Frankfurter attempts to protect the 
discretion of the state legislature to engage in redistricting and protect the constitutional 
rights whose rights have been violated by state legislatures when redistricting and, in the 
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108 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960). In his concurring opinion, Justice Charles Evan 
Whitaker argues that Gomillion concerns the fourteenth and not fifteenth amendment though he argues that 
this switch would not involve the Colegrove problem.  
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balances, lies the meaning of the right to vote and the judiciary’s ability to protect that 
right. In Colegrove, Justice Frankfurter establishes that the right to vote and the meaning of 
a vote is subject to legislative discretion; in Gomillion, legislative discretion is subject to the 
constitutional rights. After reading these decisions, a contrarian would ask Justice 
Frankfurter why the people in Gomillion are not subject to the same standards in Colegrove 
whereby a democracy requires the ability of the people, not the courts, to secure their right 
to representation from state legislatures. If Justice Frankfurter were to reconcile these 
decisions, then he would need to show that, while the redistricting in Gomillion may have 
been the result of racial animosity, as the citizens removed from Tuskegee still possessed 
the right to vote and still possessed the opportunity to petition the state legislators, or 
Congress, to alter the district back. Conversely, if the result in Gomillion were correct, then 
Justice Frankfurter would need to reconcile the judiciary’s role in other reapportionment 
cases to ensure that citizens in malapportiond districts possessed the right to a meaningful 
ballot. While Justice Frankfurter would reject this corrective reading of Colegrove, a 
majority of the Supreme Court would support it in Baker v. Carr.  
Conclusion: The Loss of Authority within the Pre-Reapportionment Revolution 
Rhetorical Tradition  
 The purpose of this chapter was to examine the historical constraints and 
exigencies concerning the Supreme Court’s involvement in the Reapportionment 
Revolution. First, the chapter examines the historical nature of redistricting, establishing 
that it is a common political tactic though its success and acceptance can vary because of 
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the size of the population within a district and the presence of partisan tension 
surrounding a districting. Second, the chapter examines the development of redistricting 
as a state judicial issue, showing that foundation for the judiciary’s involvement into 
redistricting cases.  While not all state courts declared that redistricting presented a 
justiciable issue, some states courts declared it to be justiciable and struck down 
apportionment plans even though they violated the political discretion of legislatures. 
Finally, this chapter examines the Supreme Court’s reapportionment and redistricting 
decisions before the Supreme Court’s involvement into this area of law in Baker v. Carr.  
 During the pre-Revolution cases, the Supreme Court’s decisions relied upon an 
unstable conception of the “political questions” doctrine as well as presenting 
contradictory meanings of the right to vote. Before its decision in Gomillion, the Supreme 
Court attempted to protect the legislature’s discretion to apportion its representatives 
though it diminished the ability of citizens to cast meaningful ballots. In Smiley, the 
Supreme Court decided a structural argument between two competing claims of authority, 
the ability of the legislature to develop a redistricting plan and the ability of a governor to 
veto a redistricting plan, to declare a reapportionment act unconstitutional. Additionally, 
the Court relied upon the intent of Congress to invent a judicially manageable standard 
when determining how to conduct elections when states gain or lose elections, though 
there was no clear textually referent to determine what happens when states lose 
representation. In Wood, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Congress as the authoritative 
voice for reapportionment and redistricting as it failed to uphold standards that Congress 
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decided were no longer necessary to reapportionment and omitted from reapportionment 
revolution. In Colegrove, a plurality declared that political equality was just one of the many 
choices the legislature faced when it apportioned the state and, for the Court to suggest 
otherwise, violated the “political questions” doctrine. In each of these cases, the proper 
remedy to malapportionment belonged to the people and not the judiciary as the 
judiciary’s involvement constituted a threat to the country’s democratic system.  
However, in Gomillion, the Supreme Court averted that threat as it ruled that 
there were limits to a state legislature’s discretionary power and its was not up to the 
people to persuade the state legislature to provide them representation. Though the 
citizens in Gomillion possessed the same right to vote and that vote possessed the meaning 
as the citizens’ right to vote and meaning of the vote in Colegrove, the Justice Frankfurter’s 
decision suggested that some constitutional rights could not be removed by the legislature. 
It is in this incongruity that the Supreme Court found rhetorical space to invent its 
authority to decide apportionment and redistricting cases in Baker v. Carr. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL AUTHORITY, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: 
THE ETHOS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN REAPPORTIONMENT 
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that 
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise 
in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution.1 
 
The Court's authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately 
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be 
nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from 
political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of 
political forces in political settlements.2 
 
In Acts if Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics, James Boyd White 
examines the way in which authority “becomes the subject of conscious though and 
argument.”3 White’s work focuses on moments when individuals, whether real or 
fictional, confront claims of authority and, in response, participates in creating, 
maintaining, or rejecting authority. White writes, “every speech act is a way of being and 
acting in the world that makes a claim for its own rightness, which we ask others to 
respect. Our life with language and each other involves the perpetual creation of 
                                                
1 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
 
2 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962). 
 
3 James Boyd White, Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics, (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1994), ix.  
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authorities, good and bad, successful and unsuccessful.”4  When facing a claim of 
authority, examining that claim allows a person to judge the merit of the political and 
social world as well as accepting, rejecting, or creating anew the language of the political 
and social world.  
In the political and legal culture of the United States, the Supreme Court 
performs a unique role in determining the meaning, and hence authority, of the 
Constitution, though this act often removes public controversy from the public realm and 
relocates within the hands of experts.5 The legal decisions of the Court are not without 
political consequence for the public, political parties, and governmental bodies as the 
decisions will reaffirm or remake the voice of the people as expressed via the legislative 
branch and reconceptualizes the political process and the way in which citizens participate 
in civic life. Further, as the Supreme Court alters the framework by which citizens engage 
one another over the constitution, it also determines the scope of its own authority to 
determine the extent to which it can participate in Constitutional debate, providing an 
outline for the judiciary as to what is legal and what is political.   
In 1962, The Supreme Court again faced questions about the authority of the 
judiciary in reapportionment and the authority of its own power, especially in relation to 
the authority of the other branches of government. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), 
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5 David Zarefsky and Victoria J. Gallagher, “From ‘Conflict’ to ‘Constitutional Question’: Transformations 
in Early American Public Discourse,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 247  
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the Supreme Court faced a Thucydidean moment that concerned the status of political 
representation within the United States.6 For far too long, the state legislature deprived 
segments of “the people” from participating in civic life and from possessing basic civil 
liberties. In this decision, the Supreme Court recharacterized the “political questions” 
doctrine, which provided, for the Supreme Court and the lower courts, theoretical 
classifications for that which is political and that which is legal. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, prior to Baker, the Supreme Court created a rhetorical tradition for  
apportionment and districting cases based on the “political questions” doctrine. This 
tradition of precedents served as an inventional tool that allowed the judiciary to avoid 
deciding political or partisan issues that they thought the consequences would be too 
severe for a democratic system of government. Consequently, those who brought 
challenges to the judiciary would need to look elsewhere for political remedies. Yet, under 
the authority of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the corruption of representation needed a 
new, Democratic moment to unlock the promises of the Constitution. To achieve this 
                                                
6 Thomas Gustafson, Representative Words: Politics, Literature, and the American Language, 1776 – 1865, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1 – 14. According to Thomas Gustafson, a Thucydidean 
moment concerns the moment at which, “political and linguistic disorders—the corruption of people and 
language—become one the same.” Gustafson basis this concept on J.G.A. Pocok’s Machiavellian moment, 
the “moment in conceptualized time in which the republic was seen as confronting its own temporal 
finitude, as remain morally and politically stable in a stream of irrational events conceived as essentially 
destructive of all systems of secular stability. In the language which had been developed for the purpose, this 
was spoken of as the confrontation of ‘virtue’ with ‘fortune’ and ‘corruption.’” Gustafson uses the 
Thucydidean moment to “describe the moment that succeeds the failure of the Machiavellian moment: it is 
the moment when fortune or necessity or corruption defeats virtue, or when moral and political stability—
and the code of language that sustains that stability— collapse into confusion and the muteness of violence. 
Railing against this collapse, the poet’s voice articulates the conditions of this chaos, this fall of words…. 
This decay of words can no more be avoided than the dropping of leaves and fruit, but in the soil of politics, 
as well as in the versus of poetry, an unsettling of words, their turning and troping, even their uprooting, can 
yields something other than rotten diction: it can help produce new growth, new leaves of grass, new 
conceptions of liberty,” 14.  See also J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and 
the Atlantic Republican Tradition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).  
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Democratic moment, the Supreme Court reaccentuated the rhetorical tradition and 
reinvented its authority to decide apportionment cases. By reaccentuating the rhetorical 
tradition, the Supreme Court redefined the “political questions” doctrine and the concept 
of the judicial restraint behind the doctrine and, consequently, a majority of the Supreme 
Court and instituted a new set of “good reasons” to allow future Supreme Courts the 
ability to interpret and read a democratic form of government in the Constitution, 
returning government to the hands of “the people.” 
  This chapter examines the concept of legal authority that develops through the 
Supreme Court’s entrance in to the reapportionment revolution in Baker v. Carr. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Baker is a landmark decision as it reconstitutes the 
foundation for the country legal and political institutions and begins a transformation 
process during a crisis of representation when the political process could no longer 
provide political reform for the people. Necessarily in understanding this transformation 
is the rhetorical invention of authority in the rhetorical tradition guiding apportionment 
and districting cases. This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s rhetoric of authority in 
Baker v. Carr. In Baker, a plurality of the Supreme Court Justices seeks to reclaim 
legitimacy in the political process on behalf of “the people.” Through an invention and 
selection of judicial authority, the opinion of Justice William Brennan redefines the scope 
of judicial power and the jurisprudence of apportionment as a voting right, and, 
subsequently recharacterizes the relationships between an individual and the political 
community and between the judiciary and the state legislature. Consequently, because of 
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the new definitions in judicial power and apportionment, the Supreme Court provides a 
new vision of law that focuses on the experience of the people rather than the formalistic 
rules of the Supreme Court. Further, because of Supreme Court’s decision to enter an 
area of law thought to be political, the Supreme Court must structure its own involvement 
on the basis of a new judicial restraint where it manages a dialectical tension between 
transferring power to the people and protecting the discretion of state legislatures to be 
the primary authority of apportionment. I will begin first with a discussion of the 
development of the political questions doctrine before Baker and a discussion of the social 
exigence of Baker.        
Social Context: From Luther  v . Borden to Baker v . Carr : The Precedent of the 
Polit ica l Question and the Cris is  of Representation 
Luther  v.  Borden and the Political Question 
In addition to the Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, the rhetorical 
tradition of the political question develops from the Supreme Court case of Luther v. 
Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 40 (1849). While issue before the case concerns whether or not a civil 
magistrate improperly arrested a Rhode Island citizen, the case developed in the context of 
an attempted political revolution. In January of 1841, political dissidents under the 
leadership of Thomas Wilson Dorr attempted to take seriously the ideas of the 
Declaration of Independence as they instituted a political revolution against the Rhode 
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Island state government because of diminished voting rights within the state.7 Without 
any hope of political reform as the Rhode Island General Assembly refused to expand 
voting rights and hold a constitutional convention, the political dissidents decided to run 
for office, and when they could not get enough support to receive a majority of seats in the 
General Assembly, they called their own constitutional convention outside of the “proper 
forms of law.”8 After ratification, the people elected their own representatives under the 
“People’s Constitution.” however, the Rhode Island General Assembly refused ailed to 
acquiesce its offices and refused to turn over public records and the state’s arsenal. 
 Rather than acquiesce, the General Assembly refused to turn over public records 
and the state’s arsenal, defined the dissidents’ actions as treason, enacted martial law to 
isolate Luther, Dorr, and their “deluded adherents,” and asked citizens to support civil 
authorities in their search for the rebels. The authorities under the General Assembly 
                                                
7 According to Orville J. Victor,  while the beginning of the 19th century roughly saw 75% of the adult male 
freeholders with the ability to vote, that number decreased to under 50% by the 1830’s in order to diminish 
the voting strength of the rising classes manufacturers and immigrants. By the time of the rebellion, the 
State Legislature prevented two-thirds of the people from voting and refused to extend the right to vote or 
alter the original charter. Orville J. Victor, History of American Conspiracies: a Record of Treason, Insurrection, 
Rebellion, & Andc, in the United States of American, from 1760 to 1860, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Library, 2006), 449.   
 
8 Marvin E. Gettleman, The Dorr Rebellion: A Study in American Radicalism 1833 – 1849, (Huntington: Robert 
E. Kreiger Publishing Company, 1980), 28. After gaining some popular support for electoral reform in the 
beginning of the 1840s, the Rhode Island Suffrage Association enacted a constitutional convention and 
drafted a constitution that the people of the state, i.e. white freeholders and non-freeholders, would put to a 
vote. In January of 1842, elections results showed that of the 20,000 citizens of the states who were eligible 
to vote, 13,947 endorsed the People’s Constitution; further, 4,925 of the 8,000 approximate freeholders 
who were eligible to vote under existing Rhode Island voting landholder requirements voted in favor of the 
People’s Constitution. From these results, it appeared as if the citizens of the state favored and enacted 
revolutionary reforms. After the ratification of the People’s Constitution, the people of the state elected 
officials, including William Dorr as governor. Governor Dorr claimed that he would take control of the 
State through the use of force if necessary, as exemplified by his attempt in May of 1842 to capture the 
state’s arsenal in Providence. 
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found Luther in his home, arrested him, and damaged his home. With no other political 
recourse available, Luther attempted to carry out the political revolution through legal 
means as he sued Borden, claiming the arrest was illegitimate as the original Charter of 
1663 was no longer the constitution of the state after the people enacted the People’s 
Constitution. In 1848 the legal challenge reached the Supreme Court and, in January of 
1849, the Supreme Court relied on the political questions doctrine to decide Luther v. 
Borden and precluded Luther and Dorr’s desire for fair representation it was not the 
province of the judiciary to entertain political questions. 9  
 Faced with the political reality of having two competing forces acting as the proper 
authority of Rhode Island and no desire to determine which group possessed the correct 
claim, and the Supreme Court decided that the case constituted a political question and 
the judiciary possessed no authority to determine what constituted a Republican form of 
government. By refusing to decide, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the authority of the 
Circuit Court and the General Assembly of Rhode Island, and declared that Congress or 
the President, but certainly not the judiciary, possessed the Constitutional authority to 
                                                
9 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 40 (1849). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether or not Borden 
trespassed on Luther’s property when Borden’s subordinates sought to arrest Luther. However, if the Court 
were to answer this question, it would have been necessary to answer the larger question of which man, 
Luther or Borden, represented the legitimate government in Rhode Island. If the Charter Government 
constituted the legitimate government, then Borden possessed the power to arrest Luther for his rebellious 
and treasonous acts. If the charter government was voided by the People’s Constitution, then Martial Law 
could not have existed and Borden trespassed provided there were a law against trespassing. Further, if 
Luther’s party was the correct sovereign, then Luther would have no legal recourse through the judiciary 
since the state courts of Rhode Island would have been voided along with the Rhode Island Constitution. If 
there were no constitution, then the state court would possess no authority to hear a case or issue a decision. 
Even though “the people” of Rhode Island chose a new form of government, “the people” lacked the 
institutional authority to enact that political change. 
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declare the meaning of a Republican Form of Government. Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney stated, “It is the province of a court to expound the law, not 
to make it,” and, if the Supreme Court were to determine which voters could vote would 
usurp the constitutional power of the states to determine who could and could not receive 
political privileges.10 Under this narrow conception of judicial restraint, the Taney Court 
determined that the people must seek relief through the proper political bodies, such as 
the state legislature, Congress, or the President.  
The significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Luther is threefold. First, the 
legal legacy of Luther v. Borden rests with the idea that the judiciary does not possess the 
authority to expound the meaning of the Guaranty clause of the constitution as only 
elected political officials determine this clause. Subsequently, the Court’s opinion in 
Luther created the notion that portions of the Constitution were not reviewable by the 
judiciary regardless as to whether or not governmental bodies followed the constitution or 
government or the people diminished the rights of political, numerical, or racial 
minorities. Further, this decision allowed future Supreme Courts to declare that other 
clauses of the Constitution were off-limits to review as the judiciary would be powerless to 
interpret, an argument that Justice Felix Frankfurter made in Colerove v. Green. Under 
stare decisis, once one Supreme Court adds to the rhetorical tradition of the Court’s 
                                                
10 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 41 (1849). Justice Taney also remarked that the Court did not possess the 
knowledge to know who was or was not a qualified voter, how many freeholders there were, and that the 
Court did not possess the power to conduct a census and determine this information. Further, since there 
was no evidence, the result of the case would depend on testimony of witnesses, some credible and some 
not, some favorable to the plaintiffs and some favorable to the defendants. Since a verdict could not be used 
as evidence to one party over the other, there could be no resolution.  
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jurisprudence, this provides future justices with reasons to decide or reasons to ignore a 
controversy.  
Second, in Luther, the Supreme Court expounds further the dissociation between 
what is legal and what is political, especially as it relates to who possesses the authority to 
decide the boundaries between what is legal and what is political. In both the majority 
opinion and the dissenting opinion, a political question concerns the power to determine 
who is the proper authority or sovereign, and how the sovereign chooses the form of 
government. According to Justice Woodbury in his dissent, political questions relate to 
the fundamental values of society before they enter the Constitution or develop into 
public law. Once these issues are in the constitution or on the public record, then those 
issues become legal norms by which the judiciary decides controversies, if those 
controversies are brought to them. Politics, Justice Woodbury writes, belongs to “the 
people” and their representatives and that constitutions and laws precede the judiciary, 
meaning that the issue of whether or not the old charter of Rhode Island was the valid law 
was out of the hands of the Court since it could not be discerned through a legal 
principle.11 The judiciary acts as a mediator between the people and their legislature to 
check the power of the legislature and is subordinate to the people.12  But before they can 
act, the institution, such as the Republican form of government, must be in place. 13  
                                                
11 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 51 (1849). 
 
12 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 53 (1849). 
 
13 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Woodbury claims that the power of the judiciary begins after the political 
bodies act: Let the political authorities admit as valid a constitution made with or without previous 
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The third lesson of Luther v. Borden is that political reform develops only if a 
recognized authority extends the right to an outside collective. Though the rebels 
possessed the support of the people, the state refused to grant the dissidents access to the 
political institutions they sought. If the “legal” and “authoritative” political bodies were 
unresponsive to the needs of the people, then another branch of government would need 
to provide a legal remedy to a political solution if the judiciary could view the problem as a 
legal problem. Without any discursive means to alter society, dissidents possess the 
opportunity to carry out a revolt through violence if they possess the political will to enact 
violence.  
 In its best light, the Court’s decision shows that there are limitations of the 
judiciary’s power and authority, and system of governments work best when the judiciary 
adheres to this limitation, especially if controversies relate to the powers of the coordinate 
branches of government, the powers of the state, or the powers to determine who is an 
                                                                                                                                           
provision by the legislature, as in the last situation Tennessee and Michigan were introduced into the 
Union…. Let the collected will of the people as to changes be so strong, and so strongly evinced, as to call 
down no bills of pains and penalties to resist it, and no arming of the militia or successful appeals to the 
general government to suppress it by force, as none were in some cases abroad as well as in America, and 
one recently in New York, which might be cited beside those above…. In short, let a constitution or law, 
however originating, be clearly acknowledged by the existing political tribunals, and be put and kept in 
successful operation. The judiciary can then act in conformity to and under them. Then, when the claims of 
individuals come in conflict under them, it is the true province of the judiciary to decide what they rightfully 
are under such constitutions and laws, rather than to decide whether those constitutions and laws 
themselves have been rightfully or wisely made. While he believes that determining who the proper 
sovereign is not the province of the judiciary, he dissents over the implementation of Martial Law, stating 
that the State possessed no power to institute Martial Law since Martial Law relates to wartime and 
Congress, not the States, possess the power to declare war. Rather than avoid this issue, Justice Woodbury 
declares that even though determining who is sovereign is a political question, the issue of Martial Law is 
not because it is a constitutionally declared power to Congress and not the states. Therefore, this power can 
be checked and it is imperative that the Court checks the power. This distinction between the unwritten 
political power and the written law provides some guidance to the development of political questions Luther 
v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 55 (1849).  
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authority in the state. Consequently, the people and the government need the opportunity 
to act before the judiciary can step in to rule on those actions. At its worst, the Supreme 
Court still decided who possessed the political authority in the state as it reaffirmed the 
power of the Rhode Island General Assembly, it placed the political power in the hands of 
the states rather than the people, and, further, it refused to define the limitations of the 
judiciary as it passed responsibility of adjudication to another branch of government. 
Because of this, the people possessed fewer rights, especially if their viewpoints conflicted 
with the viewpoints of the states. Consequently, what is political may not be desirable for 
the majority of citizens, leaving the majority of people with little to no recourse, except as 
Justice Woodbury states in his dissent, as what occurred in the English revolution of 1688 
or the American Revolution of 1776.14  
Baker v . Carr  and the Crisis of Representation 
 In October of 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower appointed a new Chief Justice 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, the former Governor of California, Earl 
Warren. While President Eisenhower announced that he would appoint a conservative 
justice to fill the seat of former Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, the president’s appointment 
failed to fulfill this goal. Because of Chief Justice Warren’s decisions and political views, 
President Eisenhower proclaimed after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
                                                
14 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 55 (1849). 
 
 120 
Education that the appointment of Earl Warren was, “the biggest damned-fool decision” he 
made.15 
 With his appointment to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren ushered 
in the new era for political and civil rights, especially related to advancement of individual 
rights. Cases under the Warren Court such as Brown v. Board of Education, Miranda v. 
Arizona, Gideon v. Wainwright, and Engel v. Vitale, sought to protect individual freedoms 
from the usurpation of the state and the community in such areas as public segregation, 
criminal law, legal representation, and establishments of religion. Yet, the advancement of 
individual civil and legal rights faced criticism, especially in the Southern States. As 
individuals gained rights, southerners feared the loss of state sovereignty and the 
encroachment of federal power into their peculiar lifestyle. To counter-act the 
development of the “Rights Revolution” in Brown, Bake v. Carr, and Reynolds v. Sims, some 
southern citizens advocated for the impeachment of Earl Warren on billboards 
throughout the South. It is in this political and social context that the political rights of 
individuals in the reapportionment cases are best understood.    
 In Baker v. Carr, the concepts of authority and legitimacy are paramount as they 
intertwine as the judiciary and the legislature determine the meaning and scope of 
representative government.16 Because of the judicial commitment to the rhetorical 
                                                
15 David Nichols, A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution, (New York: 
Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group, 2007), 91.  
 
16 Authority, in these cases, refers to which body, either political or legal, possesses the power to determine 
what representation—via the creation of electoral districts—should mean to that states and the citizens of the 
states. Legitimacy develops in regards to the consequences of the authority, especially in how either the 
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tradition in favor of upholding the “political questions” doctrine, the states faced a crisis 
within representation as the political bodies developed a system of representative 
government that appeared illegitimate for the majority of citizens within certain states. 
The concept of consent of the governed, or of Lincoln’s “of the people, by the people, and 
for the people,” seemed antiquated under the pre-Baker apportionment plans.  
 According to the facts of Baker, the urban citizens of Tennessee faced a crisis in 
representation due to legislative entrenchment and an institutionalization of political rule 
by the rural representatives and their constituencies. In 1901, the State of Tennessee 
reapportioned its electoral districts in accordance with the decennial census of 1900. Sixty 
years and five decennial censuses later, the state of Tennessee employed the same electoral 
districts for its apportionment, regardless of the changes in population that occurred over 
time. In 1901, the population of Tennessee was 2,020,616, of whom 487,380 were eligible 
voters; in 1961, the population reached 3,567,089, of whom 2,092,891 were eligible to 
vote.17 With the increase of variance in population and with the absence of 
reapportionment, districts featured extreme variations in voting population. Moore 
County contained 2,340 voters and elected one representative; Shelby County contained 
312,345 voters and elected seven representatives.18  The disparities in voting allowed 37% 
of the qualified voters to elect 20 of the 33 members of the Senate while the remaining 
                                                                                                                                           
political or legal bodies enact representation. While authority concerns who possesses the power to act, 
legitimacy concerns whether or not institutions work correctly or constitutionally.  
 
17 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192 (1962). 
 
18 Phil C. Neal, “Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of the Law,” The Supreme Court Review 1962 (1962): 253. 
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63% of the qualified voters elected 13 members; for the State’s House of Representatives, 
40% of the population elected 63 members while 60% of the voters elected only 36 
members.19 In effect, the institutional form of representation in place allowed the few to 
rule over the many and presupposed that the many were incapable of rule while it 
presupposed that the few always acted wisely on the behalf of the state.20  
 The problem of inequality extended beyond electoral representation as it altered 
distribution of goods and services throughout the community. In addition to the 
diminished weight of their vote and a diminished ability to elect representatives of their 
choice, the appellees argued that those in over-represented areas received a greater 
distribution of state funds, especially for the support of the public schools, the 
maintenance of roads and highways, and the distribution of county aid.21 Further, because 
                                                
19 Baker v. Carr, Brief for Appellants, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
 
20 Howard Ball, The Warren Court’s Conception of Democracy: An Evaluation of the Supreme Court’s Apportionment 
Decision, (Rutherford, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971), 51.  
 
21 Baker v. Carr, Brief for Appellants, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). According to the Brief, the Appellants argue, 
“Laws 1959 ch. 14, House Bill 123. in providing for a distribution of revenues collected in support of the 
education system of the state, exempts the over-represented counties from application of the formula for 
contribution to their own county educational needs required of the under-represented counties where 
applicants live, but nevertheless guarantees the exempt counties school funds in amounts previously paid to 
them by the state.” Furthermore, the inequities in population altered the use of highway funds. According to 
the appellees brief,  “Similar discriminatory results have occurred in respect to highway improvement. Of the 
seven cents collected by the state for the storage and sale of each gallon of gasoline, two cents is paid into a 
separate fund known as County Aid Funds". Notwithstanding that said funds are derived from the 
consumption of gasoline one-half of the fund is distributed equally among the ninety-five counties of the 
state, one-fourth is distributed among the ninety-five counties on the basis of area, and only the remaining 
one-fourth is distributed among the counties on the basis of population. Finally, the inequity in population 
skewed also county aid fund: “In the 1957-1958 apportionment of the county aid funds, the General 
Assembly permitted 23 counties to receive 57.9% more state aid than would be the case on a basis of state 
aid per capita, and it turns out that these counties had 23 more direct representatives than permitted under 
the state constitution. Ten counties, having 25 less direct representatives than required by the Tennessee 
Constitution,29 among them Shelby, Knox, Hamilton, and Davidson, received 136.9% less state aid than 
on a per capita basis. Expressed another way, a voter in Moore County (with a voting population in 1950 of 
 123 
the conservative rural areas of the state dominated the legislature cultural differences 
became legal differences as urban and metropolitan areas were unable to seek legislative 
solutions to overturn the state’s prohibition on teaching evolution within pubic schools 
and the state’s prohibition on allowing bars and nightclubs within the counties.22 Since 
the representatives of the state refused to reapportion in order to preserve their power, 
citizens resided in an area where the few controlled the many. The malapportionment 
problem extended beyond Tennessee as only Nevada’s Senate possessed a deviation of less 
than 10% from the ideal size as the rest of the states contained deviations greater than 
10% of the ideal.23 In 44 states, less than 40% of the state’s population could elect a 
majority of the elected representatives.24 
Frustrated with the lack of change of and by the state legislators, voters initiated 
democratic revolutions to secure representation; however, the representatives were 
unwilling to allow reform. According to the appellants, reapportionment bills failed to 
gain support by representatives as no bill for reapportionment received more then 13 votes 
in the Senate and no more than 36 votes in the House.25 Other remedies failed as well. 
                                                                                                                                           
2,340) has 17 times as much representation in the lower House as does a voter in Davidson County (1950 
voting population 211,930), and Moore County receives 17 times the apportionment per vehicle of state 
gasoline taxes as does Davidson county.” See brief, pages 12 – 13.  
 
22 Howard Ball, The Warren Court’s Conception of Democracy, 94.  
 
23 “Legislative Districts in the Fifty States,” The New York Times, 28 March 1962 p22. 
 
24 Clayton Knowles, “Study Details Rural Domination of Most Legislatures in Nation,” The New York Times, 
28 March 1962 p22. 
 
25 Baker v. Carr, Brief for Appellants, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
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Governors campaigned over the issue of reapportionment but could not secure it because 
of the legislature; a Constitutional Convention was not available since a convention could 
only be called for by two successive General Assemblies; furthermore, even the Tennessee 
Supreme Court “sealed the door of the legislature by holding that is it were to declare the 
Act of 1901 unconstitutional, it would deprive the state of its legislature and bring about 
the destruction of the state itself.”26 Since, as the appellants argued, it was no longer 
reasonable for those in power to relinquish the power, the only recourse was to petition 
the federal judiciary.  
Baker developed on appeal from the Federal District Court in Tennessee. In the 
lower court’s decision, the District Court reflected the view that the appellees presented a 
violation of constitutional rights and the district court recognized that a violation of 
constitutional rights were alleged, however, the Court exposed its “impotence to correct 
that violation.”27 The Court reasoned that while the citizens and voters of Tennessee 
possess certain rights, the district court, as a division of the judiciary, could not provide a 
remedy since, “it has long been recognized and is accepted doctrine that there are indeed 
some rights guaranteed by the Constitution for the violation of which the courts cannot 
give redress.”28 Yet, in its decision, the Distinct Court interpreted the “long accepted” 
                                                
26 Baker v. Carr, Brief for Appellants, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
 
27 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 197 (1962).  
 
28 The District Court stated, “"With the plaintiffs' argument that the legislature of Tennessee is guilty of a 
clear violation of the state constitution and of the rights of the plaintiffs the Court entirely agrees. It also 
agrees that the evil is a serious one which should be corrected without further delay. But even so the remedy 
in this situation clearly does not lie with the courts. It has long been recognized and is accepted doctrine that 
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doctrine in a way that varied with Chief Justice John Marshall’s initial discussion of that 
tradition, especially as it related to the individual rights of citizens. The Supreme Court 
noted probable jurisdiction in October of 1960.  
According to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker 
decisions was the most important decision during his tenure on the Court, even more 
important than Brown v. Board of Education because the Court introduced political reform 
when the prospects of reform seemed hopeless.29 Rhetorically, the Supreme Court’s 
challenge in Baker, and the other cases of the Reapportionment Revolution, was two-fold: 
first, it needed to invent its authority to decide reapportionment cases and, second, to 
discern a legal solution to a problem that the political process could not solve or the 
political bodies refused to solve. By accomplishing this task, the Supreme Court would 
reinvent its authority and reexamine prior decisions without overturning precedent, 
develop its authority in response to the lack legitimacy exemplified by the State 
Legislature, and return legitimacy to the electoral process by discerning a way to break 
legislative entrenchment and force the legislative bodies to act while it reaffirmed the 
legislature’s role in enacting reapportionment. 
During its deliberation, the Supreme Court remained deeply divided over the 
resolution of the case. The Court first heard arguments in April of 1960; after failing to 
                                                                                                                                           
there are indeed some rights guaranteed by the Constitution for the violation of which the courts cannot 
give redress," Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 828 (1959).  
 
29 Abner J. Mikva, “Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of Baker v. Carr,” 
University of Illinois Law Review (1995):  685.  
 
 126 
reach a decision, the parties reargued the case to the Court in October of 1961.30 Chief 
Justice Warren believed that because of continued judicial restraint in apportionment, 
political inequalities festered and encouraged further malapportionment, making 
alterations in the political process hopeless for the people.31 The dissenters in Colegrove, 
Justices Douglas and Justice Black, sided with Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, believing Gomilion, and not Colegrove, controlled Baker.32 Justices Frankfurter, 
Harlan, Clark and Whittaker favored affirmation of the lower Court’s decision that held 
reapportionment was a political question. Knowing tension existed between the justices 
on the question of the Supreme Court’s involvement, Chief Justice Warren attempted to 
preserve his coalition through the selection of the justice to write the opinion. At first, 
Warren contemplated assigning the decision to Douglas, who wanted a sweeping decision 
for Court involvement, and then looked to a wavering Stewart, who wanted a narrow 
opinion.33 Yet, fearing that Douglas would write in such a way that would cause Douglas 
or Black to break from the majority, Warren turned to Brennan to hold the coalition 
together. 34 After the initial drafts, Warren stepped in to preserve his coalition as Justice 
                                                
30 Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, “Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting Revolution: A 
Plea for Rationality,” North Carolina Law Review 80 (2002): 1362 
 
31 Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made, (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006), 389 – 
390. 
  
32 Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, “Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting Revolution,” 
1362.  
 
33 Jim Newton, Justice for All, 390. 
 
34 Jim Newton, Justice for All, 390. 
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Douglas and Stewart threatened to bolt to the minority. Justice Stewart, a possible swing 
vote in the case, sided with reversal of the lower court’s decision only after he read and 
agreed with the decision of Justice Brennan. 35  
The decision ended as a plurality 6 –2 decision, as Justice Clark and Stewart 
agreed to the holding but for different reasons36 and Justice Charles Evans Whitaker 
recused himself from the decision as he suffered a nervous breakdown agonizing over this 
decision.37 Justice Clark’s switch remained the most curious move. Originally, he believed 
that voters failed to explore all available avenues to challenge the reapportionment, such 
as “invok[ing] the ample powers of Congress;” however, Justice Clark changed his mind in 
                                                
35 Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, “Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting Revolution,” 
1362 
 
36 In Baker, the Supreme Court declares that reapportionment is justiciable but does not overrule the prior 
cases that state reapportionment was not justiciable nor does it provide guidelines for lower courts to decide 
apportionment cases as it remands the decision back to the lower courts for further proceedings in line with 
this decision. The Supreme Court’s opinion features a plurality decision by Justice William J. Brennan, 
which examines the Court’s authority to hear reapportionment and outlines the political questions doctrine; 
a concurrence by Justice Goulas that argues the Supreme Court never declared apportionment as being 
“beyond judicial cognizance,” and argues the judiciary can enter the debate to examine whether or not the 
states engage in invidious discrimination; a concurring opinion by Justice Clark that that the Tennessee 
legislature engages in discrimination of certain citizens through the design of its districts or, as Clark refers 
to them as “crazy quilt without rational basis,” and, as a result, prevents the citizens from correcting the 
discrimination through the electoral process; a dissent by Justice Felix Frankfurter and a dissent by Justice 
Harlan, both of which attack the Supreme Court for interfering with the precedent of the Court and for 
interfering with the other branches of government, the state legislatures, the people, and the delicate balance 
of federalism.  
 
37 According to Jim Newton, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Frankfurter placed tremendous pressure on 
the Justices for their vote and, consequently, Justice Frankfurter “scorched the Earth” after his defeat, 
trashing the wavering Whitaker and breaking him under the strain. Whittaker, who suffered from 
depression exacerbated by the stress on the Supreme Court, visited Walter Reed Medical Center where his 
doctors warned him of his health. He stepped down from the Supreme Court on April 1, 1962. See Jim 
Newton, Justice For All, 391 – 392.  
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the process of writing a decision.38 In a letter to Justice Frankfurter, Justice Clark 
concluded: 
Preparatory to writing my dissent in this case, along the line you suggested of 
pointing out the avenues that were open for he voters of Tennessee to being about 
reapportionment despite its Assembly, I have carefully checked into the record. I 
am sorry to say that I cannot find any practical course that the people could take in 
beginning this about except through the Federal Courts. 
Having come to this conclusion I decided I would reconsider the whole case, and I 
am sorry to say that I shall have to ask you to permit me to withdraw from your 
dissent. I regret this, but in view of the fact that the voters of Tennessee have no 
other recourse I have concluded that this case is controlled by MacDougall.39  
Before switching sides to join the majority, Justice Clark told Justice Frankfurter that his 
“dissent was unanswerable…. As you suggested by telephone I will prepare something on 
failure to exhaust other remedies….[After discussing a trip and returning] In light of the 
waiting period Tenn. Has already experienced, I hope my delay will not too long deprive it 
of a constitutional form of gov[ernment], i.e. control by the ‘city slickers.’”40 By switching, 
Justice Clark agreed to transfer authority from the state to the people by invoking the 
                                                
38 Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, “Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting Revolution,” 
1362. 
 
39 Tom C. Clark, “Letter to Justice Felix Frankfurter,” 7 March 1962 available at The Papers of Justice Tom C. 
Clark  http://utopia.utexas.edu/explore/clark/view_doc.php?id=a120-02-02. 
 
40 Tom C. Clark, “Case Files: Daft of Justice Frankfurter dissenting Opinion in Baker Case” 2 February 
1962 available at The Papers of Justice Tom C. Clark: 
 http://utopia.utexas.edu/explore/clark/view_doc.php?id=a119-05-03. 
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judiciary and not Congress. Congress would have been unable to help since the states 
possessed the power to redraw the lines for state and federal elections. If the states were 
unwilling to redraw lines for the people of the state, why would they redraw the lines for 
the people of the nation? As Justice Clark noted, the authority of the states prevented the 
individuals of the state to secure representation.  
 Justice Clark’s memorandum to Justice Frankfurter exemplifies why the authority 
of precedent no longer applies to the reapportionment cases. In Acts of Hope, James Boyd 
White writes that, “to be complete and effective the legal argument must claim that the 
law and justice coincide.”41 In Colegrove, the state legislature of Illinois failed to 
reapportion its congressional districts for over forty years; in Baker, the state legislature 
failed to reapportion for over sixty. When citizens challenged the inaction of the 
legislatures through the judiciary, the judiciary asked “the people” to find a remedy with 
the legislative branches. Unable to find a legislative remedy, the people possessed no 
recourse, diminishing the authority of the Supreme Court’s remedy. The people can act 
only if there are avenues in which to act, yet, because of the legislature, there were no 
remedies to act, returning the controversy to the Supreme Court though this time new 
justice to the court provided a different remedy.  
The Authority  of the  Supreme Court: The Source  and Vis ion of the Law 
In Baker, the Supreme Court Justices contest the ground for judicial involvement 
into apportionment and district through the selection and rejection of authority. For the 
                                                
41 James Boyd White, Acts of Hope, 170. 
 130 
dissenters in Baker, the way in which the judiciary provides meaning to representation is to 
follow the traditional and proper forms of judicial action, which means that the authority 
rests within the hands of the state legislatures or Congress and the judiciary participates 
only in so far as it exemplifies judicial restraint.  To reinforce this set of beliefs, the 
dissenters rely on conceptions of authority that respect prior precedent, forewarns of 
future action, exemplifies restraint, as well as respecting the authority of the other 
branches of government as well as the people. When doing this, the rhetorical style the 
dissenters employ is to amplify each argument to signify that an encroachment in to one 
area of law allows for an usurpation of all relevant powers and all areas of law on which 
basis the judiciary possesses no authority. Yet, the way in which the dissenters argue 
against judicial involvement and the way in which the dissenters argue for judicial 
restraint creates an incongruity with the process of representation. As the dissenters argue 
for a process of self-correction, it perpetuates a system whereby self-correction will not 
occur. While the dissenters lament the advancement of judicial discretion in 
apportionment, the majority of justices create the discursive space to enter this area of law 
through the rhetoric of definition. By defining the scope of judicial power and redefining 
apportionment under a new type of law, the majority of justices alter the relationship 
between the individual and the state as well as the relationship of the state to the federal 
government, allowing for greater judicial checks and balances on the political process.  
 
 
 131 
Respecting the Past and Fearing the Future 
Justice Felix Frankfurter opens his dissent by challenging the decision-making of 
the judiciary for disregarding the relevant precedent concerning reapportionment and 
redistricting. The Justice writes that the Court “reverses a uniform course of decisions 
established by a dozen cases,” and the “impressive body of rulings thus cast aside reflected 
the equally uniform course of our political history regarding the relationship between 
population and legislative representation— a wholly different matter from denial of the 
franchise to individuals because of race, color, religion or sex.”42 Concerning Colegrove, 
Justice Frankfurter writes that the two opinions that speak for the majority of the seven 
sitting justices reaffirm the holding that “considerations were controlling which dictated 
denial of jurisdiction”43 of these types of cases, though Justice Frankfurter fails to note that 
Justice Routledge’s concurrence argues for a willingness to intervene if there is enough 
time for a remedy.44 This omission symbolizes the unstable argumentative ground on 
which the decision rests as Justice Frankfurter prefers that the justices follow precedent for 
precedent’s sake, without determining whether or not the precedent remains viable due to 
empirical conditions with the malaaportionment of representation or that precedent is 
correct as a matter of law or ethics. Justice Frankfurter relies on a reverence for wisdom of 
the past rather than the partiality of the present to provide citizens and governments the 
clarity to develop a functioning government. Justice Frankfurter believes that if the 
                                                
42 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962). 
 
43 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 277 (1962). 
 
44 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566 (1946). 
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decisions were wrong and the judiciary erred, then it is the duty of the people to act 
through their legislature to correct the decision.  
Behind his words, Justice Frankfurter presents a claim that the personal views that 
the Justices hold on issues such as reapportionment must remain subordinate to the 
Constitutional rulings of the Supreme Court as a whole and overtime. This serves as a 
stark reminder to the justices serving presently on the court that if they allow their 
personal views to decide cases, the future justices will do the same, removing the clarity 
and impartiality from the law. If the body of law were to change from justice to justice and 
generation to generation and the judiciary itself would not longer follow the mandates of 
the law, there is not reason why the other branches of government at the state or federal 
level would follow the law. Any deviation from what has been said represents the fear of 
Justice Frankfurter over why the judiciary should stop deciding apportionment and 
districting cases since state and federal justices, if they do not ground themselves in 
restraint, could institute their judgment for the legislature, acting as a super-legislature for 
all political policies, diminishing the need for the people or for the legislature.  To retain 
authenticity, the Supreme Court must follow precedent and follow its “unwilling to 
intervene in matters concerning the structure and organization of the political institutions 
of the States,” especially when broad federal guarantees such as “equal protection” 
overrule state powers. 45 
                                                
45 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 284 (1962). 
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In addition to accepting considerations of the past to avoid discretions in the 
present, the dissenters reject the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker because of prudential 
considerations of the future. While, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan refuse to provide 
moral or substantive claims about the status or legitimacy of representation, they provide 
these claims about the actions of the judiciary.  While these justices may or may not 
believe that the malaaportionemnt is a concern, they argue that involving the judiciary 
leads to unknown consequences that are much worse in principle than what is known 
now from consequence. If the federal courts or the Supreme Court lacks knowledge about 
the state and possesses the ability to create or judge reapportionment and redistricting 
plans, then the court will not only possess expansive power but it will possess expansive 
power that altering the social contract between legislators and citizens. As Justice Harlan 
declares, Baker concerns, “the right of a State to fix the basis of representation in its own 
legislature,”46 while Justice Frankfurter argues as a result of the plurality’s decision in 
Baker, the Supreme Court “empowers the courts of the country to devise what should 
constitute the proper composition of the legislatures of the fifty States,” and, if the state 
courts are unable to fulfill the duty, then the federal courts must.47 In addition to the 
relationship between the citizen and the state, Baker the interplay between Republicans 
and Democrats for the control of the Tennessee state government and the ability of the 
legislature to use its discretion to allocate appropriate resources. If and when the judiciary 
                                                
46 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 331(1962). 
 
47 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 269 (1962). 
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interferes, even to require the states to employ political equality in redistricting, the 
consequence will be the reconfiguration of almost all aspects of politics at the local level.   
Once the Supreme Court wills itself the authority to reconfigure one aspect of 
representation, there is no principled reason to resist further usurpation. Once the 
Supreme Court rejects its long-standing decisions in this area of law then the Supreme 
Court can will itself the authority to provide any answer to a legal or political question 
even is it alters the configuration of state government or concerns an area of governmental 
action that the judiciary does not possess the proper virtues to understand. Justice 
Frankfurter writes that, “the crux of the matter is that courts are not fit instruments of 
decision where what is essentially at stake is the composition of those large contests of 
policy traditionally fought out in non-judicial forums, by which governments and the 
actions of governments are made and unmade.”48 By acting in this area of law, the 
plurality violates its own place in American government as it violates the long-standing, 
“unwillingness to make courts arbiters of the broad issues of political organization 
historically committed to other institutions and for whose adjustment the judicial process 
is ill-adapted - has been decisive of the settled line of cases, reaching back more than a 
century.”49 If the Supreme Court is willing to violate the tradition of restraint in this area 
of settled law, the fear is that the Supreme Court will violate its restraint in other areas of 
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49 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 290 (1962). 
 
 135 
settled law, establishing the “private views” and “political wisdom” of the justices as the 
“the measure of the Constitution.”50 
By understanding its authority and place in society and ignoring partisan politics, 
the Supreme Court can remain the impartial arbitrator of the constitution. Justice 
Frankfurter writes that the judiciary ought to understand its own judicial impotence in 
realizing that, “there is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political 
mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative power.”51 This judicial self-awareness 
extends the authority of the Supreme Court, which, “ultimately rests on sustained public 
confidence in its moral sanction,” and develops from “complete detachment, in fact and 
in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into 
the clash of political forces in political settlements.” 52 The authenticity of the American 
form of government rests with the ability of the branches of government to follow their 
own powers and not interfere upon the rights and duties of other branches of 
government. As Justice Harlan declares, Baker concerns, “the right of a State to fix the 
basis of representation in its own legislature,”53 while Justice Frankfurter argues as a result 
of the plurality’s decision in Baker, the Supreme Court “empowers the courts of the 
country to devise what should constitute the proper composition of the legislatures of the 
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51 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 271 (1962). 
 
52 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962). 
 
53 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 331 (1962). 
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fifty States,” and, if the state courts are unable to fulfill the duty, then the federal courts 
must.54 In this conception of authority, Baker concerns not the relationship between the 
citizen and the state but the interplay between Republicans and Democrats for the control 
of the Tennessee state government. If and when the judiciary interferes, the consequence 
will be the reconfiguration of politics at the local level. 
Respecting the Limitation of Power and the Authority of the Legislature 
A further complaint by Justice Frankfurter suggests that the plurality’s decision 
relies on an authority that it does not possess: determining the meaning of the Guaranty 
Clause by instituting theories of representation and of political philosophy. Similar to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Luther v. Borden, the Supreme Court does not possess the 
authority to hear cases on every clause of the constitution but only on certain clauses of 
the constitution on which it can provide relief.  One clause that escapes judicial 
cognizance is the Guaranty Clause, especially as citizens as the Supreme Court to enforce 
notions of political equality within the Guaranty of a republican form of government.  
Justice Frankfurter writes that Baker is a “Guaranty Claim masquerading under a different 
label” and, as such, the Supreme Court can lay no claims to judicial competence in this 
area of law.55 By raising concerns about the Guaranty Clause, Justice Frankfurter warns 
the plurality that they must think about structural composition in order to act and, to 
think of structural composition, especially in relation to incorporating democratic theory, 
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55 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962). 
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is beyond the cognizance of the judiciary.56 In this conception voting rights, but only 
certain aspects of voting rights, fall under the category of the Guaranty Clause of the 
constitution as those rights follow from legislative action and concern the composition 
and allocation of power in the state. The appellants’ claim, that they suffer from 
discrimination through a debasement of voting power that presents a distortion of 
representative government, rests on the notion that they do not receive an appropriate 
share of political power in the state, which according to Justice Frankfurter, is the result of 
state discretion as no matter which redistricting plan the state creates, some voices will not 
possess the same electoral strength.57 Yet these citizens without a voice cannot rely on the 
judiciary as the judiciary possesses no authority to remedy the situation since this occurs 
from the discretionary power of the legislature as “‘Equal Protection’ is no more secure a 
foundation for judicial judgment of the permissibility of varying forms of representative 
government than is “Republican Form.”58 In quote that dissenting justices invoke 
throughout reapportionment cases, Justice Frankfurter proclaims: 
What, then, is this question of legislative apportionment? Appellants invoke the 
right to vote and to have their votes counted. But they are permitted to vote and 
their votes are counted. They go to the polls, they cast their ballots, they send their 
                                                
56 Guy-Uriel E. Charles, “Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics; Reflections on the Interpretive 
Approach of Baker v. Carr,” North Carolina Law Review 80 (2002): 1114. Justice Frankfurter’s position is 
contradictory at best as his argument against judicial involvement into the apportionment decisions also 
rests on a conception of democratic theory, especially the noting that it is anti-democratic for the judiciary to 
interfere democratic politics, (1155).  
 
57 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962). 
 
58 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 - 301 (1962). 
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representatives to the state councils. Their complaint is simply that the 
representatives are not sufficiently numerous or powerful - in short, that Tennessee 
has adopted a basis of representation with which they are dissatisfied. Talk of 
"debasement" or "dilution" is circular talk. One cannot speak of "debasement" or 
"dilution" of the value of a vote until there is first defined a standard of reference 
as to what a vote should be worth. What is actually asked of the Court in this case 
is to choose among competing bases of representation - ultimately, really, among 
competing theories of political philosophy - in order to establish an appropriate 
frame of government for the State of Tennessee and thereby for all the States of 
the Union.59 
Justice Frankfurter stakes his authority on the grounds that the judiciary cannot 
determining the meaning of the right to vote necessary to sustain a Republican form of 
government and it certainly cannot invoke political equality as the standard since it is but 
one of many choices for the legislatures, and not the judiciary, to discern. He states to, 
“divorce ‘equal protection’ from ‘Republican form,’ is to talk about half a question.”60 Yet 
his narrow reading of the right to vote in Baker, which refers to the physical act of voting, 
conflicts with a more expansive reading in Gomillion, which refers to the meaning behind 
that act. His comment that, Baker “is not a case in which a State has, through a device 
however oblique and sophisticated, denied Negroes or Jews or redheaded persons a vote, 
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or given them only a third or a sixth of a vote” rings hallow as the state legislature 
determined that a class of votes, mainly those residing in urban areas, possess a 
diminished ballot in comparison to the rural voters. As he deflects away from the meaning 
inherent in the Constitution, Justice Frankfurter defers to the authority of the state 
legislature since he believes that they possess the authority to determine the right to vote, 
even if the judiciary has in the past determined the meaning of a ballot. This leads only to 
a contradiction to his authority within his own jurisprudence as he determines the 
meaning of the right to vote in some cases but not all cases, diminishing his claim to a 
categorical exemption of judicial action in reapportionment and redistricting cases.  
 For the dissenters in Baker, the proper remedy must develop from an authoritative 
voice of the people who working through the state legislature or Congress and not the 
judiciary. “The Framers,” Justice Frankfurter writes, “carefully and with deliberate 
forethought refused so to enthrone the judiciary. In this situation, as in others like its 
nature, appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be to an informed, civically 
militant electorate.”61 The judicial belief in equal representation must not be greater than 
the state legislature’s ability to develop policy.62 For the dissenters, it is best for the people 
to persuade the legislative bodies to act while it is far from best to let the judiciary 
proclaim what the people, the states, and Congress ought to do with reapportionment. 
Yet, in Justice Frankfurter’s view, the power does not necessarily rest within the hands of 
the people but with the discretion of state legislators and there is little discursive space for 
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62 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 277 - 278 (1962). 
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the citizens to challenge the authority of the state legislators and receive recognition for 
their interests.  
Justice Frankfurter basis his decision on the judiciary’s involvement in 
reapportionment and redistricting on the belief that self-government is self-correcting. Yet, 
as 60 years passed in the state of Tennessee, there was no self-correction. While self-
correction can occur to some degree, such as the limitation of the number of rural districts 
because of the fixed number of representatives in the legislature, state legislators can 
redistricting to maintain imbalance between rural and urban areas.63  
One failed apportionment allowed the state legislature to acquire the power of the 
people and each failed apportionment further entrenched the legislature. By focusing this 
case on situated political knowledge and the rights of state legislatures, and the political 
parties that run them, to determine how to respond to that local knowledge, the dissenters 
deflect away from the rights of voters within the state. Justice Harlan declares that he finds 
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause “or elsewhere in the Federal Constitution which 
expressly or impliedly supports the view that the state legislatures must be so structured as 
to reflect with approximately equality the voice of every voter.”64 “In short,” Justice Harlan 
writes, “there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to prevent a State, acting not 
irrationally, from choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to the 
                                                
63 Allan P., Sindler, “Baker v. Carr: How to ‘Sear the Conscience’ of Legislators,” The Yale Law Journal 72 
(1962): 25. Sindler notes that the presence of malapportionment hinders the viability of the states’ right 
argument as it shows that legislators seem unresponsive to the people.  
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interests, temper, and customs of its people.”65 Rather than have the judiciary find a 
solution to all of the interests and competing preferences within a state, Justice Harlan 
would prefer to allow this choice to develop through the state legislatures and provide the 
elected officials, and not the people themselves, to determine the allocation of resources 
and the state and local customs without widespread debate among all citizens.  Further, 
even if the judiciary were to enter the debate, the only way in which the Supreme Court 
could establish its authority is through a very narrow and legal sense, and, as a result, the 
judiciary would not be able to comprehend the complexity of reapportionment. 
 Yet, the arguments of Justice Harlan returns us to the nature of the complaint, 
which reinforces why representation in Baker is not self-correcting and the arguments of 
the dissenters loses its authority for controlling the apportionment and districting 
jurisprudence. Theoretically, the foundation of the country rests upon the political and 
ethical notion of self-government whereby if Congress fails the people, then the people 
could vote them out of office; the same would apply at the state level. Yet, in reality, the 
institutional practice of representation before Baker precluded resolution and the judicial 
invocation of the “political question” continued the status quo of representing interests 
and not people regardless of the interests and rhetorical strategies of the citizens of 
Tennessee. Justice Frankfurter’s position provides authority to the states to enact 
reapportionment though that system lacks legitimacy since it prevents meaningful 
elections, denies citizens any legal recourse, and removes fairness and equality from the 
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political process as it politicizes the law to affirm the state over the citizen and rural 
citizens over urban citizens. State legislators distributed resources throughout the state 
with no regard to fairness of all of the state’s citizens. This distribution, like 
apportionment itself, was not up for debate, which diminished the force of Frankfurter’s 
belief that the people possessed the authority necessary to determine reapportionment.  
Complicating this matter was the fact that the state legislatures ensured there was 
no means for citizens to enact any electoral change. While gubernatorial candidates could 
discuss reapportionment, they, like their constituencies, would not possess the power to 
enact legislation to alleviate the problem. Justice Frankfurter’s use of democracy could not 
include the will of the majority, the voice of the people, or fairness in the electoral system 
as the minority governed the majority and used the resources of the majority. 
Representation under the view of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan fosters notions that 
civic participation rests upon the self-recognition of knowing one’s place in society as the 
people who receive less representation ought to know that unless they offer society more 
they will not receive more representation. If legitimacy in a representative government 
requires the consent of the governed, which develops from all citizens in the state rather 
than just a few in a state, then the legislative entrenchment in the pre-Baker era could not 
be considered legitimate since the nature of authority constrained the political process. 
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Reapportionment and the Authority of “The People” 
While the dissenters attempted to profess authority in terms of prior case law and 
the discretion of the legislative branches, the transition between Gomillion and Baker marks 
the Thucydidean moment, or, the time when the rhetorical tradition of apportionment lost 
its authoritativeness and the rhetoric needed to recreate the tradition. Because of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Baker, Justice Brennan recharacterized the idea of 
representation as a voting right rather than a political question. By engaging in this act of 
redefinition, the plurality’s decision opens discursive space to allow citizens, by using the 
judiciary, to challenge apportionment and districting schemes, which transferred power 
back into the hands of the people and provided a sense of checks and balances to the 
separation of power. After Baker, a political question involved the relationship between 
the branches of the federal government and not the relationship between the federal 
government and the states. The decision of the plurality rests on two sources authority: 
the first source authority rests on the redefinition of the separation of powers in include 
the checks and balances necessary to preserve Constitutional rights and the second source 
of authority rests on the ability of the Justice Brennan to define apportionment as a voting 
right rather than a political question.  
Justice Brennan and the Voice of Authority 
As Perelman and Olbrechts—Tyteca note, “a definition is always a matter of 
choice,” and the person creating or employing a new meaning will claim that this is the 
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only reasonable meaning or the “only meaning corresponding to current usage.”66 To 
combat the long-standing decisions of the Supreme Court and the most important 
rhetorical constraint within the jurisprudence of apportionment and districting, Justice 
William Brennan’s opinion in Baker relies on a rhetorical strategy of redefinition, altering 
the concept of the “political questions” doctrine to remove the rhetorical constraint.  Yet, 
the new authority of the Supreme Court to guide the reapportionment decisions does not 
concern the justices themselves but in the procedural rules guiding the justices. While the 
holding in Luther v. Borden rests on the concept of a political question first developed in 
Marbury v. Madison, the Taney Court failed to provide an explicit explanation or 
principled guideline for the invocation of the political question, relying only on a self-
evident notion that there is a difference between the political and the legal. Even though 
the doctrine lacked a full, judicial understanding, the Supreme Court relied on it to avoid 
answering questions concerning malapportionment or the Guaranty Clause in the 
constitution. Yet, Justice Brennan believed that the persistence of malapportionment 
within the states prevented the United States from reaching the “high principles of 
democracy of democratic egalitarian government” associated with the Constitution.67 By 
narrowing the definition of “political,”68 Justice Brennan diminished the constraints upon 
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the authority of the Supreme Court to decide reapportionment cases, allows himself 
discursive space to recreate apportionment as cases that concern political rights and not 
political questions.  
After reviewing the facts of the case in Baker, which sets the ground for judicial 
action because of legislative inaction, Justice Brennan redefines the procedural rules that 
the Supreme Court must follow, showing how other justices— Justice Frankfurter—, prior 
Supreme Courts— the Supreme Court in Colegrove—, and state legislatures— the Tennessee 
State Legislature— have engaged in misreadings of the Constitution requirements and 
judicial precedent. Necessary to the development of new standards is the ethos of the 
Court, especially as Justice Brennan navigates the checks and balances with the separation 
of powers. To correct the misreadings, Justice Brennan reviews the actions of the district 
court,69 as well as the concepts of jurisdiction of the subject matter,70 standing,71 and 
                                                
69 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196 (1962). According to Justice Brennan, the district court dismissed the 
claim because of want of jurisdiction and failure to state a justiciable cause of action. Further, he noted that 
while the District Court believed a constitutional violation occurred, the district court noted the “judicial 
impotence” to correct the violation (197).  
 
70 Jurisdiction, according to Justice Brennan, concerns whether or not the case arises under the Federal 
constitution, laws or treaties or under Article III, 2; or whether or not this is a case of controversy; or “the 
cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute,” (198). The cause of action in this case arises under 
the constitutional as the challenge concerns the textual referent of the fourteenth amendment and the court 
possesses authority under III, 2 to hear cases that concern the fourteenth amendment.  
 
71 Standing concerns the concerns whether or not the person involved possess a “personal stake,” or suffers 
an injury, to receive a judicial remedy, whether or not he defendant caused or initiated the harm, and 
whether or not the courts can provide a remedy. In Baker, Brennan saw no conflicts with the first two as the 
voters in this case established the disadvantaged they faced at the polls though the judicial remedy would not 
be established until a later case (205 - 206). Further, if the Supreme Court possesses the authority to decide 
electoral cases when state agents or citizens harm other citizens by creating false tallies, refusing to count 
votes or arbitrarily counting votes, and by stuffing the ballot box or other actions that dilute the strength of 
the vote, they can show harm through malapportionment. (208).  
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justiciability.72 By explicitly defining these judicial procedures for the first time, Justice 
Brennan reaccentuates the rhetorical tradition as well as invents the discursive space to 
hear apportionment cases though this new authority rests on the ability of the Supreme 
Court to manage a new ethos of judicial restraint.  
For Justice Brennan, the new definition of a “political question” applies only to 
the relationship between the coordinate branches of government and the separation of 
their powers and not to the relationship between the federal government and a state 
government.73 By narrowing the scope of “political” in just that one sentence, Justice 
Brennan provides more protection for citizens, expands the power of the federal 
government, especially the judiciary, and subordinates the states to the federal 
government, reducing their discretionary power when enacting legislation. Yet, by doing 
to increasing the scope of judicial authority, Justice Brennan’s decision needs to find its 
own self-correction to decrease the ability of the Supreme Court to hear all cases brought 
forth and diminish the apparent ethos of judicial supremacy. Paying reverence to 
precedent, but only precedent that is applicable or correct, he notes that certain 
representative cases provide the “analytical threads” that constitute the political questions 
doctrine, which highlight the categories of federal power dealing with the co-equal 
                                                
72 Justiciability concerns whether or not the case was properly brought before the court in relation to 
whether or not those involved possess standing, mootness, or ripeness. Justice Brennan reviews the “political 
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73 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 - 211 (1962); David E. Merton, The Jurisprudence of Justice William J. 
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branches of government may, but not necessarily, exists beyond the scope of judicial 
review.74 Finally, Justice Brennan lists the new rules of the “political questions” doctrine to 
restore an ethos of judicial restraint involving the separation of powers, which present the 
threshold to judicial power.75  
If the judiciary is to follow these rules, it reveals that the judiciary follows the 
necessary authority to hear and decide a case or to defer the controversy to the proper 
branch of government. The self-imposed judicial requirements institute a legal 
reasonableness that follows the simple belief, and the simplicity is deceiving, that if a 
person presents a perceived constitutional harm and the power to fix that harm does not 
rest with another party or the Supreme Court believes it is not interfering or would be 
imprudent to act and the judiciary can develop a solution to the problem, then the Court 
can procedure to hear arguments in the challenge. In the review of precedents, Justice 
Brennan admits humility that the Supreme Court can be wrong as it has been incorrect in 
this area of law though if the law is incorrect it is incorrect because the justices believe that 
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U.S. 267, 278 (2004). 
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the precedent is bad or no longer possesses authority in society, challenging the 
foundation of the law itself. Also, there is also an admission by Justice Brennan that the 
decisions of the Court will have unavoidable political implications but that is not a reason 
to avoid the case. The Court’s “political questions” doctrine does not exclude the judiciary 
from hearing “political cases” and it is the responsibility of the judiciary employ a 
skepticism to controversies at hand and to the actions of the government by showing “the 
necessity for discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular 
cases.”76 Restoring the doctrine in Marbury, the Court states, “the courts cannot reject as 
‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated "political" 
exceeds constitutional authority.”77 A “political question” can be nothing more than a 
“play on words”78 and unless the judiciary undertakes its action with a judicial skepticism, 
the governmental bodies may violate the constitutional rights of citizen. Of course, what is 
necessary is some textual referent, which Justice Brennan finds in the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Political Questions, Political Rights, and Political Rationality  
After redefining the procedural authority of the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan 
turns his attention to Baker. According to the tests of the political questions doctrine, the 
controversy in Baker exists outside of the nonjusticiable realm of court action as the case 
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does not concern a coequal branch of government or an action abroad or a grave 
disturbance at home. Instead, Baker concerns the interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, which provides judiciable standards that are well “developed and familiar.”79 The 
criticism of Baker is two fold. First, though Justice Brennan’s opinion locates 
apportionment on a clause of the Constitution that the Supreme Court can interpret, it 
does not provide a judicially manageable standard and fails to answer Justice Frankfurter’s 
“remonstration that the Constitution did not provide any guidance to the federal courts 
to justify judicial supervision of the political process.”80 Second, as stated early, Justice 
Frankfurter argues that reliance on the Equal Protection Clause serves just as a mask for 
interpretation of the Guaranty Clause. Yet, for Justice Brennan, the Equal Protection 
Clause provides an escape from the authority of the Guaranty Clause, an escape that was 
not present in Luther. While this case, “in one sense” involves the “allocation of political 
power within a State, and the appellants might conceivably have added a claim under the 
Guaranty Clause,” Justice Brennan argues that it is unnecessary to interpret the equal 
protection clause in relation to the Guaranty Clause since the case law prohibiting judicial 
involvement is clear and “any reliance on that clause would be futile;” however, reliance 
on the Equal Protection Clause is preferable since the clause is “not so enmeshed with 
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those political questions elements,”81 meaning that it prohibits state but not federal 
action.  
 In his division of the Guaranty Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, Justice 
Brennan recreates the focus of apportionment cases from political questions to voting 
rights, beginning a new rhetorical tradition for the judiciary to discern apportionment and 
districting decisions. Throughout Baker, the authority of Justice William Brennan occurs 
through the interaction between the community and the Supreme Court, especially in the 
reconsideration of the past and a “creative reflection” of the political and legal wisdom in 
relation to the community’s experience.82 In the reconsideration of the tradition, Justice 
Brennan attempts judicial reconciliation between the establishment of the political 
questions doctrine from Marbury v. Madison and the political questions doctrine in pre-
Baker lines of cases. Citing the development of the “political questions” doctrine in Luther 
v. Borden, Justice Brennan argues that while the apportionment controversy concerns the 
power of other branches of government and while the judicial tradition that “the 
Guaranty clause is not a repository of judicially manageable standards,” the judicial facts 
does not warrant a categorical judicial ban on judicial considerations of representation.83 
While the Guaranty Clause works for the decision in Luther, it is no longer the only 
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authoritative clause available for judicial interpretation as the Equal Protection Clause 
transforms the relationship between the citizen and the state. Additionally, the Supreme 
Court’s precedent shows that the equal protection clause does not rest on a conditional 
interpretation with the Guaranty Clause. In Pacific States Tel. Co v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 
(1912), 84 a case concerning interpretation of the Guaranty Clause, the Supreme Court 
upheld that the power of interpreting that clause rests with Congress. Yet, this case 
represents the initial use and rejection of the due process and equal protection claims in 
conjunction with the Guaranty Clause.  For Justice Brennan, the decision reveals that the 
Court’s ruling shows that that the fourteenth amendment clauses are unnecessary and, 
consequently, separate from the Guaranty Clause. Consequently, because the of the 
constitutional provisions within the fourteenth amendment, Justice Brennan determines 
that the meaning of Luther is no longer authoritative, diminishing its authority as the 
defining political questions case. 
After reconciling the “political questions” cases, Justice Brennan attempts to 
reconcile the fragmented precedent found within in the pre-Reapportionment Revolution, 
especially with the discrepancies existing between Smiley v. Holm, Colegrove v. Green, and 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot. Justice Brennan argues that in Goillion the Supreme Court struck 
down a districting plan because the Alabama state legislature diminished the meaning of 
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the right to vote and hence the Voting Rights of the black citizens in Tuskegee by 
removing them from city limits and, even though the action of the Alabama State 
Legislature derived from their authority via the political arena their action violated 
constitutional rights.  In Colegrove, the concurring opinion by Justice Rutledge, and not 
the decision by Justice Frankfurter, is the controlling decision and it concerns want of 
equity and not lack of jurisdiction. As Justice Brennan notes, in Colegrove, Justice Rutledge 
believes that because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smiley, the Court possesses the 
authority to hear cases involving apportionment, and the reason for in action in Colegrove 
concerns the lack of time between the decision and the election that would afford relief. 
While the authority of the Constitution within the commands of Article I, 4, Article I, 5, 
Article I, 2 concern congressional elections and not apportionment, the Supreme Court 
has provided its own authority to hear apportionment cases, even if the prior justices 
ignored that authority. In order to fulfill its role as the “final arbitrator of the 
Constitution” and since apportionment is a political right and not a political question, the 
Supreme Court must fulfill its obligation to the people by remanding the decision to the 
district court for further proceedings, especially since there is enough time between the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the eventual decision of the lower court, and the next set of 
lections. If the state of Tennessee is to provide districting for its citizens, then the state 
must treat the citizens equally.  
For Justice Brennan, the decision in Baker concerns the ability of the individual to 
reclaim power usurped by the states. By recharacterizing the political questions doctrine 
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and the basis that apportionment is a constitutionally protected political right like other 
voting rights rather than a political question, Justice Brennan recreates the role of the 
citizen to find redress from state governments.  He writes that the citizens in Baker are 
entitled to a hearing since, “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right 
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives in injury.”85 
Further, for the judiciary to deny the rights of citizens, it would be rejecting its moral 
obligation to the citizens of the United States. According to Justice Brennan, if a citizen 
brings forth a claim under the Constitution then it becomes the responsibility of the 
citizen to demonstrate harm and the responsibility of the judiciary to determine if there is 
a substantial constitutional claim. Refusal to enter the “political thicket” to determine the 
deprivation of “voting rights” would lead to an abdication of responsibility on behalf of 
the judiciary.  
Competing Sources of Authority 
 In Baker, three Justices supply concurring opinions that compete with the holding 
of the case and the vision of democracy by Justice Brennan’s. Justice Potter Stewart, the 
fifth and controlling vote in the case, reads Baker narrowly, stating the decision means that 
the court possesses jurisdiction of the subject matter, it is a jusitciable cause of action 
appropriate to relief, an that the appellants possess standing to bring forth a claim.86 In his 
concurrence, Justice Stewart attempts to narrow the reading of Baker to reconcile the 
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plurality with the dissenters and Baker with precedents. As for the competing visions of 
the Justices, Stewart argues that Baker does not call for equality and does not preclude the 
state from promoting interests. Instead, a state must act rationally to and not discriminate 
against citizens through an arbitrary reapportionment plan. States still possess the ability a 
“wide scope of discretion in effecting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently 
than others,” though citizens possess the ability to counter that treatment, allowing for 
reasonable counter-balancing between urban and rural citizens though and the potential 
for judicial remedies.87 According to this decision, representation works best when there is 
a balance between the state government and the citizens, with the burden of proof upon 
the citizens to prove that a districting plan causes harm.  
 In the second concurrence, Justice Thomas C. Clarke argues that reapportionment 
needs to be governed by rationality and the plan in Baker defies rationality. Not happy 
with the “mental blindness” from the opinion plurality by Justice Brennan or the 
dissenters by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, Justice Clark seeks a middle-ground 
approach that would provide guidance to the judiciary in reapportionment but not 
provide the Supreme Court excessive to interfere with the political process, limiting its 
involvement to egregious cases. Further, it would allow for the state to protect interests 
but prevent them from pursuing plans that are irrational. 
 In his concurrence, Justice Clark explains rationality in terms of following 
constitutional standards or with treating similar counties alike. Rather than following the 
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precedent of the Supreme Court in terms of its reapportionment decisions, Justice Clark 
focuses on decisions only in so far as they rest judgment on the Supreme Court striking 
down or upholding cases where there is a rational policy behind legislative action.88 He 
notes that the constitution of Tennessee calls for the statewide numerical equality of 
representation with certain qualifications and this constitutional provision is rational. Yet, 
the actions of the state legislature have been irrational as it ignores the constitutional 
provisions and allocates representatives by counties and districts that the legislators create 
according to their own discretion, leading to the wide discrepancy in voting strength 
between urban and rural, existing only as a “crazy quilt.”89 Disagreeing with Justice 
Frankfurter, Justice Clark notes that since there is no initiative and referendum available 
to the citizens, “The majority of the voters have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket. 
Tennessee has an ‘informed, civically militant electorate’ and ‘an aroused popular 
conscience,’ but it does not sear ‘the conscience of the people's representatives.’”90 So long 
as the state legislators represent only their constituencies, continue to protect incumbents, 
prevent reapportionment, and refuse constitutional conventions, there will be no 
legislative recourse. 91 Further, while, “It is said that there is recourse in Congress and 
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perhaps that may be,” Congress has never attempted reform in any state, making this 
recourse, from a practical standpoint, without substance. 92  
 In attempting to find middle ground, Justice Clark seeks to rest his opinion of the 
ability of the judiciary to determine the rationality or irrationality of a reapportionment 
plan on a case-by-case basis, which would further involve the judiciary into the political 
thicket more so than Justice Brennan’s implicit call for political equality. For Justice Clark, 
the function of the Supreme Court is to protect national rights and for far too long the 
Supreme Court neglected the national rights of citizens in the area of law; and, by 
deciding these cases, the Supreme Court only enhances its authority as it strengthens 
those rights.93 In order to render a proper decision, the Supreme Court must focus upon 
the rationality in the plan.  As rationality depends on a particular audience or a particular 
judiciary, the ability of state legislatures to ignore their own constitutional commands such 
as the state legislature of Tennessee, ignoring the constitutional provisions for 
representation based on numerical equality, rests with a judicial determination. The 
rationality principle leaves the state of American democracy in flux. If a democratic system 
implies that the preferences of the people should prevail,94 then the decision of Justice 
Clark only partially opens access to representation for the people. By structuring electoral 
system to protect interests before elections, Justice Clark aggress with the dissenters that 
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public opinion should matter only to a degree that the state legislators allow the people to 
matter unless the state legislatures prevent the people from challenging the system.  
 For Justice Douglas, the author of the third opinion for the Supreme Court’s 
intervention, the authority necessary to decide a case develops in the case at hand rather 
than through precedent Baker is “Governed by Gomillion!”95 Even though Chief Justice 
Warren feared that his views would prevent a majority, Justice Douglas would play an 
instrumental role in reading political equality as a predominant value of the Constitution 
though the “One Person, One Vote” from rule his majority opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368 (1963), which answered one of Justice Frankfurter’s major obstacles about 
the Supreme Court’s involvement in reapportionment.96 
In Baker, Justice Douglas desired to set aside the political questions doctrine to 
consider the issue at hand: the “recurring problem of the of the relation of the federal 
courts to state agencies. More particularly, the question is the extent to which a State may 
weigh one person’s vote more heavily than it does another’s.”97 While the constitution set 
numerous provisions about the voting rights, the Constitution itself presents large gaps. 
Yet, with those large gaps, “those who vote for members of Congress do not ‘owe their 
right to the State law in any sense which makes the exercise of the right to depend 
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exclusively on the law of the State.’”98 States possess numerous barriers on employing its 
discretionary power in the area of voting rights if that discretionary power is tantamount 
to discrimination and the question for Justice Douglas concerns whether or not a state 
discriminates against certain groups of citizens if one for a citizen in one county is worth 
eight votes for a citizen in another county or 19 votes for a citizen is a third county. Even 
though this area of law is complex, as many areas of law are complex, since the Supreme 
Court and the federal courts possesses the authority to discern cases involving voting 
rights and the federal government intrudes into the election machinery of the states for 
numerous reasons, the Supreme Court’s area of into this law is nothing new and would 
reconcile the decisions such as Colegrove that serve as exceptions and not the rule.99 
Polit ica l Institutions : Democratic Structures , Judicial Review, and the 
Establishment of a Judicial Restraint 
Law and Democracy: Foundations and Structures 
 In The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., offers his reconceptualization of 
the meaning of the law, declaring that, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience.”100 Breaking from the tradition of Legal Formalism, a view that believes in the 
technicality of the law and that a judge discerns the correct decision through the correct 
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application of the rules,101 Holmes argues that “felt necessities of the time, the prevalent 
moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the 
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to do than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.”102 If Holmes’ view 
of the law is correct, then the law that enables democratic structures must reflect the 
experiences of the law and the experiences of the people.  
In the pre-Baker apportionment decisions, the vision of the law and the vision of 
democracy contradicted the experience. In Colegrove, Justice Frankfurter’s commitment to 
Legal Formalism concluded that the law and precedent requires the “vigilant of the 
people” to secure their political rights through the proper channels of law.103 In Baker, 
Justice Frankfurter argues that a democracy rests on that “relief must come through an 
aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's representatives.”104 
Yet, as Justice Douglas implies, the legal formalism that provides the foundation for 
reapportionment decisions highlights the futility of persuasion and the inability of the 
people to secure their political rights when divisions of power between classes of people 
and their representatives prevents the acceptance of arguments calling for a political 
revolution. Disagreeing with Justice Frankfurter, Justice Clark notes that since there is no 
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initiative and referendum available to the citizens, “The majority of the voters have been 
caught up in a legislative strait jacket. Tennessee has an ‘informed, civically militant 
electorate’ and ‘an aroused popular conscience,’ but it does not sear ‘the conscience of the 
people's representatives.’”105 So long as the state legislators represent only their 
constituencies, continue to protect incumbents, prevent reapportionment, and refuse 
constitutional conventions, there will be no legislative recourse. 106 Justice Clarks notes 
also that while, “It is said that there is recourse in Congress and perhaps that may be,” 
Congress has never attempted reform in any state, making this recourse, from a practical 
standpoint, without substance. 107 
 In Justice Douglas’ concurrence, the laws that create democratic structures must 
rely on the experience of the people and not the formalism of the law. Justice Douglas’ 
concern in apportionment lies not with the intricacy of the law but the correction of a 
perceived wrong to return the law to its correct path. The reapportionment precedents as 
well as the actions of the state legislatures, violates Justice Douglas’ view that the law 
adapts to new conditions. Always willing to reconsider the precedent of the judiciary since 
the justices of the past may not understand the present conditions, Justice Douglas’s 
decision to circumvent Colegrove reflects his belief that reconsidering precedent is a 
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“healthy practice.”108Like Justice Brennan, the moral obligation of the Supreme Court to 
set the law correct overrides the rules of judicial restraint and traditional detachment that 
Justices ought to employ.  In the reapportionment cases, the discrimination at the hands 
of the state legislatures through the maintenance of malappporrtionment constrains the 
individual from participating in government and preserves representation in the past. 
Since this vision of representation ignores the voices of the people in the present, Justice 
Douglas believes that the law ought to mirror reality and, consequently a democratic form 
of government needs representation from the proper democratic structures, making Baker 
the correct decision to fix crisis in reapportionment. 
 In the plurality’s decision, Justice Brennan attempts to reconcile the role of the 
judiciary with the new vision of the law and democracy. When discussing the authority 
and responsibility of the Supreme Court in determining political questions, Justice 
Brennan characterizes the Court justices who possess a moral obligation to the 
Constitution. If a political question concerns the separation of powers this diminishing 
the state governments’ immunity to national judicial scrutiny, and provides an order for 
the federal courts to “act when every possible to protect rights and grievances.”109 With 
this redefinition, Justice Brennan presents the American people with a proposition: 
because of the continued neglect by the state legislatures, we will expand the rights of the 
people and diminish the scope of a political question to cover only the action between the 
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coordinate branches of government as to whether or not the Constitution commits an 
action to another branch of government or whether the action of that branch exceeds its 
authority.110 Yet, the catch for the American people is that only one branch of government 
sits in the position to exert the “delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation,” and, for 
the Supreme Court to engage at this level of interpretation, the Supreme Court, as well as 
the other branches of government and the American people, must accept the 
“responsibility of this Court as the ultimate interpreter.”111  
Justice William Brennan’s opinion in Baker offers a corrective reading of the 
American political process while diminishing the ability of other governmental bodies to 
inflict harm on the process. In Baker, Justice Brennan offers the American people the 
same proposition that James Boyd White states Chief Justice John Marshall offers the 
American people in Marbury v. Madison: “the development, over time, of a self-reflective, 
self-corrective body of discourse that will bind its audience together by engaging them in a 
common language and a common set of practices.”112 Yet, this time, Brennan’s opinion 
appropriates much more than the other branches of government would be willing to 
provide. Because of continued neglect, state legislators contributed to the decline of their 
ethos and their ability to make credible claims on representing all of the people, allowing 
for others to bypass the state legislatures as the sole authority for apportionment and 
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districting.113 Because of this loss in standing and the increase in the imbalance between 
the state and the citizens, Justice Brennan’s opinion argues that this area of law requires a 
new foundation, enabling the judiciary to read into the apportionment law the values that 
are “consistent with the principles of egalitarian dignity” found within the Constitution. 
114 By providing a new foundation for the law, Justice Brennan’s decision in Baker would 
provide a better correlation between the law and experiences, as well as open up the 
judicial forum to a new group of individuals who were unable to seek electoral relief.115 As 
the arbitrator of the constitution, the Supreme Court justice serves as, as Owen Fiss 
describes, the “paramount instrument of public reason.”116 
 Yet, in the process of opening up the federal courts to the judicial and expanding 
the power of the judiciary to hear cases, the Supreme Court creates a problem of ethos. If 
the law concerns what the Justices say the law is, then the Justice need to provide 
constraints on there own power, especially since the Constitution is explicit in its 
command that the state legislatures possess the burden of representation. Consequently, 
the Supreme Court must experience a balancing act to allow for citizens to bring forth 
claims challenging apportionment and districting bills but ensure that the state 
governments retain the power to govern representation.  
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The “New” Judicial Restraint of the Supreme Court 
 In Baker, Justice Brennan reconceptualizes the foundation on which 
apportionment decisions rests to reinvent the authority of the Supreme Court to decide 
reapportionment decisions and to provide citizens an ability to challenge the perceived 
discrimination by the state legislatures. In other words, the purpose of the 
reapportionment decisions, according to John Hart Ely, is to allow for the free and 
popular choice of representatives by the people and not by the states.117 Yet, since the 
Supreme Court alters the foundation for the law, from a view of legal formalism that 
suggests the correctness of a decision depends on the application of rules and precedent to 
the view of legal realism, which suggests that the law concerns experience and not the 
syllogism, the Supreme Court needs to invent limitations to its authority that prevent the 
court from dominating the political arena as it invents its authority to hear case. The 
authority of justice, Owen Fiss argues, does not develop from any “unique moral 
expertise” but from the “limits of office through which they exercise power.”118 
 The immediate failure of Baker as a communicative act concerns the way in which 
Justice Brennan’s decisions ignores his own rules for the political questions doctrine. 
While stating that the judiciary possesses the ability to hear a case if it can develop a 
judicially manageable standard, then a decision that claims an area of law is not a political 
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question ought to contain a judicially manageable standard. While the opinions by 
Justices Brennan and Douglas imply the incorporation of political equality as a standard 
and Justice Clark’s decision calls for a rationality test, the decision lacks a particular 
standard when the lower court rehears arguments in the case.  After the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Baker, the district court waited to provide a ruling on the apportionment in 
question as the Tennessee state legislature attempted reapportionment. After 
reapportioning the state, the district court heard arguments on the constitutionality of 
that plan, and that that while Baker provided “certain guidelines” and not “exact 
standards,” the district court concluded that Tennessee House districts were “rational” as 
they balanced areas with population but the Senate plans were “irrational” plan and 
would not be rational unless it created representation of the basis of population since the 
House created representation on factors other than population.119 In Gray v. Sanders, 
Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court declared that population and 
not rationality would be the basis for representation.  
 Knowing that the Supreme Court needed to reaffirm an ethos of restraint, the 
Supreme Court relied on cases after Baker to reinforce its image. In the process, the 
Supreme Court created a new rhetorical tradition on the basis of legal topoi reflecting this 
judicial restraint. If the Supreme Court is to follow its constitutional responsibility, it 
must protect the rights of citizens from state despotism and protect the right of an 
individual to case a meaningful vote. Yet, on the other hand, the Supreme Court must 
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reaffirm the power of the state to control reapportionment. The ethos of the Supreme 
Court materializes in the way in which the Supreme Court balances the protection of an 
individual’s right and the power of the State to conduct reapportionment.  
One of the most important reoccurring topoi in reapportionment cases is legislative 
primacy in redistricting, qualified with as long as the legislature meets the Court’s 
constitutional requirements. The Court’s argument for the legislative supremacy proceeds 
in the following way. First, the Supreme Court reminds its readers that the Supremacy 
Clause controls the actions between the States and the Federal Government, especially the 
Courts, and that apportionment in that States, based on either their Constitution or 
statute or from legislative action or inaction, needs to comply with the Equal Protection 
Clause.120 Second, even though a plan may be unconstitutional and immediate relief 
should be granted, there will be circumstances, such as where an impending election is 
imminent, where effective relief in reapportionment cases by the Courts should be 
withheld in order for the political process to work. Third, the Supreme Court reminds its 
audience that “legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative 
consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a 
legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely 
fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.121 If the Supreme Court is to 
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enter the “political thicket,” it must do so only when citizens can establish that the state 
fails to protect their right to cast a meaningful ballot.  Furthermore, once the judiciary 
acts, it is to defer to the legislature as much as possible, allowing the political branches to 
assume primary responsibility for the reapportionment and elections. Finally, if there is 
Court involvement, it must allow the proper time for the political process to work. It 
cannot interfere with elections by ruling too soon before an election. There must me 
enough time for the reapportionment to occur and to allow candidates times to adjust to 
the reapportionment.  
 The Supreme Court also engages in a balancing process as it determines how the 
states are to initiate reapportionment but remind the states that they have a duty to 
protect the constitutional rights of the citizens of the states. In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 
U.S. 52 (1964), the Supreme Court rules that citizens possess the burden of proof to 
establish a reapportionment plan is unconstitutional. 122 Unless shown otherwise, state 
actions carries the presumption that it is constitutional and the judiciary will only act if 
citizens can establish otherwise. Yet, while the citizens must bring forth a challenge, the 
state must offer a rational reason for deviation or correct a challenge as soon as possible. 
While Court allowed the states a reasonable amount of time to develop a plan, the 
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reasonable time did not mean waiting for the next census. In Swan v. Adams, 383 U.S. 210 
(1966) the Supreme Court requires that a state possesses no warrant for delaying action 
until the next census as that would result in a delay in effective representation.123 If a 
citizens challenge a plan, then the State must provide a rational basis for deviations in 
population disparity. 124 If it does not provide a rational explanation, the state must 
reapportion.   
In addition to the presumption of apportionment and districting plans, the 
Supreme Court relies on other decisions to reduce its action on reapportionment, 
especially in relation to the design of the district. In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 
(1965), the Supreme Court requires that the Equal Protection clause does not necessarily 
require the creation of only single member districts, allowing for single member, multi-
member, or floterial districts to protect political subdivisions. The Supreme Court would 
later clarify this in Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, (1971), noting that if the judiciary were 
to order a reapportionment plan, then single member districts would be preferable to 
multi-member districts.125 In Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965), the Supreme Court 
rules that appropriate state action to correct malapportionemnt needs to be encouraged, 
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meaning the district courts should step in only when the states fail to reapportion in a 
reasonable time.126  
In each of the decisions, the Supreme Court attempts to find a balance between 
state discretion and the protection of constitutional rights for citizens. In the process of 
establishing this balance, the Supreme Court reaffirms its ethos to hear apportionment 
and districting cases but reaffirms the power of the states to control the process. By doing 
so, citizens still posses the ability to fight for effective representation  but the Supreme 
Court refrains from appropriating the process of representation.  
 Conclus ion: The Acceptance of Polit ical Rights  within the American Republic 
 As mentioned earlier, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that the legitimacy of the 
Court relied upon the “public confidence of its moral sanction.” For this reason, Justice 
Frankfurter believed it was best if the judiciary remained on the sidelines as the political 
parties played political football over reapportionment. Unfortunately, for Justice 
Frankfurter, he was unable to persuade the Warren Court about his position. For Justice 
Frankfurter, his decision in Baker would be his Swan Song for legal formalism on the 
Court as in the weeks after Baker, Justice Frankfurter suffered a stroke and resigned soon 
there after. Justice Harlan, who provided the strongest dissent after Justice Frankfurter 
resigned from the Supreme Court, acquiesced eventually. Even though Justice Harlan 
believed that Baker, Reynolds, and the other decisions were wrong constitutionally, Justice 
                                                
126 Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 410 (1965). 
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Harlan cited “judicial responsibility” and the idea “so long as those cases remain the law, I 
must bow to them” in support of the actions of the Warren Court.127  
As Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan offered the minority position on the 
Court, they offered the minority decision in the political realm as well. Justice 
Frankfurter’s beliefs about the judiciary remaining outside of the political thicket occurred 
at a time when the public’s views of reapportionment shifted. According to Howard Ball 
in The Warren Court’s Conception of Democracy, Baker arrived at a time when it was 
“‘political feasible’” for the Supreme Court, given a Court majority favoring change, and a 
national majority likely to favor the change (and therefore aid in the implementation 
aspect of any future decision)”128 to pronounce an alteration in case law. Further, as John 
Hart Ely notes, even some of the critics of Baker, such as Louis Jaffe, noted that the 
decision “enhanced the prestige of the Court.”  
While certainly not everyone altered their opinion of Baker and “Impeach 
Warren” signs existed throughout the South, some Americans believed that Baker was the 
correct decision and others started to rethink the meaning of representation within the 
United States. President Kennedy offered his complete support of the Supreme Court’s 
decision and Attorney General Robert Kennedy believed that it was a “landmark 
decision;” further, Senators Kenneth Keating (D-NY) Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) believed 
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128 Howard Ball, The Warren Court’s Conception of Democracy, 90. Note: Tennessee was one of five states where 
there were legal challenges to state reapportionments. The others were Michigan, New Jersey, Maryland, and 
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that it was the correct decision.129 According to Richard C. Cortner, out of the 63 leading 
metropolitan newspapers, 39 favored the Court’s opinion, ten opposed it, and the 
remained expressed “neutral or confused opinion.”130 In 44 states, less than 40% of the 
state’s population could elect a majority of the elected representatives.131 Five months after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker, 22 states fought battles in their state legislatures 
over reapportionment.132  
As The New York Times noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker was both 
“inevitable” and “inconceivable.” A change in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
occurred because the Justices in Baker possessed views on human liberty and American 
democracy that differed from the Justices who decided Colegrove.133 Baker, according to an 
editorial in The Washington Post, represented a “momentous decision,” and initiated the 
“first mile of what must inevitably be a long journey,” to secure “representation of people 
(rather than cows or acres).”134 Royee Hanson, the president of the Maryland Committee 
for Fair Representation, declared, “This may be a Magna Carta for urban people.”135 The 
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Wall Street Journal noted that though the warnings of Justice Felix Frankfurter, which 
concerned the inevitable friction of federalism and the proper remedy ought to be the 
people, the paper noted, “that would be indeed the right remedy, if the states would do 
it.”136 Further, the paper stated, “there can hardly be any serious arguments about the 
inequality of the situation, [in Tennessee.]”137 The Washington Post stated that the Court’s 
decision would be welcome, even if it may disturb the peace of mind of judges, and will be 
successful unless the Court loses its prestige.138 Further, the report by The Wall Street 
Journal noted that in response to Baker governors and state legislators should reapportion 
“before the Federal Government does it for them.”139 The New York Times reminded the 
New York State Legislators it was their “clear duty” to “undertake the correction of 
existing evils voluntarily” before the judiciary ordered to do so.140  
Public complaints against the Court’s decision argued against the Court’s 
expanded jurisdiction and the disruption of the political process. The New York Times 
reported that after Baker, the Justices “added hugely” to its jurisdiction though “exercises 
in semantics” by Justice Brennan and, consequently, the High Court would possess the 
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power to “decide which kind of apportionment is ‘rational’ and which is not.”141 The New 
York Times quoted Senator Richard B. Russell, (D-GA) who charged that Baker provided, 
“another major assault on our constitutional system,” and threatened the rights of citizens 
and “the cornerstone of our great civilization,” the system of checks and balances, “which 
the majority of the Supreme Court has set out to destroy.” Russell added, “if the people 
really value their freedom… they will demand that the Congress curtail and limit the 
jurisdiction being exercised by this group before it is too late.”142  
Prophetically, The Wall Street Journal discussed the ways in which Baker could 
transform the political landscape and the distribution of power in the state legislatures. 
The paper stated that Baker would allow:  
Metropolitan liberals to wrest control of some state legislative bodies from the 
rural Republicans in the North and West and from conservative Democrats in the 
South; lead to great state spending on such urban problems as transportation, 
schools, slum clearance; bring new prestige, power and patronage to metropolitan 
political machines as that gain strength in state legislatures; and trigger more rapid 
desegregation efforts in the South as urban leaders gain new leverage vis-a-vis their 
more tradition bound rural counterparts.143 
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During the 1970s, the Supreme Court’s decisions focused on the transfer of power and 
the attempts to block that transfer as it discussed the consequences of apportionment on 
according to class, racial conflict, and communities of interest. Another article from The 
Wall Street Journal stated that the transfer of power from rural to urban may allow the 
political machines in urban areas to gain more power, increasing Washington’s power; 
however, such objections “cannot do away with the basic problem, which is that urban 
voters have been increasingly disenfranchised over the years.” Since the state legislators did 
not reapportion to provide the voters an opportunity to speak, the state legislatures 
ensured that the citizens would turn to the federal government as they had no other 
available means to redress grievances.144  
 Representatives in Tennessee based their favoritism of the decision on its 
usefulness for their cause. Congressional Republican Howard Baker believed that is was a 
welcome decision since it would increase Republican representation in the Tennessee.145 
The former chairman of the Republican State Executive Committee Guy L. Smith 
believed that the decision was the beginning of a “political revolution” that would give 
representation to “urban areas” and republicans throughout the state, developing into the 
beginning of a “real two-party system.”146 Through there were no open vows of defiance 
against the Supreme Court some of the representatives passively discussed their reluctance 
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to support the decision. State Representative James H. Cummings, an opponent of 
reapportionment, stated that the legislature would be at a “complete loss” and the courts 
would have to take control of the process since the legislature could not decide how to 
create districts.147 One rural representative stated that reapportionment would be like 
integration: “the Supreme Court already has shoved integration down our throats, and 
now it is trying to do the same with reapportionment…. Apparently its formula s more 
Negros and less money for rural areas.”148 
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court develops its authority to enter the political 
thicket to balance out the power between the states and the people within the states. 
Because of the judicial precedent established in Luther v. Borden and the pre-
Reapportionment Revolution cases, the Supreme Court’s most important task in these 
cases is the development of judicial authority to declare apportionment cases justiciable in 
a legal and not political manner. In order to do this, the Supreme Court redefines the 
“political question” doctrine, making apportionment a political right and not a political 
question. Consequently, the Supreme Court diminishes the unchecked power of the state 
and, seemingly, transfers control of the political process to the people of the states, with 
the goal of carving out space in American society for political dialogue. Of course, to 
ensure the transfer of power, the Supreme Court increases the ability f the federal courts 
to hear challenges to state discretionary power.  
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In addition to transferring power, throughout these reapportionment cases, the 
Supreme Court develops criteria to judge the enactment of authority and legitimacy in 
reapportionment and representation cases and, in the process, the Supreme Court 
reestablishes an ethos of judicial restraint. First, the voters must show the judiciary that 
the state government discriminates against voters. Second, the voters must show the 
judiciary that the political process eliminates their voice and the political process is not 
subject to reform. Simply losing an election is not a criterion for having no voice; 
however, if the voters show that there is no chance for change and there would be little 
chance for change without judicial relief, the voters can establish a prima facie case for 
discrimination. Third, the judiciary must establish that the reapportionment rests 
primarily in the hands of the state legislatures until the citizens can establish charges of 
invidious discrimination against the state legislatures. In the process, the Supreme Court 
balances the rights of the citizens to bring forth claims and the ability of the state 
legislatures to conduct their constitutional duties.  
Yet, missing from this discussing is the focus of representation. One of the major 
faults of the Baker decision is that it fails to establish a judiciable manageable standard to 
discern the scope of relief. As the number of legal cases challenging state and 
Congressional reapportionment rose after Baker, it was apparent that the Supreme Court 
needed to determine the proper resolution for reapportionment. With this in mind, I will 
now turn to the examination of the meaning of representation, or, the meaning of “One 
Person, One Vote.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
REAPPORTIONMENT, REPRESENTATION, AND THE RHETORIC OF 
CONSENT: THE INSITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL EQUALITY 
 
This Court's apportionment and voting rights decisions soundly reflect a deepening 
conception, in keeping with the development of our social, ethical, and religious 
understanding, of the meaning of our great constitutional guaranties. As such, they have 
reinvigorated our national political life at its roots so that it may continue its growth to 
realization of the full stature of our constitutional ideal….. A vote is not an object of art. It 
is the sacred and most important instrument of democracy and of freedom. In simple 
terms, the vote is meaningless - it no longer serves the purpose of the democratic society - 
unless it, taken in the aggregate with the votes of other citizens, results in effecting the will 
of those citizens provided that they are more numerous than those of differing views. That 
is the meaning and effect of the great constitutional decisions of this Court. In short, we 
must be vigilant to see that our Constitution protects not just the right to cast a vote, but 
the right to have a vote fully serve its purpose.1 
 
The fact is, however, that Georgia's 10 Representatives are elected "by the People" of 
Georgia, just as Representatives from other States are elected "by the People of the several 
States." This is all that the Constitution requires…. All of the appellants do vote. The 
Court's talk about "debasement" and "dilution" of the vote is a model of circular 
reasoning, in which the premises of the argument feed on the conclusion. Moreover, by 
focusing exclusively on numbers in disregard of the area and shape of a congressional 
district as well as party affiliations within the district, the Court deals in abstractions 
which will be recognized even by the politically unsophisticated to have little relevance to 
the realities of political life.2 
 
 
                                                
1 Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 249 – 250 (1966). In Fortson v. Morris, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Georgia’s method of allowing the state legislature to choose the governor of the state when the candidates 
failed to received majority of the popular vote was constitutional, overruling the district court’s decision. In 
his dissent, Justice Fortas wrote that this decision violates the “One Person, One Vote” rule of Wesberry and 
Reynolds because of the current malapportionment in Georgia, which was being “worked out” after the 
Supreme Court cases of Gray v. Sanders, Fortson v. Dorsey, Fortson v. Toombs, and Toombs v. Fortson. Because of 
the malapportionment the majority of legislatures, who represent the minority of the people, possessed the 
power to select the governor of the state.  
 
2 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 24 – 25 (1964). 
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Equality  in the Constitution: Linco ln at Gettysburg 
On the afternoon of November 19, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln joined in 
the dedication ceremony for the Battle at Gettysburg, the turning point of the Civil War. 
On that day, Lincoln was not the featured orator of the day, just an after thought. The 
featured speaker of the day, Edward Everett, offered an invitation to the unpopular 
president since Lincoln, after all, was the president of the United States. By inviting 
President Lincoln, Everett hoped that the president would to offer “a few appropriate 
remarks” for the occasion but that was all. 
Though his speech lasted just under three minutes in length, Lincoln’s 272 words 
proclaimed a turning point for the constitution as he reconstituted the fundamental 
values of the country as he read a commitment to political equality in to the governing 
text. President Lincoln’s speech symbolized the progression of representative government, 
beginning with a government created by the founders and ending with a government “of 
the people, by the people, and for the people.” He transformed a Constitution of slavery 
into a constitution of equality; he reconstructed a Constitution for and of the few to a 
Constitution for and of the many.  
Edwin Black writes that, at key moments in time, individuals confront the choice 
of defining who they are, what they believe in, and what mark they will leave on history. 3 
When making his definitional choice, President Lincoln “concluded the existence of 
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slavery presented a consuming crisis in self-definition.”4 According to Gary Willis, 
Lincoln, “cleared[ed] the infected atmosphere of American history itself, tainted with 
official sins and inherited guilt. He altered the [constitution] from within, by appeal from 
its letter to the spirit, subtly changing the recalcitrant stuff of that legal compromise, 
bringing it to its own indictment.”5 Lincoln’s words provided a new way of speaking about 
the country as he read a principle of political equality into the constitution and, 
consequently, a principle of democracy to govern the country. Yet, for 100 years, that 
principle of equality, like the promises of liberty and equality for all, would remain 
unfulfilled.  
While President Lincoln provided a new moral reading of the Constitution in 
November of 1863, the Supreme Court returned to that reading almost a century later 
and relied on it to guide its legal decisions. On an ethical level, no longer would the legal 
document leave individuals at a disadvantage; no longer would the legal document exclude 
equality; no longer would self-government only apply to those favored by the state. 
Through the reapportionment revolution, Gray v. Sanders, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds 
v. Sims, the Supreme Court reconstituted the United States in Lincoln’s vision of a 
government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” In the process, the 
Supreme Court institutionalized political equality in the electoral process to preserved the 
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right to vote as the “basic political right” since it preserves all rights.6 No longer would 
citizens understand representation and democracy in terms of the discretion of the state 
legislatures; instead, after the Supreme Court’s decisions, the meaning of democracy 
would occur through understanding of the citizens’ experience of democracy. 
Consequently, the legitimacy of democracy would concern how the availability of the 
democratic experience to the greatest number of individuals as possible at all levels of 
government.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the Reapportionment Revolution serve as a 
means by which the majority of the Supreme Court provides the new moral and legal 
characteristics of representation for state and congressional districts. At issue in these 
decisions are the meaning of representation and the notion of consent between citizens 
and their legislators. In this debate, the Supreme Court attempts to balance out the 
competing interests of the equality of the citizen to engage in representation and the 
liberty of the state to conduct representation. Through these decisions, the Court 
concerns itself with the institutionalization of political equality as the guiding 
characteristic of representation, allowing for citizens to engage in the present rather than 
have self-government dictated from voices in the past. Through the reapportionment 
decisions, the Court characterizes representation as a process by which deliberation is to 
occur without interference of the state to prefigure the results by privileging interests. In 
the balance lies, on one side, the characterization of our political institutions as republican 
                                                
6 Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 300 (1886). 
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in nature as representatives seeks to defend interests and the characterization of our 
political system as democratic in nature as representatives seek to defend citizens. In the 
Reapportionment decisions, the majority of the Supreme Court chooses the later and 
seeks to use reapportionment as a way in which to provide citizens a public space for 
dialogue. Yet, these decisions do not eliminate the legislature’s ability to promote interests 
or pursue rational or objective interests within the state; these decisions provide a way for 
citizens to engage in the process to exert influence on elections without the coercion of 
the state legislature to decide the outcome of the elections and, hence, the focus of the 
state, without consent from the citizens. 
Noting the connection between the performance of public address and the 
development and understanding of political philosophy, Michael William Pfau argues that 
the understanding of republicanism centers on an understanding of time. Pfau writes that 
“time is the dimension of civic republican political theory most productive for developing 
interpretive theories to account for the complex internal dynamic of rhetorical texts.”7 
                                                
7 Michael William Pfau, “Time, Tropes, and Textuality: Reading Republicanism in Charles Sumner’s ‘Crime 
Against Kansas,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 6.3 (2003): 387. Drawing from the work of J.G.A. Pocock and 
Michael Leff, Pfau focuses on the relation of time and mortality in political thought and public address to 
develop an interpretive theory of understanding republicanism since, “the nexus of Pocock and Leff suggests 
the promise of reading orations as iconic representations of civic republicanism’s ‘problem of time’ and 
republicanism’s assumptions about the cycles of decay through which all republics must pass indicate the 
connection between this political theory and the pedagogical and hermeneutical strategy known as 
imitation,” (387). For Pocock, the problem of time concerns the “problem of maintaining a particular 
existence, that instability was the characteristic of particularity and time the dimension of instability.” See 
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 75 – 76. According to Pfau, “temporal finitude of the 
oratorical text is at the core of Michael Leff’s critical practice,” as he connects the “text’s time and political 
time, writing that ‘the meaning of the speech progresses through time to reconfigure the audience’s 
perception of both space and time relative to public events.,” (387). See Michael C. Leff, “Rhetorical Timing 
in Lincoln’s ‘House Divided’ Speech,” The Van Zelst Lecture in Communication (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University School of Speech, May 1983), 5.   
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Building upon Pfau’s work, I argue that the necessary understanding of the meaning of 
our Constitutional democracy rests upon our understanding of the democratic experience 
necessary to sustain it. In the Supreme Court’s Reapportionment Revolution cases, the 
opinions by the Supreme Court Justices reconstruct the characterization and process of 
representation, focusing the meaning of democracy on the greatest quantity of participants 
to ensure a legitimate form of government. First, I will examine the social context of the 
revolution to show why the Supreme Court needed to provide a coherent vision of 
representation through the development of legal standards. Second, I will examine the 
institutionalization of political equality and the characteristics of representation necessary 
for the democratic experience. Third, I will examine how the institutionalization of 
equality alters the political institutions at the federal, state, and local level, especially in 
relation to the implementation of rationally objective apportionment plans. I will begin 
first with a discussion of the narrative of progression in representation, which provides 
presence to the Supreme Court’s understanding of the meaning of representation.  
Social Context: The Advent of the Democratic Exper ience 
Competing Perspectives of Representation 
In Baker, the Supreme Court decided to allow the lower courts and the state 
legislatures to develop an rational standard appropriate to the exigencies and needs of the 
state rather than create a uniform judicially manageable standard for all states. Of course, 
it did not take long for the issue to return to the Supreme Court. Within a year after the 
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Supreme Court’s in Baker, petitioners filed 75 cases throughout the country.8 Within two 
years of Baker, petitioners challenged districting plans in 41 states.9 In those cases, the 
lower courts found 26 apportionment schemes unconstitutional even without a judicially 
enforceable set of standards under the Equal Protection Clause and not knowing what 
constituted an appropriate deviation from “equal protection,” whether or not equal 
protection applied to both houses, and whether or not the people of a state could protest 
inequality of representation.10 Without clear standards, the reapportionment problem 
returned to the Supreme Court.  
The fact that before Reynolds the government in any form— whether it were 
legislative, judicial, or executive— and at any level— whether it were county, state, or 
federal— failed to determine the meaning of representation is hardly surprising. The 
Supreme Court’s uncertainty about a judicial manageable standard symbolizes the general 
uncertainty about representation throughout the history of the United States. This 
uncertainty develops from competing perspectives over the implementation of 
representation and the refusal to adopt the one representative anecdote to determine the 
scope of representation within the United States. Yet, the disagreements themselves 
become instructive as they contribute to the mythos of representation in the American 
system of government. This development of an American mythos, according to Bruce 
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Ackerman, fosters a collective self-definition and its “re-telling plays a critical role in the 
ongoing construction of national identity.”11  Narratives, according to Hayden White, are 
not a neutral discursive form but rather they reveal ontological and epistemic choices with 
“distinct ideological and even specifically political implications.”12 In both legal and 
political forms, the history of representation in the United States is the story of inclusion 
and exclusion of voices in participatory government at the expense of partisan interests. 
While the ideals of the country, such as the equality of  “All Men” in the Declaration and 
“We the People” in the Constitution, expressed one narrative, the political reality 
displayed another narrative. 
Historically, electoral requirements in the early Republic served to exclude rather 
than include citizens from civic participation. Under the original Constitutional order, the 
Republic denied blacks and women the rights to vote, protected a group right to vote via 
the slave owners’ codification of the unnamed “Persons,” and provided for the protection 
of state interests via the Senate. Some of the Founding Fathers distrusted democracy, e.g. 
James Madison and Elbridge Jerry,13 and allowed for the necessary exclusion of voters 
from the polls. State requirements allowed only freeholders, i.e. the landed gentry, to vote 
                                                
11 Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
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13 Elbridge Gerry feared the “danger of the leveling spirit” and believed that the “evil we experience flow 
from an excess of democracy.” See James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1966), 655. In Federalist X, James Madison expressed fear that the 
majority would intrude on the rights of the minority, especially in regards to property rights. See James 
Madison, “Federalist X,” in The Federalist, ed. William Brock, (London, Phoenix Press, 2000), 41 - 48.  
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because they possessed a stake in society.14 Since non-freeholders possessed no stake in 
society, conventional wisdom dictated that they were political slaves and their voice could 
be purchased and controlled. Further, in some states, certain religious believers were 
denied the right to vote, though those restrictions diminished over time.15 
For those who could vote, especially for representatives to serve in Congress, equal 
representation was important, as was the protection of partisan interests. During the 
Constitutional Convention, the delegates agreed that the number of constituents for 
representation should not exceed 30,000 inhabitants per representative, which implied 
political equality.16 Yet equally important was the protection of certain interests, the 
Constitution provided for an institutional means of balances interests between the North 
and the South as the agreement over the Constitution and the presidential election system 
represented allowed for the protection of Northern interests and free states in the Senate 
while the House allowed for the protection of Southern interests and slave states.17 One 
way of understanding the Federal Constitution and state constitutions is to see them as a 
means to preserve competing ideologies over representation.  
                                                
14 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States, (New York: 
Basic Books, 2000), 5.  
 
15 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: 7. 
 
16 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, 655.  
 
17 Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 103. According to Graber, Southerners expected the population in the South to grow and population 
in the North decline. Further, the Southerners did not expect the growth of population in the West, which 
diminished the power of the South. Yet, it is uncertain if the Founders believed that the Constitution would 
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While the original set of compromises allowed for the exclusion of voices, over 
time, the States and the Constitution allowed for the extension of voices via the rights to 
vote, though the extension for one group did not meant the extension of the right to vote 
for other groups without a voice. According to Alexander Keyssar, during the early 19th 
century, the right to vote extended to new groups because of socioeconomic and 
institutional developments such as, “widespread change in the social structure and social 
composition of the nation’s population; the appearance or expansion of conditions under 
which the material interests of the enfranchised could be served by broadening the 
franchise of; and the formation of broadly based political parties that competed for 
vote.”18 By the middle of the 19th century, the right to vote extended to mechanics, non-
freeholders, blacks— who were not slaves—, and immigrants. By 1870, the Constitution 
protected the right to vote for blacks via the 15th amendment, though that right has been 
tampered with throughout the country, especially in the South. By 1920, the right to vote 
was extended, graciously, to women via the 19th amendment. By the 1960s, the right to 
vote was near universal within the United States. 
As this historical record suggests, the original understanding and application of the 
right to vote has been in conflict with the extension and progression of the right to vote. 
Throughout the history of suffrage in the United States, the right to vote moved from a 
social and political right to a fundamental right; the right to vote encompassed both a 
political language and a legal language. Because of the conflicting standards and 
                                                
18 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: 34. 
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applications of the right to vote and the desire to deny the right to vote, the political 
branches left open a door for the judiciary to provide an authoritative interpretation to 
the meaning of representation so long as the judiciary did not instruct the legislature on 
how to represent. As the competing narratives reached the Supreme Court in the 1960s, 
the Supreme Court faced competing rhetorical dilemmas as to how the Supreme Court 
ought to write about representation. Should the Court reconsider its decision in Baker and 
remove itself form the political thicket, allowing the states to determine their own course 
of action? Should the Supreme Court allow the inferior courts to develop their own 
standards, which would allow competing standards of representation and, possibly, 
discrimination in the states? Which vision of suffrage would be more important: the 
original narrative of exclusion, the narrative of state discretion, or the narrative of 
progressive and inclusion? It is these questions that faced the Supreme Court during the 
next round of reapportionment decisions. 
Legal Context of the Reapportionment Revolution 
In November of 1963, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) and, in February of 1964, decided not only that congressional 
reapportionment was justiciable but also that the Constitution intended the establishment 
of the “One Person, One Vote” rule. Wesberry developed from a malapportionment claim 
as voters from Georgia argued that population disparities in electoral districts debased 
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their votes and, in addition, 30 years of legislative inactivity worsened the disparities.19 The 
District Court ruled that even though there were great disparities, this case constituted a 
political question and it could not decide this case for want of equity. The majority of the 
Supreme Court disagreed. In the majority’s, Justice Black rejected Justice Frankfurter’s 
opinion that only Congress possessed “exclusive authority” under Article I, 4 to protect 
“the right of citizens to vote for Congressmen,” and stated that since Marbury v. Madison 
the Supreme Court defended constitutional rights from “legislative destruction” and “the 
right to vote is too important in our free society to be stripped of judicial protection by 
such an interpretation of Article I.”20 After Wesberry, the governing standard of Article I, 2, 
which states Representatives be chose “by the People of the several” means “as nearly as is 
practicable “ that “one man's [sic] vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much 
as another's,”21 making the “One Person, One Vote” rule applicable to Congressional 
electoral districts. 
                                                
19 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, (1964). Prior to Wesberry, the last apportionment occurred in 1931. The 
petitioners’ electoral district, the fifth district, contained 823,680 persons, the ideal or ideal district 
contained 394,312, and a rural district, the ninth district, contained 272,154. The petitioners alleged that 
the State deprived them of the right to vote on the basis of Article One, Section Two, the Equal Protection, 
the Due Process, and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the fourteenth amendment, which “provides 
that ‘Representation shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective number,” 
(3). 
 
20 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 - 7 (1964). 
 
21 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7- 8 (1964). Justice Black states that in the early Republic, statewide 
elections did not diminish the value of a ballot as the reliance on single member districts did in Wesberry: 
“To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter to our 
fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives 
elected "by the People," a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional 
Convention,” (8). 
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In 1964, the Supreme Court applied the “One Person, One Vote” rule to both 
houses within a state government in Reynolds v. Sims.22 According to Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, the decision in Reynolds placed in importance only behind the Supreme Court’s 
decision Baker as it represented Warren’s fundamental commitment to fairness and 
democracy.23  The legal action in this base began before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Baker and continued two-year past as the courts involved deferred to both the decisions of 
the Supreme Court and the discretion of the state legislature. Like Baker, in Reynolds voters 
alleged serious vote dilution and debasement due to legislative inaction. Despite 
requirements by Alabama’s constitution for representation to be based on population and 
in accordance with the census, the Alabama state legislature protected counties and failed 
to reapportion from 1901 to 1961.24  
After a hearing in a district court after the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker, the 
state legislature attempted to resolve the apportionment problem to satisfy the state and 
                                                
22 Reynolds was one of six apportionment cases the Supreme Court handed down on the same day. On June 
15th, 1964, the Court released decisions in six reapportionment cases over reapportionment controversies in 
Alabama, Delaware, Virginia, Maryland, New York and Colorado. 
 
23 Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made, (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006), 425.  
 
24 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 539 - 540 (1964). Pursuant to the Alabama constitution, the Alabama 
legislature consisted of 106 representatives and 35 senators for the State’s 67 counties with each county in 
Alabama receiving one representative and each senatorial district receiving one senator. For the Senate, each 
district should be “as nearly equal to each other in the number of inhabitants,” and receive one 
representative; for the House, “representation in the legislature shall be based on population, and such basis 
of representation shall not be changed by constitutional amendments.” The plaintiffs in the case alleged, 
first, that since population growth in the counties developed unevenly, populous counties were subject to 
serious discrimination; second, the failure of the legislature to reapportion denied the voters “equal suffrage 
in free and equal elections…and the equal protection of the laws,” in violation of both the constitution of 
Alabama and the constitution of the United States via the fourteenth amendment; and, third, the voters 
exhausted all other forms of relief and the Alabama legislature demonstrated clearly, by their inaction, no 
reapportionment would occur, (540).  
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federal requirements of equal population or, at the very least, follow Justice Clark’s 
suggestion in Baker and relieve the most “egregious discrimination” by “releasing the 
strangle hold on the legislature sufficiently so as to permit the newly elected body to enact 
a constitutionally valid and permanent reapportionment plan.”25 However, the State 
legislature refused to comply. Under an “extraordinary” legislative session in response to 
the District Court, the Alabama Legislature developed two reapportionment plans but 
neither completely solved the inequality of representation. The first proposed was the “67-
Senator Amendment,” which gave each county one senator and one representative and 
allocated the remaining 39 members of the House based on population. The second 
proposal, the “Crawford-Webb Act,” which would take effect in 1966 if the Amendment 
failed, called for the creation of 35 senatorial districts with each district receiving one 
senator, and apportioning the 106 members of the House so that each county would 
receive one member and the other 39 would be based on a rough population basis. The 
District Court ruled that neither plan met the necessary constitutional requirements since 
25.1% of the population resided in districts represented by a majority of the members of 
the Senate and only 25.7% of the population resided in districts that could elect a 
majority in the House.26 Consequently, the lower court ordered a temporary plan based 
                                                
25 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. 543 (1964). 
 
26 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). According to Reynolds, Population-variance ratios of up to about 
41-to-1 existed in the Senate, and up to about 16-to-1 in the House. Bullock County, with a population of 
only 13,462, and Henry County, with a population of only 15,286, each were allocated two seats in the 
Alabama House, whereas Mobile County, with a population of 314,301, was given only three seats, and 
Jefferson County, with 634,864 people, had only seven representatives. With respect to senatorial 
apportionment, since the pertinent Alabama constitutional provisions had been consistently construed as 
prohibiting the giving of more than one Senate seat to any one county, Jefferson County, with over 600,000 
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on 67-Senator Amendment and the Crawford-Webb Act for the November 1962 
elections. After the elections of 1962, the legislature failed to adopt a reapportionment 
plan, and the legislature, which meets biannually, would not meet until 1965. 
Furthermore, no other political remedies were available since Alabama does not allow for 
initiative procedures, constitutional amendments needs the support of three-fifths of both 
houses and approval from the majority of the people, and a constitutional convention 
needs the support of the people and a majority of both houses. As a result of the facts of 
the case, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.27  
In Reynolds, as with the other five cases decided on June 15th, the Supreme Court 
faced controversies that involved gross malapportionment in voting districts for both 
Senators and Representatives at the state level. In each case, the Supreme Court ruled that 
any deviation from “One Person, One Vote,” for both the House and the Senate in each 
state violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment and, if the 
judiciary is to consider an apportionment plan for one house in a state, it must rule on 
both houses in the state. Further, according to Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 
                                                                                                                                           
people, was given only one senator, as was Lowndes County, with a 1960 population of only 15,417, and 
Wilcox County, with only 18,739 people,” (545 – 546).   
 
27 Reynolds itself involves three cases, Reynolds (No. 23), Vann et al. v. Baggett, Secretary of State of Alabama 
(No 27), et al., and McConnell et al. v. Baggett, (No. 41). According to Reynolds, “Appellants in No. 23 
contend that the District Court erred in holding the existing and the two proposed plans for the 
apportionment of seats in the Alabama Legislature unconstitutional, and that a federal court lacks the power 
to affirmatively reapportion seats in a state legislature. Cross-appellants in No. 27 assert that the court below 
erred in failing to compel reapportionment of the Alabama Senate on a population basis as allegedly 
required by the Alabama Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. Cross-
appellants in No. 41 contend that the District Court should have required and ordered into effect the 
apportionment of seats in both houses of the Alabama Legislature on a population basis,” (554).  
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713 (1964), even if the people of a state employ a state initiative to create a system of 
representation that prefers the protection of interests to equal population, that plan is still 
unconstitutional.28  
As the exigence of the Reapportionment Revolution suggests, state legislatures 
created reapportionment plans to secure the protection of interests over the voice of 
citizen. In this view of representation, the state legislatures possessed a distrust of citizens 
to know or to do what is best for the state, which reinforced the anxiety over corruption as 
a threat to republican governments as those without the ability to cast a meaningful vote 
did not possess the necessary virtue to sustain a Republic.29 Citizens were not thought to 
possess rational or objective interests because they would not do what is best for the state 
and, instead, pursue policies that would protect self-interest over public good. Urban 
voters, consequently, received a diminished voice because their interests were separate 
from the interests of the rural areas or of the state. 
Under this view, the state legislatures debased the voter of those in urban areas as 
state legislatures characterized representation as a process that protects interests and not 
individuals By favoring interests over people, the state of Alabama enclosed its citizens in a 
political vacuum, whereby the issues were settled and the interests were favored. This form 
of representation implied that the state was not neutral as it could proceed to develop the 
interests that chose regardless of what the population wanted as it denied citizens the 
choice of determining the focus on the state. Further, it eliminated the possibility for the 
                                                
28 Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 - 737 (1964). 
 
29 See J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, ix.  
 193 
community to even question that the focus of the state should be to preserve the balance 
between rural and urban and to protect the agricultural industry. Persuasion in this 
scenario was almost unnecessary, especially throughout the state, since the representatives 
of the state possessed the power to make decisions for that state without adhering to the 
wishes of some of the people in the states. Because of this, the Supreme Court provided 
new guidelines for apportionment decisions in a hope to institutionalize equality. By 
institutionalizing equality, the Supreme Court hoped that fairness would be the result. 
 Ideology of Representation: Institutionalizing Polit ica l Equality  
Debating the Narrative of Representation 
In the Reapportionment Revolution, a majority of the Supreme Court provide a 
corrective reading to the Constitution by basing its argument on the progressive view of 
representation, restoring the original vision of political equality embedded in the 
Constitution.30 As Jonathan W. Still notes there are numerous definitions of political 
equality, each with their own selections, reflections and deflections, and each with their 
own analytical problems.31 In developing his own definition, Stills develops six criteria for 
                                                
30 In the eight “Revolution cases” discussed in the previous section, Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo 
Black, Justice William Douglas, Justice William Brennan, Justice Byron White, and Justice Arthur Goldberg 
form a consistent majority for the advancement of political equality. Justice Harlan dissents in each case as it 
is unwarranted judicial power. Justice Clark and Justice Thomas Clark and Justice Potter Stewart alter their 
vote, dissenting in Wesberry, WMCA, and Lucas. Justice Stewart dissented also in Tawes.  
 
31 Jonathan W. Still, “Political Equality and Election Systems,” Ethics 91.3 (1981): 375 – 377. Still includes 
the following definitions of political equality: Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, 
and Welfare, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 41: "Control over govern- mental decisions is shared so 
that the preferences of no one citizen are weighted more heavily than the preferences of any other one 
citizen," with each member having an equal vote, the exact weight of the vote may vary. Giovanni Sartori, 
Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), p. 335. 6. Austin , “The principle of 
political equality. . . is that every man counts for one vote, and that one man's vote is the equivalent of the 
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political equality, universal equal suffrage, equal probabilities, anonymity, majority rule, 
and proportional representation.32 Guy-Uriel E. Charles conceptualizes a vision of 
political equality as referring to any one of the following suppositions: universal equal 
suffrage where everyone possesses a vote and that vote must be equal; everyone vote must 
count; all votes must count equally; citizens possess an equal chance to determine the 
outcome of an election; voters must have equal power to affective legislative outcomes; 
and equal legislators must possess an equal power in proportion to the population 
represented.33 In the Reapportionment Revolution cases, the Supreme Court’s 
establishment of political equality rests on the progressive view of representation, which 
follows a political culture within the United States that saw a skepticism of democracy but 
now favors it as being necessary for a legitimate government. The Court’s vision of 
political equality concerns the availability of universal suffrage and the equality of voice in 
                                                                                                                                           
next man's;” Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (New York: 
Harcourt Brace & Co., 1956), p. 16. "One characteristic that most persons regard as essential to democracy 
is political equality. A familiar way of describing this trait is 'one man, one vote,' which we take to mean that 
in a democracy political power must be equally shared by all its citizens, and no man should have any larger 
a share than any other man.” Still argues that these definitions suffer from analytical deficiencies as they do 
not state their precise criteria for determining political equality and they are insufficient to electoral 
mechanisms (376 – 377).    
 
32 Jonathan W. Still, “Political Equality and Election Systems,” 385. The definitions for his criteria: 
“Universal Equal Suffrage: Everyone is allowed to vote, and everyone gets the same number of votes,” (378); 
Equal Shares: “Each voter has the same "share" in the election, defined as what that voter voted on divided 
by the number of voters who voted on it,”(378); Equal Probabilities: “Each voter has the same statistical 
probability of casting a vote which decides the election (under certain assumptions),” (380); Anonymity: The 
result of the election is the same under all possible distributions of the voters among the positions in the 
structure of the election system,” (383); Majority Rule: “An alternative favored by a majority of the voters 
will be chosen by the election system,” (383); Proportional Group Representation: “Each group of voters 
receives the same proportion of the seats in the legislative body as the number of voters in the group is of the 
total electorate,” (384).  
 
33 Guy-Uriel E. Charles, “Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics; Reflections on the Interpretive 
Approach of Baker v. Carr,” North Carolina Law Review 80 (2002): 1154.  
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the process in relation to the weight of a vote. Legitimacy for representation and 
democracy concerns the experience of democracy in relation to the expansion of voting 
rights to include as many equal voices as possible.   
The introduction of political equality as a Constitutional ideology occurs from 
Justice William Douglas’ opinion in Gray v. Sanders, a case that is not a redistricting case 
though the majority’s opinion conveys the “One Person, One Vote” rule.34 The guiding 
principle of this opinion does not concern the original historical narrative of the founding 
that included the compromises between interests but the correction of those 
compromises, allowing for the development of the democracy and the protection of the 
individual’s right to vote. According to Justice Douglas, representation in the United 
States contains a Constitutional telos: “The conception of political equality from the 
                                                
34Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 371 (1963). In Gray, the state of Georgia, a one-party state, employed a 
county-unit voting system that weighed votes in a way that allows the rural counties to possess greater voting 
strength than urban areas, ensuring that the rural counties would elect the candidates of their choice. To 
show the disparity in the weight of votes, the decision states: “Appellee asserted that the total population of 
Georgia in 1960 was 3,943,116; that the population of Fulton County, where he resides, was 556,326; that 
the residents of Fulton County comprised 14.11% of Georgia's total population; but that, under the county 
unit system, the six unit votes of Fulton County constituted 1.46% of the total of 410 unit votes, or one-
tenth of Fulton County's percentage of statewide population. The complaint further alleged that Echols 
County, the least populous county in Georgia, had a population in 1960 of 1,876, or .05% of the State's 
population, but the unit vote of Echols County was .48% of the total unit vote of all counties in Georgia, or 
10 times Echols County's statewide percentage of population. One unit vote in Echols County represented 
938 residents, whereas one unit vote in Fulton County represented 92,721 residents. Thus, one resident in 
Echols County had an influence in the nomination of candidates equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton 
County.” After the appellee filed suit, the State amended its practice, but the appellee still alleged 
discrimination: “"There are 97 two-unit counties, totaling 194 unit votes, and 22 counties totaling 66 unit 
votes, altogether 260 unit votes, within 14 of a majority; but no county in the above has as much as 20,000 
population. The remaining 40 counties range in population from 20,481 to 556,326, but they control 
altogether only 287 county unit votes. Combination of the units from the counties having the smallest 
population gives counties having population of one-third of the total in the state a clear majority of county 
units.” The appellants in the case, the Chairman and Secretary of the Georgia State Democratic Executive 
Committee, argued that the county-unit system was not unconstitutional since it was designed “to achieve a 
reasonable balance as between urban and rural electoral power.” The Supreme Court ruled that this practice 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one 
vote.”35 By drawing upon these non-artistic proofs, Justice Douglas relies upon the 
fundamental values of the United States that these texts reveal as an inventional source on 
which political equality rests.36 While Justice Douglas’ argument may not follow the logic 
of the syllogism, his opinion rests on the popular political beliefs of the United States.37 
Combining the political developments of representation through the voting rights 
amendment, Justice Douglas argues that the legal development of voting rights cases shows 
that the Supreme Court consistently holds that the right to vote means the ability to cast a 
ballot and to ensure that the ballot counts equally.38 As this right to vote progresses 
through political and legal developments, states cannot employ electoral practices that 
diminish the right to vote or the measure of that ballot. Even though states posses the 
right to qualify voters due to age or previous prison records, the states could not debase 
the right to vote by denying political equality, via malapportionment , to the voter. 
                                                
35 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
 
36In Gray, Justice Douglas argues in the context of the transcendental values of Democracy discusses in these 
texts. In “Vernacular Legal Discourse,” Marouf Hasian, Jr. argues that in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965), Justice Douglas relies on the word “penumbra” to show that the core, textual rights in the 
Constitution are not the only rights present, (95). See Marouf Hasian, Jr. “Vernacular Legal Discourse: 
Revisiting the Public Acceptance of the ‘Right to Privacy’ in the 1960s.” Political Communication 18 (2001): 
97.   
 
37 Melvin I. Urofsky, “William O. Douglas as Common-Law Judge,” The Warren Court in Historical and 
Political Perspectives, ed. Mark Tushnet, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993) 82 -84. 
 
38 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963). 
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Consequently, with telos of representation, then each aspect of the process of 
representation is to contain equality. If the district does not possess equality, then the 
statewide result cannot possess equality. Writing for the majority in Gray, Justice Douglas 
states that when representatives select the geographical unit for representation, citizens in 
that area must have an equal vote under the Equal Protection Clause: “whatever their 
race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever 
their home may be in that geographical unit…. The concept of ‘We the People’ under the 
Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the 
basic qualifications.”39 The legitimacy of elections in a representative democracy requires 
that the part, the electoral district or the voter, receives the same treatment as the whole, 
the total of districts within the state or all the voters in the state. Denying equality in one 
district would lead to the denial of equality throughout all of the districts in the state. 
While Justice Douglas begins the narrative of progress concerning state action in 
Gray v. Sanders, Justice Hugo Black modifies the argument for Congressional action in 
Wesberry v. Sanders. In Wesberry, Justice Black confronts the delicate task of discussing the 
malapportionment of a co-equal branch of government, a result that Justice John Marshall 
Harlan declares is a political question since the Court’s decision would alter the 
composition of a co-equal branch of government.40 Rather than framing his decision on 
the progress of representation, Justice Black argues against its dialectical counterpart, 
                                                
39 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 - 380 (1963). 
 
40 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 - 21 (1964). Justice Harlan states that the majority’s decision would alter 
the validity of 398 Representatives from 37 states, leaving only 37 legitimate congressional districts.  
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electoral retrogression, which violates the inherent Constitutional norm of political 
equality for Congressional elections. In his opinion, Justice Black presents an enthymatic 
jeremiad as he declares that the Constitution intends for the establishment of the “One 
Person, One Vote” rule for interpretation, returning representation to its original 
sacredness. By reconceptualizing the original understanding of Article I, 2, Justice Black’s 
decision commits itself to a vision of democracy constituted by an ideology of political 
equality contained within the narrative of progress, which also provides the authority of 
the Supreme Court to determine Congressional apportionment cases justiciable.  
According to Justice Black’s opinion in Wesberry, since the Supreme Court 
previously entered this area of law in Smiley v. Holms and Baker v. Carr, then the Supreme 
Court is correct in continuing its pursuant to protect voting rights from “legislative 
destruction.”41 Since the Supreme Court possesses the necessary authority to determine 
the case, then the issue in Wesberry concerns the location of political equality within the 
Constitution, which Justice Black interprets in Article 1,2’s command that 
Representatives must be chosen “by the People of the several states,”42 reaching the 
conclusion that if the Constitution “intends that when qualified voters elect members of 
Congress,” 43 then the weight of that vote must equal as nearly as is practicable.44 
                                                
41 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
 
42 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,8 (1964). 
 
43 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,8 (1964). 
 
44 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,8 (1964). 
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Continued inequality, Justice Black writes, would contradict, “our fundamental ideas of 
democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives 
elected ‘by the People,’ a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the 
Constitutional Convention.”45 
To support his proposition about Article 1, 2, Justice Black employs selective 
historical arguments that serve as the covenant between the Constitution and the people: 
Upon ratification, political equality provided the foundation for the constitutional 
requirement for representation. In the beginning of his opinion, Justice Black notes that 
state-wide elections, a “widespread practice in the first 50 years of our Nation’s history,”46 
rests on the accepted notion of political equality. Turning his attention to constitutional 
design, he argues that when the delegates at the Constitutional Convention accepted the 
Great Compromise, consensus rests that no state would be deprived of equal 
representation in the Senate and no person would be deprived of equal population in the 
House as representatives would be, “apportioned among the several States… according to 
their respective Numbers.”47 The purpose of the census, according to Edmund Randolph, 
is to secure “fair representation of the people,” ensuring, according to James Madison, that 
“numbers of inhabitants should always be the measure of representation in the House of 
                                                
45 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 
46 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9 (1964). 
 
47 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,13 (1964). 
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Representatives.”48  According to Justice Black, the discussions of the House as 
representing the people, the idea of a census to assure a proper counting of the people, 
provides evidence that the House of Representatives would provide representation to 
individuals on the basis of “complete equality for each voter,” avoiding the problem of 
representation in Great Britain, where the existence of “rotten boroughs” created 
disproportional representation. Justice Black further states his case through the words of 
James Madison in The Federalist Papers,49 speakers at the state ratification conventions,50 
and Supreme Court Associate Justice James Wilson51, all of whom argued that 
representation concerned the individual and, hence, political equality for those who could 
vote. Finally, Justice Black rests his case with a quote from James Madison n Federalist #57 
that states, “Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich more 
than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of 
distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. 
                                                
48 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,13 (1964). 
 
49 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,15 (1964): Justice Black cites #57, “"The city of Philadelphia is supposed to 
contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of 
Federal Representatives" and #54, “"[N]umbers," he said, not only are a suitable way to represent wealth but 
in any event "are the only proper scale of representation." 
 
50 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,16 (1964): According to Justice Black, “Charles Cotesworth Pinckney told 
the South Carolina Convention, ‘the House of Representatives will be elected immediately by the people, 
and represent them and their personal rights individually.’” 
 
51 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,16 (1964). According to Justice Black, James Wilson stated, "[A]ll elections 
ought to be equal. Elections are equal, when a given number of citizens, in one part of the state, choose as 
many representatives, as are chosen by the same number of citizens, in any other part of the state. In this 
manner, the proportion of the representatives and of the constituents will remain invariably the same." 
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The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States.”52 Consequently, 
by reaching the conclusions that representation occurs on the basis of political equality, 
the Supreme Court fulfills the covenant set by the Founding Fathers and declares that the 
country restore the covenant through the constitutional rule of “one person, one vote.”  
The beginning of Justice Black’s opinion focuses on a dissociation between the 
foundational values with the Constitution and the actions of partisan agents diminishing 
the access to those values.53 While the Constitution intends for a standard of political 
equality, generations of politicians acting in contradiction to those wishes by advancing 
partisan concerns, alters the promise of political equality. This argumentative move 
connects with the premise that “the people” are sovereign, the constitution encodes this 
sovereignty, and representatives must not interfere with that sovereignty and, when they 
do, they break the sacred covenant between Constitution and the people. If the Supreme 
Court is to fulfill its moral obligation of Constitutional interpretation, then the justices 
must restore the value of equality found within the text of the Constitution.  
Further, the rhetorical strategy of the Court connects with the larger cultural 
beliefs about the political process and the distrust of state legislatures to protect the rights 
of the people. As Stephen Lucas writes, during the American Revolution the discourse 
and strategy of the Whigs insists upon “American natural and constitutional rights as the 
overriding criteria by which acts of Parliament were to be judged and by which resistance 
                                                
52 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,17 (1964). 
 
53 Chaim Perelman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argument, (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 411.  
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to those acts was justified.”54 In Wesberry, Justice Black taps into those cultural beliefs in 
order to provide for a criterion to judge the proper form of representation, and his 
opinion. Justice Black states that once the delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
reached the Great Compromise, the delegates determined that representation in the lower 
House would be based on “the people.” Representatives cannot be trusted to protect the 
rights of the people, especially when the people cannot check their representatives. 
By incorporating the Framers and the Federalists, Justice Black reaffirmed the 
original terms of representation for the House of Representation to argue for political 
equality. While mathematical precisions may not be possible, the “One Person, One 
Vote” standard is closer to the original application of representation and more desirable 
than the political realities of the districts in Wesberry. The force of Justice Black’s argument 
suggests that the Founding Fathers created the “One Person, One Vote” criterion for 
Congressional districts and the Supreme Court is there just to implement their wishes. 
This argumentative strategy is plausible if the focus is only on Congressional Districts. 
Combating the majority, Justice Clark, in his concurrence, and Justice Harlan and 
Justice Stewart, in their dissents, reject Justice Black’s simplification of history and the 
reinvention of the people under Article One, Section Two.5556 While the opinions of 
                                                
54 Stephen Lucas, Portents of Rebellion, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976), 60.  
 
55 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 19 (1964). Justice Clark rejects the historical arguments of Black in light of 
Justice Harlan’s dissent. However, he accepts that congressional districting is subject to judicial review on 
that basis that malapportionment counters the equal protection clause of the fourteenth since 
malapportionment discriminates against citizens and selects some citizens to possess a vote worth more than 
others,” (19) By adopting this line of argument, Justice Clark could still commits to Baker on the basis that 
plans must be rational and districting plans that discriminate are not rational. Justice Stewart accepted the 
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Justice Clark and Stewart are brief, Justice Harlan provides substantive attacks against the 
majority and counters the narrative of progress and the commitment to political equality 
with a commitment to the state legislative discretion backed by other historical arguments 
and narrow textual arguments. He argues that, according to the view of representation at 
the time of ratification, representatives were to be apportioned, “largely, but not entirely 
by population,” the Constitution authorizes the states to determine the requirements for 
representation at their discretion, and Congress possesses the excusive right to check this 
power.57 Yet, by rejecting the argument of progress, the ontological consequence of Justice 
Harlan’s legal formalism leads only to the perpetuation of malapportionment, revealing 
that the foundational law possesses no correlation to the contemporary political realities 
and that the probability of reform diminishes without judicial backing.  
To refute the history of Justice Black, Justice Harlan employs his own historical 
arguments, refuting the ideology of political equality. He notes that the Delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention did not discuss Congressional districting let along “One 
Person One Vote” and the political equality could not have been the norm as the 
Constitution allocated representation on the basis of the three-fifths clause, which 
                                                                                                                                           
notion that the Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction but dissents as he rejects Justice Black’s historical 
interpretation of Article I, 2 (51).  
 
56 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 19 (1964). 
 
57 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 23 (1964). Accordingly, the appellants have no right to relief as it is beyond 
the ability of the Supreme Court to decided if “equally populated districts is the preferable method for 
electing Representatives, whether state legislatures would have acted more fairly or wisely had they adopted 
such a method, or whether Congress has been derelict in not requiring state legislatures to follow that 
course. Once it is clear that there is no constitutional right at stake, that ends the case,” (24).  
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protected the Southern interests and a group right to vote.58 Further, Justice Harlan notes 
that at the time of Wesberry three states possessed representatives though the population of 
those states existed greatly under the ideal district size, meaning the concept of political 
equality cannot mean actual equality for ever Congressional districts.59 For Justice Harlan, 
while the appearance of Wesberry rests on reapportionment, the reality of it concerns the 
legislative branch as the primary source of Constitutional authority. In this conception, 
the right to vote, even through the power of apportionment, means what the legislative 
branches desire it to mean since those possess exclusive authority on its application. In 
this case, he right to vote means the ability to cast a ballot in a literal sense since, even 
under the malapportioned plan, the Constitution requires only that the people elect the 
representatives and the 10 Georgia Representatives were elected by the people.60 Justice 
Harlan argues that the majority’s decision rests on a misplaced distrust of the legislative 
process, one that exists outside of the realm of power the judiciary ought to possess. In 
order to enact this distrust, they must twist the meaning of Article I, 2 and “surreptitiously 
slip their belief into the Constitution in the phrase "by the People," to be discovered 175 
years later like a Shakespearian anagram.”61  
                                                
58 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 28 - 30 (1964). 
 
59 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 29 (1964). At the time, the ideal district size was 410, 481. Yet, the States 
of Alaska, Nevada, and Wyoming received one representative each and their state populations were are 226, 
167, 285, 278, and 330,066.  
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Justice Harlan’s commitment to unchecked legislative supremacy rests on a Catch-
22 that prevents political reform. Concluding his opinion, Justice Harlan writes that since 
Congress possess the power, the people need to force Congress to act: “What is done 
today saps the political process. The promise of judicial intervention in matters of this sort 
cannot but encourage popular inertia in efforts for political reform through the political 
process, with the inevitable result that the process is itself weakened. By yielding to the 
demand for a judicial remedy in this instance, the Court in my view does a disservice both 
to itself and to the broader values of our system of government.”62 His selective reading on 
the Constitution and historical arguments neglect the transcendent cultural beliefs about 
representation since the Founding, such as the expansion of the right to vote and the 
expansion of checks on state legislative power through the Civil War Amendments. In 
addition to ignoring the expansion of the right to vote, Justice Harlan ignores the 
improbability of political reform. The legal formalism he employs cannot explain the 
failure of the political process to correct itself as the people cannot “sear the conscience” 
of their legislators. By enabling a process that refuses to accept deliberation from all 
citizens as a fundamental goal, the representation crises on the basis of malapportionment 
will perpetuate ad infinitum. The only recourse Justice Harlan allows for concerns the 
people’s ability to persuade their state representatives or Congress though 60 years of 
neglect diminishes the strength of this argument.  
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By employing historical arguments to counter Justice Black, Justice Harlan focuses 
on the notion that the States can conduct representation as they see fit and, if any branch 
of government is to intervene, Congress is to be that branch. His arguments are not 
infallible since, in his commitment to legislative supremacy, he ignores the argument that 
the Founders committed to political equality, at least for those who possessed the right to 
vote, by calling for strict apportionment of the people where one legislature would 
represent 30,000 people. If the goal is equal representation, then the means to achieve this 
goal should reinforce the goal and, though the state legislature possesses the authority to 
create requirements, apportionment on the basis of one representative for every 30,000 
people does not mean that one represent can represents 5,000 citizens and a second 
represent 55,000. But rather than acknowledge this he chooses to note that the judiciary 
supersedes its authority as it forces Congress to carry out its responsibilities.63  
Instead of reinforcing the value of political equality, Justice Harlan reinforces the 
authority of the state legislature regardless of how they use their power, reinforcing the 
narrative that the state legislature will abuse its power by disregarding the rights of citizens. 
While malapportionment may not be as bad in degree as slavery or preventing groups of 
citizens from possessing the right to vote through literacy tests, poll taxes, or violence, it 
still falls under the category of preventing individuals from developing and obtaining 
political equality. Without any deliberative forum to petition, the system perpetuates itself, 
nullifying the opportunity for persuasion.  
                                                
63 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 48 (1964). 
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The Characteristics of Democratic Representation 
By selecting a narrative of representation that prioritizes progression and fears 
retrogression, the Supreme Court reconstitutes representation to concern the Democratic 
experience. Just as President Lincoln used his Gettysburg address to present the American 
people with a new moral reading of the constitution to correct the political sins in the 
country’s past, the Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), 
reinforced and extended Lincoln’s vision of equality to all citizens as the decision 
expanded the political process to those previously denied. The Court reasoned that only a 
constitution of equality, especially equality of access, protected the civil rights and liberties 
of all citizens and that constitution. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court established four 
important characterizations of the Democratic Experience: representation as a 
fundamental right; representation as a means of self-government, which is an individual 
right; representation as an act that concerns a conception of experience and not a 
conception of time; and, representation through a procedural construction of the citizen. 
By refocuses representation to fulfill a democratic experience, the Supreme Court alters 
the way in which citizens use the electoral process to engage in deliberation and self-
government. 
First, to develop a notion of equality for all citizens, the Supreme Court 
reconstitutes representation as a fundamental right of society rather than a political or 
social right, enhancing the level of scrutiny the judiciary applies to voting rights cases. 
Fundamental rights concern the individual, exist universally in their application, and 
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focus on the traditions of the United States, such as freedom of speech, trial by jury, 
habeas corpus, and, after Reynolds, suffrage. Since each citizen possess this right, the state 
legislators must allow the citizens the ability to exercise this right and to be free from 
unwarranted discretion by the state legislature.  
By grounding his arguments on the narrative of progression, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren writes that the voting rights cases before the Supreme Court provide evidence of 
the expansion for the right to and the meaning of suffrage, leading to the idea that the 
constitution protects the rights of all qualified citizens to vote in elections, whether they 
are state or federal elections.64 Consequently, voting concerns not only the physical tally of 
the vote, but the meaning of the vote. The Chief Justice writes: 
History has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in 
this country. The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the 
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the 
heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a 
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by 
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.65 
The problem with malapportionment is that it diminishes the meaning of the vote to a 
social or political right that depends on the partisan interests of those who control the 
process. If one vote does not count as much as another vote, then the citizen that casts the 
vote without as much meaning does not have an equal voice when participating in 
                                                
64 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964). 
 
65 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
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deliberation about the government or the resources from the state because the state 
legislators believe that voice is unwarranted in the process. If some citizens do not possess 
the same voice as others, there is an illusion of representative government, which means 
that other basic rights are in jeopardy as well: “Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a 
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society, especially since the right to exercise 
the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and 
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized.”66 The prior cases before the Supreme Court reflect a desire 
to limit the development of a political consciousness in the minds of certain voters. Only 
if voters possess equal access to the ballot box, enjoy liberty to associate and vote 
independently, and receive equal consideration through the ballot box, will citizens enjoy 
the fulfillment of self-government and the protection of their civil liberties. This begins by 
redefining the right to vote as consisting of a fundamental right and not a social or 
political right.  
Second, since the right to vote concerns a fundamental right in the United States, 
then the way in which individuals exercise that right needs protection. For most citizens, 
political participation occurs through the elections of representative, which is why the 
Supreme Court argues the legitimacy of representative government occurs through the 
meaning, expansion, and protection of the right to vote. Chief Justice Warren writes that 
while state governments played an important role at the birth of our nation, the evolution 
                                                
66 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 - 562 (1964).  
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of the country favors the role and expansion of the individual as in government 
participation:  
But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium 
of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an 
inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his 
State's legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as 
qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and 
effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that 
each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state 
legislature. Modern and viable state government needs, and the Constitution 
demands, no less.67 
Since there is a new foci of self-government in the transition from the states to the people, 
the foundation of representation protects the equality of the voter even through the 
districting process. Representative government begins with the equality of the individual 
and, through electoral participation, develops into representation. Legislators, according 
to the Supreme Court, are to be “responsible for enacting laws by which all citizens are to 
be governed, they should be bodies which are collectively responsive to the popular will.”68 
This constitution of government means that the majority of people should elect the 
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majority of representatives and those representatives should be responsive to the majority 
of people. 69  
Since legitimacy occurs through the consensus of individuals, the Supreme Court 
sees itself as the protector of what amounts to be a “natural” or “organic” consensus. 
Chief Justice Warren writes that, “Since the achieving of fair and effective representation 
for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that 
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all 
voters in the election of state legislators.”70 While the Supreme Court faces certain 
limitations, as it cannot legally enforce representatives to represent in a certain way or to 
represent all of the people, it possesses the ability to protect the institution by interjecting 
equality into apportionment and legislative districts. In Reynolds, voters in Alabama, like 
the other 49 states, do not possess a democratic town-hall style of meeting whereby the 
voters choose what is best for the community themselves; individuals are able to 
participate in government through informal elections. Citizens cannot be deprived of 
representative government before elections through the manipulation of districts; an 
individual must possess the same opportunity to influence an election ensure proper 
representation after the election.  
Consequently, as the Supreme Court constructs the concept of self-government 
within the individual, it attempts to protect the ability of individuals to find their 
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respective voices rather than allow state legislators the ability to create and manufacture 
that voice. State Legislators cannot allow the minority to the power to dominate the 
majority and diminish the rights of the majority as they must enact laws for all and act as 
if they are, “collectively responsive to the popular will.”71 By opening the deliberative 
process to individuals, the Supreme Court allows each individual the opportunity to 
decide what is appropriate for himself or herself. While some individuals may not 
participate or not participate “wisely,” the choice itself cannot be deprived by state 
legislators. Elections serve as the mechanism by which voters declare their vision of what 
would be best for the community but that choice develops at the individual level through 
the tally of each vote. To circumvent the vote through malapportionment diminishes the 
voices of the majority of actors and limits the ability of those to engage in self-government.  
Third, according to a majority of Justices in the Reapportionment Revolution, 
representation concerns an act that expands the democratic experience and frees it from 
the voices of the past. In Reynolds, the counsel for Alabama argued against the commands 
of the state’s constitution as the lawyers neglected the document’s command for equal 
population. Instead, the council of the state argued that Alabama’s malapportionment was 
ratified by the people and the chose to record the protection of interests within their 
constitution when the people first wrote and ratified the state constitution. Since 
ratification, all further interpretation would be subject to the initial ratification and 
interpretation. Yet, the Supreme Court rejected this reading of Alabama’s electoral 
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requirements and, in the process, grounds representation in the expansion of the 
democratic experience, allow for the rapid change in civilization where, “A nation once 
primarily rural in character becomes predominantly urban. Representation schemes once 
fair and equitable become archaic and outdated.”72 
The historic argument defending the State of Alabama reveals the potential for the 
undemocratic nature of historic arguments. Since the people of the present possess no 
method of initiative or the ability to call for a constitutional convention, the people of the 
present are governed by the voices of the past. Subsequently, the consent of the governed 
develops not from the living but from the dead, diminishing the ability of representation 
to develop and respond to the needs of each individual voter rather than an institution 
grounded by those who spoke long ago. By reframing the representation from a 
conception of time to a conception of experience, the Supreme Court alters the 
appropriate the scope and meaning of consent. In 1824, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the 
authority of the people would prevent the ability of the past to bind future generations: 
“Rights and powers can only belong to persons, not to things, not to mere matter, 
unendoewd with will. The dead are not even living things. The particles of matter which 
composed their bodies, make now of the bodies of other animals, vegetable, or minerals, 
of a thousand forms.”73 While Jefferson wrote of the prioritization of the states in relation 
to the federal government, he affirms the necessity of experience over time. While the past 
                                                
72 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964). 
 
73 Thomas Jefferson, “To Major John Cartwright,” 5 June 1824 in Thomas Jefferson, Writings ed. Merrill D. 
Peterson (New York: Library of Congress, 1984), 1493.   
 
 214 
may influence the decisions of the present as the particles of the deceased provide 
sustenance to life of the present, the voices of the past cannot govern the living. Each 
generation, for Jefferson, must choose its own path and recognizes the inalienable rights of 
citizens, which in this case concerns the right to vote. In Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 
377 U.S. 716 (1964), the Court recognizes this conception of representation as it rejects 
the ability of the citizens of Colorado, even through a referendum process, to 
constitutionalize representation in the past and protect the interests of the state.74 
Of course, it is not clear in Reynolds the extent to which the State can ground 
representation on experience, especially in relation to how a reapportionment plan at the 
beginning of a decade slowly becomes governed by the voices of the past. Chief Justice 
Earl Warren notes that the states can “adopt some reasonable plan for periodic revision of 
their apportionment schemes,” to correct shifts in population within the state and favors 
the tradition of apportionment after each census.75 Yet, the Chief Justice also warns 
against frequent apportionments on the need for “stability and continuity in the 
organization of the legislative system,” as well as the constitutionally suspect avoidance of 
                                                
74 During the 1962 elections, Colorado voters decided the fate of two Amendments to the Colorado 
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opinion, the Court ruled that even though the voters of Colorado created a political solution to the 
problem, the solution needed to be Constitutional.  
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reapportionment.76 As the Supreme Court would note in L.U.LA.C. v. Perry, 
apportionment plans exist on the legal fiction that the plan at the end of the decade is as 
constitutional apportioned as the plan at the beginning of a decade.77 Successive Supreme 
Courts have allowed the local courts to follow the state constitutions over these 
considerations. In 2004, the State Supreme Court of Colorado struck down a mid-decade 
reapportionment plan since the state constitution requires apportionment to occur after 
the census, rebuffing the attempts of Republicans to gain control of the redistricting 
process before the 2010 census.78 However, in Texas, the Supreme Court allowed a mid-
decade apportionment plan since there is not prohibition against it. Further, the Supreme 
Court’s precedent allows for state legislators to act as the primary authority in 
redistricting, even if it is to correct errors in previous districting plans, to create a new plan 
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when the judiciary developed a previous plan, or to institute a plan with partisan 
purposes.79  
Fourth, when characterizing representation the Supreme Court defines the citizen 
in procedural terms, altering relationships between the citizen and the legislator to the 
extent that deliberation can occur between the people and the legislators. While it is a 
political good that the Supreme Court fails to impose a political philosophy80 or dictate to 
representatives how they must represent as it would encroach on both the separation of 
powers and the relationship between the federal government and the states, the Supreme 
Court fails to understand the meaning of the individual in political society, discussing 
citizenship only in procedural rather than substantive terms. 
In Reynolds, the Chief Justice Warren declares that the substance of the act 
representation is on the people and not interests: “Legislators represent people, not trees 
or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long 
as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments 
of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to 
elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.”81 
The Court continued as it stated: “Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. 
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Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the 
equal-population principle. Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote.” Chief 
Justice Warren’s quotes on the Court’s constitutional duty and representation rebuked 
not only the state legislators, but also the thoughts of Justice Frankfurter, who favored 
legislature discretion to promote valuable state interests.82 Yet, his rebuke was selective as 
it failed to discern the people’s role in representation. 
Any given act of representation posits a dialectic relationship between the 
representatives and the represented. The Chief Justice’s comments in Reynolds creates a 
division between the legislators and the people, whereby the people refer to the majorities 
who do not receive effective representation because of interests though there is not dearth 
of challenges by individuals seeking to protect their interests or even their political party. 
In order to accept this division though, there needs to be a separation of the individual 
and interests. To say that “interests” do not vote prioritizes the equality of each voter and 
entails consequences that the minority should not overpower electorally the majority even 
as it deflects attention away from the notion that individuals possess political interests and 
exist inside of a political community. While the Court argues, correctly, that a pasture 
does not vote—in a literal sense—, it overlooks the conception of the individual whereby 
the individual votes to protect him/ herself as a farmer, the farm, the family, the pasture, 
the cows, his or her fellow farmers, the corporations that provide farming equipment, etc. 
Furthermore, depending on the State, favoring a group of voters may benefit the entire 
                                                
82 Jim Newton, Justice for All, 424 - 425.  
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state. In the case of Baker, Gray and Wesberry, the Supreme Court rules that it may be 
unfair for rural communities to receive greater benefits in infrastructure and education 
prior to the formation of consensus from all members of the state, and employs Reynolds to 
correct the constitutional defect that prevents consensus through deliberation. As a result, 
if the rural areas were to be truly important to the community, then the Supreme Court 
shifts presumption in the debate, forcing the minority of citizens to show why their 
interests should receive greater recognition in the political process.  
Through the Supreme Court’s Reapportionment Revolution decisions, the 
Supreme Court characterizes representation as a fundamental right, the process by which 
individuals engage in self-government, as an act that occurs the expansion of experiences, 
and an act that requires citizens and states to be relatively neutral during the process. 
While the Supreme Court reconstitutes representation within the general value of 
equality, it diminishes the value of legislative discretion. Consequently, this new priority 
in values would change the structure in the country’s political institutions.  
Polit ica l Institutions : The Rise of Institutionalized Democratic Equality  
With ideology of political equality serving as the Constitutional interpretive key 
for congressional and state reapportionment decisions, the Supreme Court alters the 
structure of political institutions to ensure the protection of the democratic experience. By 
reading political equality into the Constitution, the Supreme Court extends political 
equality to all political subdivisions that require electoral districts and diminishes the 
discretion of the state to interfere access to deliberation. Consequently, as the majority of 
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the Supreme Court favors the privileging of the citizen over the state, it must also find 
ways in which to create rules and regulations to ensure that there is a space for citizens to 
engage in dialogue and deliberation and to limit the authority of the state to close access 
to that democratic space. While the Supreme Court engages in a practice of instituting a 
democratic experience by diminishing the power of old forms of government, affected 
most in this transition is the loss of conceptions pertinent to a tradition form republican. 
As the dissenters note, with the new electoral power of the citizen the states lose the ability 
to determine its own form of government and to respond to its own regional exigencies. 
While the dissenters of the judiciary’s involvement in reapportionment attempt to define 
the situation as favoring political equality or legislative rationality, the majority present a 
way in which citizens possess both political equality and the ability to pursue the rational 
or objective interests of the states. This process occurs through the rejection of the federal 
analogy and the rejection of the protection of interests. 
Rejection of the Federal Analogy: Diminishing the Power of the States 
The reliance on the federal analogy serves as a means to reaffirm the power of state 
over the power of the citizens with the state and suggest that the states exist as a coequal 
branch of government. While attempting to restore federal power, i.e. allow the states to 
respond to the exigencies within the state, the states overextended their argument to 
suggest that they possess the same power as the federal government to conduct 
representation, eliminating the Constitutions preamble of “We, The People.” By 
developing the federal analogy, the states sought adherence to an a fortiori argument: if 
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the federal government can conduct representation in a way in which that denies the 
people of different states equal representation, the states can develop representation that 
denies counties equal representation. In the process of enacting this argument, the state 
legislators conceived of political subdivisions as the host for reception rather than the 
people who inhabit those geographical areas. Chief Justice Warren redefines them as 
being “subordinate government instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the 
carrying out of state governmental functions,” rather than being “sovereign entities” in 
and of themselves.83 Consequently, the Court hold that Reynolds means that both Houses 
within a state legislature must be apportioned on the basis of equal population to avoid 
the protect that a minority receives through malapportionment in one House to veto the 
legislative will of the majority in another House.84 Yet, Chief Justice Warren argues that 
the call for equal population in both Houses will not alter the function of the 
bicameralism, “to insure mature and deliberative consideration of, and to prevent 
precipitate action on, proposed legislative measures.”85 The call to apportion on the basis 
of equality to sure enhance deliberation by creating an experience where more voices, not 
less, participate in the deliberation of legislation affecting all of the citizens. Chief Justice 
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Earl Warren notes that even Congress could “insulate states” in order to allow state 
governments to deprive individuals of constitutional rights.86 
Second, the reliance on the Federal Analogy serves as a way for the States to argue 
that exists as a co-equal form of government in the Constitution. By employing this 
argument, the Alabama sought to equate the state legislators with the Founding Fathers to 
raise the standing and power of the state to reapportion to pursue rational objectives. To 
argue that the states possess the same power as the federal government to apportion 
representation just as the federal government does in the Senate, is to argue that argue 
that the states possess the same authority to create Constitutionally impermissible 
malapporitonment at the expense of the people.87 However imperfect the democratic 
standards of the Senate are, Chief Justice Warren creates an exception for it as a political 
institution because without it the smaller states would not have agreed to join the 
Union.88 Though the Supreme Court does not possess the authority to alter 
representation of the Senate because of the separation of powers, the Supreme Court 
declared in Baker that the separation of powers does not extend to the states. While the 
federal government may be able to discriminate against the people of all of the states by 
allowing for unequal representation in the Senate, the Supreme Court will not allow the 
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states to do the same, especially since the Constitution of Alabama, and other states, calls 
for representation in both houses of the states to develop from the people. Consequently, 
as Chief Justice Warren states, that whether or not reapportionment is a constitutional or 
statutory requirement, and whether or not the state legislators follow or ignore those 
commands, any apportionment act concerning both Houses in a state violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution when the goal is not equal population.89  If 
federal representation depends on equality, then state representation must depend on 
equality: “When there is an unavoidable conflict between the Federal and a State 
Constitution, the Supremacy Clause of course controls.”90 
If the federal analogy were correct, then the state could have argued that the 
people of Alabama chose to record the protection of interests within their constitution 
when they first wrote and ratified the state constitution as the founding fathers wrote and 
ratified the protection of interests in the federal constitution via the Senate. However, the 
states could not argue that point since the original constitution of Alabama enacted 
representation by population, as did the constitutions of 35 other states at the time of 
Reynolds.91 The most the state could do is argue that since Congress allowed for inequality 
as a norm through the three-fifths clause, then Congress acknowledged and approved of 
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the unequal representation.92 The Supreme Court rejected the later argument in Wesberry 
as it contradicted the narrative of progress. Further, for the state of Alabama to argue that 
legislators are only modeling the representation they prefer rather than the representation 
that appears in the constitution of Alabama is to misread the text of the constitution to 
pursue partisan interests. 
Representation, Rationality, and Equality of Access 
With the subordination of the state to the federal government and to the citizens 
of the state, the Court faces the question to what degree can political intuitions prefigure 
electoral districts to favor interests over individuals. In this debate, the Supreme Court 
begins to discuss the identity of the state government as it relates to representation. For 
the dissenters, Reynolds and the cases in the 1960s provide an opportunity to defend the 
“republican,” as opposed to “democratic,” institution of representation that supports the 
ability of the states and the state legislatures to prioritize the ideology of legislative 
discretion to pursue objective state interest over the ideology of political equality, even if 
“legislative discretion” or “rationality” hinders the development of deliberative structures 
and prevents individuals in their communities from engaging in self-government.  
“Rationality” allows representation to prefigure electoral districts to ensure a desirable 
result and subordinate the people to the state and requires the people to adopt the 
interests of the state in order to receive political recognition.  
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When rejecting the One Person, One Vote rule, opponents base their arguments 
on the impracticality of the implementation of the ideology of political equality through 
the Court’s standard. Though the One Person, One Vote requirement forms the basis for 
the conscience of American democracy, objection to the call for political equality focuses 
on the practical considerations of districting and the over-involvement of the judiciary in 
to democratic politics. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer argues that the Court’s decision in Baker 
concerns the development of a rationality test for reapportionment rather than an equal-
population requirement and it is in the judiciary’s best interest to allow states to follow 
standards of rationality rather than the rule of equal-population to ensure that state 
legislators are the primary source of redistricting.93 John Hart Ely, who supports the 
Court’s involvement to unblock democratic stoppages, states that the One Person, One 
Vote rule from Reynolds, “is certainly administrable. In fact administrability is its strong 
suit, and the more troublesome question is what else is has to recommend.”94 Sandy 
Levinson writes that the One Person, One vote mantra presents an inadequate description 
of who can vote and a poor guide to who can gain access to the franchise.95 Further, the 
mantra does not provide a requirement for an equal amount of people in a district, only 
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95 Sandy Levinson, “One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning,” North Carolina Law Review 80 
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equal constituents.96 James Gardner states that the One Person, One Vote rule forced 
governing bodies to create at-large voting systems and force sub-communities to create one 
large community or to add municipalities to ensure all political subdivisions would be 
equal in population.97 The consequence of these choices concerns the break-up of 
traditional communities and smaller sub-communities. Grant M. Hayden argues though 
there is widespread acceptance for the ideology, the One Person, One Vote rule does not 
create a sense of neutrality or objectivity in electoral districts and does not end the practice 
of vote dilution.98  
Further disagreement of the rule focuses on the alteration in our political 
institutions, especially in regards to the value of legislative discretion, which resembles 
Madisonian representative government whereby legislatures would find ways to balance 
the interests within a state so long as the balancing did not lead to a non-republican form 
of government, especially an aristocratic or monarchical government.99 According to 
Robert Bork, the work of James Madison suggests that the states, as representative 
democracies could enact its government in many forms so long as that form is rational.100 
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It seems that, for Bork, the court ought not to brush aside a state’s reapportionment plan 
if it seeks to protect distinctive economic interests or social views that may disappear in a 
purely majoritarian legislature.101 Bork’s position enhances the standing of the state by 
suggesting that states, and not the federal government,  serve as the branch of government 
that represents the people and provides the states more latitude in employing their 
discretion as the state does not engage in discrimination against the citizen so long as it 
possesses a rational basis for its political institution. 
Alexander Bickel would take Bork’s position two steps further. First, according to 
Bickel, in a purposefully malapportioned legislature, most groups in society have some 
interest at stake and likely possess the power to conduct some maneuvering for some of 
their objectives, which may not occur in a majoitarian apportionment plan.102  
Malapportionment is desirable since to some degree—and the degree is not stated— groups 
can influence and legislatures can balance those interests. Second, in the Madisonian 
system, Bickel prefers to downplay the role of elections because of the voter. Bickel states: 
Elections, even if they are referenda, do not establish consent, or do not establish 
it for long. They cannot mean that much, Masses of people do not make clear-cut, 
long-range decisions. They do not know enough about the issues, about 
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themselves, their needs, and wishes, or about those needs and wishes will appear 
to them to be two months hence.103 
Bickel’s position defends the notion that representatives act to filter public opinion rather 
than reflect it. Bickel’s arguments rest on the assumption that the legislator would only 
mirror his/her constituents and not act with any political prudence if the Supreme Court 
enacts political ideology, though under the apportionment plans in Baker, Wesberry, and 
Reynolds, the complaint is that representatives mirror the desires and interests of the rural 
voters unproportionately more than the urban. Further, Bickel claims that the decisions 
by the Warren Court attempts to “dictate answers to social and sometimes economic 
problems” through the alteration of “the structure of politics, educational policy, the 
morals and mores of society,”104 and interferes with the political process. Because of the 
absence of knowledge and the incommensurability over the interests of voters, this style of 
representations slows the passions to allow reason to measure public goods. Political 
equality would only allow the passions to dictate governmental policy and, consequently, 
the balance of interests would succumb to the tyranny of the majority. Because of these 
claims on human nature and the deficiencies of the voters, government institutions need 
to weigh the costs and benefits of the interest in society without reflecting the passions of 
the voter.  
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For the Justices in the Reapportionment Revolution cases, rationality can mean 
following Constitutional provisions to allowing for legislative compromise. In Baker v. 
Carr, Justice Clark states that when a state legislature follows Constitutional standards of 
equal population, with some minor qualifications, it follows a rational or reasonable plan; 
when a state legislature fails to reapportion for sixty years and allows vast 
malapportionemnt, the legislative action is no longer rational.105 While Justice Clarke 
despised the “crazy quilt” design of the Tennessee apportionment scheme in Baker 
opinion shows reluctance to impose mathematical equality as a substitute.106 In Reynolds, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren states that it is rational for state legislators to consider legislative 
interests in addition to equal population but it cannot subordinate equal population to 
pursue other legislative interests107 as the reapportionment plan in Alabama is nothing 
more than an “irrational anachronism.”108 In WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 
(1964), the Supreme Court ruled that districts in New York State violated the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, overruling District Court’s holding that 
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New York’s apportionment presented a rational, and not arbitrary, system whereby the 
state used districts of historical origin that contained no geographic discrimination.109 
For the dissenters, rationality provides argumentative ground to allow state 
legislatures the authority to subvert political equality to pursue state interests. In Baker 
Justice Frankfurter, asserts that a state possesses the discretionary power to develop an 
electoral structure “it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and customs of its 
people,” though it cannot act “irrationally.”110 He adds that the judiciary ought to provide 
equal respect to a legislative judgment that chooses to “distribute electoral strength among 
geographical units, rather than according to a census of population, is certainly no less a 
rational decision of policy than would be its choice to levy a tax on property rather than a 
tax on income.”111 Justice Harlan writes that rationality concerns, “not what the State 
Legislature may actually have considered but what it may be deemed to have 
considered,”112 and the protection of rural voices by the refusal to “recognize the growth of 
the urban population that has accompanied the development of industry,” is rational 
since it reflects a legislative “give-and-take” and compromise.113 He adds that, “And so long 
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as there exists a possible rational legislative policy for retaining an existing apportionment, 
such a legislative decision cannot be said to breach the bulwark against arbitrariness and 
caprice that the Fourteenth Amendment affords.”114 Further, according to Justice Harlan, 
even if the state legislators denied reapportionment to further their interests and entrench 
themselves over the voters, it would not be the “business of the federal courts to inquire 
into the personal motives of the legislators.”115 In Reynolds, Justice Harlan notes the abuse 
of rationality by the majority as the decision of the Chief Justice’s position that “a clearly 
rational state policy” that submerges population is not, “principle of logic or practical or 
theoretical politics, still less any constitutional principle.”116 
Adherence to the rationality argument allows the states the ability to create 
political institutions that protect interests and not individuals with few checks on what is 
rational. Since there are no objective checks on rationality, as rationality depends upon 
the legislative body enacting a plan on the basis of rationality or the members of the 
judiciary hearing a case involving the rationality of a reapportionment plan places the 
Supreme Court in a position where case by case jurisprudence would overpower the 
judiciary’s docket, prevent the Supreme Court from presenting clear, judicial standards to 
guide lower courts, and potentially diminish the rights of some citizens where the plan 
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met rationality requirements without political means to challenge the plan. Further, 
acceptance of rationality by one court may lead to the rejection of rationality by another, 
potentially necessitating legal challenges because of changes on the Supreme Court.  
To advance the argument of rationality, the justices focus on the unique aspects of 
the redistricting plan to show that the legitimacy of the system develops by the way in 
which it serves the public. In his dissent in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, Justice Stewart argues 
each systems of legislative apportionment depends on their respective state and 
geographical region and that, in New York, the state ought to possess the ability to employ 
malapportionment if it is beneficial for the county system since it serves as a central and 
efficient institution for carrying out government programs.117 If the county did not receive 
the overrepresentation, then it would not be able to provide these resources, as it would 
lose some of its resources to New York City, New York City, which, “by virtue of its 
concentration of population, homogeneity of interest, and political cohesiveness,” would 
overpower the rest of the state.118 In Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), Justice 
Harlan presents similar concerns as he states that under the “One Person, One Vote” rule 
a local government could not create a governing body that would balance the different 
                                                
117 Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 761 - 765 (1964). Justice Stewart presented his dissent in 
the WMCA Inc. case in Lucas. The forms of state aid are found in footnote 18. They are: such as the 
distribution of state aid for educational extension work, community colleges, assistance to the physically 
handicapped children, social welfare such as medical aid for the aged, the blind, dependent children, the 
disabled, and other need persons, public health, mental health, probation work, highway construction, 
improvement maintenance, conservation, and civil defense preparations. 
 
118 Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 764 (1964). 
 
 232 
interests between a metropolitan area and a suburban area.119 Important to this 
conception is that the citizens of a county have multiple interests and these interests may 
not be reconcilable on their own or with standards of equality. Since the parties involved 
may not bring equal resources then they may not desire to receive representation on the 
basis of population alone. In Justice Harlan’s suburban and metropolitan example, the city 
brings the services and the rural areas bring the wealth, an arrangement that would not be 
possible under Reynolds, causing Justice Harlan to reject the Supreme Court’s attempt at 
solving complex social problems with the “simplistic defects” of the “One Person, One 
Vote” rule.120 Finally, Attempting to balance the requirements of equal population with 
rationality, Justice Fortas would extend “One Person, One Vote,” to state and 
congressional districts but disregard for local districts.  “Constitutional commandments,” 
Fortas states, “are not surgical instruments. They have a tendency to hack deeply—to 
amputate.”121 Rather than adopt a blunt instrument to divide communities or adopt a 
“rigid, theoretical, and authoritarian approach to the problem of local government,” 
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Fortas desires the deployment of reason into the problems of apportionment at the local 
level.122  
In these decisions, Justice Stewart, Justice Harlan, and Justice Fortas rely on the 
rationality argument to explain that citizens possess different interests and the state should 
possess the discretionary power to weight the elections to protect those interests. Speaking 
only for himself, Justice Fortas states that the Equal Protection Clause forces unnecessary 
equality on citizens as it insists that, “each stockholder of a corporation have only one vote 
even though the stake of some may be $1 and the stake of others $1000.”123 If Justice 
Fortas is serious in his comment, then there is no need for representation for those with a 
$1 share for their money will not matter in the marketplace even if they form coalitions to 
match the voter power of those who possess more in society as those who possess more 
power will alter the rules yet again with very few changes to ensure that the stock-holders 
in the lower tier experience a meaningful vote. While noting that citizens possess interests 
and those interests may be different in rural areas than urban areas, he fails to characterize 
other differences and even identifications that rural or urban voters possess. Though rural 
citizens may support rural policies, rural citizens may classify themselves in other terms 
that the Supreme Court does not consider: party affiliation, social concerns, social 
services, etc. In addition, while stakeholder theory may relate to the distribution of goods 
and services that promote agriculture, it does not translate well into education or the 
prompt collection of taxes, which the MCCC plays a role for both rural and urban areas. 
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Further, like other heresthetical designs in districting, it seeks a result without 
deliberation, allowing those in power to invoke a shareholder qualification on voting 
whereby if a person lacks political equality, they lack the ability to participate in society 
and allows them to be “token” members of a political community.  
Equal Access for Equal Determination 
By rejecting rationality as the Constitutional standard, the Supreme Court rejects 
the potential for state legislators to employ that argument to diminish the rights of citizens 
since, as Chief Justice Earl Warren states, “to the extent that a citizen's right to vote is 
debased, he is that much less a citizen,” and that right should not depend on the 
geographic area in which a person resides.124 Accordingly, citizens, and not interests must 
predominate the electoral process before citizens cast their vote as, for the majority, 
citizenship develops and is expressed by casting a meaningful ballot. For this access to 
representation there must be a neutral framework, or a government of laws, that guides 
the process and reduces the ability of citizens, or a government of men, from denying 
equality to other citizens. If an individual, in terms of his or her vote, is less than an 
individual through vote dilution, then the civil liberties of that individual can be 
diminished or reduced. As a result of this decision, a minority cannot make a person into 
three-fifths of a person; a state cannot violate the federal constitution by making a one 
groups of citizens three-fifths citizens. 
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“Rationality” becomes the empty vessel by which state legislatures, as well as 
justices not committed to the equality of “One Person, One Vote,” prioritize the state or 
certain interests over the individual. Without any checks and balances, “rational” can 
mean anything without any political or judicial recourse. For the state legislators in 
Gomillion, the redistricting plan constituted a rational plan. For the state legislature in 
Tennessee, not apportioning for 60 years constituted a rational act. The problem, as John 
Hart Ely points out, is that this justification can be extended well beyond the means of the 
normal “rationality” that the constitution as an authoritative source would prescribe: “If 
protecting the agricultural economy is truly important to the state, and it obviously is to 
some, it would not be illogical to give 90 percent of the effective voting power even though 
they make up only 10 percent of the population.”125 Rather than protect these interests 
before an election by prefiguring districting, legislators ought to develop other solutions to 
the problem such as when states, as well as the federal government, provide certain 
interests in society some form of breaks such as the subsidies provided for farmers within 
rural areas to foster a strong agricultural economy.126  
If the “rational” argument were to stand over a commitment to political equality, 
then the judiciary would find itself in a compromising position, especially over the 
protection of individual rights. Forced into a position where the judiciary would need to 
consider the merits of each plan, it would be best for the Supreme Court to remove itself 
from apportionment and districting plans. Consideration of each plan on a case by case 
                                                
125 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 122. 
 
126 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 121.  
 236 
basis would violate the new ethos of judicial restraint the Supreme Court establishes in 
Baker by validating or rejecting the interests for which the states attempt to secure 
representation.  To avoid this position, the Supreme Court would need to reject the 
justiciability of apportionment and districting plans. At the very least, the first option 
would may perpetuate the malapportionment, involve the judiciary further into 
apportionment, and allow the states to perpetuate the idea that civic participation does 
not matter for those who do not share the same interests as the state. Of course, the 
second option perpetuates the malapportionment throughout the country. In 
consideration of these options, political quality balances interests within the state, allows 
citizens to participate in government, and provides a judicially manageable standard that 
allows for protection but removes the judiciary from the process, reinforcing the ethos of 
judicial restraint.  
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the protection of interests argument does not 
mean that the state cannot protect its interests through elections. Instead, the Supreme 
Court’s position is that it cannot prefigure elections to protect interests. Consequently, 
the state and state representatives must engage citizens in a debate about the state but that 
debate cannot eliminate the political equality of the citizen. Each state can still be a 
“laboratory for democracy,”127 but instead of providing rural areas with a majority of the 
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political power, the state may only provide funding to rural areas if the people choose to 
do so and the people cannot prevent other citizens from securing their political rights.128 
As a result of the Reapportionment Decisions, the Supreme Court the Supreme 
Court recharacterized the relationships of the state governments to its citizens and the 
state governments to the federal government. In both cases, the Supreme Court 
diminished the power of the state to favor the power of the individual or the power of the 
national government. As the Supreme Court enacted political equality universally, the 
Supreme Court diminished the power of the state to use its discretionary power to protect 
its interest. While the dissenters of the Revolution claimed that federalism suffered, the 
Court’s decisions created a public space that privileged all voices within the state to 
determined policy for the state. Instead of allowing states to discover solutions to its own 
problems before reaching consensus with all citizens, the Supreme Court stated that 
equality is prior to rationality, or, before the state can determine its desired preferences, it 
must allow citizens to partake in the process of representation. 
Conclus ion: The Degree  of Equality  
With the institutionalization of political equality through the reapportionment 
decisions, the Supreme Court needed to decide how equal “equal representation” would 
be. In Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 
(1969), the Supreme Court ruled that for Congressional Reapportionment, equal 
representation would mean that the states would need to make a “good faith effort” to 
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achieve mathematical equality and there would be no de minimis standard to satisfy the “as 
nearly practicable” portion of “One Person, One Vote.”129 In Wesbery and Reynolds, the 
Court established the “One Person, One Vote” standard but left room for the States with 
“as nearly practical” exception, knowing full well that mathematical certainty was not 
obtainable but, also, if the Court were to articulate a de minimis standard, then legislative 
motive would be to push further away from equality to protect interests.130 For the 
Supreme Court, the presence of deviation implies the presence of discrimination, 
especially if the state legislators did not choose the plan with fewer deviations or disregards 
the maxim of political equality. If the states legislators created districts with variations, 
then they possessed the burden of proof to show why the variations would be allowable 
under the “One Person, One Vote,” principle. While the states legislatures of Missouri 
and New York relied on the perceived invention of an imminent de minimis standard, as 
well as defending the interplay of partisan forces within the political process and the 
protection of interests that would disappear under “One Person, One Vote,” the Supreme 
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Court rejected those arguments to protect equality.131 In both cases, the Supreme Court 
prioritized political equality to create political fairness and would not let the state 
legislature trump that right without providing good reasons to do so. 
The dissenting justices in Kirkpatrick and Wells further despised the ways in which 
the Supreme Court’s decisions diminished the power of the legislature to engage the 
political process. Justice Harlan, who acquiesced to the majority on reapportionment in 
the 1966 case Burns v. Richardson, pronounced that the majority’s “Draconian judgments” 
transformed, “a political slogan into a constitutional absolute. Strait indeed is the path of 
the righteous legislator. Slide rule in hand, he must avoid all thought of county lines, local 
traditions, politics, history, and economics, so as to achieve the magic formula: one man, 
one vote.”132 The religiosity of equality, for Justice Harlan, weakened the political process.  
Because the census itself may be inexact, due to problems of conducting the census, a 
mobile population, and large group of ineligible voters, Justice Harlan condemned the 
Court for its desire to impose exactness and for the distrust of the legislative process.133 
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other plans with smaller variances, the state legislature refused to adopt those to preserve the protection of 
interests. In Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, (1969), New York required 41 Congressional districts. Of 
those districts, 31 met the “One Person, One Vote,” Requirement, while the remaining ten counties 
contained some variation (+6.488% and -6.6.8% below the mean population for a district). Because of the 
variations, the Supreme Court ruled that the districts violated the command of equal population from 
Article I, 2.    
 
132 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 549 – 550, (1969). 
 
133 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 550, 551 (1969). 
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In Wells, Justice Byron White noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Reynolds requiring political equality would not prevent gerrymandering as it is impossible, 
especially for the Supreme Court, to remove the political, economic, regional, and 
historical considerations.134 Noting the absurdity of trying to create equal districts in order 
to prevent the court from implementing equality, he writes, if legislators ignore traditional 
political boundaries to favor equality, then a cartographers can rely on a computer to, 
“produce countless plans for absolute population equality, one differing very little from 
another, but each having its own very different political ramifications. Ultimately, the 
courts may be asked to decide whether some families in an apartment house should vote 
in one district and some in another, if that would come closer to the standard of apparent 
equality.”135 Consequently, the articulation and institutionalization of political equality 
does not mean the articulation or institutionalization of political fairness. According to 
Justice Harlan in Wells, the rule of absolute equality is “perfectly compatible with 
‘gerrymandering’ of the worst sort. A computer may grind out district lines which can 
totally frustrate the popular will on an overwhelming number of critical issues.136 In time, 
the Supreme Court would back away from the stern pronouncement of political equality. 
                                                
134 In Wells v. Rockefeller, the plaintiff characterized the apportionment plan as a partisan gerrymander but 
the Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of this claim. Justice White’s attack here alludes to Chief 
Justice Earl Warren’s claim in Reynolds v. Sims: “Valid considerations may underlie such aims. Indiscriminate 
districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little 
more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.”  See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 550, 544 (1969) 
and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).  
 
135 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 556 (1969). 
 
136 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 551 (1969). 
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These opinions from the Court would prophesize the challenges facing the 
Supreme Court over the next two decades. For the dissenters, since the foundation of 
apportionment is equality, the Supreme Court pursues jurisprudence that will be 
impractical, impossible and undesirable; consequently, the Court should allow the state 
legislatures to ability to determine the political realities of the state even if the citizens do 
not possess the ability to petition the legislature for a change through the political or 
judicial institutions. Consequently, state rationality enthrones political inequality and 
diminishes the potential for political participation but it would prevent the judiciary from 
determining the nature of representation inherent in the complexity of the political 
process. Even if the judiciary were to allow the state to adhere to traditional lines or follow 
traditional boarders (i.e. prevent the judiciary from checking the power of the state or to 
prevent the judiciary from discerning discrimination through boundaries), then the court 
may prevent the egregious cases of gerrymandering or malapportionment though some 
citizens would still be excluded from civil society. 
For the majority in the Reapportionment Revolution, any unnecessary or 
unjustified deviation from equality represents discrimination against the citizen. If there 
were a deviation at any level, then the apportionment plan threatens the civil liberties at 
that level. Further, any deviation from equality at the expense of interests allows for the 
state legislature to create any “rational” plan for reapportionment. According to the 
majority in the Reapportionment Revolution, the state needs to be characterized by its 
neutrality rather than its partisanship. Further, the political institutions need to provide a 
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space that all citizens can access and determine the important interests of the state. In this 
reading of the Reapportionment Revolution, the extension of the “One Person, One 
Vote” rule constitutes the creation of a meaningful public sphere. Rationality can exist 
under this plan, but equality must precede it to ensure all citizens can access the public 
sphere and that all citizens can benefit from the division of governmental resources. 
Yet, missing from this account of the public sphere is to what extent political 
groups can exert influence over one another and the state. According to Alexander 
Keyssar, the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen concerns the lack of representation for 
minority communities and their community interests, which would become the focus of 
vote dilution cases.137 On its face, the language of Baker, Wesberry, Reynolds and the 
subsequent cases refer to the right of the individual. By the end of the decade, the 
language of the Reapportionment Revolution itself would need modification to cover the 
protection of the community and a right to vote that discusses fairness for those 
communities especially as state legislators found new ways to threaten the development of 
representation under the ideology of political equality.  
                                                
137 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 300.  
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CHAPTER V 
RACE, PARTISAN POLITICS, AND REDISTRICTING: THE RHETORIC OF 
POLITICAL FAIRNESS 
 
Our fathers believed that if this noble view of the rights of man was to flourish, it 
must be rooted in democracy. The most basic right of all was the right to choose 
your own leaders. The history of this country, in large measure, is the history of 
the expansion of that right to all of our people.  
Many of the issues of civil rights are very complex and most difficult. But about 
this there can and should be no argument. Every American citizen must have an 
equal right to vote. There is no reason which can excuse the denial of that right. 
There is no duty which weighs more heavily on us than the duty we have to ensure 
that right. Yet the harsh fact is that in many places in this country men and 
women are kept from voting simply because they are Negroes.1 President Lyndon 
B. Johnson 
 
When I vote my equality falls into the box with my ballot— they disappear 
together.2 Louis Veuillot 
 
 On March 15th, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed Congress and the 
American people in support of the Voting Rights Act, the purpose of which was to 
weaken the structure of racial discrimination throughout the United States. In this 
address, President Johnson offered a legislative solution to combat racial discrimination 
contained in voting regulations and perpetuated by “every device of human ingenuity.” As 
Garth E. Pauley writes, President Johnson located the VRA within the context of the 
American Promise and that support for the act is a way for Americans to fulfill the 
                                                
1 Lyndon B. Johnson, “The American Promise,” In Garth E. Pauley, LBJ’s American Promise: The 1965 Voting 
Rights Address, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 3.  
 
2 Louis Veuillot quoted in Benjamin Barber R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 146. 
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purpose of the Nation. According to Pauley, the president asked his audience to see 
themselves as a chosen people, “endeavoring to sustain democratic governance in order to 
live out their covenant,” and engaged in a mythic and quasi-religious quest and not just a 
political quest.3 Opponents of the VRA, Pauley writes, would be considered un-American, 
as voter discrimination would be inconsistent with American democracy.4 Yet, while 
support for the bill was overwhelming in the House and the Senate, it did not receive full 
support throughout the states.  
In January of 1966, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), that challenged the constitutionality of the bill. Soon 
after the enactment of the VRA, South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the 
VRA on the grounds that the act exceeded the authority of Congress and encroached on 
the authority of the states to create electoral requirements.5 Arguing on behalf of South 
Carolina, David W. Robinson II stated that plaintiffs did not challenge the purpose of the 
act or a majority of provisions of the act; however, the South Carolina challenged portions 
of the VRA that required the automatic suspension of literacy tests, froze the legislative 
process, and created criminal sanctions against states. 6 In creating the act, the plaintiffs 
argued that Congress exceeded its constitutional and historical authority to create 
                                                
3 Garthe E. Pauley, LBJ’s America Promise, 108.  
 
4 Garthe E. Pauley, LBJ’s America Promise, 106. 
 
5 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). 
 
6 Transcript of Oral Argument South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1965). Available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_22_orig/argument-1/. 
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electoral requirements for the state; the coverage formula violated the “principle of 
equality of the States;” the act denied due process as it altered presumption and 
constituted states covered as guilty; prevented judicial review of administrative findings; 
impaired the separation of powers by “adjudicating guilt through legislation;” and 
constituted a bill of attainder against the states.7 In deciding the case, the decision by 
Chief Justice Warren dismissed the due process, the Bill of Attainder, and separation of 
power arguments as they relate to persons and private groups and not states.8 In defining 
the case, The Chief Justice asked whether or not Congress “exercised its power under the 
Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner with relation to the States.”9 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach reveals the dangers 
of democratic politics, especially concerning irrational forms of majortarian rule and the 
depth of racial animosity preventing individuals from fulfilling political equality. The Act 
stands as the culmination of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Fifteenth 
Amendment and seeks to eliminate all of the tests and devices to prevent citizens from 
participating in the electoral process. Speaking for an 8 - 1 majority, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren states “the Voting Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress’ firm intention to rid the 
country of racial discrimination in voting.”10 The legislative history reveals that, “Congress 
                                                
7 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). 
 
8 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). 
 
9 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). 
 
10 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966). 
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felt itself confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in 
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the 
Constitution,” concluding that, “the unsuccessful remedies which it had prescribed in the 
past would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy 
the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.”11 Though severe, the act’s purpose, 
according to Chief Justice Warren, concerns the ability of the Attorney General, the 
Department of Justice, and the Federal Judiciary to “combat widespread and persistent 
discrimination in voting,”12 in hopes that millions of racial minorities to, “to participate 
for the first time on an equal basis in the government under which they live.”13 
 Justice Hugo Black offered the lone dissent in the case. In his opinion, Justice 
Hugo Black attacked the VRA for the way in which it decimated principles of federalism 
and denied state sovereignty, treating the states like “conquered territories,” and forcing 
the states to “beg federal authorities to approve of its policies” before it could pass state 
laws.14 As the Constitutional ratification debates show, Congress never possessed the 
authority to “veto or negative state laws” and the power of the judiciary to invalidate a 
state long after the law passed in a “long way away from the power to prevent a State from 
                                                
11 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966). 
 
12 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
 
13 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). 
 
14 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358 - 360 (1966); see also the dissent by Chief Justice Burger, 
Justice Stevens and Justice Rehnquist in United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141 (1978). 
In the later decision, the three justices use the destruction of state power argument as a way to narrow the 
Supreme Court’s reading and limit the interpretation of the VRA to include only states and counties and 
not cities.  
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passing a law. I cannot agree with the Court that Congress— denied a power in itself to 
veto a state law— can delegate this same power to the Attorney General or the District 
Court for the District of Columbia”15 While Justice Black acknowledges that the VRA 
allows for Congress to suspend literacy tests, he could not support the threat to state 
sovereignty though some states themselves denied the sovereignty of its citizens.  
 The Supreme Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach represents the 
beginning of a new era of voting rights cases concerning representation and race relation, 
partisan politics and government relations. Keith J. Bybee writes that the language of 
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s decision focuses on the deliberations of Congress, arguing 
that Warren frames his discussion by focusing on Congressional learning. Bybee writes 
that, Warren’s opinion concerns the “language of discovery and edification,” revealing 
that Congress “learned” the extent of discrimination and “knew” the discrimination must 
end.16 By adopting this language, the Chief Justice could provide a broad and aggressive 
remedy to fight the next new device that would deprive racial minorities the right to vote 
and participate in the political process. By using Congress as a model, even for the 
controversial section of preclearance, Justice Warren provides the country with an 
example of fair deliberation and fair political opportunities,  showing the States that if the 
followed the model exemplified in Congress’ use of inclusive hearings, gathering and 
examining enormous amounts of data, holding lengthy debates, and providing reasonable 
                                                
15 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 361 (1966). 
 
16 Keith J. Bybee, Mistaken Identity: The Supreme Court and the Politics of Minority Representation, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 84.  
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measures to repair political communities, there would not be problems with the 
acceptance of the VRA.17Of course, as the Supreme Court’s decision in the 1970s and 
1980s suggest, state government chose not to accept the Chief Justice’s call for 
deliberation, choosing to develop representation according to their interests and not the 
interests of their citizens. This chapter examines the competing visions of 
representation and democracy that constitutes the democratic experience in the Supreme 
Court’s reapportionment and redistricting decisions after Chief Justice Earl Warren 
stepped down from the Supreme Court. During the reapportionment and redistricting 
decisions in 1970s and the 1980s, the Supreme Court attempts to define the nature of 
representation and democracy. Because the ideology of political equality is malleable with 
territorial districting, the ideological debate during the 1970s and the 1980s concerns the 
ideology of political fairness in the reapportionment and districting process. Beneath the 
ideology of political fairness, the Supreme engage in a debate to establish interpretive 
dominance over which vision of representation, which vision of the judiciary, and which 
vision of democracy should form the basis for the representative anecdote of American 
democracy.18 Through these decisions, I argue that the Conservative Justices define 
representation as an act of authorization and define political fairness in terms of the 
ability of state legislators to conduct representation. These two definitional arguments 
constitute voting as an individual right that privileges the state legislators. Consequently, 
                                                
17 Keith J. Bybee, Mistaken Identity, 85. 
 
18 For a discussion of interpretive dominance see Mary E. Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak, “The Battle of 
Issues and Images: Establishing Interpretive Dominance,” Communication Quarterly 42.2 (1994): 120 – 132.  
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the Conservatives Justices envisions a political process that protects a majoritarian 
conception of democracy and an elite conception of democracy that requires little 
deliberation by the people. Conversely, the Liberal Justices on the Court attempt to 
replace the ideology of political equality with of political fairness, where representatives act 
for a group. Accordingly, the Liberal Justices argue for a conception of democracy that 
protects the ability of groups to compete within the democratic process and the judiciary 
acts to protect that rights. By the end of the 1980s, the Liberals Justices would claim a 
tentative victory in interpretive dominance though it would be a short-lived victory 
because of ideological alterations to the Supreme Court.  
Exigence of Reapportionment and Redis tr icting in the 1970s and 1980s 
Judicial Transitions: The End of the Warren Court 
In the beginning of the 1970s, state legislators initiated the first attempt of 
redistricting in light of the standards created by the Supreme Court through the 
Reapportionment Revolution as well as the Congressional standards from the Voting 
Rights Act. With the next round of reapportionment, in increase in litigations occurred 
throughout the state and federal courts as political parties and political interests 
judiciously selected jurisdictions to ensure victory for their cause. However, while there 
was in increase of litigation in the lower levels of the judiciary during the 1970s, the 
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in nearly the same number of cases as it did in the 
1960s. In the 1980s, the Supreme Court heard arguments in only a third of the cases that 
it did in the 1970s. Further, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court did not 
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enact revolutionary reforms that reshaped the electoral process as it did during the 1960s. 
With the standard of political equality in place as the guiding principle for 
reapportionment and the resignation of Chief Justice Earl Warren as the most vocal 
advocate for that political equality, the Supreme Court refrained from enacting wide-
spread reform in the political process, allowing for its 1960s decisions to settle in the states 
and providing Congress the opportunity to develop standards for representation, 
especially in regards to the Voting Rights Act. 
 One of the reasons why the Court did not establish revolutionary reforms 
concerns the constitution of the Court itself. In June of 1968, Chief Justice Earl Warren 
presented President Johnson with two letters, both of which discussed his resignation 
from the Supreme Court. This first letter by the Chief Justice, which consisted of only one 
sentence, stated he would resign at the pleasure of the president; the second letter 
presented a more detailed account for his retirement, his age and views of democracy: 
“When I entered the public service, 150 million of our 200 million people were not yet 
born. I, therefore, conceive it to be my duty to give way to someone who will have more 
years ahead of him to cope with the problems which will come to the Court.”19 By 
presenting his resignation letters to President Lyndon Johnson, Warren attempted to 
avoid what happened next—the possibility that Richard Nixon would appoint the next 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Though he possessed the opportunity to appoint a 
new Chief Justice, a political miscalculation by the President to promote his friend and 
                                                
19 Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made, (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006), 491.  
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confidant Abe Fortas resulted in Nixon’s opportunity to nominate a Chief Justice and an 
Associate Justice.20  It would not be until 1993 until a Democratic President would 
nominate a Supreme Court Justice. 
 During the 1970s and the 1980s, Republican Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan 
appointed eight justices to the Supreme Court. In making their appointments, Nixon and 
Reagan declared that, like Eisenhower, they would appoint conservative justices who were 
not “liberal” or “activists.”21 This time though the Republican presidents were more 
successful with their judicial appointments following conservative principles. In 1969, 
Nixon nominated Warren Burger to replace Chief Justice Warren. After his strategy of 
nominating Southern Justices,22 who opposed the Civil Rights movement, failed to replace 
Justice Fortas, in June of 1971 President Nixon filled the vacancy with Henry Blackmun, a 
Justice that, while on the Court, voted in the majority, regardless of ideology, for each the 
reapportionment and redistricting issue. On September 17, 1971— six days before his 
death—Justice Hugo Black submitted his resignation to President Nixon. On September 
23, 1971, Justice John Marshall Harlan submitted his resignation. With two additional 
                                                
20 The Senate rejected the nomination of Fortas. Soon after his failed confirmation, Justice Fortas resigned 
the High Court as an investigation revealed the Justice received a $20,000 fee from Louis Wolfson, who was 
the target of an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Committee and bragged that Justice Fortas 
would use his influence to help me. See Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the 
Supreme Court, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 5 – 15. 
 
21 Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 524 – 
525. 
 
22 Trevor Parry-Giles, The character of Justice: Rhetoric, Law, and Politics in the Supreme Court Nomination Process, 
(Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2006), 88. Parry-Giles argues that the Senate rejection of Clement 
F. Haynesworth and G. Harold Carswell serves as an ideological sign of the law’s commitment to Civil 
Rights.  
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vacancies, President Nixon nominated Louis F. Powell, a moderate Justice who voted with 
the other conservatives except in partisan gerrymandering cases, and William Rehnquist, a 
Justice who provided one anchor for the Conservative ideology on the Supreme Court. 
During his one term as President, Gerald Ford nominated John Paul Stevens to the 
Court, who started his tenure as a moderate-conservative but then drifted liberal, 
especially during the 1990s and 2000s. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan appointed 
another conservative anchor to the Court with his selection of Antonin Scalia and two 
moderate Justices, Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy, who provided the 
essential “swing-vote,” directing the jurisprudence of the Court during the 1990s. Finally, 
upon Chief Justice Burger’s retirement, Reagan nominated Justice Rehnquist claim the 
throne.  
Under the guidance of Chief Justice Warren Burger, the direction of the Supreme 
Court was not always clear. With the numerous additions to the Court, and the number 
of Justices switching positions and ideology, the opinions did not create a coherent 
reapportionment and redistricting jurisprudence in a similar fashion to the Warren, or 
even Rehnquist, Court. While the Burger Court did not reverse the progressions of the 
Warren Court, it attempted to hold the line to prevent additional developments of the 
Rights Revolution. As Mark Tushnet points out, the phrase “this far and no further” 
describes the post-New Deal and Great Society constitutional order, especially in regards 
to the understanding of individual rights: “The overall effect is to create a constitutional 
order with a chastened vision of what the Constitution requires in connection with 
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individual rights, but no radical alternative to or general repudiation of the prior order’s 
accomplishments.”23 Yet, in other ways, Tushnet’s comments deflect away from the 
attempts of the Conservative Justices to eviscerate the law of the Warren Court through 
small, incremental changes.  
  For example, in the reapportionment decisions under Chief Justice Burger and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court followed the One Person, One Vote requirement and 
the establishment of political equality. 24 Yet, while upholding the political equality 
ideology of the Warren Court, the Conservative Courts eased some of the dictates of the 
Reapportionment Revolution and refused to grant new substantive rights in 
reapportionment. During this time, the Court ruled that local and state governments 
could deviate from equality to follow the integrity of political subdivisions to allow for 
flexibility to meet changing social needs;25 supported the state legislature as the primary 
                                                
23 Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 67. Tushnet 
borrows the phrase “this far and no further” from James Fleming. See James Flemming, “Fidelity, Basic 
Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner,” William and Mary Law Review 41 (1999): 152. 
 
24 Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 54 - 55 (1970). In a 5 – 4 decision 
by Justice Hugo Black, the Supreme Court declared, on the authority of Avery v. Midland County, that 
political equality must extend to a state or local government function that performs public functions, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires each voter to possess equal voice for the election. In Ely v. Klah, 403 U.S. 
108 (1971), the Supreme Court issued a 9 – 0 opinion that state a district court did not err by providing the 
state legislators a reasonable amount of time to redistrict the state and that the district court is in the best 
position to know whether or not the state possesses enough time to redistrict before an election. In White v. 
Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973), the Supreme Court issued a 9 – 0 decision that struck down Congressional 
districts in Texas as the State Legislators failed to make a good faith effort to eliminate deviations in 
population in order to protect political subdivisions as those deviations were not unavoidable. The Supreme 
Court decided White v. Weiser on the same day as White v. Regester and Gaffney.  
 
25 Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971).  
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authority in redistricting;26 required that state legislators need a chance to determine the 
question of its law before the district court or the Supreme Court determines the federal 
constitutional issue over reapportionment;27 stated population deviations are permissible 
in a state’s reapportionment plan, more so than a Congressional plan, if the state follows a 
rational state policy;28 noted that equal population standards for state reapportionments 
are not as strict as they are for Congressional standards, allowing for deviations up to 10% 
without judicial scrutiny absent from other racial or political considerations;29 and, in a 
narrow decision tailored to one state, ruled that a Wyoming county, with a population of 
only 2,294--- an 23% deviation from the ideal— could possess one representative because 
since its inception as a state Wyoming consistently used the county boundary as a criteria 
to create districts and apportion representatives in the state legislature.30 By easing the 
restrictions, the Supreme Court upheld the basic provisions of the Warren Court but 
provided the states with greater flexibility to enact reapportionment and redistricting 
plans, allowing for an interjection of federalism into reapportionment and the desire to 
consider practical measures of each state rather than subjecting state legislators to an 
abstract ideal of political equality.  
                                                
26 Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 196 - 198 (1972).  
 
27 Harris County Commissioners v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 (1975).  
 
28 Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320 – 328, (1973).  
 
29 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 762 - 765 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings 412 US. 722 (1973).  
 
30 Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).  
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While the Supreme Court no longer enacted widespread reform to the electoral 
process, it began to uncover the hidden reality of the reapportionment decisions. As the 
Supreme Court framed its decision within the language of electoral proceduralism to 
promote political equality, voters challenged the substance of the Court’s decisions, 
especially as to how representation affects individuals and groups within states and their 
political subdivisions. Further, one of the most important aspects of Baker and other 
reapportionment decisions the Supreme Court refrained from explicit discussion within 
the text was which groups of citizens received diminished voting because of the 
reapportionment plans. While the decision reinforces dialectics between rural and urban, 
conservative and liberal, and to an extent rich and the poor, the justices rarely discussed 
the racial aspect of reapportionment, especially with regards to how reapportionments 
allowed white rural voters to possess more political power than black urban voters,31 
hiding the reality that “unresponsiveness” translated into “exclusion.”32 For example, in 
pre-Bake Tennessee, the lack of reapportionment by the state legislature presented 
minorities with another poll tax, another literacy test, and another “good-character” test 
that prevented racial minorities effective and fair representation. Accordingly, Baker 
becomes symbolically important as a victory in the long struggle for Civil Rights, in some 
ways as important as the Freedom Rides and the protests in Selma, and the passing of the 
Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act. By the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 
                                                
31 Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made, (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006) 388. 
 
32 Lani Guinier, “The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black 
Representation,” Michigan Law Review 89 (1991): 1095. 
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the 1970s, the Supreme Court, as well as the other coordinate branches of government, 
needed to address how electoral districts altered the representation of minorities within 
the states.  
In addition to the development of a jurisprudence centered on the VRA, the 
Supreme Court began to focus on the partisan nature of apportionment and 
gerrymandering cases. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in five cases that discuss the partisan implications of reapportionment and 
redistricting plans.33 In Baker, the state Democrats frustrated the will of the state 
Republicans and those that would vote for Republicans; however, this was outside of the 
scope of the Court’s decision. According to Mark Tushnet, Baker initiated a period of 
ideological driven districts where candidates face tougher challenges in their party than 
against the other party.34 Consequently, political parties searched for ways to ensure 
victory at the expense of competitive elections and at the expense of the other party. 
Partisan redistricting culminated in the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision, Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S. 109, where the Court ruled that partisan redistricting challengers were 
justiciable. Yet, even though they were justiciable, partisan gerrymandering claims never 
received the same sympathy by the Supreme Court as racial gerrymander claims because of 
                                                
33 The five cases are Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971), Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 772, White v. Weiser, 
412 U.S. 783 (1973), Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), and Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).  
The decision for Gaffney v. Cummings (Connecticut State Legislative Reapportionment) and White v. Weiser 
(Texas Congressional Reapportionment) were handed down on June 18th, 1973, the same day the Supreme 
Court handed down White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973 (Texas State Legislative Reapportionment), which 
protected minority voting blocs in Texas and allowed for a 10% population deviation standard for state 
legislative apportionment.  
 
34 Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, 15. 
 257 
the Voting Rights Act and a plurality of the Supreme Court would rule in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267 (2004) that political gerrymandering claims were not justiciable.  
Congressional Action: The 1965 Voting Rights Act and the Guilt of Racial Vote 
Dilution 
Though the Supreme Court refused to expand the rights of citizens, it upheld the 
expansion of rights through Congressional action. When Congress enacted and the 
President signed the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) into law, they initiated the most 
comprehensive electoral reform act and the largest possible rebuke to state governments, 
especially in relation to the subordination of the state governments to the federal 
government. While President Johnson presented the bill in the language of hope and 
redemption, the bill itself arrived in the language of guilt and sin. No longer would 
Congress accept excuses as to why some members of the community lacked the right to 
vote or the right to cast a meaningful ballot almost one hundred years after the ratification 
of the fifteenth amendment. The VRA not only protects the ability of a citizen to case a 
meaningful ballot by prohibiting the states from enacting procedures to diminish the 
worth of a vote, it would eventually ensure the representation of constituents through the 
selection of the “candidate of choice.”  
Though harsh, the text of the VRA presents a means to redemption, but only by 
accepting a stigma of discrimination through a strategy of mortification. The toughest 
provision on the offending states is that of the Pre-Clearance portion of Section 5. During 
deliberation on the VRA, Congress thought that the was necessary because states 
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implemented new prohibitions of voting as soon as a prior ban was held unconstitutional, 
resulting in the dilution of the right to vote without any form of judicial remedy.35 The 
presence of these tests and the absence of voter registration and turnout serve as a 
powerful sign of voter discrimination in the areas under coverage of the VRA. 
Rhetorically, the stigma of the VA upon the states and the covered areas serves as a means 
to persuade those covered areas to adopt a position of mortification about racial 
discrimination. The stigma of the VRA, especially the Pre-Clearance of Section 5, serves as 
a legal representation of discrimination past, Hawthorne’s Scarlet A. As a corrective move, 
it asks legislatures to identify no longer with the past efforts of discrimination but to adopt 
a strategy of mortification by admitting its guilt, moving forward, and allowing its citizens 
to gain access to the political process.  Accordingly, because of the high level of 
discrimination, new areas would be included and the meaning of political of political 
subdivision would extend to any governmental entity “having power over any aspect of the 
electoral process within designated jurisdictions.”36 
The provisions of the VRA call for the protection of both an individual’s right to 
vote and a group’s right to vote, especially for protected minorities who saw their vote 
diluted through electoral devices and redistricting. Section 2 of the act declares that “no 
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard practice or procedure,” shall be 
                                                
35 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 355 (1966), Any political subdivision, a county or parish that 
registers citizens to vote, that employed a test or device to abridge the right to vote or that, according to the 
Director of the Census, less than 50% of its voting-age residents were registered, would be required to file its 
apportionment plan for review to the Attorney General of file for a hearing in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia (317).  
 
36 United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, (1978).  
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used by any political subdivision or state to deny the right to vote based on race or color.37 
Section 3 allows for judicial relief in legal controversies over the violation of the fifteenth 
amendment, the Attorney General the power to enforce guarantees of the fifteenth 
amendment and to suspend voting tests and devices that suspends the right to vote, and 
the judiciary to retain jurisdiction, if a violation were found, until the court determines 
that the “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect o denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race or color.”38 Section 4 prohibits the use of any tests of devices the denies the right to 
vote and calls for the conveying of a three judge panel, with an appeal to the US Supreme 
Court, to determine a violation. Further, Section 4 requires that this rule will apply to a 
state or political subdivision which, according to the Attorney General, maintained voting 
tests on November of 1964, or whereby less than “50 per centum of the persons of voting 
age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less then 5- per centum 
of such persons voted in the residential election of 1964.”39 Section 4 also protects the 
rights of citizens to vote using ballots that are not in English.40 Section 10 prohibits the 
use of poll taxes and provides the court with jurisdiction to hear cases involving poll taxes.  
                                                
3789 Public Law 110, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (6 August 1965), Voting Rights Act of 1965, 437.  
 
38 89. Public Law 110, 437-438 
 
39 89. Public Law 110, 438. 
 
40 Other important aspects of the VRA, which do not concern redistricting or reapportionment include, 
Section 6 allows the court to appoint examiners to search for violations of Section 3 and to determine 
eligibility to vote. Section calls for examiners to investigate who is eligible to vote.  Section 8 allows 
examiners to observe elections in states and political subdivisions. Section 9 concerns challenges to the 
examiner’s prepared list of who can vote. Section 12 provides a penalty for any individual who would violate 
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Section 5, which originally was the most controversial aspect of the VRA, requires 
that if a state or political subdivision is found in violation of the VRA, then that state or 
political subdivision requires pre-clearance when it attempts to change any “voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard practice, or procedure with respect to 
voting different from that in force on November 1st, 1964.”41 The state must submit its 
plan to the Attorney General or to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia for a declaratory judgment to determine that such “qualifications, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose of will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”42 Once submitted, the 
Attorney General possesses sixty days to render a judgment, though the Supreme Court 
ruled in that this does not mean that if the Attorney General does not respond in 60 days 
the plan is valid.43 The controversy with this provision is that once an area is designated as 
a “specially targeted area,” i.e. a place where violations occurred in the past, then in order 
to free itself from §5 requirements, the state, and not just a political subdivision within a 
                                                                                                                                           
sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, or 10. Section 13 presents conditions for the termination of listing, such as when all 
people listen on an examiner’s report have been placed on voting rolls, when there is no longer reason to 
believe people will be denied the right to vote, when 50% of non-white inhabitants are registered to vote, 
and upon the authorization of the court. 
 
41 89. Public Law 110, 439. Originally, the pre-clearance portion of VRA covered six Confederate States; 
however, currently, the pre-clearance section covers the entire states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia (except eight counties); certain counties in 
California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota; and, finally, certain towns in Michigan 
and New Hampshire 
 
42 89. Public Law 110, 439. 
 
43 Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, (1969).  
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state, possesses the burden of proof to show that it does not discriminate voting practices 
or procedures.44  
Though the Supreme Court followed the mandates set by Congress, the Warren 
Court, the Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court provided competing interpretations 
over the scope of the VRA, especially in relation to §5. While this provision of the VRA 
may have been designed to cover voter registration and balloting, the Supreme Courts 
reading of the provision covers reapportionment and redistricting, causing a switch from 
concern over protected minorities from registering to vote to a concern over the meaning 
and utility over that vote.45 In Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the first 
and only case to involve the VRA and apportionment under the Warren Court, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren argues that the Court must reject, because of Congressional intent, a 
narrow reading of the Act as it “was aimed at the subtle, as well as obvious, state 
regulations which have the effect of denying citizens the right to vote because of their 
race,” and that the “right to vote” includes “all action necessary to make a vote effective.”46 
                                                
44 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.  156, 162 - 169 (1980). 
 
45 Richard K. Scher, Jon L. Mills, and Johns J. Hotaling, Voting Rights & Democracy: The Law and Politics of 
Redistricting, (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997), 49.  
 
46 Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 - 566 (1969). Allen includes four cases, three from 
Mississippi (cases 25, 26, & 36) and one from Virginia (case 30). Case 25 involves a change from district 
election to at large elections. No. 26 involves making an important county official an appointed rather than 
elective office. No. 36 concerns making it more difficult for an independent candidate to gain access on the 
ballot. No. 3 involves new procedures for write in candidates. All of these, the Court rules, constitute 
changes to voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or standard, practices or procedures with respect 
to voting under §5. In his Opinion, Chief Justice Warren states that these changes need to be considered 
under the VRA, as well as stating that individuals, and not just the Attorney General, can challenge changes 
to voting practices and procedures under §5 (557); citizens can bring forth complaints in local district courts 
rather than just the District Court for the District of Columbia to seek a declaratory judgment as to whether 
or not a new districting plan or change in procedures violates §5 (563); the State enacting change must 
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This broad reading would cover all state laws in regards to voting practices and 
procedures, from districting to voter registration to counting ballots. Under the Burger 
Court, the Supreme Court would adopt a more conservative and narrow reading of the 
VRA, determining that the criteria to judge §5 would be if the plan is non-retrogression in 
effect whereby protected minorities could not lose their influence in representation and 
state reapportionment and redistricting would need to preserve that representation.47 This 
counters the broader reading of the VRA since it only minimally protects racial minorities 
and allows for the protection of redistricting plans that maintain the status quo rather 
than expand the political equality for groups.  Under the Rehnquist Court, the 
Conservative Justices employed a strict test that required challengers to prove that State 
Legislators intended to discriminate against voters rather than show that the consequences 
of a plan, or disproportionate effects, discriminated against or diluted the votes of 
citizens.48 In response to this decision, Congress altered §2 of the VRA to protect racial 
minorities as cohesive political groups. In a 9 – 0 decision, the Supreme Court supported 
this interpretation in Thornburg v. Gingles.   
                                                                                                                                           
submit the changes to the Attorney General rather than just rely on the fact the Attorney General may be 
“aware” that a state is making changes (571); and the States must resubmit plans and can receive bail-out 
from the VRA when the state they obtain a declaratory judgment that they have not used “tests or devices” 
proscribed by §4 (572).  
 
47 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). In the next chapter, I will discuss how the non-
retrogression and later interpretations of §5 and the vote dilution standard from the 1982 changes and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles will stand as a contradiction in jurisprudence.  
 
48 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The City of Mobile employed at-large elections for its three 
city commission officers. Challengers attacked than plan stating that the at-large system prevented minority 
citizens the ability to elect candidates of their choice because the city employed at-large rather the district 
voting schemes and this constituted a vote dilution claim under §2. In a 6 – 3 decision, the Supreme Court 
ruled that at-large did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and political groups do not have the right to 
claim representation independent of an individual’s right to vote.    
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Politically, the authorization and reauthorization of the VRA requires a high level 
of coordination between the three branches of the federal government. Congressionally, 
there has been a high level of support for the act with its initial authorization of 1965 and 
its reauthorizations in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006 though some members of Congress 
express doubt and frustrations with the preclearance conditions of Section 5. 
Congressman Lynn Westmoreland (R-GA) spearheaded a group in 2006 to release 
Georgia and other communities from the pre-clearance requirement of Section 5 since 
Georgia, and other areas, saw an increase in representation and elected officials for the 
protected minority groups.49 Further, Rep. Westmoreland’s group claimed that the pre-
clearance was unfair since it required citizens to view the relations between races and 
representation in the past rather than in the present and diminished the notion of 
progress with minority voting.  
Presidentially, there has been some disagreement with certain aspects of the act, 
especially from President Reagan, President G.H. Bush, and President George W. Bush. 
Under the Reagan Administration, current Chief Justice John Roberts, who worked for 
the Reagan administration as a special assistant to the Attorney General, attacked 
provisions of the VRA, especially concerning the broad language of the Act and what he 
considered a move to “racial quotas” for representation and the development of 
proportional representation, both of which he argued would be inconsistent with the 
                                                
49 Bob Deans, “Voting Rights Act Extended,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 28 July 2006 3C. 
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democratic principles of the United States.50  President Reagan believed that a move from 
discovering discrimination by effects instead of intent would lead to proportional 
representation, which was, “alien to the traditional principles of our country,” and, 
consequently, he preferred to extend the VRA with exceptions.51 Though he asked 
President Reagan to commit to supporting the Voting Rights Act, President George H.W. 
Bush was not known for his commitment for protecting Civil Rights and opposed quota 
systems for representation, which some conservatives believe the VRA promotes.52 
President George W. Bush, like his Republican predecessors, supported the VRA to a 
degree. As Governor of Texas, Bush opposed the pre-clearance portions and the Act itself 
in Bush v. Vera 517 U.S. 952 (1996). However, because of the widespread support for the 
VRA, the president could not veto the act.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
50 Robin Toner and Jonathan D. Glater, “Roberts Helped to Shape 80s Civil Rights Debate,” The New York 
Times, 4 August 2006 A14.  
 
51 Ronald Reagan, “Statement on Action by the Senate Judiciary Committee Concerning Extension of the 
Voting Rights Act May 1982 Public Papers of Ronald Reagan: 
 http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/50382c.htm. 
 
52 Ruth Marcus, “What Does Bush Really Believe? Civil Rights Record Illustrates Shifts,” The Washington 
Post, 18 August 1992 A1. According to the article, in the 1960s then Congressman Bush opposed the Civil 
Rights Act, though as president he appointed Clarence Thomas and signed a Civil Rights Bill. During his 
term as President, Bush signed A Civil Rights Bill that would allow individuals more protection to bring 
forth legal challenges, especially in regards to hiring practices. Opponents believed that this would create a 
quote system for businesses. See John Lewis, “Civil Rights Opponents Resort to Old Arguments,” St. 
Petersburg Times, 24 April 1991 15A. 
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State Recalcitrant: Mississippi Burning 
 While the federal government seemed to coordinate their efforts to prevent vote 
dilution and any practice the diminished the rights of racial minorities to cast a 
meaningful ballot, not all state governments desired that change in their reapportionment 
plans. As the States worked to develop redistricting plan after the 1970 census and 
incorporate the new reapportionment and redistricting guidelines, such as the One 
Person, One Vote rule and the new requirements under the VRA, not all states complied 
with the new regulations. The worst state, or the state to consistently disregard the new 
legal standards, was Mississippi. Between 1969 and 1990, the Supreme Court issued ten 
decisions that concerned reapportionment, redistricting, or the VRA from cases that arose 
in Mississippi, eight of which related to the implementation of one apportionment.  
In Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court heard four cases, three of 
which were from Mississippi, which challenged whether or not changes in districts would 
be covered under the Section 5 of the VRA.53 Allen represents two ways in which the state 
of Mississippi attempted to disregard racial minorities as well as the VRA. First, the state 
believed that when it made changes to districts, it did not need to inform the Attorney 
                                                
53 Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). In the Mississippi cases, the District Court ruled that 
these changes did not meet the pre-clearance requirement. In addition to Fairly v. Patterson, the other cases 
were Bunton v. Patterson and Whitley v. Williams. In No. 26, Bunton v. Patterson, the state legislature amended 
the state code to provide that in eleven specified counties, the county superintendent of education would be 
appointed rather than elected here as before the change, the counties had an option of electing or 
appointing the member. In No. 36, Whitley v. Williams, the state legislature changed the requirements for 
independent candidates running in the general election so that, (1) no one who voted in the primary could 
run as an independent candidate; (2) the time to file a petition to run was moved to 60 days before a 
primary instead of 40 days before; (3) the numbers of signatures needed to run was increased; and, (4), a new 
provision required that each qualified elector who signed the independent qualifying petition must include 
his/her polling precinct and county, 551.  
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General even if those changed would negatively impact the ability of racial minorities to 
cast a meaningful ballot. In No. 25, Fairly et al. v. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, 
the state legislature of Mississippi altered the state’s requirement that the board of 
supervisors for each county would be elected at–large rather than through electoral 
districts. The change in form of election by the state legislature was preemptive as it sought 
to delay the first instance that a black citizen of Mississippi would take his or her seat on 
the county board of supervisors. 54 Because Mississippi could not longer prohibit the right 
to vote outright, the state needed to invent other ways to prevent the political equality of 
racial minorities. While a district election may result in a minority group winning a 
legislative seat to represent them, in an at-large election with racial-bloc voting, the 
political equality of an individual’s ballot means that the dominant majority frustrates the 
will of a minority group. Second, attorneys for the state argued that the legislature did not 
need to make a formal submission of its changes to the Attorney General and that the 
Attorney General would be aware of the changes in Mississippi. Since, as Mississippi 
believed, the AG was “aware” of the changes and he did not object to the changes, then 
there were no problems under the VRA. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments 
and the state legislature’s authoritative interpretation of reapportionment under the VRA. 
 In 1971, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision in Connor v. Johnson, 490 
U.S. 690 (1971), the first of several cases that would concern the same apportionment 
                                                
54 Andrew Kull, The Color Blind Constitution, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 214.  
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plan.55 The impetus of this case was Connor v. Johnson, 256 F. Supp. 962 (1966), in which 
the District Court invalidated the State Legislature’s 1962 apportionment plan, leading 
the establishment of a court drawn plan for the 1967 elections that too was declared 
unconstitutional in Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492 (1967). In the 1971 decision, the 
Supreme Court decided that the District Court needed to create an apportionment plan 
that utilized Single Member-Districts for Hindis County, which the District Court 
declared it could not do because of “insurmountable difficulties.”56 In 1972, the Supreme 
Court decided Connor v. Williams 404 U.S. 549 (1972) and, in a Per Curiam opinion, 
objected to the disparity between the largest and smallest districts of 18.9% in the 
Mississippi Senate and 19.7% in the House from a District Court ordered plan but 
decided to wait for consideration as it did not know if the rule from Preisler and Wells 
should apply to state districts.57 In 1975, the Supreme Court declared that two Mississippi 
                                                
55 In Conner v. Johnson, 490 U.S. 690 (1971), a District Court invalidated a Mississippi reapportionment plan 
because of large variations among districts. Parties submitted new plans and then the District Court released 
its own plan, which contained both single-member districts and multi-member districts. The Court ruled 
that the districts court’s plan should not be in place because of the multi-member districts and, in the 
process, created a new guideline that stated, “when district courts are forced to fashion apportionment 
plans, single-member districts are preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter,” 692. 
Further, the Court ruled that there was ample time for the district court to create a new plan, featuring 
single-member districts, before elections, even though the deadline for candidates to file for the election was 
June 4t. The case was decided on June 3rd. The Supreme Court extended the deadline for filing to June 14th, 
which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Black and Harlan disagreed with this decision because, first, the 
Supreme Court disrupted the plans of politicians, forcing them to plan and run for a district election rather 
than at large election, second, would cause confusion with candidates and voters because of the unknown 
district lines, and, third, because the Supreme Court supported the use of multi-member districts in the 
previous cases. 693. 
 
56 Connor v. Coleman, 425 U.S. 675, 676 (1976). Plans by the state legislature and the district court attempted 
to follow historical guidelines, the most important of which were county lines. 
 
57 Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551 - 552 (1972). Appellants wanted the Supreme Court to decide this 
case in light of Congressional standards that concern no de minimis standard. However, the Supreme Court 
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legislative enactments to reapportion the state needed pre-clearance under Section 5 
before those laws could be effective.58 Consequently, the state submitted a plan to the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General objected, leaving the district court to create a 
temporary plan until the state legislature could develop a permanent plan in February 
1976. Of course, this did not occur, as the district court decided against the examination 
of plans presented by the legislature because of other cases that concerned 
reapportionment under review by the Supreme Court.59 In Connor v. Coleman, 425 U.S. 
675 (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that there was no reason to wait and the district 
court needed to complete the apportionment process because the state legislature refused 
to develop a constitutionally permissible plan.  
 By 1979, the issues before the Supreme Court had still not been resolved, calling 
into question the 1979 state elections. In 1977, the Supreme Court reached yet another 
decision about malapportionment by the state legislature and the district court in Connor 
v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) and issued orders to the district court to draw a 
                                                                                                                                           
hesitated on this point. Further, the Supreme Court decided against another claim by the appellants, 
invalidating the 1971 elections.  
 
58 Connor v. Waller, 421 US 656 (1975). In Waller v. Connor, 396 F. Supp. 1308 (1975), Appellees claimed 
that the Mississippi State Apportionment plans, through the use of multi-member districts, violated the 
“One Person, One Vote” rule of Reynolds and minimized or canceled out black voting strength. The 
District Court ruled that just because a racial group did not receive representation does not mean that the 
legislature discriminates against a group. Further, the court stated that the legislature possesses no duty to 
draw laws to enhance the representation of “sizable” minority groups to “maximize” political advantage.” 
Finally, the group in question failed to show how the use of multi-member districts creates racial or 
economic discrimination.   
 
59 At the time, the district court waited for decisions in East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 422 U.S. 
105 (1975), Beer v. United States, 419 U.S. 822 (1974), United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v Carey, 
423 U.S. 946 (1975).  
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reapportionment map that featured deviations less than the 16.5% in the State Senate and 
19.3% in the House as well as drawing legislative districts that would not dilute the voting 
strength of blacks in the state, unless the district court provided a reason as to why that 
could not be accomplished.60 Further, the apportionment plan, whether legislative created 
or court ordered, should “allay suspicions and avoid the creation of concerns that might 
lead to new constitutional challenges,” especially in relation to the dilution of the vote of 
blacks within the state.61 The state legislature and district court failed to present 
constitutional plans, leading to the final decision in Connor v. Coleman, 440 U.S. 612 
(1979), whereby the Supreme Court ordered the district court to create a constitutional 
plan without regard as to whether or not the state legislature would do so before the 
deadlines for the 1979 elections. Additionally, in 1977, the Supreme Court released a per 
curium decision in US v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County Mississippi 429 U.S. 642 
(1977), which reversed a decision by a Mississippi District Court that erred since it 
decided the wrong issue it faced.62 
                                                
60 Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414 - 426 (1977). In this decision, the Supreme Court reminded the district 
court that the district court plan needs to be held to higher standards and that deviations must be 
accompanied by persuasive justifications and that the court ordered plan needs to avoid multi-member 
districts. Further, the historical reliance by the state, both the legislature and the district court, to rely on 
county boundaries as district boundaries would not be permissible. 
 
61 Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425 (1977). 
 
62 United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County Mississippi 429 U.S. 642 (1977). In this case, the 
District Court should not have ruled as to whether or not there was a violation of §5 but whether or not the 
county should could be enjoined from holding elections under a plan that could had not been cleared under 
§5.  
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In 1971, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision in Connor v. Johnson, 490 
U.S. 690 (1971), the first of five cases ruling an 1967 reapportionment plan 
unconstitutional.63 The Connor cases represent the weakness of judicial persuasion and the 
problems of incommensurability. Even with the general acceptance of Reynolds and the 
VRA throughout the country, some state governments found ways to circumvent political 
equality and political fairness by creating reapportionment plans that did not meet the 
standards from Reynolds or the VRA. 64 According to the Court in Connor v. Finch, neither 
the legislative apportionment plan nor the court ordered planed followed the “neutral 
principles” of Reynolds. In fact, where the state could have created compact districts of 
equal population, the state chose to create bizarrely drawn districts of unequal population 
to preserve white majorities in the districts.65 As Justice Thurgood Marshall argues, the 
district court’s reliance on the state legislature’s primacy in state reapportionment 
presented a “transparent attempt to avoid the unequivocal command of the Court,” 
leaving the Supreme Court with no other solution than to issue a writ of madamus to the 
district court to ensure the correct reapportionment.66  Between the state legislature and 
the district court, three sets of state elections occurred (1967, 1971, 1975) with population 
                                                
63 The other Mississippi are  Conner v. Johnson, 490 U.S. 690 (1971); Connor v. Coleman, 425 U.S. 675 (1976); 
Connor v. Williams 404 U.S. 549, (1972); Connor v. Waller, 421 US 656 (1975). Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 
414 - 426 (1977).  
 
64 According to Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 14 – 21 (1975), the Supreme Court ruled that state 
reapportionment was the primary responsibility of the state legislatures, meaning the district courts must 
defer if the state legislatures can accomplish its goal.  
 
65 Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 423 - 425 (1977). 
 
66 Connor v. Coleman, 440 U.S. 612, 624 (1979).  
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deviances and with the dilution of the right to vote for blacks. Without any power to 
punish the state legislators and the district court, its reapportionment decisions developed 
into empty decrees. From these decisions, it appears of if the state waited for additional 
decisions for the Supreme Court in the hopes that the Court would make some decision 
that would allow Mississippi to avoid complying with Reynolds or the VRA. By refraining 
to adopt constitutionally valid reapportionment plans under the authority of Wesberry, 
Reynolds and the VRA, state legislators ensured that elections occurred and minorities were 
denied the right to vote for another election cycle.  
Race, Partisan Polit ics  and the Ideology of Polit ica l Fairness : The Failure  of 
Polit ica l Equality  
 During the 1970s and the 1980s, the Supreme Court released decisions in 35 cases 
relating to the reapportionment, redistricting, and the Voting Rights Act. Of these 35 
cases and not considering the eight cases concerning Mississippi already discussed, the 
Supreme Court heard arguments in four specific areas of reapportionment and 
redistricting law. First, five cases concern claims of vote dilution, culminating in the 
Supreme Court’s decision of Thornburg v. Gingles, which upholds Congress alteration of 
the VRA in 1982 and protects the ability of racial minorities, acting as cohesive political 
communities, to elect candidates of choice.67 Second, twelve cases concern the procedure 
                                                
67 Before Congress amended the VRA in 1982, challengers present claims of vote dilution under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court. The vote dilution cases are 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55 (1980); Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 US. 613 (1982); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 20 (1986).  
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or substance of preclearance claims under §5 of the VRA.68  Third, twelve cases explicitly 
concern apportionment though some of these decisions implicitly discuss partisan 
gerrymandering.69 Finally, in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), the Supreme Court 
rules that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable.  
 As state legislators incorporated the ideology of political equality and the 
requirements of the Reapportionment Revolution into their apportionment and 
districting laws, citizens continued to challenge the apportionment and districting laws. 
Yet, the concerns of citizens and the subsequent opinions of the Supreme Court reflected 
a change in the ideology governing reapportionment decisions from political equality to 
political fairness. For example, In Allen v. State Board of Elections, Chief Justice Earl Warren 
stated that, “Voters who are members of a racial minority might well be in the majority in 
one district, but in a decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change could 
therefore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would 
prohibiting some of them from voting.”70 While the Chief Justice attempted to reject this 
                                                
68 Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Taylor v. McKeithen 407 U.S. 191 (1972). In Georgia v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).  East Carroll Parish School Board 
v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). United Jewish Organization, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.  144 (1977). Morris v. 
Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala 435 U.S. 110 (1978); 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); and McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981); UPham v. 
Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982).  
 
69 The apportionment cases are: Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 
108 (1971); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972); 
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 
772 (1973), and White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973), which were released on the same day; Chapman v. 
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description of voters in Reynolds, he could no longer ignore the reality of political 
communities in Allen. As Andrew Kull suggests, the assumptions of Allen suggest a new 
standard to determine discrimination: whether or not the voting “rights’ of a specific 
group, in this case a protected minority class, possesses the power to vote as a racial bloc 
and elect a candidate of its choice.71  
 The change from Reynolds to Allen represents the problems of political equality as 
the guiding ideology in reapportionment. A group, not an individual, wins elections. A 
group displays its political power, if once aggregated together, it elects a candidate of 
choice, knowing that the group will be able to hold that representative accountable, 
especially if that candidate reflect the interests of the people.72 Consequently, the change 
from the individual standard to the group standard alters the meaning of the Reynolds 
phrase of “fair and effective representation.” While state legislatures can employ 
technology draw district lines in any number of ways to ensure a political victory and to 
follow the precepts of “fair” districting, such as “One Person, One Vote,” compactness, 
contiguity, political subdivisions, the strict adherence to the ideology of political equality 
can dilute “fair and effective representation.” 
 For example, consider two decisions by the Supreme Court whereby it adheres to 
political equality but frustrates the concept of political fairness. In Beer v. United States, the 
                                                
71 Andrew Kull, The Color Blind Constitution, 214 - 215. 
 
72 In Davis v. Bandemer, 748 U.S. 109 (1986), Justice Stevens wrote: “The concept of ‘representation’ 
necessarily applies to groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not. Gross 
population disparities violate the mandate of equal representation by denying voters residing in heavily 
populated districts, as a group, the opportunity to elect the number of representatives to which their voting 
strength otherwise would not entitle them,” (167).  
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City of New Orleans brought forth a challenge under §5 that its districting plan for city 
council did not “have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color.”73 At the time, 600,000 people inhabited New Orleans; 55% of 
the population was white while 45% was black. Since 1954, voters in the city elected two 
members of the seven-member city council from at-large districts and five members from 
individual districts, which were required to be apportioned and districted after each 
decennial census. In 1961, the city council redistricted, creating one wedge-shaped district 
and four north to south districts, resulting in the creation of one district where black 
residents constituted a population majority but not a registered voting majority; in the 
other four districts, white were the majority in both population and registered voters.74 
Because of the history of racial-bloc voting, during the 1960s a black representative was 
not elected to the city council. In 1970, the city council followed a similar redistricting 
plan, keeping the north to south district formation and the wedge-shaped district. Because 
of demographic changes, black citizens constituted a population majority in two districts 
but a registered-voting majority in neither district.75 When the city submitted the new 
districting plan to the Attorney General, the AG rejected the plan because it diluted the 
voting strength of the black voters in the community by combining segments of the black 
                                                
73 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976). The district court that heard the case ruled that the 
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population within the white districts due to the north to south configuration of districts, 
which the AG stated were not necessary for, “numeric population configurations or 
considerations of district compactness or regularity of shape," making the selection of 
design arbitrary.76 After the City and the Attorney General deliberated on what plan to 
adopt, the Attorney General stated that the “‘the predominantly black neighborhoods in 
the city are located generally in an east to west progression,’ and pointed out that the use 
of north-to-south districts in such a situation almost inevitably would have the effect of 
diluting the maximum potential impact of the Negro vote.”77When the city council 
members received this plan, they challenged it in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia. The Supreme Court upheld the discretion of the city to create a 
plan with only a population majority in one district for black residents. 
 In City of Mobile v. Borden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), black voters in Alabama challenged 
the electoral structure for the City Commission, which since 1911, elected its members 
through an at-large voting process. The voters challenged the political structure under §2 
of the VRA and the fifteenth amendment since the system of at-large elections denied the 
ability of a racial minority to elect a candidate of choice.78 The assumption behind the 
claim, which is consistent with Gomillion and Reynolds, is that the right to vote ought to 
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possess meaning and it should not just focus on the physical tallying of the vote. Yet, 
rather then look to the ability of voters to participate effectively in the political process, a 
plurality of the Supreme Court misread Gomillion and look to the intent of the state 
legislators to determine if they employ the electoral structure to discriminate against black 
voters in the city. The opinion by Justice Stewart states that even though there is a history 
of racial-bloc voting, which the appellees argue is the same as being excluded from the 
primary process, a literal and narrow use of a doctrinal and textual argument reveals that 
the Court’s precedent and the fifteenth amendment, “does not entail the right to have 
Negro [sic] candidates elected.”79 While each citizen possesses political equality and no one 
citizens is being excluded form the process, because of the racially polarized voting the 
racial minorities in the City of Mobile do not possess the voting strength to elect 
candidates that will provide representation. In other words, the new cases of 
reapportionment and redistricting are malapporitonment by other means.  
Visions of Representation: Individual and Group Political Equality 
 In The Concept of Representation, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin presents six different ideal 
types of representation. In Colegrove and the pre-Baker cases, the majority of the Supreme 
Court discusses representation in terms of authorization where the representative has 
been authorized to act on behalf of the people and any act that occurs under that 
                                                
79 City of Mobile v. Alabama, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980). The precedent Justice Stewart cites Smith v. Allwright, 
321 U.S. 649 (1944) and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) which concern discriminatory voting practices 
in the Democratic primary process in Texas.  
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authorization equates to representation.80 In Baker, a plurality challenged this view of 
representation because electoral structures prevented individuals from providing consent. 
In Wesberry and Reynolds, et al, the Supreme Court initiates a vision of representation 
whereby the representative is accountable to all of the people in a state. Yet, by the end of 
the 1960s, the Supreme Court rethought its vision of representation as state legislators 
found ways to exploit political equality to deny accountability for minorities in society. 
Yet, because of the ideological differences on the Court, the Justices fought to establish 
interpretive dominance as to the best form of representation to guide the process of 
reapportionment and redistricting. For the liberal Justices, representation concerns the 
group and not the individual and reaches its fulfillment on the basis of acting for a group 
in substantive ways. Consequently, political structures ought to protect democratic 
structures that allow for conceptions of political fairness of the people in opposition to the 
elites. Conversely, for the Conservative Justices, representation concerns the individual 
and democratic structures must reflect majoritarian consensus to provide authorization for 
the elites. Of course, in the process of enacting these views of representation, the Supreme 
Court must protect the Constitutional Rights of all citizens and allow state legislators the 
ability to pursue rational objectives in their redistricting acts.  
                                                
80 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1967), 
38. In her work, Pitkin discusses the different conceptions of representation: representation as authorization, 
which consists on giving another the authority to act; representation as accountability, which refers to making 
a representative responsible for his/her actions; representation as descriptive, which refers to when a person 
or object stands for something through resemblance or reflection that is not present; representation as 
symbolic, whereby a person or object stands for something, especially emotionally or affectively, when there is 
no obvious connection; and, finally, representation as acting for, which discusses the special relationship 
between the representative, the represented, the act, trust in the accomplishment of the act, and restrictions 
on what can be done. 
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The Realism of Group Representation 
The group right of representation, especially against majority discrimination, 
develops from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) and Hernandez v. Texas, 3347 
U.S. 475 (1954), both of which concern jury selection in murder cases. In Struader, a 
former slave believed that he could not receive a fair trial and, consequently, did not 
receive equal treatment under the law because blacks were excluded from serving on 
juries. The Supreme Court declared that, under the newly enacted fourteenth 
amendments, states were prohibited from creating laws that applied to whites and not to 
blacks, especially when the effects of those laws were to imply “inferiority in civil society, 
lessoning the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and 
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the conditions of a subject 
race.”81 Yet, rather than try to eliminate different standards or classes from the 
constitution, the Supreme Court argued that different classes must be treated alike and, in 
this case, equal treatment requires an open jury selection process for whites and blacks.82  
In Hernandez v. Texas, the Warren Court extended this protection to Hispanics in 
Texas because of the discrimination against that group in Texas since in over 25 years no 
                                                
81 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 – 308 (1879). 
 
82 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 – 308, (1879). The depth of this opinion seems extremely 
shallow, as the opinion states, “We do not say that within the limits from which it is not excluded by the 
amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations. 
It may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons 
having educational qualifications. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to 
prohibit this,” (310). The qualifications not covered by the fourteenth amendment, as disused by the Court, 
would be enough to prevent blacks from sitting on juries, leading to discrimination through other means.  
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person with a Hispanic name served as a juror in Texas. According to Chief Justice 
Warren: 
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily 
identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the courts in securing 
equal treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are not static, and from 
time to time other differences from the community norm may define other groups 
which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community 
is a question of fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it 
is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for 
different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of 
the Constitution have been violated. The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed 
solely against discrimination due to a "two-class theory" - that is, based upon 
differences between "white" and Negro.83 
The importance of these decisions is to determine the questions of fact—as to whether or 
not a group exists and whether or not the group faces discrimination. In these cases, 
discrimination occurs when the group does not receive adequate representation in the jury 
selection process with representation referring to possessing the same physical 
characteristics, the same cultural beliefs, and the likelihood that the person in a position 
of power will act on behalf in favor for the person needing representation. Both courts 
realize that they must avoid the class-less theory and color-blind approach because, in both 
                                                
83 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).  
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cases, the discrimination and prejudice about “other” groups seems so pervasive that the 
petitioners, Strauder and Hernandez, would not receive a fair trial. In both cases, lawyers for 
the petitioners invoked a synendochic relationship in their argument: because of 
prejudices against a group or a conflict of interests between groups, a citizen needs 
members of his or her group to receive equal treatment under the law and to act for one 
another under the law.  
Understanding the Democratic Experience: Virtues and Vices in Group Representation 
The best understanding of the Democratic Experience through the 
reapportionment and redistricting decisions concerns the cultivation and the protection 
of a group’s right to cast a meaning and effective ballot. According to Justice Powell in 
Davis v. Bandermer, “The concept of ‘representation’ necessarily applies to groups: groups 
of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not.”84 Districting involves some form 
of voter aggregation. Territorial districting groups people in relation to some defining 
characteristic, whether it is political interest, geographical proximity, or racial identity.85 
Combined with the implementation of gerrymandering and the winner-take-all electoral 
system, districting reveals how a virtue, the protection of interests and voters that would 
not predominant in a majoritarian electoral scheme, becomes a vice as the group in the 
district that cannot identify with the larger majority or the smaller majority-minority may 
receive little electoral protection. While an individual can change his or her mind and act 
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as a rational, atomistic voter, it is usually not the case that the single individual becomes 
the deciding factor in an election or that a voter acts rationally.86  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Justices on the Supreme Court accept the 
premises of the Warren Court and follow the One Person, One Vote rule for 
apportionment. Yet, in Ely v. Klahr, the opinion by Justices Hugo Black foreshadows the 
problems of the Supreme Court with the concepts of political equality. According to 
Justices Black, the Reynolds rule of equal population threatens effective representation 
since state legislators can follow the rule of equal population and then introduce 
secondary criteria, such as creating compact districts, protecting incumbents, or arranging 
politically homogenous districts, to further legislative interests.87 As Justice Black states, 
gerrymandering does not reflect the voting power of a “natural” majority, but with the 
manipulation of lines, a majority where it is “overwhelmingly either Republican or 
Democrat… [where] an incumbent had not only the natural benefits of incumbency but 
also the benefits (where possible) of a one party district, his own fiefdom.”88 Since Reynolds 
cannot create effective representation because of the malleability of political equality in 
the districting process, the Justices who concern themselves with effective representation 
begin to speak the language of political fairness. Yet, the disagreement over the ideology of 
political fairness exists in the debate as to whether representation concerns the 
                                                
86 Bryan Caplan, The Myth of The Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 2. 
 
87 Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 117 (1971). 
 
88 Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 117 – 118 (1971). 
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constitution of authoritative representation or substantive representation. Further, the 
Court debate the nature of representation through the legislative intent or the electoral 
effects of a plan; through a discussion over whether voting is an individual or group right; 
and through a debate on the meaning of a ballot, whether influence or winning is the 
proper definition for an election. 
Legislative Intent and Representative Effect 
In envisioning representation as authorization, the proper criterion to judge 
discrimination, according to the Conservative Justices, concerns the purposeful intent of 
the state legislators to exclude a group from the political process. By avoiding an effects 
test, the Conservative Justices can narrow the scope of complaints against redistricting 
plans and diminish the judiciary’s ability to decided voting rights cases. Further, this 
strategy attempts to limit an expansive reading of the VRA and to ensure that vote 
dilution claims, or group representation, does not receive constitutional protection. 
According to the Conservative Justices, Gomillion means that electoral 
discrimination occurs only through purposeful intent and not through effects. Electoral 
designs by themselves do not deprive an individual or a group the right to vote, only the 
prevention of the right to register and to cast a ballot for the candidate of their choice. 
According to a plurality decision in Mobile v. Borden, the Justices reasons that Gomillion is 
similar to the primary cases of Smith v. Allwright, in which the Texas Democrats used 
statues to exclude black candidates from the primaries, and Terry v. Adams, in which the 
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Jaybird Association restricted candidate access to the electoral process.89 The lesson of 
Bolden, according to the plurality, is that “the Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the 
right to have Negro candidates elected…. That Amendment prohibits only purposeful 
discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote ‘on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’”90  
The requirement for intent serves as a way to tilt the balance between legislative 
discretion and the protection of voting rights to favor state legislators, which ensures that 
representation refers to authorization. As long as a governing structure treats each 
individual in the same way, as the use of the at-large voting does in City of Mobile, the state 
legislatures do not need to concerns themselves about the effects of an electoral scheme or 
representation. As Andrew P. Miller and Mark A. Packman note, an effects test expands 
the power of the judiciary into reapportionment law and allows the court to develop 
proportional remedies to districting plans.91 Abigail M. Thernstrom writes that if an 
effects or a result test replaces an intent test, a “fair shake” becomes a “fair share,” and 
“assumes the existence of a racially based entitlement to a proper share.”92 Consequently, 
the effects test introduces a redistribution of power between the majority and the minority 
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and between the legislative branch and the judicial branch. Opposition to an intent test 
view it as another barrier to casting a meaningful ballot, leading to the development of 
vote dilution and another indirect method by which state legislators prevent racial 
minorities from achieving political equality at the polls. As a heresthetical strategy, vote 
dilution combines interests to ensure that one interest cannot succeed at the polls. It 
concerns the integration and aggregation of black voters into districts with others they do 
not share interest with but cannot win elections because of sheer numbers.93 If done the 
correct way, state legislators can develop a plan of integration and prevent some members 
of the community from receiving meaningful political representation. Consequently, like 
the pre-Baker reapportionment decisions, the reliance on state discretion as a virtue 
becomes a vice for those seeking political equality as voting concerns a social or political 
right rather than a fundamental right. 
Further, an intent test creates an incredibly high burden of proof to establish 
discrimination. As Justice Marshall states in Mobile v. Borden, the intent test when applied 
to at-large and multi-member elections overlooks the historical and social factors that 
prevent racial minorities from achieving political equality and leaves citizens with little 
recourse to challenge the political structure in areas that contain racial-bloc voting or 
receive the support of representatives who will speak and act for them. Citing the use of 
an effects test in White v. Regester, Justice Marshall states, “White stands for the proposition 
that an electoral system may not relegate an electoral minority to political impotence by 
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diminishing the importance of its vote. The plurality's approach requiring proof of 
discriminatory purpose in the present cases is, then, squarely contrary to White and its 
predecessors.”94  
To protect the discretion of the state-legislators, the voting rights of citizens, and 
incorporate an ideology of political fairness to the political process, the judiciary must 
reject an intent test. According to Justice Stevens, an intent test is a subjective inquiry into 
legislative motive and, because of the numerous people involved with redistricting plans, 
the intent test concerns an epistemological test to find “whose intent controls,” i.e., out of 
the numerous state agents, how could the court determine which views are relevant or 
irrelevant, rational or irrational, necessary or sufficient. Further, the search for intent 
denies the role of the voter in the legislative process since they ask representatives to speak 
for them and, certainly, some of the voters in the South could ask their representatives for 
racial vote dilution.95 Since the districting process concerns tradeoffs between competing 
group interests, the judiciary must find a balance between some toleration of advantaging 
or disadvantaging some interests; it must protect the ability of voters to prove 
discrimination without knowing the subjective motivations of the legislators; and it must 
protect the authority of the state to conduct representation.96 To reach this balance, the 
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Court must adhere to “objective” factors that provide a context for the redistricting plan, 
leading to the recognition of a “totality of circumstance” test.97 Finally, the rejection of an 
intent test is important to avoid a case by case review of apportionment that denies 
impartiality necessary to the Equal Protection Clause. To avoid this, what is necessary is 
the finding that a plan significantly decreases the political power of a group and departs 
from the neutral criteria of reapportionment. 98 
The Nature of Group Representation 
Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the idea that representation occurs for 
groups rather than the individual usually correlates to ideological position of the Justices, 
with the liberal justices supporting group representation and the conservative justices 
rejecting group representation to focus on the atomistic, individual voters. Rejection of 
group-representation focuses on the requirement for all groups to receive representation 
and the development of a “quota” system, which hinders the advancement of the 
American ideal. Support for a group right to vote, especially for racial vote dilution cases, 
focus on the historical circumstances surrounding racial-bloc voting in relation to the facts 
of the case and the acceptance of racial classifications to develop group representation, 
especially when groups in power do not speak or act for groups out of power.  
                                                
97 See page in the next section. See also J. Morgan Kousser for a list of ten factors to determine the “intent” 
of lawmakers. J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second 
Reconstruction, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 347.  
 
98 Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725, 753 – 754, (1983).  
 
 287 
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, the opinion of Justice White fluctuates between 
understanding representation in terms of the Reynolds standard of the individual and the 
protection of group interests. In Whitcomb, the challengers argued that as residents of the 
Ghetto area, who happen to have different cultural, economic, and political interests than 
those from the white suburbs, were unable to receive effective representation because they 
resided in multi-member districts. While Justice White did not deny the different 
interests, he argued that the record did not show that blacks, on an individual level, were 
prohibited from registering, participating in elections, or from supporting candidates.99 
Further, Justice White refused to see this as a racial issue as the county elected six other 
blacks, who were Republican and not from the Ghetto area, to the state legislature.100 
Between 1960 and 1968, only three members of the state legislature who represented 
Marion County were black Democrats.101  
Yet, with the creation of safe majority-minority districts, fair representation for 
racial and ethnic groups would exist through sum of elections at the county level and not 
the individual district. Noting that voting against a candidate because of the candidate’s 
race is unfortunate, but not rare, Justice White argues that “the individual voter in the 
district with a nonwhite majority has no constitutional complaint merely because his 
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candidate has lost out at the polls and his district is represented by a person for whom he 
did not vote.”102 If the state possesses the power to create a redistricting plan that is fair to 
the major political parties, then the state can develop a districting plan that can create 
districts on the basis of race, especially when racial bloc voting prevents racial minorities 
from achieving political equality.103 The logic of the argument means that the plaintiffs 
would not lose representation because they could not elect a candidate of choice because 
other “white” candidates would be elected in the county and those officials would 
represent the interests of “whites.” Consequently, “whites” were not forced out of the 
political process because they would still receive representation; the 1974 plan sought only 
to “achieve a fair allocation” of political power between white and nonwhite voters.104  
As Justice White notes in Whitcomb, political fairness becomes a vice through the 
protection of multiple groups, diminishing the authority of the state legislators. If the 
Supreme Court were to protect the group interests one racial group, then there is very 
little containing the Supreme Court in protecting the rights of all groups. By protecting 
one group, the Supreme Court creates a standard that reflects the, “general proposition 
that any group with distinctive interests must be represented in the legislative halls if it is 
numerous enough to command at least one seat and represents a majority living in an area 
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sufficient to constitute a single-member district.”105 Relying on a slippery slope argument, 
Justice White asserts that if Supreme Court protects a racial minority, then it ought to 
protect “union orientated workers, the university community, religious or ethnic groups 
occupying identifiable areas of our heterogeneous cities and urban states.”106 
Consequently, the judiciary would possess the authority to remake the composition of 
Congress and state legislatures. To argue against group representation, the Conservative 
Justices state that the introduction to group representation will lead to the development of 
proportional representation that stands in contradiction to the vision of American 
representation. This argument connects with their advocacy of understanding 
representation in terms of legislative intent and opposition to unnecessary judicial 
involvement in districting. Without focusing on intent, the judiciary would need to decide 
cases without judiciable manageable standards, enlarging the arbitrary authority of the 
judiciary and enabling the justices to read their own legal and partisan interests into the 
controversy and diminishing the liberty of the proper authority, the state governments.107 
In Rogers v. Lodge, Justice Powell concludes that without “compelling reasons of both law 
and fact,” the judiciary cannot restructure a political system to enforce the adoption of 
quotas or group representation, which would be, “antithetical to the principles of our 
                                                
105 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156 (1971). 
 
106 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156 (1971). 
 
107 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 629 – 631 (1982) . 
 
 290 
democracy.108 Mimicking the traditional complaints about judicial action in districting 
and apportionment, political fairness in the electoral process requires the removal of the 
subjective whims of the judiciary to return the districting duties to the political bodies 
within the states. Yet, this passage does more to deflect away from the area of 
apportionment than appropriately discuss this topic.  
With the use of “quota,” Justice Powell attempts to locate unsettled areas of 
apportionment law within settled constitutional doctrine, alluding to his majority opinion 
in The University of California Regents v. Bakke, the case in which the Supreme Court held 
that the use of quotas were unconstitutional because they violated the equal protection of 
the laws. The implicit analogy is that the judiciary or state institutions cannot develop 
apportionment plans that empower minority groups since protecting certain groups would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. “The concepts of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ itself,” 
according to Justice Powell in Bakke, “is composed of various minority groups, most of 
which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and 
private tolerance.”109 Because of the fluidity of group identity, the role of the judiciary is to 
stand aside, allow citizens to identify with whom they chose, and allow state politics to 
develop organically. The judiciary could enter into a debate in order to “discern 
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‘sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and continuity over 
significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the pragmatic political 
judgments.”110 Even if there is past discrimination, the Court cannot rule in favor and 
provide a remedy for one minority group at the expense of other groups; the judiciary 
could only enter under special circumstances, such as when it acts under the authority of 
the VRA. Instead, as Justice Powell states in Rogers v. Lodge, the “principles of our 
democracy” means that citizens must work to persuade one another, even in the area of 
race relations, if there are to be remedies to the absence of voices. Further, with the 
slowdown of integration after Brown v. Board, it seems that the conservative position is that 
the law can only do so much to persuade someone to change their position of race and 
identity and that the area of race relations needs to develop outside of the law, even 
outside of legislative act. Without any specific act of discrimination the proper scope of 
race relations, is political and not legal.   
However, by examining the actual voting practices in certain areas, the moderate 
and liberal Justices redefine representation as a group right, especially in light of the 
necessity of the VRA and the development of racial bloc voting. The necessity of 
acknowledging representation as a group right develops from the vices of a majoritarian 
representation. According to Benjamin R. Barber, the discussion of equality in terms of 
electoral equality deflects attention away from “crucial economic and social detriments 
that shape its real-life-incarnation. In the absence of community, equality is a fiction that 
                                                
110 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978). 
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not merely divides as easily as it unites but that raises the specter of a mass society made 
up of indistinguishable consumer clones.”111  Samuel Issachrof notes, racial-bloc voting 
plays such a prominent role in American politics, that in order to predict the outcome of 
an election for a minority office-holder, one needs to examine the racial composition of 
the jurisdiction.112 Racial-bloc voting acts as a majority faction in the Madisonian sense, 
which because of the passions of the majority, political minorities cannot find success 
though elections. Electoral systems that perpetuate the majority dominance and a 
monopoly of the political process undermine the meaning of effective representation in 
Reynolds. Issachrof states that, “Combined with the greater wealth, education, and 
resources of the majority white community, white bloc voting robs representative systems 
of any presumed entitlement to deference.”113 For example, in Beer Justice Marshall cites 
the long history of discrimination of voting, public schools, public assemblies, public 
recreational facilities, public transportation, housing, and employment; further, since 
racial-bloc voting was the norm, the white representatives ignored the plight of the blacks 
and since tickets, not individuals, won elections in New Orleans, without a system of 
representation of political equality at the group level, then blacks would suffer from a lack 
of representation whereby they were “represented” by members of another group. For 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the best way in which to control the passions of the majority is 
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to fairly proportional the political power, protecting the political equality of both and 
ensuring that a majority faction cannot ignore or refuse to deliberate with a minority 
faction about the community goals and resources. 
 One year after its decision in Beers, the Supreme Court upheld a decision by New 
York State Legislators to develop political quality for racial minorities by providing them 
with safe majority-minority districts. In United Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 
(1977) (UJO hereafter), the Supreme Court states it is not unconstitutional to rely upon 
racial classifications to draw district lines in order to gain preclearance approval for the 
Attorney General even if, as a result, the state legislators of New York diminishes the 
voting power of another historically oppressed group.114 In his decision, Justice Byron 
White argues that with the history of racial bloc voting, and the likelihood that it would 
continue even after the VRA, it is not unconstitutional for the state legislators to take race 
into account when creating fair districts. Relying on the authority of the VRA, the 
decision allows the consideration of race if it enhances the voice of racial minorities when 
they would otherwise be voiceless. By considering race, the state legislators of New York 
could ensure that racial minorities possessed some level of political equality and 
                                                
114 Because of low voter registration and discrimination against blacks, Kings County, NY (Brooklyn) was 
subject to the VRA. In 1972, state legislators submitted a plan to the Attorney General, which he rejected 
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legislators resubmitted a plan that created safe districts whose population contained 65% non-whites. 65% 
was the baseline as this is what a member of the districting committee and the Department of Justice 
believed to be necessary for a non-white community to elect a candidate of choice. Yet, to achieve these non-
white majorities, the state legislators divided the Hasidic Jewish community in Williamsburg. In response, 
the Hasidic Jewish community challenged the plan, first, as a community of interests, and when that failed, 
as white citizens, claiming that the creation of safe-districts constituted an electoral quota that violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the use of racial classifications violated the Fifteenth Amendment. 
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representatives could act on the group’s behalf. This protection of group representation 
occurs so long as the state legislators do not discriminate against other voters. However, 
just because a plan promotes the interests of one group does not mean that it 
discriminates against another group or abridges the right to vote for another group.115 
Yet, with the creation of safe majority-minority districts, fair representation for 
racial and ethnic groups would exist through sum of elections at the county level and not 
the individual district. Noting that voting against a candidate because of the candidate’s 
race is unfortunate, but not rare, Justice White argues that “the individual voter in the 
district with a nonwhite majority has no constitutional complaint merely because his 
candidate has lost out at the polls and his district is represented by a person for whom he 
did not vote.”116 If the state possesses the power to create a redistricting plan that is fair to 
the major political parties, then the state can develop a districting plan that can create 
districts on the basis of race, especially when racial bloc voting prevents racial minorities 
from achieving political equality.117 The logic of the argument means that the plaintiffs 
would not lose representation because they could not elect a candidate of choice because 
other “white” candidates would be elected in the county and those officials would 
represent the interests of “whites.” Consequently, “whites” were not forced out of the 
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political process because they would still receive representation; the 1974 plan sought only 
to “achieve a fair allocation” of political power between white and nonwhite voters.118  
The Meaning of the Ballot: Influence or Selection 
 According to Justice Byron White in Whitcomb v. Chavis, the proper way to 
understand the meaning of a ballot is through its potential to influence an election rather 
than win an election. In Whitcomb, the District Court found that the black residents of the 
Center Township Ghetto constituted a cognizable minority group, which if elected 
through single-member districts rather than multi-member districts, would constitute a 
majority in three districts.119 Though the opinion by Justice White notes that multi-
member districts can dilute the meaning of a ballot and reduce the quality of effective 
representation, the lack of proportionality does not mean that state legislatures invidiously 
discriminate against its citizens.120 Instead, Justice White states that the proper view of this 
case is that, “the failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its 
population emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against 
poor Negroes [sic]. The voting power of ghetto residents may have been ‘cancelled out’ as 
the District Court held, but this seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the 
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polls.”121 Rather than focusing on winning an election, the ballot must refer to the ability 
of a voter to influence an election, which the plaintiffs could not do.  
By protecting influence as the proper understanding of the ballot, Justice White 
believes, as Justice Frankfurter did before him, that a virtue in representation concerns 
ensuring that the people who must be vigilant in searing the conscience of the legislators. 
Even safe districts because a vice of representation as the people who reside in safe 
districts regularly do not need to engage actively political associations or political issues. 
White writes that even for safe or competitive districts, single-member districts of multi-
member districts, “As our system has it, one candidate wins, the others lose. Arguably the 
losing candidates' supporters are without representation since the men they voted for have 
been defeated; arguably they have been denied equal protection of the laws since they have 
no legislative voice of their own.”122 Yet, the creation of safe, single-member districts may 
not provide accountability or enhance the quality of representation as the citizens within 
the multi-member districts possess a greater chance to influence the election and legislative 
acts since those citizens can vote for more representatives.   
 Yet, this position returns the Supreme Court to the pre-Baker cases since the 
design of the multi-member district creates a situation whereby suburban whites and 
Ghetto area blacks fought for control over the political process and the available 
community resources.  When discussing the facts of Whitcomb, Justice White notes that 
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excluding the middle-class black district, the wealthy suburban area contained 13.98% of 
the population as received 47.52% of the county’s representatives while the Ghetto area 
contained 17.8% of the population and 4.75% of the representatives.123 Because of racial-
bloc voting and partisan tensions, which Justice White downplays because black 
Republican candidates were elected in Marion County, residents of the Ghetto area could 
rarely elect candidates of choice in a multi-member district though they would possess the 
ability to do this in single-member districts. This means that even with an influence 
criterion to judge the effectiveness of a ballot, reasons exist as to why a group cannot can 
the necessary influence to win elections consistently. Throughout the reapportionment 
and redistricting cases, when groups of individuals possess competing interests, it is rare 
that the group in power shares these resources. Exacerbating the competition between 
interests is the presence of race. As Alexander Keyssar notes, that voting rights cases 
concerning race reveal the historical truth that, “there was always conflict about the 
breadth of the franchise and that those who possessed it could not necessarily be counted 
on to extend the right to others. Faced with this reality, it made sense for an insulated 
institution such as the Court to defend what is believed to be a fundamental feature of 
American politics.”124 Without the ability for a political group to elect a candidate of 
choice, the design of a district may diminish the ability for minority political groups to 
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elect candidates, then the functional definition of influence means that the minority 
candidates cannot achieve political equality.  
 The problem, as Justice William Douglas argues in his dissent, is this case is not 
political, it is racial. Douglas writes that the “problem of the gerrymandering” concerns the 
way in which state legislators circumvent the sentiments of the community and it is the 
“problem of the law” that concerns how to prevent it.125 The multi-member districts in this 
case allow for the white voters, from “upper-middle class and wealthy” suburbs, to 
surround and dilute the votes of black residents in the Ghetto area, diminishing “fair 
representation” since the lines outweigh the votes of one race more than another.126 
Justice Douglas states that under the authority of the Fifteenth Amendment the Supreme 
Court possesses the power of state legislators to “abridge” the voting power of racial 
minorities and to ensure that the dictate of Reynolds does not mean, “One White Person, 
One Vote.”127 Even though the citizens may be Democrats or Republicans, the citizens 
from the urban areas possess less power and less influence and, hence, less ability to 
persuade state legislators to see beyond race and support the interests of the Ghetto 
community.  
 While Justice White may be correct that one of the most important virtues for a 
democracy is the ability to influence an election that influence needs to develop with an 
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additional virtue of competitiveness where the design of the district promotes democratic 
deliberation and minimizes impediments to deliberation, such as racial-bloc voting. Where 
there may be good reasons to advocate for “safe” districts, as I will discuss later, the 
districts in question in Whitcomb, as well as others involving racial bloc voting, reduces 
the possibility that a voter of one race can influence a candidate or a group can influence 
an election. Influence, as a democratic virtue, can succeed only when competing parties 
possess the actual ability to influence others. Since racial group identity, anathema to 
American politics, hinders the ability of groups to influence one another, other forms of 
influence must prevail. Besides hindering the ability of voters “knowing” their 
representatives,128 multi-member districts that secure representation for some citizens 
while ignoring other citizens who could form an autonomous district themselves diminish 
the ability of those in the minority to influence elections unless they identify against their 
interests and receive “representation” by the candidate of the majority.    
                                                
128 In addition to diluting the vote of politically cohesive groups, multi-member districts contain a hidden 
vice as those districts diminishing the quality of the connection between a representative and his/her 
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resulted, and the residents of those areas had no single member of the Senate or House elected specifically 
to represent them. Rather, each legislator elected from a multimember county represented the county as a 
whole,” (731 – 732). 
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 By conceptualizing representation in terms of authorization, the Conservative 
Supreme Court Justices attempt to increase the power of the state legislators in conducting 
representation and diminish the influence of political groups and the judiciary. 
Conversely, by defining representation in terms of substantive representation, the Liberal 
Justices desire to expand the scope of representation and allow political and racial 
minorities, who have been shut-out of the process, to receive benefits and share burdens. 
Because of these competing views of representation, the Justices present difference visions 
of democracy and seek to gain interpretive dominance for their visions of democracy 
through their rulings.  
Visions of Democracy: Competing Structures  of Government 
 While the Justices on the Court disagreed over what constituted the proper 
characterization of representation, the Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal Supreme 
Court Justice disagreed also on what ought to be the proper characterizations of a 
Democratic form of government. Even the Conservative Supreme Court Justices, who 
argue that representation concerns authorization, cannot avoid envisioning the best 
arrangement of the Country’s political institutions. Though there exists a seemingly 
endless amount of ways in which to define democracy and the Supreme Court possesses a 
“democracy-defining dilemma,” when the Supreme Court hears cases that cover certain 
topics such as reapportionment and redistricting, the Court must offer some definition of 
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democracy to resolve these cases.129  I will begin by discussing two ideal forms of 
government: a deliberative model represented through the work of John Dewey, and an 
Elite model, represented by the work of Richard Posner.  
Dewey, Posner, and the Concepts of Democracy 
In The Public and Its Problem, John Dewey writes that “governmental institutions are 
but a mechanism for securing to an idea channels of effective operation.”130 The problem 
of the public, as Dewey sees it, is to secure “recognition of itself as will give it weight in the 
selection of official representatives and in the definition of their responsibilities.” For 
Dewey, it is the concern of the people to find ways to develop better institutions and 
better communities through the cultivations of the necessary habits. Representative 
government must, according to Dewey, find its foundation from the public interests rather 
than the desires of the elites who disregard the public.131 To improve deliberation, Dewey 
believes that the public needs to cultivate the habits of democracy and especially improve 
upon the “methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion” leading to a 
political consensus.132 Based on this view of the public and the need for deliberation, the 
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question becomes what is the best way to develop an institutional framework that will 
develop the democratic habit even in competing publics.  
 In Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Richard Posner labels this type of Democracy 
as Concept I Democracy. Concept I Democracy rests on the premise that citizens possess a 
moral right to participate in government and retain moral duties to participate in that 
government.133 Because of the desire to establish a social consensus on American policy, 
Concept 1 Democracy develops as a type of Deliberative Democracy whereby citizens must 
be willing to modify their conception of the public good, they must be responsive to 
reasons offered by others, and must openly commit themselves to act on a modified 
version of the public good.134 Of course, Posner rejects this type of democracy because it 
fails to present a credible account of how citizens with competing premises and self-
interests debate with one another over the common good of society. For Posner, Concept 
I Democracy occurs as faculty members in a workshop: “deliberative democracy is the 
‘democracy’ of elite intellectuals.”135 
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 In opposition, Posner presents Concept II Democracy, which relies heavily on the 
elite conception of democracy by Joseph Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy. While Concept II democrats do not disparage the need or benefits of debate in 
society, they also do not believe, as Chief Justice Earl Warren believed in Reynolds, that you 
can separate the interests from the people and may call into question the “liberty of the 
moderns,” or the civil liberties of the people.136 Richard Posner describes the 
characteristics of this Elite Democracy (Concept Type II Democracy) as one as being a 
“method by which self-interested political elite compete for the voters of a basically 
ignorant and apathetic, as well as determinedly self-interested electorate.”137 Concept II 
democracy, according to Posner, is the “democracy of interests and so of responsiveness to 
public opinion”138 and serves as the best method of governance for people who concerns 
themselves with private rather than public affairs since politics has little intrinsic value and 
is not ennobling.139 In this type of democracy, the political parties attempt to drive toward 
the middle to pick up as many votes as possible to win office though if these elected 
officials do not perform well for the political consumers, then the voters may choose to 
fire the officials at the end of their term.140 Concept II Democracy, according to Posner, 
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does not concern self-government but “government subject to checks.”141 It loathes third 
parties, which may bring sharply divided ideological parties though it needs the threat of 
third parties to preserve competition among the two-party system.142 
 While Posner presents these two types of democracy as being incompatible, the 
Supreme Court’s partisan reapportionment and redistricting decisions presents a way in 
which to find institutional and political reconciliation between these two conceptions of 
democracy. While the elite conception of government serves as a reminder of the lack of 
involvement in the political process and the lack of desire to understand public policy 
questions, it fosters a belief that civic participation, even in voting, means very little. If the 
focus of deliberation and the instillation of democratic virtues, the strength of Concept I 
Democracy, is not possible, even though electoral design, then the reasons for civic 
participation decreases. For Posner, the advantage of Dewey’s epistemic democracy is not 
the focus on deliberation or high-mindedness, but that it determines public opinion.143 
Yet, the Elite Conception of democracy leads to the manipulation of public opinion 
through the manipulation of electoral districts. The strength of the Supreme Court’s 
vision of democracy would be a blend of these two types of democracy where it encourages 
meaningful deliberation in the process of elections even if the result resembles an Elite 
consensus. This becomes especially important as the Justices engage in a debate over the 
best form of democracy through the experience of racial and partisan conflicts.  
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Race and Representation, Majoritarian and Pluralistic Democracy 
  In the cases of Mobile v. Borden, and City of Rome v. The United States, the Supreme 
Court took two different directions in its voting rights jurisprudence. In Mobile, the 
Conservatives Justices prevailed in a 6 –3 decision, holding that the City of Mobile’s 
County Commissioner election system, which has been in use since 1911, did not dilute 
the voting strengths of black Americans under the Fourteenth Amendment and that racial 
minorities do not have the right to elect their candidates of choice under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Yet, to the dismay of the Conservatives Justices, in 6 – 3 decision in City of 
Rome, the Liberal Justices held that the Rome must comply with the preclearence authority 
under §5 and that the its change in voting procedures possessed a discriminatory effect of 
diluting the right to effective participation.144 Two years after Mobile v. Borden, the 
Supreme Court issued a 6 – 3 decision in Rogers v. Lodge, ruling that the electoral practices 
in Burke County, Georgia possessed discriminatory effects against racial minorities. In 
Rodgers, the Liberal wing of the Court persevered as the Chief Justice Warren Burger 
switched positions and the newly appointed Justice Sandra Day O’Connor replaced the 
Conservative voice of Justice Stewart. The symbolism of Rogers revealed the Court’s new 
position on race as it reflected the mandates of Congress in the newly amended §2 of the 
VRA. It also revealed the ideological division between the Conservative and Liberal 
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Justices over the Supreme Court’s vision of law and democracy. For the Conservative 
Justices, the vision of representation as authorization creates democratic structures that 
envision the country as a majoritarian democracy, promoting a conception of the 
individual and rejecting a conception of the group. Conversely, because of their view of 
substantive representation, the Liberal Justices argue that democracy concerns the 
protection of pluralism in order to achieve the Democratic Experience.  
 Throughout vote dilution and §5 cases during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Conservative Justices employed a strategy in their majority, plurality, and dissenting 
opinions to limit an expansive interpretation of the VRA. In his dissenting opinion in 
UJO, Chief Justice Burger argued against the Court’s decision, stating that achieving a safe 
district for racial minorities constituted an electoral quota and that even though the 
districts were created to comply with the VRA they were not constitutional.145 In Beer v. 
United States, the Conservative Justices established the nonretrogression test to limit the 
scope of the VRA’s substantive requirements. In United States v. Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110 
(1978), Justice Stevens argued that according to the language of §4, the city of Sheffield, 
Alabama, and all cities, could not be included under the definition of State or political 
subdivisions since the definition for political subdivision referred to “any county or parish, 
except where registration for voting is not conducted.”146 Already displeased with the 
Attorney General’s authority to “make sovereign states submit its legislation to federal 
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authorities before it may take effect,”147 the majority’s opinion in City of Rome reduced the 
Conservative Justice’s belief that the VRA applied to the political process and not to “fair 
and effective representation.” In City of Rome, Justice Powell criticized the majority for 
reading evidence into the record to support a claim of vote dilution since white officials 
were “responsive to the needs and interests of the lack community’” and actively sought 
the political support from the black community.”148 Justice Rehnquist attacked the 
deviation from the Court’s tradition and stated that, in Mobile, the Court “correctly 
concluded” that a city has “no obligation under the Constitution to structure its 
representative system in a manner that maximizes the black community’s ability to elect a 
black representative.” If the Court were to follow precedent, the Court should not prevent 
the city of Rome, GA to adopt a structure in which is constitutional for Mobile, Al.149 
Because of the apparent contradiction in results over arguments for the same system, 
Justice Rehnquist argues that the Court should not abdicate its authority, meaning the 
Court should either free City of Rome or determine that certain provisions of the VRA 
are unconstitutional.   
 Beneath the Conservative opinions in the vote dilution and §5 cases exists a 
cultural anxiety about political groups, especially racial groups, receiving representation as 
groups within the democratic structures of the United States. At the center of this anxiety 
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is the interpretation of the VRA and its implication for democracy concerns the use of the 
controversial legislation after Congress and the judiciary ended the use of literacy tests and 
poll taxed, and opened up the political process to allow racial minorities to compete for 
political equality. In Allen, Chief Justice Warren argued that the legislation should be 
interpreted broadly as its purpose was to stay ahead of electoral devices that would stay 
ahead of political majorities disenfranchising minorities. In this view, when state, county, 
and city officials altered voting practices, such as switching from district to at-large 
elections, and the Supreme Court and the Attorney General argued this violated the 
VRA, the Court and the DOJ upheld the telos of the act.  By ruling these electoral 
changes were an attempt to impair participation in the electoral process, the Court 
pursued decisions similar to its work in as in Baker, Weberry, and Reynolds. 
 Ideological opposition to the expansive reading of the VRA followed the warnings 
of Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John Marshall Harlan that the Court ought to 
avoid the political thicket for democracy’s sake. In Whose Vote Counts?, a text that 
represents this opposition and one that would influence Justice Clarence Thomas’ 
dissenting opinion in Holder v. Haller, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), Abigail M. Thernstrom writes 
that the single aim of the VRA concerns black enfranchisement in relation to registration 
and voting.150 Yet, after Allen, the Supreme Court exceeded its authority as it handed 
down rulings that judged the substance of representation and unconstitutionally 
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diminished the power of state legislators to conduct representation. Whose Vote Counts? 
states: 
Provision initially inserted to guard against the manipulation of an electoral system 
for racist ends has thus evolved as a means to ensure that black votes have value— 
have the power, that is, to elect blacks…. We have arrived at a point no one 
envisioned in 1965. The right to vote no longer means simply the right to enter a 
polling booth and pull the level. Yet the issue retains a simple Fifteen Amendment 
aura—and aura that is pure camouflage. An alleged voting rights violation today is a 
districting plan that contains nine majority-black districts when a tenth could be 
drawn. The question is: how much special protection from white competition are 
black candidates entitled to?”151 
Thernstrom’s passage argues two points of democratic structures. First, voting is a rational 
exercise of individual choice as exemplified by pulling the lever in a booth in a solitary 
fashion. Second, democratic structures do not reserve space for groups as that infringes 
upon the rights of the individual to make a choice between alternatives provided for them. 
Both of these arguments converge with he language of “redistribution” that Thenstrom 
employs, connecting to a consciousness of that which is unearned as the community takes 
from those individuals who are successful. Thernstrom writes that to ensure ballots fully 
count to protect groups, districts must be drawn to achieve success and “anything less 
suggests a compromised right. Yet maximum weight implies an entitlement to 
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proportionate ethnic and racial representation— a concept that is no less controversial 
with respect to legislative bodies than with reference to schools and places of 
employment.”152 This argument exaggerates slightly as it overlooks the ability of a ballot to 
influence an election as Justice White suggests in Whitcomb v. Chavis. But the point here 
by Thernstrom is not to present a fair discussion of representation but to state that ballots 
either count or they don’t; if the count they only count if they achieve representation and 
if any system guarantees representation, it denies the natural order.  
 Thernstrom’s argument focuses on the natural talents of individuals in the 
political process, which democracy must protect as it is the space where elites separate 
themselves from commoners out of talent and will. When discussing the Court’s change 
from Whitcomb v. Chavis to White v. Regester, Thernstrom notes that though districting 
decisions can affect outcomes for partisan, ethnic, or other groups, “none can promise 
every citizen equal power; inevitably, some individuals, like some other groups, will be 
better positioned and more skillful than others.”153 The logic of this ideological position 
reveals that systems of representation, and corrective legislation, which preserve political 
space for groups, deny the rights of individuals to affirm the natural order of human will 
and the development of human talent in society. In this view, politics concerns not 
institutional control but the battle of individual wills. Overlooking arguments about 
structure, she implies that those who do not succeed fail because of lack of talent or will. 
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Thernstrom writes that, “democratic choice and democratic institutions require fluidity 
and freedom that are at odds with the concept of labeling citizens for political purposes on 
the basis of ethnicity. They also require a sense of community,” which labeling by ethnicity 
or race denies and at-large elections can build or foster.  
Thernstrom presents the idealistic vision of a united, majoritarian democracy, 
which is constituted by the individual fulfilling the natural order. Yet, it is not an 
argument of principle supporting democracy as it fails to argue against other forms of 
“minority” representation that diminishes democracy, such as judicial review, the Senate, 
or a Presidential veto. It fails to consider the historical role of group representation in the 
U.S. in the original representational sin of the three-fifths clause. It does not consider 
other threats to “natural” democracy, such as partisan gerrymandering.  Thernstrom’s 
vision of democracy deflects away from the history and realities of race and the heresthetic 
nature of elections to shape debate. Concerning the Lani Guinier controversy, Mark 
Lawrence McPhail writes that Guinier’s rejection rests of an image of democracy whereby 
people are of good will; citizens unite themselves in a common enterprise and live 
accordingly to a common consent.154 McPhail writes that, “This is a vision of America in 
which the racial past no longer has any implications for the present, an American in 
which whites have already done everything that they could, in which the ball is in the 
other’s court.”155 For Thernstrom, since the VRA accomplished its goal of prohibiting 
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practices that prevent people from registering and voting, the judicial enforcement after 
that point altered the meaning of the VRA to the point that it would guarantee 
representation for minorities.156 History and minority rights have progressed; the future 
will not be like the past. Accordingly, for Thernstrom, the use of race becomes 
unwarranted.  
Missing from Thernstrom’s discussion and the decisions by the Conservative 
Justices is how attitudes about race change over time as race no longer matters to the 
rational individual. The historical discussion moves from official policies of discrimination 
to the advent of the VRA to the eradication of literacy tests and prohibitions on 
registrations to the development of political equality as administered by the states to the 
individual. In this transition, this ideological movement shifts the view of the federal 
judiciary and racial minorities, as they become the active agents in weakening political 
equality and destroying the liberty and sovereignty of state legislators to adopt effective 
policies of representation and representative government. The consequence of this 
position requires limiting the authority of the Court and preventing the power of groups 
to balkanize the American electorate by attacking the source of authority, the VRA. In City 
of Rome, Justice Rehnquist uses his dissenting opinion to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VRA as the Court allows for Congress to 
exceed its authority of the states by prohibiting state legislators from enacting specific types 
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of electoral structures that would be permissible under the Civil War Amendments.157 
Though Rehnquist could gain only one adherent in City of Rome, in just over a decade’s 
time, the Supreme Court would begin its judicial flirtation with overturning certain 
aspects, if not the entirety, of the VRA.     
In response to the Conservative plurality in Mobile v. Borden, Congress amended 
the VRA, allowing challengers to prove vote dilution claims by showing discriminatory 
effects rather than just discriminatory intent.158  In a unanimous decision, the Supreme 
Court upheld challenges to the 1982 VRA amendments, resolved the tension in precedent 
between Mobile v. Borden and Rogers v. Lodge, and ruled that a North Carolina District 
Court reached the correct decision as it concluded that, under a totality of circumstances 
test, six multi-member districts diluted the rights of black citizens to participate in the 
political process and prevented them from electing representatives of their choice.159 
                                                
157 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 206 (1980). Justice Rehnquist’s position relies on an intent 
test. Since there was no intent by the state legislators to discriminate against its citizens, then the state 
legislators possess the ability to enact the electoral structures it desires.  
 
158 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36 (1986). The newly amended portions of the VRA read: 2(a): No 
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied 
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b). 2(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based 
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate 
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which 
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one 
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." The last 
section is a point of controversy as it rejects the standard for establishing proportional representation of 
groups though it does not state that legislator cannot pursue it.  
 
159 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30. 36 (1986). The semi-coherent “totality of circumstances” test developed 
in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973) as a response to Justice White’s use of the phrase in his 
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Under this decision, racial minorities received an opportunity to challenge at-large and 
multimember districts if a group could provide evidence that, first, the group constituted a 
“sufficiently large and compact” to warrant a single-member district; second, it 
demonstrated political cohesion; and, third, racial block voting prevented the group’s 
success.160  Though the Conservative Justice may have accepted the change of the VRA 
and upheld them in Gingles because of Congressional action and authority, they also 
                                                                                                                                           
opinion in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973). In Mobile v. Borden, a conservative plurality rejected 
the “totality of circumstances” guidelines to adopt a intent based test where challengers need to establish 
districts and electoral practices were racially motivated. In the 1982, the Senate Judiciary Report that 
accompanied the newly amended §2 noted the following circumstances or factors to help discuss the totality 
of circumstance test in §2(b)(a): “1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or 
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or 
otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state 
or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used 
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting 
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. 
If there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access 
to that process; 5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision 
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their 
ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. Whether political campaigns have been 
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. The extent to which members of the minority group have 
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. "Additional factors that in some cases have had probative 
value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:  whether there is a significant lack of 
responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority 
group. Whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous." Days after Congress amended the 
VRA, the Supreme Court released its decision in Rodgers v. Lodge, which relied upon an effects test.   
  
160 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36 (1986). In order to prove that multimember districts dilute the votes 
of a minority voting bloc, that voting bloc must, first, establish that the voting group is “sufficiently large and 
geographically compact” to constitute majority of voters in a single-member district; second, the minority 
group must show it is politically cohesive; and, third, white voters vote as a bloc to defeat minority 
candidates, 51 – 52. When considering the racial polarized voting, the reasons why the citizens voted for a 
candidate do not matter as much as the race of the voter and the selection of the candidate (63).  The race of 
the candidate does not play a role in racial polarized voting. Instead, what matters is which candidate the 
minority parties supports and if the white majority opposes that candidate (68 – 69).  Additionally, the 
plaintiffs do not have to establish any racial animosity on the part of the officials as to do so would be 
unnecessarily divisive as the plaintiffs would need to the majority of a community would be racist (72). 
Instead, the plaintiffs only need to establish a correlation between race of the voters and the selection of 
certain candidates to establish that racial bloc voting exists in an area (74). 
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accepted a competing vision of democracy that they would later challenge during the 
1990s.  
 If the overall goal of the Supreme Court’s reapportionment and redistricting cases 
concerns the development of the Democratic experience, with the value of political 
equality as a means to fulfill this goal, the Supreme Court’s decision in Thornburg v. 
Gingles, returns the Court’s jurisprudence closer towards that goal. In Gingles, Justice 
Brennan’s opinion implicitly argues that the health of the U.S Democracy rests on 
developing participation in the political process even if the process contains pluralism and 
if it rests on groups possessing competing interests. When reviewing the facts, Justice 
Brennan notes that, by using the guidelines set out in the Senate Report, the District 
Court noted that black representatives of North Carolina faced official and unofficial 
forms of cultural, political, and social discrimination that prevented them from achieving 
political equality.161 These circumstances suggest that in North Carolina blacks received 
representation only to the degree that whites spoke for them and the history of 
discrimination and the racially polarized voting suggests that the dominant majority did 
                                                
161 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36 - 42 (1986). First, North Carolina official discriminated against its 
black citizens through the use of poll taxes, literacy tests, and a prohibition against single-shot voting; 
second, historic discrimination in education, housing, and health services created disadvantages for black 
citizens; third, the use of a majority vote requirement for primary elections created an unnecessary 
impediment for the ability of black candidates to win elections and black constituents to elect 
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appeals in campaigns; fifth, black candidates were disadvantaged in the relative probability of success while 
running for office and that success for black candidates, especially for statewide offices was low; and, sixth, 
the districts in question featured racially polarized voting. Additionally, in the oral arguments, Ralph 
Gingles argued that in the elections between 1978 – 1982, white did not vote for blacks 81% of the time in 
primaries, over 60% whites did not support a black candidate when nominated, and even when blacks were 
nominated by their party, whites form the party did not support the candidate. Further, because of low 
socio-economic status and the cost of running in multi-member districts, blacks faced an additional 
constraint while running for office. See Thornburg v. Gingles., No. 83-1968  4 December (1985). 
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not speak for the minority very often. While the official prohibitions such as poll or 
literacy tests were removed, the attitudes of the people who enacted those tests did not 
change when Congress prohibited them in the VRA.  
 Justice Brennan’s decision in Gingles reflects a distrust that the legislative process 
would not protect the liberties of political minorities by limiting the ability of minorities 
to aggregate themselves with other individuals that share the same interests. While the 
majority always possesses this right in North Carolina, the minority, according to the 
development of partial and “unnatural” lines of the multi-member districts, found 
themselves without an ability to develop a sense of community unless they adopt the 
interests of the majority, a majority that has neglected them for centuries. Because of the 
electoral structure, whites would always out vote blacks in the multi-member districts.162 
According to Heather Gerken, the essence of the American representative system is the 
ability of individuals to “elect a person to speak on their behalf,” and one of the most 
effective ways to accomplish this is through the use of compact districts which typically 
group like individuals together and allow for easier communication and representation 
between the representative and his or her constituents.163 Consequently, vote dilution 
threatens the essence of the American system and threatens the ability of individuals to 
work together as a group and convey interests to which the representative ought to 
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adhere.164 In multi-member districts that serve as the basis of Gingles, though the minority 
group could establish political equality if situated in a single-member district, the majority 
dominated the equality of the minority and failed to respond to their interests.  
 This group right to vote within Gingles represents the fulfillment of the One 
Person, One Vote standard by Justice William O. Douglas and Chief Justice Earl Warren. 
In Wesberry and Reynolds, the decisions by the Court ask state legislators to focus not on 
the physical act of casting a ballot but the expansive reading of examining the meaning of 
the ballot cast. By doing this, the Supreme Court sees the importance of voting in the 
process by ensuring that each person possesses the opportunity to compete in the political 
process.165 As Lani Guinier notes, the transition from multi-member districts to single-
member districts serves, first, as electoral means to elect black representatives and provide 
their constituents with a political voice; second, as a means to preserve black voters’ status 
as citizen since the right to vote affirms citizenship status; and, third, as an instrumental 
means to increase participation in the political process and promote democratic values.166 
Though, as Guinier notes, while the majority may employ other tactics to deny political 
fairness while minorities possess equality,167 the Gingles decision fosters democratic 
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 318 
empowerment within a community that historically lacked representation and opened the 
possibility of deliberation.  
Elite Democracy, Partisan Entrenchment and the Loss of Deliberation 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in five 
cases that concern the concept of political fairness in partisan reapportionment and 
redistricting plans.168 Similar to the Reapportionment Revolution cases, the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in the partisan redistricting rely on the concept of “political fairness” to 
discern what type of democracy should form the basis of the political system in the United 
States and what the Supreme Court’s role ought to be in the American political system. 
Yet, unlike the decisions in the Reapportionment Revolution, the Supreme Court 
attempts to articulate a concept of “political fairness” in the midst of three rhetorical 
constraints. First, the Supreme Court must defend the rights of citizens to participate in 
the political process, cast a meaningful ballot, and receive effective representation against 
manipulation by the political parties in control of the legislative branches. Second, the 
Supreme Court must also adhere to the problem of the “political question” by deferring to 
the political branches and allowing state legislators the liberty to pursue rational state 
                                                
168 The five cases are Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971), Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 772, White v. Weiser, 
412 U.S. 783 (1973), Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), and Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).  
The decision for Gaffney v. Cummings (Connecticut State Legislative Reapportionment) and White v. Weiser 
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a 5 – 4 decision by Justice Brennan, with Justice Stevens writing the controlling concurrence; Davis v. 
Bandemer, a 6  - 3 plurality opinion by Justice White, with support from Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.  
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objectives that benefits the citizens of a state, though in this pursuit, some citizens may 
receive more benefits than others and one party may receive more benefits than others. 
Third, unlike the cases that involve the VRA or racial gerrymandering, the Supreme Court 
must act without the mandates of Congressional or Constitutional authority and to 
pursue decisions that may in fact alter the relationship between the elected and the 
represented, but also the composition of the state legislatures and of Congress. This 
occurs without any clear and discernable standard of how to judge when partisan interests 
seek to disrupt the political process and diminish the political fairness of citizens. 
Like the VRA and vote dilution cases, the meaning of the democracy not only 
concerns the institutionalization of representation but the proper role of the Supreme 
Court in relation to the political branches and the American people. In case after case, the 
Supreme Court debates the proper interpretation of Colegrove, Gomillion, Baker, Wesberry, 
and Reynolds as the Supreme Court discuss the reconciliation between group and 
individual rights, between the boundaries of the legal and political. By casting a vote, 
citizens form themselves into an identifiable voting bloc and the mistreatment of the 
group, especially if it occurs before the election occurs in the reapportionment and 
redistricting process, becomes analogous to the meaning Gomillion. In Karcher, Justice 
Stevens, who provided the swing vote in the case, writes that the basis for a 
gerrymandering claim develops form the ethical reading of Gomillion: the judiciary ought 
to find a reapportionment or redistricting plan unconstitutional if the state dilutes the 
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voting strength of a cognizable political or racial group.169 Conversely, the desire to return 
the authority of representation, especially when considering the rights of political parties 
to tame the nature of democracy, some justices desire to redefine the right to vote as a 
political or social right and not a fundamental right. The judiciary’s authority, 
consequently, depends on its restraint from interfering with power of the political parties 
to enable the political process. Effective representation concerns the ability of the political 
parties and the state, and not just the states, to represent the people and determine the 
health of the body politic. The ideological fight over the best form of democracy concerns 
the integration and institutionalization of political fairness into the country’s democratic 
structures.  
Political Fairness and Elite Democracy: The Sisyphean Task of the Judiciary 
 In The Law As It Could Be, Owen Fiss writes that during the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts, the Civic Republicans on the Court, express their disenchantment with the role 
of the Supreme Court, turning their backs on the judiciary and “placing their trust in the 
more political agencies, including Congress, to give specific content to our public 
values.”170 For the Rehnquist Court, the Chief Justice’s ideological commitment to 
legislative Supremacy reveals his commitment to his Federalism Revolution.171 For the 
reapportionment decisions, a commitment to federalism would mean the Supreme Court 
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would need to diminish its own authority to in its jurisprudence. While the Liberal 
Justices on the Supreme Court reflect a distrust of the legislative process, especially the 
way in which the legislative process may exclude the voices of all citizens, the Conservative 
Justices on the Supreme Court reflect a pessimism about the nature of democracy, 
especially concerning the ability of the people to administer that democracy and the ability 
of the judiciary to discern sound policy.  
Because of the need for competence, the Conservative justices allow those with 
expertise, e.g. state legislators and the political parties, to necessary political authority to 
govern, even if that governing means that voting no longer exists as a “fundamental right” 
in society. Richard H. Pildes writes:  
To ensure “political stability” and avoid “ruinous competition,” American 
democracy required regular organizations, a highly ordered two-party system, a 
style of politics that was channeled and contained, lest too much politics 
undermines democracy itself. Perhaps it also required, or came to be seen as 
requiring, an active judicial role to ensure that too much democratically-adopted 
restructuring did not undermine the stability of democracy itself.172 
The Conservative position in the reapportionment decisions fears political disorder, 
which occurs when apportionment plans limit the power of political elites to apportion to 
their discretion. Too much politics or too competitive a system, Pildes writes “will bring 
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instability, fragmentation, and disorder.”173 For the Conservative Justices, opening up the 
political process threatens political stability, even if it is to open the process up to the 
average citizens. Consequently, the rhetorical strategy for the Conservative Justices to 
argues that the success of democracy depends on judicial absence in the political process.  
 In Gaffney v. Cummings, a majority of the Court held that small population 
deviations for state legislative apportionment plans were constitution, setting a de minims 
standard of 10% and returning some discretion to the state legislators by diminishing the 
regulations of the Supreme Court. Yet, more importantly, the opinion invents a new 
standard of political fairness for the country’s democratic structures as the decision 
concludes that districts could provide a way to preserve competing voices within a state 
but so long that the state legislators possess the authority to create the “political fairness.” 
According to Justice White, “The very essence of districting is to produce a different—a 
more politically fair— result than would be reached with elections at large, in which the 
winning party would take 100% of the legislative seats.”174 Yet, the best way to create the 
fairest plan is to allow the major parties, working through the state legislators, to use the 
most informative data available to create as many safe districts as possible for each party 
“as the demographics and predicted political characteristics of the State would permit,”175 
even though it would deny the minority in those districts “any realistic chance to elect 
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their own representatives.”176 While promoting political stability between the political 
parties and the authority of the state legislators, the decision perpetuates virtual 
representation for many of the voters For those that support the losing candidate in a 
district, those voters would need to move to receive the representation they desired, 
change their ideological preferences, rely on “representation” from other districts, protest 
by abstention, or vote in protest. As long as the parties involved in the process follow the 
goals of equal population, then the Supreme Court will allow the state legislators to 
pursue rational objections: “judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State 
purports to fairly allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting 
strength and, with quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so.”177 
 Since the Conservative Justices were unable to form a majority in Karcher and 
Davis, their enacted a strategy to diminish the authority of the judiciary to act in the 
Democratic process. Employing a futility thesis, the Conservative Justices advance a 
position that further involvement into democratic politics will destroy the essence and 
stability of the country’s political institutions.178 In Karcher, the Conservative Justices of 
the Chief Justice and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist, were unable to extend a de 
minimis standard for Congressional districts and perverse the discretion of state 
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legislators. In stating their opposition, the Justices not only argued the position was 
incorrect but offered one of the few challenges to reapportionment itself.179 For the 
dissenters, the population deviations are “statistically insignificant,” especially in regards of 
the deficiencies of the census and the changes in population within and between districts 
and states after the census occurs, meaning that the Supreme Court ought to adhere to a 
de minimis standard and allow the state legislators to forgo answering for the small 
deviation.180  According to Justice White, as long as the state legislators seek a legitimate 
purpose and following some of the basic requirements to allow political fairness, such as 
“maintaining compact, contiguous districts, the respecting of political subdivisions, and 
efforts to achieve political fairness,”181 the judiciary ought to adhere to a limited ethos of 
judicial minimalism and allow the organic political process to work itself out between the 
voters and the state legislature.  
The judiciary’s extended involvement into reapportionment, especially partisan 
reapportionment, ends up as being as a Sisyphean task: since it cannot prevent the state 
legislators from incorporating some political elements in their reapportionment plan, the 
judiciary will not be able to provide citizens with “effective representation” as state 
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181 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 782 (1983). Justice White notes that cases with deviations below 5% that 
possess extraordinary circumstances may warrant judicial intervention and that some cases that possess 
greater deviations, though the legislators possess rational state objectives quoted above, may result in judicial 
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legislators can manipulate the One Person, One Vote rule to prevent effective and 
meaningful representation, unless that representation is authorization.182 Consequently, 
the judiciary’s involvement into reapportionment, especially with cases that concern 
minor deviations, will lead only to an increased judicial involvement. Micromanaging the 
ability of the state legislator to conduct reapportionment disregards the state legislative 
process and will only lead to an increase of the judiciary’s docket. By focusing on the 
minor issues, the Supreme Court will not develop a principle to settle these issues and will 
only increase it interference in the political process. As the Supreme Court settles one 
case, it will need to start anew and push another rock up the hill. Further, the dissenting 
opinion in Karcher serves as a warning to the majority: if you attempt to proceed further 
into the political thicket, the conservative justices will no longer provide the rhetorical 
rope to find your way out and, eventually, once the dissenters become the majority, the 
new majority on the Court will cut the rope entirely, returning all representation back 
into the discretion of state legislators.  
In Davis, Justice O’Connor’s argument for judicial abstinence in partisan 
redistricting rests on the acceptance of the futility thesis to prevent the judiciary from 
seizing control of the democratic process. For Justice O’Connor, the issue before the 
Supreme Court involves the authority of the judiciary and the best way to develop a 
democratic process. As Justice O’Connor notes, the facts of Davis rest on a “perceived 
injustice” and the best and only remedy is to “place responsibility for correction of such 
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flaws in the people, relying on them to influence their elected representatives.”183 For the 
former legislator, the Supreme Court lacks the inherent judicial authority to decide 
partisan reapportionment cases, leaving the issue to be determined by the political parties 
and the people, acting through the political parties. Justice O’Connor objects to the idea 
that the judiciary can employ the “Equal Protection Clause as the vehicle for making a 
fundamental policy choice [about how this Nation should be governed] that is contrary to 
the intent of its Framer’s and to the traditions of this Republic.”184 Though Justice 
O’Connor displays vehemence on this point, she provides nothing except a self-evident  
claim that the Founding Fathers would reject the ability of the judiciary to limit the 
legislative branch and prevent the political parties in providing stability. While Justice 
O’Connor may be correct that the Founders may not have wanted the judiciary to decide 
these questions, she overlooks the disdain some of the Founding Fathers possessed with 
political parties. Though there is too much conflicting evidence to reach consensus, the 
idealized version of our founders would reject the power of political parties, as George 
Washington did in his Farewell Address, while rejecting the notion that the judiciary, 
though partisan, would enter the political arena. 
Second, according to Justice O’Connor, the judiciary lacks the authority to decide 
these cases since nothing in the Supreme Court’s precedents suggests that the Supreme 
Court ought to act in this area of election law. Rather than to extend the Supreme Court’s 
authority and, consequently, weaken it, the dissenters would prefer that the judiciary 
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displays prudence and caution while rejecting the temptation to transform 
reapportionment into proportional representation. The meaning of Baker and Reynolds, 
according to Justice O’Connor, is that the right to vote is an individual right and that vote 
dilution occurs only when equality is not present for the voters in the districts.185 If the 
judiciary were to enter the debate over partisan gerrymandering, then it would need to 
take control of the entire process to ensure fairness at the state-wide level and enact 
proportional level throughout the country. Consequently, this approach would be flawed 
from the onset since the Equal Protection Clause does not provide “judiciable manageable 
standards for solving purely political gerrymandering claims, and no group right to an 
equal share of political power.”186  
Additionally, proportional representation is to be rejected as politics in the United 
States concerns compromise between two parties. In Gingles, Justice O’Connor’s decision 
rests on the premise that compromise is essential to federal legislation.187 In this view of 
government, democracy must have its limits or else it would limit the authority and 
efficacy of the state legislature. Consequently, Justice O’Connor believes that the Supreme 
Court employs Gingles to push too far toward proportional representation, which limits 
the authority of the state legislature. A representative body that is proportional guarantees 
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the composition of a political body and diminishes the opportunity for electoral 
compromises and coalitions. By creating a mirror of the electorate, proportional 
representation overrides the liberty and discretion of the state legislators to pursue an 
electoral strategy that offers voters mainstream alternatives. By reading Davis and Gingles 
together, Justice O’Connor’s opposition to proportional representation serves as a threat 
to the political parties that form the foundation and stability of the American Republic. If 
there were a diminishing of minority voices as a consequence of rejecting proportional 
representation, it appears that Justice O’Connor would accept this trade-off especially if it 
were still possible for racial minority groups to bring forth some challenges to vote 
dilution. 
To accept this position means that “political equality” does not lead to better 
representation for the citizens, especially since political parties can control the state and 
reapportionment. Since the standards of Wesberry and Reynolds are malleable enough, 
political parties can prevent the citizens from receiving “effective representation” if they 
choose. In Davis, Justice O’Connor sees partisan gerrymandering as a “self-limiting 
enterprise,” and argues that if the political parties attempt to create too many safe districts 
then they take the risk of diluting their political strengths; once they attempt to pick up 
too many seats beyond their perceived strength, the party will create competitive districts 
that the party in control may lose or they will dilute the strength of their safe seats.188 The 
vice of this institutional system is the accountability may never develop through elections 
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since the political parties can minimize their losses and pack the opposition into districts. 
However, since stability and not competition is the most important value in Justice 
O’Connor’s vision of democracy, then it is best for the political parties in a state to create 
as many districts above the competition threshold, which according to UJO exits above 
55%. In a stable, two-party system achieving this is an easier task as there are fewer 
demographic points of data to consider. Additionally, the need for democratic debate 
lessons as does the need for an informed electorate; however, according to this view of 
democracy, stability ensues.  
Further, even if the Supreme Court were to enter fully the political thicket, it 
would not possess the authority to condemn the worst cases of ineffective representation. 
Hidden beneath the vote dilution, §5, apportionment, and partisan gerrymandering 
claims, reside other forms of representational vices leaving citizens with no recourse as the 
judiciary defers in these areas to the discretion of state legislators. When establishing 
interpretative dominance in the early partisan cases such as White v. Weiser and Gaffney v. 
Cummings and invoking representation as authorization, the majority of the Court allows 
democratic structures to contain certain vices that threaten the effectiveness of 
representation. In White v. Weiser, Justice White sates that as long as the states followed 
the first priority of political equality, it would not disparage the state’s ability to preserve 
“constituency-representative relations” or diminish the ability of the state to protect its 
seniority in the House of Representatives.189 The lack of competitiveness in elections, 
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Justice White remarked, failed to present a sign of invidious discrimination against 
citizens that would warrant judicial action even if the lack of electoral competition 
diminishes civic participation. While safe districts allow for the protection of political 
subdivisions and allows for legislators to identify important social structures,190 and 
combining competing interests leads to fragmentation,191 too much protection e.g. 
Gaffney, allows political collusion and diminishes any need for deliberation.192 Further, 
creating safe districts for incumbents, who already possess an advantage in money and 
name recognition, legislators invent the “will of the people” that favors specific 
representative.193 Even the Liberal Justices may not desire to interfere in these gray areas, 
meaning that judicial activism is quite fruitless.  
Justice O’Connor’s decision to focus her attacks on the Supreme Court’s authority 
serves as a means to position the strength of the political process on the shoulders of the 
political parties rather than the judiciary, the citizens, or the state. In Justice O’Connor 
view, the country’s “sound and effective government” develops from the stability of the 
two-party system:  
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The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and federal, 
depends to no small extent on the continued vitality of our two-party system, 
which permits both stability and measured change. The opportunity to control the 
drawing of electoral boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment is 
a critical and traditional part of politics in the United States, and one that plays no 
small role in fostering active participation in the political parties at every level. 
Thus, the legislative business of apportionment has been carried out—by the very 
parties that are responsible for this process—present a political question in the 
truest sense of the term.194 
For Justice O’Connor, the health of the democratic system rests on the political parties to 
provide for the American people rather that an informed electoral “searing the 
consciousness” of the representatives. The political parties, and not just the elected 
representatives, act as the filter for the political process, bringing about the stability and 
change within American society. For the Judiciary to extend its authority over partisan 
redistricting would mean that the judiciary would be the branch of government to 
determine the health of the democracy but also into one of the “most heated partisan 
issues.”  
Theoretically, in her vision of democracy, the people act as a corrective agent in 
the democratic process, even if Justice O’Connor doubts their ability to do so. According 
to Jeffrey Tubin in The Nine, Justice O’Connor is, at times, hostile to the people, as 
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exemplified during Bush v. Gore, in which she believed that the real issue involved 
concerned the ignorance of the people in not know how to cast their ballot; further, it was 
not the role of the judiciary to make that decision for them.195 This view carries over to 
reapportionment as she places presumption for the democratic process with the political 
parties. Consequently, instead of basing the right to vote on the traditional social qualities 
such as wealth or property, the right to vote and the meaning of that vote depends to 
some degree on affiliation with a political party.  
As Justice O’Connor defines the political parties and the keepers of the 
democratic tradition, she diminishes the vigilance of the people. In her argument, 
O’Connor leaves her readers with a choice between the control of reapportionment by the 
judiciary, leading to an unhealthy democracy, or, control by the political parties, which 
upholds the health of the democracy. The people, according to this view, follow the 
choices of the political parties as democracy is best left to the political elites. But this view 
of the political process does not require the active participation in self-government, just 
the ability of the individuals to pull the level or touch the screen. While some people may 
act rationally, while others emotionally, active participation and sound deliberation are 
not necessary or sufficient to an elite conception of democracy. Instead, democracy 
requires that people authorize legislators to conduct the process. As the parties try to enact 
legislation and gain support for their policies, they may win or the may fail; however, this 
is a decision for to the people, the people’s representatives, and not the Courts. Even 
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though the dominant political power may attempt to alter the debate in its favor by 
packing its adherents and isolating or minimizing dissent, the voters may choose to 
support the opposition, which undercuts the evidence that voters vote consistently for a 
group and, hence, counters a group right to vote. Passionate, or wealthy, citizens will run 
for office; apathetic citizens may vote for those who run. Some of these who register and 
vote may join a party; other may remain independents, enhancing elections and increasing 
a party’s voting strength.196 Accordingly, if political parties want to engage in a process 
where they arrange districts to their advantage, then Justice O’Connor would allow this 
opportunity to influence the election since it is the nature of the electoral system and the 
political process. If equality is the standard, then the system will work itself out; if fairness 
it the standard, the foundation of democracy crumbles.  
Public Reason and the Political Process: Sustaining Democracy 
 While the Conservatives Justices on the Court argued to return redistricting to the 
legislative branches, the liberals and moderates exemplified the argument that a political 
standard of fairness could be found, possibly. Additionally, the argument for judicial 
involvement served as a way to protect the authority and ethos of the judiciary, especially 
in relation to the judge as the protector of constitutional rights, and nature the 
development of democracy by enhancing civic participation.    
 While the majority’s decision in Karcher focuses its decision upon procedural 
grounds in an attempt to for state legislatures to achieve the most effective 
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reapportionment plans possible, the larger issue in which Justice Brennan discusses is the 
role of the judiciary in American Law. While noting that the “One Person, One Vote” 
rule in Wesberry and Reynolds is the ideal for state legislators and the Article 1, 2 allows 
only for deviations that are “unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve equality,” 
the majority attempts to make Karcher about how to determine a violation.197 Under 
Karcher, challengers of a plan possess the burden of proof to show why the population 
variations could have been reduced or avoided and, if they are successful, then the state 
legislators must show why the variations ought to stand and that the deviations are 
significant to pursue a legitimate legislative goal.198  
However, even though the majority focuses on procedural, one of their 
motivations in Karcher to protect judicial authority. While the majority notes that 
population is the ideal, Justice Brennan refuses to allow state legislators to follow any 
standard less than the ideal to preserve the proper order of government. Throughout its 
history in reapportionment, Justice Brennan desired not to abandon the authority of the 
court, especially since if the Supreme Court abandons its authority in one case, there 
would be precedent for it to abandon authority it other areas of Constitutional law. 
During the Burger Court, Justice Brennan began to loathe the conservative treatment of 
reapportionment, especially during the unstated cutback of political equality as the 
Supreme Court allowed for deviation to equality in Mahan v. Howell, which nearly brought 
Justice Brennan to tears, and development of a “secret internal rule of thumb,” allowing 
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for 10% - 20% deviation and the ability of local politicians to redraw districts to ensure 
reelection.199 As the defender of the Warren Court, Justice Brennan felt the actions of the 
Burger Court threatened the political equality of citizens. Ten years after Mahan v. Howell, 
Justice Brennan relied on Karcher for a legal defense of the Warren Court for  if the 
Burger Court possessed the authority to alter its stance on political equality in Karcher, 
then the Supreme Court could alter Justice Brennan’s decision in Baker, removing the 
Supreme Court from the apportionment cases but not necessarily the VRA cases.  
This argument on the Supreme Court’s authority becomes relevant since two years 
after the Karcher decision, President Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meece 
would engage in a public debate with Justice William Brennan over constitutional 
interpretation and the role of the Supreme Court in public life, especially as it relates to 
the Rights Revolution. In this public debate over the Constitution and the role of the 
judiciary, Justice Brennan feared that the Reagan Administration would roll back the 
advancement of rights. Speaking for the Reagan Administration, Edwin Meese argued that 
the Supreme Court needed to follow a jurisprudence of original intention to diminish the 
power of the Supreme Court and returning the process constitutional decision-making to 
the political branches at the state and local level.200 By making this argument, the Reagan 
administration hoped to alter the political battle during the next Supreme Court 
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nomination process as the administration sought to appoint justices that followed this 
philosophy, such as Robert Bork.201 Justice Brennan countered that Meece’s philosophy of 
original intention was nothing more than “arrogance cloaked as humility,” and that the 
roll back that the Reagan administration desired would deny the advancement of law 
during Justice Brennan’s tenure on the Supreme Court.202  While Justice Brennan’s 
decision notes that reapportionment is a political process and that the state legislators 
possess the liberty to pursue secondary goals through reapportionment, Justice Brennan is 
unwilling to relinquish the role of the Supreme Court in American Public Life. 
While ideological forces desired the Supreme Court to commit to Civic 
Republicanism, the Liberal Justices provided the public with a model of reasoned debate 
even by attempting to discern standards to judge partisan apportionment cases, the most 
political of the reapportionment and redistricting decisions.  In Davis, Justice White and 
Justice Stevens focus their concerns on the ability of the voter to engage in the political 
process and to create as many associations and employ as many strategies of identification 
as possible. In “Gerrymandering as Political Caterls,” Samuel Issacharoff argues that 
partisan gerrymandering is more lethal to the health of the democracy, especially when the 
parties attempt to monopolize the democratic process.203 To remedy the collusion, there 
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needs to be a better discussion and implementation of the political process, which occurs 
in the partisan gerrymandering cases as the Supreme Court debates how to improve 
districting.  According to Richard Morrill, representation is both territorial and 
ideological, “and that meaningfulness of electoral districts to the voters matters. Electoral 
districts are not merely passing conveniences for the holding of elections, but entities with 
which citizens identify.”204  
In Davis, the plurality’s decision serves as the middle-ground position, between 
government neutrality on one hand and judicial withdrawal abstinence in the political 
process on the other.  Based on the language of vote dilution claims, to reach a conclusion 
of an unconstitutional political gerrymandering, Justice White states that the justices 
ought to examine the intent of the state legislature and the effects of the redistricting plan 
together, rather than separately, as Justice Powell would.205 Partisan gerrymander, 
according to the plurality’s decision, is similar to other types of vote dilution cases, such as 
inequality, the use of multi-member districts, and racial vote dilution.206 In declining to 
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hold that political gerrymanders are never justiciable,207 Justice White creates an ethos 
whereby the Court demonstrates its role as a defender of individual rights, minority rights 
and of procedural justice whereby the judiciary will step in to relieve that John Hart Ely 
would call “unblocking stoppages in the democratic process.”208 
 In this vision of government, democracy works if the process works. While 
democracy constitutes an important mix of partisan politics and citizen activism, political 
elites cannot limit the ability of political reform and should not manufacture consent. 
Bernard Grofman writes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis provides a necessary 
balancing act between the judiciary and the legislative branches as the decision needs to 
set a standard whereby the requirements would be high enough to discourage the most 
frivolous lawsuits on the matter but low enough to so the judiciary could strike down the 
most egregious and partisan redistricting plans.209 While Justice White’s decision nullifies 
some discretion of the state legislatures though this does not mean a “political question” is 
present as a difference exists between the relationship between coordinate branches of 
government and the discretion of the political parties. The first is not justiciable while the 
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second may be since, implicitly, the political parties via state legislatures cannot diminish 
the fundamental rights of citizens, or, as Justice White states, “the claim is that each 
political group in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice 
as any other political group.”210 
 For Justice White, democracy concerns accountability and the elected 
representatives must be accountable to a popular choice by the people. Yet, there is no 
standard of how that decisions ought to exist as he states that just because a party’s 
prospects for winning an election have been diminished by a party does not mean that the 
party will be disadvantaged at the polls.211  Samuel Issacharof states that the connection 
between accountability and elections concerns the allocation of political power and 
control of the political institutions: “the inability of a majority to prevail electorally does 
not simply compromise the integrity of any particular election result. It also skews the 
incentive structures operating to ensure the accountability of elected representatives to 
shifts in the preferences of the electorate.”212 But the problem for Justice White’s decision 
is that he rests his test for partisan gerrymandering on intent and effects. 213 However, the 
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intent of one party to diminish the power of the other party always exists; for effects, 
Justice White argues that a political group has been shut out of the process for a long 
period of time, which could not be established for the two major parties, and, 
consequently, there could be no valid evidence. This decision leads to a judicial trap: how 
much is too much? Or, how much partisanship is too much partisanship for the 
redistricting process. When connected with the other factors of running an election, such 
as the candidate, the quality of the candidate, enthusiasm for candidate, the issues, money 
raised, advertising, etc., there is little action the court can take to determine a way to 
separate out these factors after the election occurs.  
 The failure of Davis concerns the failure to develop judiciable manageable 
standards and, hence, the failure of the Supreme Court to develop a conceptual view on 
how democracy works and an appropriate ethos to referee the political process. The 
Court’s statement on partisan redistricts reads similarly to the position the Supreme Court 
provided in Baker, without the necessary rules developed in Westberry and Reynolds to 
provide good reasons to decided partisan reapportionment cases. Yet, this is an important 
difference because, by neglecting develop standards, the Supreme Court neglects to define 
the scope of the problem, i.e. what constitutes partisan discrimination against the Equal 
Protection Clause.214 Consequently, without a clearly defined problem, Davis leads to 
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another failure as it lacks necessary “rule of five” to provide a strong and binding majority 
precedent.215 
 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens sought to achieve adherence for the 
view that the government, as an entity, must govern impartially towards all of its citizens 
and “serve the interests of the entire community.”216 In Karcher, and Davis, he writes that 
the basis for a gerrymandering claim develops form the ethical reading of Gomillion: the 
judiciary ought to find a reapportionment or redistricting plan unconstitutional if the 
state dilutes the voting strength of a cognizable political or racial group.217 By casting a 
vote, citizens form themselves into an identifiable voting bloc and the mistreatment of the 
group, especially before the election occurs in the reapportionment and redistricting 
process, becomes analogous to the meaning and effect of Gomillion. When the state 
government interferes with the right to vote by adopting a redistricting plan that, “serves 
no purpose other than to favor one segment—whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, 
or political—that may occupy a position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage 
a politically weak segment of the community,” there is a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.218  
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 The opinion by Justice Stevens provides a better approach to discussing 
reapportionment in terms of communicative democracy. When the judiciary must 
interpret the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, is must also be impartial to the 
needs of the state and to the citizens. Unless the judiciary is to avoid standards it sets for 
the other segments of society, it must be blind to the myriad numbers of identifications a 
citizen can possess. According to Stevens, “There is only one Equal Protection Clause. 
Since the Clause does not make some groups of citizens more equal than others, its 
protection against vote dilution cannot be confined to racial groups…. In the line drawing 
process, racial, religious, ethnic, and economic gerrymanders are all species of 
gerrymanders.”219 When a political group that possesses enough power at the polls to 
warrant an electoral victory becomes divided by the state or another political group in 
control of the state, that group forces the state to explain why they thought the drawing of 
district lines would probably result in the diminished political power of the group that 
disagrees or opposes the state.220 However, unless there is discrimination against a group, 
the judiciary cannot provide political power and access to the state because it does not 
possess power in proportion to its numbers.  
 This view of the electoral process assumes the fluidity of group identification. 
Group identity does not concern just race or just partisan interests, but the identity of the 
citizen concerns multiple forms of associations and identifications. “Groups of every 
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character,” Justice Stevens writes, “may associate together to achieve legitimate common 
goals. If they voluntarily identify themselves by a common interest in a specific issue, by a 
common ethnic heritage, by a common religious belief, or by their race, that characteristic 
assumes significance as the bond that gives the group cohesion and political strength.”221 
Institutional fairness requires that institutions allow individuals the ability to discern for 
themselves what identifications they desire. As Robert Ivy writes, “by maintaining a 
productive tension between cooperation and competition and not privileging any single 
perspective to the exclusion of all other, ‘rowdy’ rhetorical deliberation increases the 
potential of preventing adversaries from being transformed into scapegoats and 
enemies.”222 Conversely, institutions threaten fairness when they exclude groups and 
diminish the ability of citizens to decide for them what identification they prefer.  
 For Justice Stevens, the remedy for the divisive politics that attempts to exclude 
groups form the political process is the integration of competing factions with the hope 
that the differences and the consciousness of those differences will disappear as 
representatives focus on the commonalities of all citizens. For government to be self-
correcting, then the government must ensure its citizens that when they vote, the decisions 
of government develop from the voice of the people. Concerning himself with the rights 
of citizens, seemingly to uphold the notion that the right to vote is a fundamental right 
within society, the consequence of this position is that the government is a relation 
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between citizen and state and this relationship ought to be free from the unnecessary 
interference of political parties. If the state were to develop a plan that “favor[s] one 
segment—whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political—that may occupy a 
position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak 
segment of the community, they would violate the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection.”223  
To increase competitiveness the political parties would need to relinquish some 
control of the process. However, the problem is that this prohibition stands only to the 
degree in which human actors accept them and relinquish their partisan interests. Both 
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Posner argue that one way to accomplish this task would 
be to invoke anti-trust jurisprudence into reapportionment and redistricting law. 224 The 
“political markets” approach should govern the reapportionment and redistricting process 
in increase competition in the process provides a call for increasing the amount of 
deliberation amongst citizens and between citizens and political parties.225 Issacharoff 
writes:  
Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral 
process and of the First Amendment freedoms. Further, the focus on competitive 
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processes ties back to the undeveloped original Madisonian understanding of 
republican government as one that "derives all its powers ... from the great body of 
the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, 
for a limited period, or during good behaviour [sic]."226 
By valuing deliberation, and the rhetorical tradition, this position connects the 
Madisonian vision of the Republic with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gomillion, Baker, 
and Reynolds. Further, it limits the role of the political parties to assume representation on 
behalf of the individuals before the elections occur but could still provide elite for of 
representation after the elections. Finally, it reestablishes legitimacy in terms of democratic 
accountability and creates democratic structures on the basis that representation concerns 
substantive acting for. However, the main constraint against this position is judicial. In 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, Justice Antonin Scalia argues that there are no judicially manageable 
standards to guide the Supreme Court in this area of law. Further, and even more 
devastating, Scalia notes that the four dissenters develop three different standards and all 
of them are different from the two standards in Davis.227 It is not that this position would 
not ever become law; with the Supreme Court Justices on the Court now, this will not 
become law now.  
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Conclus ion: Divergent Paths of the Law 
 The biggest victories for the Liberal Justices on the Supreme Court arrived in 1982 
when Congress amended the VRA to protect the ability of racial minorities to elect 
communities of choice and its decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, which upheld the 1982 
amendments. Civil Rights groups were jubilant after the ruling. Ralph Neas, executive 
director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, stated, Gingles stands as an "an 
overwhelming repudiation of the (administration's) attempt to gut the voting rights act."228 
Julius LeVonne Chambers, of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, stated, 
“Once again, another branch of government has reined in the extremism of the 
Department of Justice. [The ruling] gives us a powerful new tool for protecting the equal 
rights of minorities to register, to vote and to have their votes counted with equal 
weight."229 Even Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, found pleasant words to describe the 
ruling, stating. "Racial and ethnic minorities will be entitled to participate in the electoral 
process."230 Kathryn Abrams writes that though vestiges of slavery and segregation still 
exist, the Supreme Court’s Gingels’ test represents a crucial victory for racial minorities, 
ending the “stark exclusion and disenfranchisement of minority citizens.”231  
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 Not everyone warmly received the Court’s decision in Gingles. Mary J. Kosterlitz, 
states that in Gingles, the Supreme Court failed to develop a “definitive standard for 
determining the degree of significant racial bloc voting,” which is the interpretive key in 
understanding §2 claims.232 Further the fractured opinions would undermine the weight 
of the majority’s opinion as the court failed to reach consensus on the absence or presence 
of racial bloc voting.233 The decision does not address explicitly the “question of remedies 
or the tension between the statutory language and the legislative history.” Legislation 
under Gingles will cause lower courts to interpret §2 favorably to plaintiffs and allow for 
“reasonable proportional” remedies.234 Assistant Attorney General William Bradford 
Reynolds, head of the Justice Department's civil rights division, described the defeat as 
being not as bad as it seems since it did not endorse safe seats for minorities.235 
 While some admired the Court’s decision in Gingles, Davis did not fare as well.  
Since the Court could not reach an agreement, numerous scholars offered their advice on 
how to create a judicially manageable standard for districting.236 Of course, as Bruce Cain 
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notes, even in the field of political science, there is no one indicator to point to “fair 
representation,” and no consensus as to the meaning of “fair representation,”237 which 
diminishes the ability of the Supreme Court to develop standards to judge “fair 
representation.” Cain believes that because of the lack of standards, then the Court will 
not likely intervene in political gerrymandering cases and the Davis decision may help 
excluded groups but not Republicans or Democrats.238 Noting the partisan implications, 
Rep. Tony Coelho (D-CA), chairman of the House Democratic Campaign Committee, 
said Davis would be “decided by state legislatures which are dominated by Democrats 
rather than federal courts which are dominated by Republicans."239 
 Apparently, consensus after the decision rested on the rejection of the Court’s 
work as the only ones who would benefit would be lawyers and political scientists. The 
Wall Street Journal noted that the Supreme Court’s decision would lead to “complicates, 
costly and time-consuming suits.”240 After the Court’s decision in Davis, Republicans 
challenged Rep. Phillip Burton’s (D-CA) egregious redistricting effort in California that 
protect the political parties.241 Bruce Fein, a court watcher for the American Enterprise 
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Institute, declared that the ruling ''will parent literally hundreds of court challenges ... and 
place the electoral process in turmoil,” as it would lead to ''a decade of litigation'' to 
interpret the requirements.242 Harvard Law Professor Philip Heymann stated it will be 
difficult to interpret Davis as, ''It's extremely hard to figure out what they're going to 
require before anyone can bring a lawsuit.” 243 He did admit the “real winners” from Davis 
would be the citizens, stating, ''I think voters benefit because it means that on the whole, 
whether you're a Democrat or a Republican, there is more chance that your vote will 
matter.”244Samuel Issacharoff writes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis attempts 
to combine racial vote dilution claims, which concerns anti-discrimination law, and the 
political process, resulting in a jurisprudence that potentially possesses “sweeping breadth 
but of virtually no meaningful application.”245 John Petrocik, a professor of government at 
the University of California, said "not only are a lot of lawyers going to make a lot of 
money, but many of my colleagues in the political science profession are going to get some 
healthy consulting fees."246 
 The divergent paths by the Supreme Court would connect together in 1993, when 
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Shaw v. Reno, a case that integrated racial and 
political gerrymandering though the Court would only discuss the racial aspects. In less 
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than twenty years after Davis and Gingles, only one decision would be left standing. 
However, with the current Justices on the Supreme Court it is not clear how long other 
decisions will stand as constitutional law.  
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CHAPTER VI 
VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY: PARTISANSHIP, RACE, AND THE RHETORIC OF 
RECONCILIATION 
I have always believed in democracy, and nothing I have ever written is inconsistent with 
that. I have always believed in one man, one vote, and nothing I have ever written is 
inconsistent with that. I have always believed in fundamental fairness, and nothing I have 
ever written is inconsistent with that. I am a democratic idealist who believes that politics 
need not be forever seen as an 'I win, you lose' dynamic in which some people are 
permanent, monopoly winners and others are permanent, excluded losers. Everything I 
have written is consistent with that. I hope that what has happened to my nomination 
does not mean that future nominees will not be allowed to explain their views as soon as 
any controversy arises. I hope that we are not witnessing that dawning of a new intellectual 
orthodoxy in which thoughtful people can no longer debate provocative ideas without 
denying the country their talents as public servants. I also hope that we can learn some 
positive lessons from this experience, lessons about the importance of public dialogue on 
race in which all perspectives are represented and in which no one viewpoint 
monopolizes, distorts, caricatures or shapes the outcome.1 Lani Guinier 
 
I think that's what the [civil rights] struggle was all about, to create what I like to call a 
truly interracial democracy in the South. In the movement, we would call it creating the 
beloved community, an all-inclusive community, where we would be able to forget about 
race and color and see people as people, as human beings, just as citizens. Rep. John Lewis 
(D-GA)2  
 
 In Whose Vote Counts, Abigail M. Thernstrom states that though no group is 
required by legislation to receive proportional representation, decisions from the federal 
judiciary allowing for “fair” representation constitute the enactment of “proportional 
representation,” resulting in “a controversial policy that has somehow stirred no 
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controversy.”3 Six years after the publication of her text, Thernstrom would find her 
controversy on the issue of “fair” representation though debate on that topic would 
remain unfulfilled. On April 29, 1993, almost two years after the spectacle of the Clarence 
Thomas nomination, President William Jefferson Clinton faced a political nomination 
battle over his appointment of Lani Guinier to lead the Justice Department’s Civil Rights 
Division. Unlike Thomas, Guinier’s sin concerned scholarship and activism as she 
advocated for the protection and enhancement of the rights of minorities through 
representation even if it meant the abandonment of traditional, territorial districting and 
single vote elections.4 In her research, Guinier challenged the politics of the Reagan 
administration, protesting its decision to define civil rights in terms of “special interests” 
and discuss anti-discrimination in terms of confrontation rather than consensus.5 Because 
of the Reagan Administration’s framing of these issues, Guinier feared that debate 
between blacks and whites in society would be polarized solely for the benefit of electoral 
gain.6 Though her activism, Guinier challenged legislative districts in North Carolina and 
Louisiana that diluted the votes of black voters, securing the protection of political 
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equality and fairness for those that could not seek it at the polls.7  Like the nomination of 
Clarence Thomas two years prior, because of her words and her deeds, partisan forces 
challenged the nomination; however, unlike the Thomas controversy, President Clinton 
abandoned Guinier nomination rather than defend her nomination.   
 In response to her nomination and controversial academic work, Conservatives 
initiated a campaign to “Bork” Guinier. Rather than allow a confirmation hearing to 
judge the merits and the experience of Guinier—a treatment that even Robert Bork 
received—, partisan groups preemptively attacked her positions on the nature of American 
Democracy. After her appointment announcement, Guinier was defined as being a 
“Quota Queen,” and a “Social Engineer;” opponents argued that her views were “anti-
Democratic” since she believed that some decisions required a super-majority rather than 
just a majority.8 Political columnist David Broder characterized Guinier’s position as one 
which, "the rules of the game must be constantly rewritten to ensure that [blacks and other 
minorities] are not victimized."9 Lally Weymouth, a conservative journalist, argued against 
Guinier’s “radicalism,” suggesting that majority run-off voting schemes Guinier desired 
may violate the Voting Rights Act (VRA); however, Weymouth failed to criticize John 
Dunne, the Bush Administration’s Assistant Attorney General for civil rights, when he 
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described majority run-off schemes as “electoral steroids for white candidates.”10 Clint 
Bolick, an aide to William Bradford Reynolds who acted as the Civil Rights Division chief 
that approved the Louisiana District that Guinier fought, argued that she would not be 
satisfied with proportional representation11 and advocated for a “complex racial spoil 
systems,” guaranteeing the election of black representation.12 Because of the public 
backlash, even Democrats capitulated. In response to her writings, Joseph Biden (D-CT) 
stated that the nomination concerned him and, though he stated she needed to defend 
her views in public, he and the Senate Judiciary Committee searched for a way out of 
providing her a hearing.13 Southern Democrats were especially upset with her nomination, 
especially in relation to a possible political backlash over Guinier’s views of the VRA and 
minority representation. 14 Senator John Breaux (D-La), asked that President Clinton “not 
to push forward with her” as her academic work did not fit with what the Senator would 
define as a “mainstream type of Democrat.” 
In an attempt to save her nomination, Guinier appeared on Nightline to plead for 
the chance to receive a hearing in the Senate.15 Yet, that appearance failed to save her 
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nomination. Responding to the public pressure against his nominee, President Clinton 
withdrew her nomination on June 4, 1993. Even though President Clinton vowed to fight 
for racial equality and desired a serious discussion about race in America, President 
Clinton could not defend his nominee. In a public announcement, Clinton stated that, 
after reading her work, Guinier’s articles lend themselves to interpretations that he did not 
express on the campaign trail, views that he holds “very dearly.” Though he agreed with 
some of the sentiments in the articles, the President stated if he had read her academic 
research before he nominated her, he would not have nominated her,16 as her ideas on 
electoral empowerment were “too radical.”17 Claiming that the polarized battle over her 
nomination conflicted with Clinton’s campaign pledge to unite not divide, Clinton 
abandoned his nominee.18 While the President attempted to define the situation over a 
debate over representation he could not defend, in the end, the nomination concerned a 
battle of wills Clinton failed to win.   
The Guinier controversy exists at the nexus between partisan interests and racial 
reconciliation, between the representation of majority interests and the protection of 
minority rights. Randall Kennedy, a professor at Harvard Law School, stated that Guinier, 
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“asked very tough questions about our democracy…and we’re supposed to be against 
someone for asking questions.”19 He added, "She has been attacked for trying to destroy 
the system when all she wants to do is make minorities more involved in the system. I 
can't helping thinking that the sense she is somehow alien comes from ignorance, or mere 
rhetoric meant to inflame public opinion against her."20 Mark Lawrence McPhail notes 
that the Guinier nomination, “reveals the resistance of white Americans to a coherent 
account of racial injustice and discrimination in America.”21 While the Guinier 
controversy avoided a discussion on the merits of competing forms and practices of 
representation, Guinier’s writings can be considered controversial since it threatened 
those who would “subordinate our most basic right to vote to partisan agendas and 
political expediency,” rather than commit to a process whereby all voices should be heard 
and all votes counted.22  
 Twenty-four days after President Clinton withdrew Lani Guinier’s nomination and 
the country avoided a discussion of race and representation, the Supreme Court released 
its decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). In a 5  - 4 decision authored by Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, a majority held that a North Carolina district was so bizarrely 
drawn and irrational on its face that it could only be understood as a means to segregate 
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voters into separate districts based on race. 23 At stake in Shaw I, and in almost all of the 
cases during he 1990s and 2000s, concerned the reconciliation of race and representation 
in America. More specifically, the Court entertained the idea as to what would be the best 
way to reconcile competing racial attitudes in the United States through the redistricting 
process.  Yet, the Guinier controversy suggested that the Supreme Court may be in a 
better position to debate racial reconciliation in the United States. Though the Justices 
advance ideological positions, the process and discussion of race would not equate the 
spectacle of the Guinier controversy.  
Beneath the Supreme Court’s discourse on representation, the Justices debate the 
meaning of reconciliation in two distinct areas. In the first field, the Justices debate the 
best means to employ the political system to achieve reconciliation between competing 
races and ethnicities. In the second field, the Justices debate how to reconcile an ideal 
form of American Democracy with a partisan political system that desires to limit the 
ability of that democracy to flourish. In terms of racial reconciliation, the Conservatives 
Justices argue that the path toward reconciliation lies with treating people as individuals, 
regardless of their race.24 For the Liberal Justices, the path to reconciliation occurs by 
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allowing political cohesive groups access to the political process regardless of their race or 
ethnicity. Further, for political reconciliation, the Conservatives Justices argue that the 
process is self-correcting and democracy flourishes through conflict. Conversely, the 
Liberal Justices argue that democracy diminishes with the threat of partisan entrenchment  
 Previous research on the topic of the rhetoric of reconciliation focuses on 
oppositional groups developing communicative practices necessary to reject violence and 
accept communal understanding. Important to the premise of the rhetoric of 
reconciliation is that discourse can shape the social word, overcoming divergent cultural, 
economical, political, and social divisions. According to Erik Doxstader, reconciliation 
serves as a “call for and practice of communication,” to “convert violence into a set of 
shared oppositions that can motivate and sustain dialogue.”25 Reconciliation is a moment 
of rhetorical history-making, to define a time of transition and to employ that transition 
“in the name of public deliberation,” examining “how speech invents the potential for 
politics.”26 Similarly to Doxtader, John B. Hatch views reconciliation as a rhetorical 
process that focuses on the communicative and sociopsychological aspects of 
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reconciliation to achieve “coherent reconstruction of identities and relationships,”27 that 
frees the “offended and offending parties from the law of essentialist identity and into the 
rhetorical embrace of redeemed relationship and community.”28 Important in this concept 
is the balance between the comic and the tragic to eliminate guilt in society and, “bridge 
across the sociopsychological chasm between complicity and coherence.29 The aim of 
reconciliation is not a fixed and final unity of identity (for example, a color-blind society), 
but rather a fluid, evolving harmony connecting differences and moments of dissonance 
in a diverse society.”30 However, this reconciliation may occur only to the extent the 
people and political or cultural leaders are wiling to make it viable and, when it does, it 
will occur through a process rather than develop instantaneously.31   
  While Hatch focuses on the communicative aspects of reconciliation, Kirt 
Wilson, Mark Lawrence McPhail, and Erik Doxtader discuss the limitations to focusing 
solely on communication, especially in relation to the political structures that can limit or 
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prevent attitude formation and politico reconciliation. Kirt Wilson argues that a model of 
reconciliation, “lies not in a cathartic experience that removes shame, guilt, and victimage 
but in a rhetoric that induces the public to consider that its interests are served by 
dismantling existing systems of white privilege. Even this approach is limited, because 
reconciliation, itself, may be incapable of solving the structural roots of racism.”32 By 
rejecting the sociopsychological, Wilson argues that the focus of reconciliation needs to 
examine the structures in society, such as the economy, education, healthcare, rhetoric, 
politics, and culture, that perpetuates inequality and that privilege one race over another.33 
Mark Lawrence McPhail provides another skeptical approach to Hatch’s position, 
especially in regards the ability of rhetoric, and rhetoric alone, to establish reconciliation. 
McPhail argues that attentions should focus on the “social and psychological impediments 
to racial reconciliation” and believes it will take more than rhetoric to “reconcile the long 
and tragic history of white supremacy and racism;” what will be needed is a resigning of 
the racial contract and credible acts of atonement by whites to “move the rhetoric of 
racism through complicity and toward coherence.”34 If reconciliation were to occur, it 
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must develop credible arguments from an accepted source that examines and develops the 
best way to present arguments that alters the Racial.  
Similarly to Wilson and McPhail, Doxtader’s response examines the structural 
foundations that limit reconciliation. While Hatch desires to study the “grammars of 
rhetoric” behind reconciliation, such as the confession, apology, and reparation to find 
reconciliation’s “tumultuous beginnings,” Doxtader’s states that what is necessary to 
achieve reconciliation concerns developing proper preconditions for debate, especially in 
developing common ground, how to establish the terms for common ground, what 
motivates people to find common ground, who can initiate the common ground, how will 
it proceed, and under what conditions of accountability.35 The problems with these 
questions reveal that reconciliation may occur through societal institution, such as the 
law, which has everything to gain by ensuring that redemption occurs in the future and 
not the present.36 
This chapter builds upon the suggestions of Wilson, McPhail, and Doxtader by 
examining the rhetoric of reconciliation through the structural elements of constitutional 
law in the Supreme Court’s reapportionment and redistricting cases during the 1990s and 
2000s. Reconciliation concerns the construction and maintenance of rhetorical identities 
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for citizens through representation, the structuring of the ground on which divergent 
groups speak through the representations, and the transformation of the law and the 
citizen by an arbitrator of the law, seeking to balance the understanding of the law and the 
divergent political and social claims for those petitioning the law. This is a legal and 
secular form of reconciliation that seeks to balance competing claims of political equality 
and political fairness necessary to invent and sustain common ground on which the 
American democracy rests. The Supreme Court’s role in the discussing reconciliation is 
unique since they act as the arbitrators of public reason, helping to provide a sense of justice 
to an area they may only experience on an intellectual level, with Clarence Thomas as, 
maybe, the lone exception.  
Acting as an authority on behalf on the parties presenting claims, who themselves 
act for larger segments of society, the Justices negotiate ways in which elections in the 
United States should establish common ground to encourage reconciliation between racial 
groups even if elections between competing parties concern division. The Supreme Court 
faces numerous constraints to this reconciliation as partisan interests and political 
ideologies attempt to gain dominance for heir ideas and racially-polarized voting separates 
the ability of citizens to find common ground. As Matthew J. Streb notes, the racial puzzle 
in U.S. elections concerns the fact that even though race has disappeared as a major 
political issue, voting polarization along racial and partisan lines continues as African-
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Americans, almost homogeneously, support the Democratic Party.37 In the process of 
deciding these cases, the Supreme Court damages its own ethos, developing different 
standards to judge its apportionment and districting cases.  
During the 1990s and 2000s, the Supreme Court’s reapportionment and 
redistricting decisions concern the development of common ground on which citizens can 
work towards reconciliation and the establishment of interpretive dominance of the 
reconciliation process. Yet, political ideologies exacerbate the debate on the Court and the 
Justices align themselves to advance partisan ends regardless of the rhetorical traditions on 
redistricting. In this debate, the Conservative Justice desire the attainment of 
reconciliation by defining voting as an individual right, treating voters as individuals and 
not as members of groups, and developing a theory of representation that invokes the 
language of segregation to advocate for reconciliation. Additionally, to preserve political 
equality, the Conservative Justices argue that the Court must adopt a color-blind 
interpretation of the Constitution. Conversely, the Liberal Justices on the Court reject the 
language of segregation and representational harm and advance an ideology of 
representation that argues reconciliation may occur only if racial minorities possess 
political equality as a group. Additionally, to argue against the advancement of a color-
blind Constitution, the Liberal Justices attack the ethos of the conservative majority and 
its rejection of the Supreme Court’s rhetorical tradition. While the majority of the Court 
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argues reconciliation can only occur if the government looks beyond race, the dissenters 
argue that citizens need to sustain political equality before they can deliberate on 
reconciliation. 
Social Context: The Polit i cization of the Law 
 During his tenure in office, President George H.W. Bush filled two vacancies on 
the Supreme Court. On July 20th, 1990, Justice William Brennan reluctantly stepped 
down from the High Court after he suffered a slight stroke from a fall.38 Not wanting an 
ideological fight over this nomination during an election year, President Bush missed his 
opportunity to replace the most prominent liberal member of the Supreme Court with a 
prominent conservative. President Bush’s nomination of David Souter, which rested on 
the assurances by White House Chief of Staff John Sununu to the Conservative base that 
the selection would be “a home run,”39 passed through Congress without confrontation 
and disappointed conservatives immediately. On June 27, 1991, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, the last of the die-hard liberal justices of the Supreme Court, announced his 
retirement from the Supreme Court, stating colorfully, “I’m getting old, and coming 
apart.”40 Marshall’s retirement, announced almost a year to the day after Justice William 
Brennan announced his retirement, left a democratic void on the bench as only two 
members of the Thornburg plurality section, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, remained on 
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the High Court.41 While avoiding a political and judicial confrontation for the first 
choice, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu promised a ‘knock-down, drag-out, 
bloody-knuckles, grassroots fight.”42 The Bush Administration fulfilled this promise with 
the nomination of Clarence Thomas. Because of his originalist method, his desire to 
interpret the Constitution of 1789, his commitment to Natural Law, and his beliefs that 
the “crown jewels” of the liberal court, such as Miranda and Roe, ought to be overturned,43 
conservative activists believed that President Bush’s appointment fulfilled the promise of 
conflict between conservatives and liberals. And a fight there was.  
 The appointment process of Clarence Thomas exceeded the partisan and 
ideological battle over President Ronald Reagan’s appointment of Robert Bork to the 
Supreme Court in 1987.44 Knowing the legal and constitutional stakes over a successful 
appointment, Democrats and Republicans planned to engage one another over the success 
of the nomination, with Republicans going so far as to create a war room, prepping the 
candidate, and, more importantly, reaching out to African-American special-interest 
groups to prevent a unified liberal front in opposition to Thomas.45 To advance the 
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nomination, the Bush Administration developed a “Pin Point” strategy to reveal Thomas’s 
character through the realization of the American Dream, beginning with a life with 
hardship in and poverty, highlighting the dedication of family, and leading to the 
nomination on the Supreme Court.46 According to Trevor Parry-Giles, “because of the 
celebritizing power of the Pin Point strategy, Clarence Thomas was only a talented and 
hard-working man who had triumphed over adversity, overcome the shackles of 
segregation, and achieved the highest pinnacles of success in America.”47  
Yet, the nomination process moved toward an unexpected turn and the credibility 
of the Pin Point strategy decreased when Anita Hill, and a few other of Thomas’ co-
workers, stepped forward with allegations that Thomas repeatedly sexually harassed them. 
Thomas denied those accounts, as Mark Tushnet suggests, because he may not have 
believed he did anything wrong, he may have forgotten that aspect of his life before he 
married his second life, Virginia Lamp, or he trapped himself within the “simplifications 
of the media story of his successes,” whereby he could not have committed those acts.48 
Thomas ended this debate, and salvaged his nomination, when he declared that his 
judicial nomination process was a “travesty,” that “the Supreme Court was not worth it,” 
and, more emphatically:  
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And from my standpoint as a black American, as far as I'm concerned, it is a high-
tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think for themselves, to 
do for themselves, to have different ideas, and it is a message that unless you 
kowtow to an old order, this is what will happen to you. You will be lynched, 
destroyed, caricatured by a committee of the U.S.— U.S. Senate, rather than hung 
from a tree.49 
After rhetorically turning the nomination process into a Civil Rights issue and turning the 
language of liberalism against his opponents, Thomas ended discussion over the alleged 
charges of harassment with his “high-tech lynching” comments. After voting, Thomas 
survived the closest vote for a sitting Justice, receiving 52 votes in favor and 48 votes in 
opposition, most of which were straight party line votes. Like the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bush v. Gore, the belief in the guilt or innocence of Thomas resembles a 
political Rorschach test and generally reflects the political ideology of the viewer. This 
aspect of the Thomas controversy reflects the ideological batter over the law during the 
1990s and the 200s.  
 During his tenure as president, William Jefferson Clinton did not face nomination 
problems over his choices of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who replaced Justice Byron White, 
and Stephen Breyer, who replaced Harry A. Blackmun. However, in addition to his 
nomination fight over Lani Guinier, President Clinton faced political and legal battles 
over Travel Gate, Monica Lewinsky, his impeachment scandal, and a host of other Gates 
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designed to weaken his authority. When the Lewinsky scandal first broke, Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, “ascribed the president’s difficulties to a ‘vast right wing conspiracy,’” even if this 
statement deflected away from President Clinton culpabilities.50 Jeffrey Toobin writes that 
the Clinton impeachment occurs in a series of political struggles in the guise of legal 
battles. He notes that during the 1950s, when numerous political agents shut out blacks 
from participating in the political process, lawyers, such as Thurgood Marshall, and special 
interest groups, such as the NAACP, turned to the judiciary to fight their battles. 
Eventually, Conservatives would rely on these political tactics, incorporating the language 
and concepts of liberals, to achieve their aim; “toward the end of the century, it was 
extremists of the political right who tried to use the legal system to undo elections— in 
particular the two that put Bill Clinton in the White House.”51 Yet, this political 
revolution would be unsuccessful. As Jeffrey Toobin writes, the trial itself was never in 
doubt as those that brought for the charges never possessed the 67 votes necessary as there 
were only 55 Republican Senators and only 50 voted for impeachment on the second 
vote.52 
 A year-and-a-half after the Clinton impeachment scandal, voters went to the polls 
to cast ballots for the President of the United States; some of those votes would count, 
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others would not.53 In December of 2000, the Supreme Court decided who would be the 
43rd President of the United States in Bush v. Gore. In a 5 -4 decision by the Conservative 
majority, who would normally reject equal protection claims, the Court ruled that the 
manual recounts of the ballots cast in the Presidential Election violate the Equal 
Protection Clause since the canvassing boards in each county would rely on different 
standards to count the votes, diminishing the equal treatment of each voter.54 As Owen 
Fiss argues there was nothing unique about Bush v. Gore as it represents the “culmination 
of twenty-five years of Supreme Court history that sought to repudiate the legacy of the 
Warren Court and to block the progressive realization of the Constitution.55 Theodore O. 
Prosise and Craig R. Smith write that the legal inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s 
decision and the interference with Florida law diminishes the ethos of the Supreme 
Court.56Clarke Rountree declares that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore 
reveals judicial motives relating to the political and partisan concerns of the Justices and 
not motives that concern the development of democracy and the country’s political 
institutions.57  
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Yet, though the decision may be inconsistent with precedent, a few legal scholars 
argue that the Court’s decision reflects the Equal Protection Standards that the Warren 
Court initiated in Baker, Wesbery, and Reynolds. For example, Richard H. Pildes writes that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore stands as the “most dramatic moment in the 
constitutionalization of the democratic process that has been afoot for nearly forty years, 
ever since Baker dramatically lowered the ‘political questions’ barrier to judicial oversight 
of politics.”58 Ricahrd L. Hasen notes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore 
came to fruition from the seeds planted during the Reapportionment Revolution. Because 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker, the judiciary opened up their doors to election 
law cases previous Justices would not entertain59 and, because of the One Person, One 
Vote rule and the definition of voting rights as a “fundamental right” in Reynolds, the 
Supreme Court relied upon the language of “equal protection” to strike down recounts 
that failed to determine a universal standard.60 Richard H. Pildes states that the Supreme 
Court’s decision “rests on an individual right to an equally weighted vote in a statewide 
election. This individual right reflects what the Court calls the ‘equal dignity owned to 
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each voter.’”61 As stated previous, Justice Brennan’s decision in Baker offered the 
American people a proposition about the role of the Courts: the Supreme Court would 
become the final arbiter of the Constitution in order to break the legislative 
entrenchment.  Almost forty years after Baker, even the Conservative Justices, who 
typically argue against unnecessary judicial involvement in the political process, still offer 
the American people Justice Brennan’s proposition when it suits their ideologically 
conservative ends. 
While acting as President, one of the few accomplishments for George W. Bush 
concerns the transformation of the judiciary and the Department of Justice.  Even 
neglecting the failed suggestion of Harriet Miers as a Supreme Court Justice, the triumph, 
or tragedy depending on ideology, of the Bush Administration is the transformation of the 
American judiciary through the addition of conservative justices who interprets the law and 
avoids imposing their preferences or priorities on the people.62 During his tenure, the president 
replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist with his much younger protégé and law clerk, 
Chief Justice John Roberts. Further, and even more important, President possessed the 
opportunity to replace the swing-vote of Justice O’Connor with a solid Conservative vote 
of Justice Samuel Alito. But even more important than appointing two Supreme Court 
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Justices, the president appointed 57 Conservative jurists to the U.S. Court of Appeals, a 
stepping-stone to the Supreme Court, and 237 justices at the trial court level.63 
Furthermore, under the Bush Administration, officials at the Department of 
Justice engaged in partisan hiring practices, which would also help determine the meaning 
of the law. According to The Washington Post, an investigation into the hiring practices of 
career government lawyers by Monica Goodling, a counselor to former Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales, reveal that the DOJ discriminated against applicants who were not 
Conservative or Republican.64 During Senate testimony on the hiring scandal, Goodling 
admitted that she “crossed the line” as she considered political affiliation.65 While there is 
a clear distinction between political appointees and career appointees, and it is illegal to 
hiring career appointees on the basis of political affiliation or allegiance, current Attorney 
General Michel Mukasey states that there will not be an investigation into the hiring 
practices and those who were turned away can reapply.66 The investigation into the hiring 
practices provides another reminder of the politicization of the law and Justice under 
Gonzales, who is also under investigation for the potential political firing of eight US 
attorneys. According to The New York Times, the White House may have encouraged the 
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firings as the attorneys failed to aggressively pursue voter fraud, especially in voter 
registration in districts in which there were close elections.67 Senator Edward Kennedy (D-
MA) argued that the firings were a political move as “veteran prosecutors” were replaced 
with “political operatives” in important swing states before the 2008 elections.68 Similarly 
to the impeachment of President Clinton, the nomination of Clarence Thomas, and the 
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, this controversy exists as an ideological Rorschach test 
and its meaning depends on the terministic screens of the viewer. 
Representation in the 1990s and 2000s 
 During the 1990s and the 2000s, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in five 
different types of cases involving reapportionment and redistricting cases. The first set of 
cases involved the authority of the courts, citizens, and the state legislators to bring forth 
claims or hear claims.69 In the second set of cases, the Supreme Court heard arguments 
that concerned whether or not redistricting plans diluted the voting strength of racial 
minorities and were, therefore, unconstitutional under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
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Act.70 In the third set of cases, the five of the Supreme Court Justices created an 
“Analytically Distinct” sub-section to the vote dilution claims under §2 of the VRA 
whereby the Justices applied strict scrutiny to majority-minority districts to discern if race, 
and not partisan interests or traditional districting principles, was the predominant factor 
in the creation of the those districts.71 In the fourth category of cases the Supreme Court 
examined the concepts of pre-clearance and the meaning of retrogression under §5 of the 
VRA, attempting to separating claims of vote dilution from being interpreted under the 
purpose test of §5.72 Finally, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case that 
concerned partisan gerrymanders with a plurality of the Supreme Court declaring that 
partisan gerrymandering claims were not justiciable though a majority of the court failed 
to reach that consideration.73 Throughout these categories, the Justices on the Court 
negotiated their views of the law and the political process to relieve the incongruities 
between the rhetorical tradition of voting rights and the new cases on districting. 
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 As the Supreme Court attempted to separate the cases according to categories, the 
decisions of the Supreme Court reflected incongruities within its own jurisprudence. For 
example, cases brought under §2 that protected against vote dilution for a politically 
cohesive group could reasonably extend to partisan gerrymandering cases though a 
majority of justices failed to make that extension to limit the judiciary’s role in partisan 
politics. Though the judiciary allowed state legislators almost unlimited discretionary 
power to entrench legislators according to political affiliation, the Court rejected to offer 
state legislators unlimited discretionary power to entrench legislators according to 
developing majority-minority districts for political and racial cohesive groups. Where 
district irregularity is a sign of deviation and invidious discrimination in one set of cases, 
in another, irregular shapes present political choices by the state legislature in the give and 
take of politics.  
Further exacerbating tension was the Court’s decision in Voinovich v. Quitler, 507 
U.S. 146, (1993), which held that a state could create majority-minority districts even 
without a §2 violation since a §2 violation occurred when an apportionment scheme 
denies “a protected class the equal opportunity to elect the candidate of choice,” and 
remains voiceless over “majority-minority districts, districts dominated by certain political 
parties, or even districts based entirely on partisan political concerns.”74 Since the Ohio 
reapportionment plan did not deny the ability of racial minorities the ability to elect a 
candidate of its choice and, in fact, increased the ability of a group to elect a candidate of 
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its choice, the Supreme Court allowed the creation of such districts, even if the motivation 
was to diminish the political influence of an opposing party, was a constitutional use of 
racial classification. Yet, in its decision, the Supreme Court overlooked some of the most 
important questions that the Court would face in its later decisions, such as to what 
degree race can serve as a proxy for politics in reapportionment? To what degree state 
legislatures can employ race to create districts? And to what degree state legislatures can 
diminish the influence of voting blocs by either cracking or packing voting blocs into 
districts? While Justice O’Connor acknowledged each of these questions, she declined to 
answer them as the parties did not raise these complaints. Instead, Justice O’Connor 
suggested these issues to future litigants who would raise these questions so the Court 
could answer them in a future case.  
The Conflation of Racial and Partisan Gerrymanders 
 By the 1990s, the Supreme Court’s ability to separate its jurisprudence on racial 
gerrymandering and partisan gerrymandering waned as competing political and ideological 
forces invented new ways to alter the districting process and found new ways to fight back 
against the Voting Rights Act. While the reforms of the Johnson Administration, such as 
the Great Society, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965— and 
its subsequent amendments— created a solid voting bloc of racial minorities for the 
Democratic Party, the Republican engaged in its own strategies of identity politics with the 
Southern Strategy and, its possibly less benign sub-strategy, the “Max Black Campaign.” 
The conflation of racial and partisan politics emerged at a higher level during the North 
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Carolina Shaw- Cromartie cases and extended to the Texas L.U.P.A.C. v. Perry cases. The 
cases in these states showcased an ideological and political battle over the meaning of 
representation and ideological forces behind constitutional interpretation.  
 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the Shaw and Cromartie cases provide a 
representative anecdote about race and reconciliation, partisan politics and division. 
According to Tinsley E. Yarbrough in Race and Redistricting: The Shaw-Cromartie Cases, the 
North Carolina redistricting cases reveals a complex web of relations between competing 
actors over the scope of representation and constitutional interpretation  between special 
private citizens, interest groups, state representatives, congressional representatives, the 
judiciary, and the Department of Justice. Further, the four North Carolina cases, present 
the limitations of the judiciary when handling reapportionment, the use of the law as an 
ideological force, and the limitations of the law to persuade citizens in society.  
 After the 1990 census, North Carolina received an additional Congressional seat. 
Since 40 of the state’s 100 counties are covered by the Voting Rights Act, the North 
Carolina General Assembly submitted its reapportionment plan for review to the Attorney 
General and the Department of Justice. When designing the original plan, the 
Democratically dominated General Assembly desired to improve minority representation 
through the creation of one majority-minority district; however, in addition to increasing 
minority representation, which was important in the state as the state’s electorate had not 
elected an African-American to Congress since George White retired from Congress in 
1901, a majority in the General Assembly desired to protect Democratic incumbents.  
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Knowing that the vote of racial minorities throughout North Carolina voted heavily for 
Democrats, the General Assembly did not desire to thin out its support for the 
Democratic Party statewide by packing its voters into uber—-safe majority-minority districts 
as the Ohio Republicans did in Voinovich. 
After reviewing the North Carolina apportionment plan, the Department of 
Justice rejected the plan on the basis that the General Assembly did not create a second 
majority-minority district. In responding to the North Carolina General Assembly, John 
R. Dunne, the assistant attorney general in charge of the voting right’s division, stated that 
the Department of Justice would not be able to, “preclear  those portions of the plan 
where the legislature has deferred to the interests of the incumbents while refusing to 
accommodate the community of interest shared by insular minorities,… or where the 
proposed plan, given the demographics and racial concentrations in the jurisdiction, does 
not reflect minority voting strength.”75 When receiving word of the rejection, state 
Republicans, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), cheered the DOJ’s 
rejection of the General Assembly’s plan since it did not provide enough representation 
for the racial minorities in North Carolina. Even though the state Republicans refused to 
support the recognition of a paid, state holiday celebrating the life of Martin Luther Kin 
Jr., they supported the development of a second majority-minority district in North 
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Carolina.76 Since the ruling of a required second majority-minority district based on the 
proportionality of the state’s demographics, which stood in sharp contradiction to Section 
2’s prohibition of proportional representation, the state Democrats argued that the 
Republican DOJ’s rejection constituted a political strategy to diminish the electoral 
strength of Democrats throughout North Carolina. The North Carolina Democrats 
complained that this DOJ’s based its rejection on the Bush Administration’s “Max-Black 
Campaign,” orchestrated by Republican National Committee counsel Ben Ginsburg to 
support the over-packing of minorities into majority-minority districts, which diminished 
the state-wide electoral support of Democrats and, consequently, allowing white voters the 
chance to elect Republicans to office.77 A further consequence of this strategy, as what 
occurred in the Texas redistricting fiasco orchestrated by Rep. Tom Delay, was the 
branding of the two parties in the minds of the electorate whereby, as Steve Bickerstaff 
writes, the Republicans desire to marginalize the Democrats as a “party exclusively for 
losers, liberals, and racial minorities.”78 By engaging in this form of identity politics, 
Republicans intended to “increase the likelihood that undecided Anglo voters see a 
racially defined Democratic Party as inhospitable to Anglo voters and officeholders,” 
ensuring those voters would voter Republican.79 As Steve Bickerstaff notes, though this 
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may not be the intent of Republican lawmakers as they dispute this was a goal of 
redistricting in Texas, few of those Republicans dispute the effects of this type of 
redistricting.80  
 After acquiescing to the Department of Justice, the North Carolina General 
Assembly created a second majority-minority district. However, rather than create the 
district in the southeast portion of the state, a move which would have threatened 
Democratic incumbents, the General Assembly created the “irregularly-shaped” District 12 
in the north central portion of the state, which stretched for 150 miles along the I-85 
corridor and was no wider than the corridor. Opponents of the district focused on the 
aesthetics of the district as a sign of its unconstitutionality: John Dunne stated the 
majority-minority districts were “Ugly as Hell;” a state legislator remarked, “if you drove 
down [Interstate 85] with both car doors open, you’d kill most of the people in the 
district;” the Wall Street Journal called it “Political Pornography” and noted that “in one 
county, northbound drivers on I-85 would be in the 12th district, but southbound drivers 
would be in another. The next county over, the districts would ‘change lanes’” and that 
candidates would campaign by having, “rallies at every exit along I-85.”81 
 Even though Republican-appointed officials at the DOJ approved the General 
Assembly’s plan, state Republicans in North Carolina challenged the plan as being a 
partisan gerrymander as the redistricting plan packed Republican voters into two districts 
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to improve the electoral success of Democratic incumbents. Along with Republican House 
Member J. Arthur Pope and 41 aggrieved voters, Jack Hawke, the North Carolina GOP 
state party chairman, filed suit against the redistricting plan and declared, like all others 
that oppose a particular redistricting plan: 
We have government that is supposed to be based upon the principles of 
government for the people, by the people, for the people. But what the General 
Assembly of North Carolina has done is created government of the Democratic 
incumbents, by the Democratic incumbents, for the Democratic incumbents…. 
Drawing district lines in this manner to protect incumbents turns the whole 
system upside down. Instead of voters choosing their representatives, they 
representatives are choosing their voters. This is undermining, in my opinion, the 
whole fabric of the representative form of government.82 
In Pope v. Blue, 1991, a three-judge district court dismissed the claims of partisan 
gerrymander in light of Bandemer v. Davis, claiming that the North Carolina Republicans 
did not prove how this redistricting plan possessed the intent and effects of discrimination 
against Republicans in North Carolina since no elections were carried out under the plan 
and since it was created with the help of Republicans in order to provide safe seats for 
Republicans. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.  
 While the General Assembly’s apportionment plan survived against partisan 
gerrymandering claims brought forth by state Republicans, it did not survive in this form 
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against racial gerrymandering claims brought forth by concerned moderate-Democratic 
citizens. After the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision in Pope v. Blue, 809 
F. Supp. 392 (1992), 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992), Robinson Everett, his song Greg Everett, Ruth 
Shaw, and Melvin Shimm challenged the General Assembly’s reapportionment in federal 
court because as they looked at the contorted majority-minority districts they believed that 
those districts represented the racial problems from Mississippi during the 1870s, when 
the state submerged minorities into one district to ensure a diminished voice in the 
electoral process; or of Alabama in the 1950s – 1960s, when the town of Tuskegee 
redistricted almost all African-American residents out of the city limits to ensure they 
would not receive municipal services; or of Kentucky during the 1980s, when potential 
jurors, most of whom were black, could be excluded from service peremptorily.83 Everett 
and his colleagues argued that the North Carolina redistricting plan created an 
unconstitutional system of proportional representation as is packed voters into two 
districts with no regard to the traditional principles of compactness, contiguity, or 
respecting political boundaries; the DOJ trampled on state sovereignty as it coerced the 
North Carolina General Assembly into action; and, consequently, the reapportionment 
plan abridged North Carolinians’ right to vote as the electoral process is a color-blind 
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process.84 The district court did not agree. However, Everett persuaded the Supreme 
Court. In a 5 --- 4 decision, Justice O’Connor ruled that the districting was so irrational on 
its face it could only be understood as an attempt by the state legislators to segregate the 
voters.85 Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the North Carolina 
district court for future proceedings.   
 After the Supreme Court agreed to hear what would become Shaw I, Everett 
received additional support for his cause from the national Republican Party, The 
Washington Legal Foundation, former Senator of North Carolina Jesse Helms, the 
American Jewish Congress, the Equal Opportunity Foundation financed by Richard 
Mellon Scaiffe, and five Supreme Court Justices who agreed with his position.86 On 
remand in light of Shaw I, the North Carolina District Court ruled that state legislators 
relied on race to create the district thought it survived strict scrutiny as the district was 
narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate state interest.87 However, in light of its recent 
decision in Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court ruled that race was the predominant 
motive in the creation of the district and, therefore, could not survive strict scrutiny, 
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forcing the state legislators to engage in an undesired redistricting session.88 Whereas in 
the partisan redistricting cases a majority of the Court refused to answer how much is too 
much partisanship, they were more than willing to answer how little is too little 
compactness, even if they were willing to overlook the partisan aspects of the case and not 
reply the requirement of compactness to all redistricting cases. 
 Yet, after Shaw II, the challenges did not end. By the time the Supreme Court 
struck down its districts in Shaw II, North Carolina possessed a divided government that 
desired to what was best for both parties. After developing a new plan and revamping the 
bizarre District 12 so it was not as bizarre, Martin Cromartie, a friend of Robinson Everett 
and a believer in the color-bind Constitution, challenged the district.89 This challenge 
would lead to two more Supreme Court decisions, Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999), 
in which the Supreme Court ordered the trial court to conduct a rehearing on the district 
in question,90 and Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) in which the Supreme Court 
held that the lower courts findings were clearly erroneous and that partisan, not racial, 
considerations was the predominant factor.91 The decision in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 
234 (2001) is controversial for two reasons. First, the unconfirmed rumor surrounding the 
case is that Justice O’Connor switched her opinion at the last moment, moving from the 
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Conservative to Liberal side.92 This switch may have occurred because she empathized 
with the legislative process or because, in his dissent, Justice Thomas called for the 
adoption for a color-blind constitution, which Justice O’Connor did not desire. According 
to J. Morgan Kousser, Justice O’Connor’s ideological commitment to a color-blind 
Constitution depended on the interests of the Republican Party93 and, in Cromartie I, 
Republicans could have lost seats by redrawing the plan. Second, in the decision, the 
Justices argued over a question of evidence as both sides relied on expert testimony to 
argue their position as the witness for Cromartie argued on the basis of voter registration 
and that race was the predominant factor and the expert for Easley on the actual voting 
patterns and that partisan interests were the predominant factor. The trial court relied on 
the first expert, possibly because of ideological reasons as two of the three judges object to 
race-conscious districting. Yet, a majority on the Supreme Court found the actual voting 
record more persuasive. However, while the evidence may have been more persuasive to 
the majority, it did not mean that the data from the first expert was clearly erroneous.94 
Like other aspects of the Shaw and Cromartie cases, the debate over evidence reflected an 
ideological argument over constitutional interpretation and the political process. 
 The ideological, partisan, and racial struggle between the competing factions 
occurring in the Shaw and Cromartie cases is similar to battles in other Southern States 
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subject to the VRA. For example, in Georgia, the Supreme Court struck down a 
districting plan in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) on the basis that race was the 
predominant motive behind the redistricting. In Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, (1997) 
the Supreme Court struck down another attempt by the state legislators to draw two 
majority-minority districts on the grounds that race was the predominant motive in 
drawing the districts. In Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) the Supreme Court would 
hand down its third decision concerning the voting rights of minorities with the 
Conservative majority controlling this decision as well. In cases from Texas, the Supreme 
Court refused to hear a court concerning the partisan nature of its 2004 redistricting plan 
though it did hear L.U.L.A.C. v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), which concerned racial vote 
dilution to secure partisan interests. In a 5 – 4 decision, Justice Kennedy switched sides to 
join the Liberal Justices because of the political overtones of the case and the perceived 
threat to enactment of representative democracy.   
Reapportionment as  a Source  for  Reconciliation  
In the 1995 article “Our Separatism?” Pamela S. Karlan writes while the world 
witnessed the break-up of multi-ethnic states into balkanized states, the United States 
Supreme Court believed that it saw the same political fragmentation along ethnic and 
racial lines in its racial gerrymandering cases.95 Because of the elements of racial 
fragmentation in the political realm, the Justices on the Supreme Court incorporate the 
language of separatism into the redistricting cases during the 1990s, discussing racial 
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gerrymandering in terms of “political apartheid” and “balkanization.” Rather than treat 
voters as members of a politic groups and allow state legislators to segregate these groups, 
the majority of the Supreme Court argue that in order to establish the political 
foundation for reconciliation between competing races and ethnicities, the Supreme 
Court ought to treat voters as individuals rather than accept racial stereotypes and strike 
down redistricting legislation that unnecessarily divide citizens into segregated electoral 
districts.96 Conversely, the dissenting Justices argue that if state legislators allow racial 
minorities access to political participation where they can establish political equality, then 
it will be easier to develop- he electoral foundation for political reconciliation, preventing 
the development of the United States of fracturing into balkanized states.  
In the vote dilution, “analytically distinct,” and partisan gerrymandering cases, the 
Supreme Court reengages itself over the meaning of representation, who is to be 
represented, and how the people are to be represented. While working within the 
framework of the Warren Court’s vision of political equality, the Conservative majority of 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Antonin Scalia, 
and Justice Anthony Kennedy, and after their appointments Chief Justice John Roberts 
and Justice Samuel Alito, recreate the meaning of democracy to focus on an individual 
and not group interpretation of representation. Fairness, the Conservative Justices 
maintain, develops when the State respects the individual and equal protection means 
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that the state treats the individual as an individual rather than stereotyping the individual 
as a member of a political or racial group. Conversely, the liberal minority of the Court, 
consisting of Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David Souter, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen Breyer desire to protect the ability of political cohesive 
groups to engage in the democratic process. Rather than considering votes in the abstract, 
the liberal justices examine the voting records of the individuals and argue that political 
fairness occurs when the government remains neutral to voters. Further, for the liberal 
justices equal protection means that the state ought to treat racial and ethnic groups alike 
and not diminish a group’s voter power and influence because of its race or party 
affiliation.  
Reconciliation and the Citizen 
 Throughout the “Analytically Distinct” decisions, the Conservative Justices, 
especially the decisions by Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy, advance the 
proposition that the best means to achieving racial reconciliation, or the best means to 
alleviate racial tension, is to promote a vision of representation where the individual and, 
not the racial group, is the foundation of representative government. Like the Justices on 
the Warren Court who ushered in the Reapportionment Revolution believing in a telos of 
political equality, the current Conservative majority argues that the Constitution possesses 
a telos of reconciliation. Yet for this reconciliation to occur, government must treat the 
citizens as individuals, and by doing so, the hope is that individuals will treat each other as 
individuals. 
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 For Justice Kennedy, while the Voting Rights Act has reduced the electoral 
problems for racial minorities in the electoral process, there is a limitation on what the law 
can do to reach the telos of reconciliation since racial classifications prevent that 
accomplishment. In Miller v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy writes: 
Only if our political system and our society cleanse themselves of that 
discrimination will all members of the polity share an equal opportunity to gain 
public office regardless of race. As a Nation we share both the obligation and the 
aspiration of working toward this end. The end is neither assured nor well served, 
however, by carving electorates into racial blocs. "If our society is to continue to 
progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic 
invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and 
injury."97 
Perpetuating racial stereotypes in the electoral process prevents the ground on which 
reconciliation can form as it balkanizes rather than integrates. In keeping with the spirit of 
Brown, integration in the individual level and not segregation on the group level leads to 
reconciliation, even in regards to the Voting Rights Act: “It takes a shortsighted and 
unauthorized view of the Voting Rights Act to invoke that statute, which has played a 
decisive role in redressing some of our worst forms of discrimination, to demand the very 
racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment forbids.”98 Consequently, if the Supreme 
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Court justice can establish that the ideology of reconciliation concerns through the 
individual rights view of representation, the by cleansing the language of representation 
and removing the notion of group rights, especially for racial minorities, the reconciliation 
process can occur.  
Preventing Reconciliation: The Harms of Representation 
 For the Conservative Justices in the racial gerrymandering cases, especially the 
“analytically distinct” subsection to the vote dilution cases, the starting point concerning 
the relationship between the individual and the state begins with the Equal Protection 
Clause’s guarantee that no state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the law. According to Justice O’Connor in Shaw I, the central purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause, “is to prevent the state from purposefully discriminating between 
individuals on the basis of race. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on 
racial grounds fall with the core of that prohibition.”99 While not all racial classifications 
are unconstitutional, when the state classifies its citizens based on their race, the judiciary 
must apply strict scrutiny since these classifications are constitutionally suspect.100 Even 
when the state employs a classification to benefit a protected class, the judiciary must 
impose judicial skepticism on the classification to avoid the appearance that the 
classification demeans individuals by treating them as a member of a group rather than as 
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an individual since racial classification, “are by their very nature odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality…..They threaten to 
stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial 
hostility.”101 As John Hart Ely notes from the perspective of a legal formalist, the fifteenth 
amendment requires that “no one person’s vote is to be intentionally made less effective 
than another’s because of race or color.”102 Since race, unlike partisan affiliation, is an 
immutable characteristic, it should receive higher scrutiny from the state.  
However, since all redistricting acts concern the classification of voters into some 
group103 and since state legislators rely on the census material and voter records available 
at the precinct and district level available from the Census Bureau104 to make assumptions 
that the voters will cast votes for a particular political party, religion, ethnic group, or 
race,105 the issue in the “analytically distinct” cases concern the way in which state 
legislators rely on race to create electoral districts. As Justice O’Connor notes in Shaw I,  
“race consciousness redistricting is not always unconstitutional,” and the “Court has never 
held that held that race-conscious state decision-making is impermissible in all 
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circumstances.”106 While the use of race is permissible for some classifications, the 
Conservatives Justices forbid the state legislatures to create certain districts with race as the 
“predominant factor,” especially when the legislature subordinates traditional districting 
principles i.e. disregarding compactness, disrespecting political boundaries, and ignoring 
communities of interest, to create irregularly shaped districts that can only be understood 
based on race.107 The concern in the “analytically distinct” cases, especially for Justices 
O’Connor and Justice Kennedy, is if there is an express harm in the classification, 
ensuring the Supreme Court must analyze the case to see if the classification is benign or 
malign, which must be found by determining the communicative message that the district 
sends to the citizens of the state. Again, the issue is not over political equality or the 
weight of a vote but that some voters have been subjected to a racial classification and feel 
the “expressive” injury due to segregation or separation by the hands of the state. 108 
According to the Conservative Justices, the harm in these cases is communicative as the 
creation of the districts sends a message to citizens in society, inflicting as psychological 
and an emotional messages about the citizens of the state and the process leading to the 
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creation of the district. Representational harm, according to Justice O’Connor, occurs 
when state legislatures develops a district, “solely to effectuate the perceived common 
interests of one racial group,” since the elected officials from that district would be “more 
likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that 
group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our 
system of representative democracy.”109 With the concept of “representational” harm, 
Justice O’Connor argues constituents ought to prefer substantive representation rather 
than just descriptive representation, which supports the idea that that representative will 
represent the community rather than just a community within the district. 110 Further, 
representational harm creates a “stigmatic” harm, meaning that the communicative act of 
districting sends a message that “race-based line-drawing may promote racial hostility.”111 
As John Hart Ely notes, under this conception of representation, the injury occurs as the 
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state legislators fill the remainder of the district with people whose vote and political 
influence will not count or possess meaning solely based on race.112 
Throughout the “analytically distinct” cases, there are three consequences of 
“representational harm.” First, according to Justice O’Connor the racial classifications in 
Shaw treat certain members of the political community as “outsiders” or as “others.” To 
accentuate this claim, Justice O’Connor adopts the language of segregation, writing that 
the reliance on racial classifications to create bizarrely drawn districts, “pose the risk of 
lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of 
our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Racial 
classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even 
for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions.”113 Further, Justice 
O’Connor calls the district in question “political apartheid,” and locates discussion of the 
contested district in relation to the ghosts of segregation past, such as districts in 
Mississippi during reconstruction, Gomillion v. Lightfoot and other racial gerrymandering 
cases, Loving v. Virginia, and Brown v. Board of Education.114 She notes, “that argument [of 
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering] strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling 
how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of 
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the past.”115 Showing similar concerns in Miller v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy describes the 
use of race as the predominant factor in the districting process as the official policy of 
segregation in the state where there is no difference between the creation of majority-
minority districts to improve the political equality of racial minorities within the state and 
the official policies of segregation in the past: “Just as the State may not, absent 
extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks… 
buses… beaches… schools… so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its 
citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.”116  
The rhetorical strategy to highlight the harm of segregation does not concern 
examining whether or not the representative is responsive to all of his or her constituents 
but to challenge the design and aesthetics of the district. By employing a metaphor that 
creates the greatest visual dissonance between the district and the concept of 
representation but overlooking the actual representation occurring in the district, those 
challenging the plan highlight the irrationality of the plan and, therefore, the segregation 
within the district. For example, in Shaw I, Justice O’Connor writes that of the two 
majority-minority districts, District 1 is “hook shaped. Centered in the northeast portion 
of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like 
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extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the South Carolina 
border. District 1 has been compared to a "Rorschach ink-blot test” and a "bug splattered 
on a windshield.” Further, when describing District 12, Justice O’Connor writes:  
It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the I-
85 corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial 
centers, and manufacturing areas "until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black 
neighborhoods." Northbound and southbound drivers on I-85 sometimes find 
themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade" districts when they 
enter the next county. Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are 
cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. At one point the district 
remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other 
districts before crossing over them. One state legislator has remarked that "'if you 
drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people 
in the district.'" The district even has inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom the line 
is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee."117 
The description of the first district contains images of a person manipulating tracks of 
land for personal gain and images of violence, even if against insects. The description for 
                                                
117 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993). The decision in Bush v. Vera discusses the district in terms of 
violent and unnatural representational imagery. In that decision, two districts in the Houston area are 
described as being "like a jigsaw puzzle . . . in which it might be impossible to get the pieces apart."117 One 
district, Justice O’Connor discusses, is similar to, “A sacred Mayan bird, with its body running eastward 
along the Ship Channel from downtown Houston until the tail terminates in Baytown. Spindly legs reach 
south to Hobby Airport, while the plumed head rises northward almost to Intercontinental. In the western 
extremity of the district, an open beak appears to be searching for worms in Spring Branch. Here and there, 
ruffled feathers jut out at odd angles.” See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 974 (1996).  
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District 12 continues the imagery of violence by focusing on snakes that devour “black 
neighborhoods” and the ability to “kill” the members of the district by “opening the car 
doors.” The reference to For Whom the Bells Toll also provides a subtext for a discussion of 
death. With such images of violence, accountable representation must not be possible. 
 In providing these descriptions, the Justice O’Connor raises concern over the 
psychological anxiety developed through the aesthetics of the district, providing motive to 
alter the district.118  The metaphors not only provide signs that the district is unnatural for 
a democratic government, it also possess an argument that the districts will be violent for 
the citizens who live in those districts, continuing the harm that segregation caused in the 
past. Connecting the images of violence with a discussion of rationality, balkanization, 
and political apartheid, the Conservative Justices argue that political identity on the basis 
of race would perpetuate the harms of the past, especially in unnatural districts. 
Deviations from “traditional districting principles,”—which during oral arguments in Vieth 
the Justices argued that those traditional principles are far form objective or neutral, 
especially in regards to the way in which they are selected119— “cause constitutional harm 
insofar as they convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly 
racial…. cutting across pre-existing precinct lines and other natural or traditional divisions, 
                                                
118 See Kenneth Burke A Rhetoric of Motives, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 10, for a 
discussion of killing and transformation as revealing a motive.  
 
119 Transcript of Oral Argument, Vieth v. Jubelirer, (2003) (No. 02-1580). During the oral arguments, the 
lawyer for Jubelirer, John P. Krill Jr., argued, “There are no neutral criteria. Name a criterion and I'll show 
you why it represents a political choice.” Justice Scalia concurred with these sentiments as he stated, “Of 
course, I guess if there are five different criteria: compactness, past practice, or whatever, it's very much a 
political call which of the five criteria you decide to... to use.” 
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is not merely evidentially significant; it is part of the constitutional problem insofar as it 
disrupts nonracial bases of political identity and thus intensifies the emphasis on race.”120 
To combat the bizarrely drawn districts and to prevent the development of political 
identity based on race, the Supreme Court possesses a moral obligation to strike down the 
districts.  
 The second type of communicative harm that the Justices convey in the 
“analytically distinct” discusses a normative aspect of representation where the 
representative is virtual and not actual for the citizens who are not of the same race as the 
representative. Because the bizarrely-drawn majority-minority districts develop on account 
of race as the predominant factor, the concern for Justice O’Connor is that the 
representative government provided will be virtual and not actual, meaning the 
representative will not consider, on principle, the views or interests of all if the 
constituents but only the views and interests of whom he or she is a part.  As Justice 
Kennedy states in Miller v. Johnson, the classification by race is more likely to “reflect racial 
prejudices than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates that 
category.”121In Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), Justice O’Connor would rely on 
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin to argue, dismissively and paternalistically, that these district 
employ descriptive representation rather than the preferred substantive representation, 
diminishing the ability of the group to exert influence in multiple districts and preventing 
                                                
120 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996).  
 
121 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995).  
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them from establishing coalitions.122 By adopting the second approach, minority groups 
can reduce the “balkanization” of racial minorities and increase their chances at electing 
candidates of choice.123  
Conversely, by resisting the formation of influence districts as desiring the 
formation of majority-minority districts, the concern is that majority-minority districts for 
any type of minority will divide the electorate and lead to resentment for other groups. In 
Wright v. Rockefeller, one of the first cases to reach the Supreme Court concerning racial 
gerrymandering, Justice William O. Douglas challenged the Supreme Court for allowing 
state legislators to create districts based on the racial classifications of the people. Quoting 
Justice Douglas from Wright v. Rockefeller, Justice O’Connor states: 
Racial electoral registers, like religious ones, have no place in a society that honors 
the Lincoln tradition - "of the people, by the people, for the people." Here the 
individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color.] Here the individual is 
important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The principle of equality is at war 
                                                
122 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 481 (2003). In this section of her decision, Justice O’Connor relies on 
the work of Hanna Fenichel Pitkin to discuss these two competing conceptions of representation. See 
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1967), 60 
– 91. 
 
123 In her decision, Justice O’Connor relies on the following evidence to suggest that influence districts 
increase the ability of “substantive representation”: Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African-American 
Representation: A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation 
in Congress?" 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 183, 185 (1999) (noting that racial redistricting in the early 1990's, which 
created more majority-minority districts, made Congress "less likely to adopt initiatives supported by blacks"); 
Cameron, Epstein, &  [*483]  O'Halloran, Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black 
Representation in Congress? 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 794, 808 (1996) (concluding that the "districting schemes 
that maximize the number of minority representatives do not necessarily maximize substantive minority 
representation"); C. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests 193-234 (1995); Pildes, 80 N. C. L. Rev., at 1517; 
Grofman, Handley, & Lublin, Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some 
Empirical Evidence, 79 N. C. L. Rev. 1383(2001) (482 – 483).  
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with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the 
notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, 
District D by a Catholic, and so on. . . . That system, by whatever name it is called, 
is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and 
voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense. 124  
The concern for Justices Douglas is that if the state creates a district for one specific group 
of voters in mind then the state would not keep its constitutional promise to all citizens 
within that district as it would favor some but discriminate against others. Consequently, 
the state would possess the power to balkanize voters according to an overarching category, 
some changeable others immutable, and, in the process, enhance the voting rights of some 
and diminish the voting rights of others but creating political tension between the groups. 
Further, because of the use of ethnic and racial categories, the voters may develop a 
political backlash against the group receiving “special” treatment, diminishing the ability 
of competing factors to unite based on qualifications other than electoral or communal 
issues.  In some cases such as partisan affiliation or religion, the individual voters would be 
able to switch allegiances. However, to do so would violate the liberty of conscience of the 
individual sending a generic societal message that in order to live within a specific district, 
the religion or this ideology is the most important characteristic deciding an election. 
While discussing tax increases or decreases is applicable for an election, discussions of 
which religion leads to eternal salvation is not the proper argumentative field for an 
                                                
124 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 16 (1993); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 - 67 (1964). In Wright, the 
New York State Legislature drew lines, according to Justice Douglass, that zigzagged throughout Manhattan 
to create a district containing African-Americans and Puerto Ricans. 
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election. For Justice Douglas, this state coercion violates the democratic ideal whereby the 
individual possesses fewer rights than the majority. 
In Shaw I, Justice O’Connor employs Justice Douglas’ conception of the individual 
to stress the representational harm in District 12, which stretched for 600 miles along I-
81. Like Justice Douglas, Justice O’Connor believes that the state should avoid districts 
that classify voters based on race, reinforcing “racial stereotypes and threatens to 
undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that 
they represent a particular racial group, rather than their constituency as a whole.”125 Just 
through the creation of a majority-minority district that does not follow traditional 
districting principles send a societal-wide message that all residents of the state receive and 
interpret in the same fashion. To prevent citizens being treated differently or being 
discriminated against by a general classification, the judiciary places itself in position to 
declare a generalized interpretation of what the message must mean to all voters. Whether 
or not one resides in the district, which is the requirement of Hays, would be unnecessary 
to challenge the district as all members of the state, would receive the same message. 
Further, Justice O’Connor restricts the message to just race though other conditions, such 
as partisan affiliation or religion, would create the same effect: that the voter who is not 
part of the specified group would receive the message from the elected official that he or 
she would not receive the same representation as the other members, consequently 
                                                
125 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 18 (1993). In Shaw I, Justice Souter argues against Justice O’Connor’s notion 
of representational harm, stating that there is no harm losing elections. If there were, then voters would 
suffer the same harm on partisan gerrymandering claims. In response, Justice O’Connor shifts the burden of 
proof by stating that Justice Souter does not explain why these claims are not cognizable under the 
fourteenth.  
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stigmatizing the outside in the process. Further, if this message were to occur naturally, as 
it occurs in Harlem or the Bronx, the message would be fine; however, since the state 
imposed this message unnaturally by ignoring traditional districting principles, this 
message overrides the state’s flexibility in creating communities of interest, regardless of 
whether or not those communities occur in states where racially polarized voting and 
racial appeals in elections may be the unfortunate norm.   
 Third, as Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Nieme argue, the problem with the 
irregularly shaped majority-minority districts is that they reflect a problem over a perceived 
element of corruption in the districting process. Pildes and Nieme state that the problem 
of bizarrely-draw districts reflects a constitutional problem of value reductionalism in 
public policy, where there is an apparent corruption of a decision-making process since 
decision—makers reduce a process that ought to contain multiple layers to allow only one 
value to dominate the process.126 Consequently, public perception, rather than 
constitutional precedent, guides the decision-making process and, in a process whereby 
legislative redistricting should include traditional factors such as effective representation 
for communities of interest, the political boundaries of existing jurisdictions, and 
geographical boundaries that provide efficient campaigning and close connections 
between the representatives and their citizens, the bizarrely-drawn district reveals that the 
use of race trumps these other traditional concerns.127  
                                                
126 Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, “Expressive Harms, ‘Bizarre Districts’ and Voting Rights: 
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno,” Michigan Law Review 92 (1993): 500.  
 
127 Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, “Expressive Harms,” 500. 
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The arguments against bizarrely-drawn districts rely on a topos of order where 
there is a seemingly natural way to conduct redistricting and these districts violate that 
natural way.  Pildes and Niemi state that the concern of the irregularly-shaped majority-
minority districts focus on customs, practices and the social understanding, “including 
those concerning the legitimacy of political institutions.”128 If political bodies develop 
districts that violate traditional norms of the community, these districts raise awareness 
that politicians engage in the manipulation of public institutions for their own ends. 
When “race is added, the mix becomes more combustible and, in the Court’s view, the 
Constitution enters the picture.”129 Yet the vagueness of “traditional norms,” allows 
competing social factions to pursue the same goal for their own ends. As “traditional 
norms” could be understood in the history of racial-bloc voting, where there is a concern 
to prevent minorities from gaining political power, or it could be understood 
Constitutionally, preventing illegitimate action on the part of state governments to create 
segregated communities.  
 Finally, according to the Conservative Justices, the creation of districts with race as 
violates the most important norm in relationship between the citizen and the 
representative, as it constitutes the citizen as a member of the group rather than as an 
individual. In the vote dilution, racial gerrymandering, and partisan gerrymandering 
claims, the Conservative Justices constitute voting as a individual right, not group right, 
and value the independence of the voter in the electoral process. During the oral 
                                                
128 Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, “Expressive Harms,” 500. 
 
129 Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, “Expressive Harms,” 502. 
 404 
arguments in Vieth v. Jubelirer, Justice Scalia argued against the Supreme Court’s 
involvement with partisan gerrymandering claims on the basis that individual voting 
behavior is not predictable before elections occur. Noting that “race does not change,” 
Justice Scalia suggested the opposite for voters according to partisan affiliation where it 
could change for any election based on numerous factors such as party registration, quality 
of candidate, presence of issues, or the quality of campaign run. Prejudging the partisan 
effect of a plan would be problematic since it could only be known with certainty how 
people would vote after they cast their ballot. Before the election, partisan voters are “very 
hard to identify… which is why the parties go about selecting their candidates very 
carefully.”130 Justice Scalia even discounted the evidence that Paul M. Smith, the lawyer 
arguing on behalf of the petitioners Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey, 
suggested would provide the most accurate description of how a voter in a geographical 
area would vote, information from the previous elections, under the normative belief that 
voters decide for whom to cast their ballot in a rational manner and that behavior is not 
predictable in a district. The alternative, as John P. Krill Jr. suggested, is that experts 
determine the meaning of a map and not the people or their representatives, which 
disrupts the democratic process since, “if you allow the experts to control over the voters, 
then you'll never know the truth of what would really happen.”131 Pressing the point 
further, Krill argues, “Voters are not automatons in a matrix controlled by 
                                                
130 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Vieth v. Jubelirer, (2003) (No. 02-1580). 
 
131 Transcript of Oral Argument, Vieth v. Jubelirer,, (2003) (No. 02-1580). 
 
 405 
supercomputers. Voters continue to matter, and they continue to prove it in election after 
election. In fact, they proved it in Pennsylvania in 2002 under this plan. The 17th 
congressional district, which the experts predicted would go Republican, did not.”132  
 Krill’s argument deflects away from the precision of redistricting exemplified in 
any modern districting plan. With the technology available, creating districts is best 
described through Kenneth Burke’s “rotten with perfection,” aspect of the “Definition of 
Man.”133 Burke writes that the, “principle of perfection is central to the nature of language 
as motive. There mere desire to name something but its ‘proper’ name, or to speak a 
language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically ‘perfectionist.’ What is more ‘perfectionist’ 
in essence than the impulse, when one is in dire need of something, to so state this need 
that one in effect ‘defines’ the situation.”134 In redistricting, the ability to “define the 
situation” or “define the district” heresthetically ensures the desired result reflects the 
desire for perfection as parties in control of the process seek perfection by capturing the 
most seats possible by ensuring that the terms of the debate will be the terms that the 
majority of the people accept.135 Cartographers, under the supervision of legislatures and 
                                                
132 Transcript of Oral Argument, Vieth v. Jubelirer, (2003) (No. 02-1580). 
 
133 Kenneth Burke, “Definition of Man,” in Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method, 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966), 16 – 20.  
 
134 Kenneth Burke, “Definition of Man,” Language as Symbolic Action, 16. 
 
135 For a discussion of heresthetics, see William H. Riker, The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the 
American Constitution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 9. According to Riker, heresthetic 
concerns, “choosing and deciding… the art of setting up situations—composing the alternatives among which 
political actors must choose— in such a way that even those who do not wish to do so are compelled by the 
structure of the situation to supporter the heresthetician’s purpose,” (9).  
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not the legislatures themselves—a convenient fiction Krill deflects away from in his oral 
argument— possess the capacity to design districts with precision to exclude or include 
voters at will. Cartographers act as an intermediacy, the same role the experts would 
perform when discerning the results of the election. Further, as Justice Souter pointed out 
to Krill during the oral arguments, while the experts failed to predict one district correctly, 
they also predicted the other 18 correctly, “which does tell us something at least about 
their predictive criterion.”136 
 While Justice Scalia and the Conservative Justices disdain treating voters in a 
predictable fashion and ignoring their independence and individuality, they find it is 
unconstitutional to stereotype voters in racial gerrymandering cases, preferring the view a 
person as an individual rather than a member of a political group. The ethical meaning of 
the “analytically distinct” cases, “acknowledge voters as more than mere racial statistics,” 
who, “play an important role in defining the political identity of the American voter. Our 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary 
and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of racial stereotypes.”137 In partisan 
cases, the Conservative Justices argue that the predictive power of classification may not be 
powerful or effective before an election. However, as Justice Kennedy states in Miller v. 
Johnson with racial classifications: 
                                                
136 Transcript of Oral Argument, Vieth v. Jubelirer, (2003) (No. 02-1580). 
 
137 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (1996). The cases and precedents of which O’Connor speaks are Shaw I, 
Miller, Hays, Shaw II, and Vera. 
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When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and 
demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, think 
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the 
polls. Race-based assignments embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the 
product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as 
citizens—according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the 
Constitution…. Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect 
racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates 
the category. They also cause society serious harm."138 
As much as Justice Kennedy’s argument is prudential it is also ethical as it asks citizens 
and state legislatures to abandon the demoralizing stereotypes of the past when racial 
minorities were not treated as humans nor recognized as humans. By continuing to create 
unnatural geographic districts to combine voters in order for those voters to possess a 
voice means that the state legislature, and the Department of Justice that asks for those 
districts, concerns itself not with the community interests of voters but just on the 
superficial criteria of race, overlooking the notion that a citizen on the coastal plain of 
                                                
138 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 - 912 (1995). The full quote, with citations, states: When the State 
assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in  [*912]  the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters 
of a particular race, because of their race, "think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the 
same candidates at the polls." Shaw, supra, at 647; see Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 636 (KENNEDY, J., 
dissenting). Race-based assignments "embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, 
evaluating their thoughts and efforts--their very worth as citizens--according to a criterion barred to the 
Government by history and the Constitution." Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 604 (O'CONNOR, J., 
dissenting).  
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Georgia may not have the same interests as the urban dweller of Atlanta.139 In Hunt v. 
Cromartie and L.U.L.A.C. v. Perry, the Supreme Court struck down redistricting plans 
where the state attempted to eliminate a majority-minority district in one area and create a 
substitute majority-minority district for the same racial minority in another part of the 
state. Writing in Cromartie I, Chief Justice William Rehnquist argued that vote-dilution 
claims are not remedied by the drawing of another district somewhere else in the state as 
the voters who suffered the vote-dilution claim in the first place would not be remedied by 
the fact that other voters in the state possess the ability to elect a candidate of their choice. 
The only bridge between the two districts in question would be race and, “To accept that 
the district may be placed anywhere implies that the claim, and hence the coordinate right 
to an undiluted vote (to cast a ballot equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a 
group and not to its individual members. It does not.140” In L.U.L.A.C, a majority of 
Justice struck down a Latino majority-minority district, which was created to replace 
another Latino majority-minority district, because the decision rested on a belief that the 
new majority-minority district of Latinos thought alike, though they had not formed an 
“efficacious political identity” as the voters did in the old District 23.141 Justice Clarence 
Thomas would take the stereotyping argument one step further than the rest. For Justice 
                                                
139 According to Justice Kennedy’s decision in Miller v. Johnson, under the redistricting plan in question, “the 
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Thomas, “racial gerrymandering offends the Constitution,” no matter if the use of race is 
malign or benign.142 Further, relying on “the stereotype” that “blacks are reliable 
Democratic voters,” would not be a defense for state legislatures, even though the 
empirical evidence suggested throughout the decision provides a strong correlation 
between race and party affiliation and interest.143 
 Throughout the analytically distinct cases, the Conservative Justices argue that 
unnecessary racial classifications that segregates voters on the basis of race and sends a 
racial message that excludes voters from the political process diminishes the prospect for 
political reconciliation between citizens and prevents a society in which race does not 
matter. However, because of the reliance on the communicative nature of injury and the 
reliance on the rational individual as the source of representation, the majority overstates 
its case. First, it fails to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional harm, especially in 
regards to its other categories of redistricting jurisprudence. Second, it fails to address why 
some majority-minority districts are constitutional but others are not since both would 
send a societal message about race in society. If the rational individualistic voter were the 
norm in society, which the occurrence of racial-bloc voting suggests otherwise, it would be 
beneficial to create districts where the aggregate of individuals could compete in society as 
Madison suggested in Federalist No. 10.144 Yet, the ideological convictions of the 
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Conservative Justices prevent certain types of competition and certain factions to form in 
society, which contradicts their notion of judicial restraint in the political process. 
Consequently, the use of racial classifications become necessary to help individuals and 
groups achieve political equality in situations where there is a lack of political trust 
between groups.  
Reconciliation through Self-Government 
 While the majority of the Supreme Court in the “Analytically Distinct” cases 
characterizes political equality in terms of citizens as being distinct individuals separate 
from any form of group identity, the dissenters in these cases characterize individuals as 
being a part of a political group. Political equality, according to this characterization, 
occurs through the development of self-government and representation for political 
groups. Reconciliation as a political act may occur only when the racial minorities receive 
political equality prior to the creation of districts, maximizing the group’s political equality 
during and after. Because the record in each of the “analytically distinct” cases reveal a 
historical problem of racially-polarized voting, the dissenting justices adopt a realist style of 
argument to show that at this point in time the white majority will not speak for the racial 
minorities as the white majority has not done in the past. While the majority of the 
Supreme Court in these decisions attempt to remove the cases out of the immediate 
historical context and see the facts in terms of the idealistic, universal, and timeless 
provisions of the Constitution, the dissenters argue that the Justices must proceed from a 
standpoint of electoral realism, knowing that “voting rights law entertains the possibility 
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that geographical and political separation may remain facts of life,” and the response must 
be the adoption of rules that reflect these possibilities.145 Without the protection of their 
voice in the political process and without the ability to select a “candidate of choice,” the 
votes, and hence interests, will not be effective, leaving the racial minorities with little 
chance of influence an election.  
Political Equality: Equal Treatment for All Groups 
 Constitutionally, there are no explicit requirements that reject the use of race as a 
permissible classification. Legally, §2 of the Voting Rights Act allows for the protection of 
racial minorities when participating in the electoral process and the Supreme Court’s 
rhetorical tradition concerning vote dilution claims under §2 from Gingless onward allows 
for the protection and creation of majority-minority districts to protect communities of 
interest even if these communities feature racial minorities as explicit political groups.146 
Since, as Justice Stevens notes in Bush v. Vera, it is highly unlikely that a State may 
“stumble across a district in which the minority population if both large enough and 
segregated enough to allow majority-minority districts to be created with at most a ‘mere 
awareness,’”147 racial and political minorities stand at an electoral disadvantage. Even 
districts in which a “natural” majority-minority district exists, such as in N.Y.-15 in 
Harlem, or N.Y.-16 in the Bronx, the majority of the Supreme Court supporting the 
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“Analytically distinct” category, especially Justice Thomas, would desire to examine this 
district with the “same invidiousness” as the Supreme Court relied upon in Gomillion.148  
Even before the Justices can concern themselves with political reconciliation, the 
dissenting Justices argue that the Supreme Court must concern itself with the ability of 
racial minorities to establish political equality. In Bush v. Vera, Justice Souter states that 
voting in not an “atomistic exercise” as the states gather and group individuals to allow 
them the ability to “choose a representative not only acceptable to individuals but ready to 
represent widely shared interests within a district.”149 Writing in terms of political realism, 
Justice Souter notes that:  
Racial groups, like all other groups, play a real and legitimate role in political 
decisionmaker. It involves nothing more than an acknowledgment of the reality 
that our concepts of common interest, geography, and personal allegiances are in 
many places simply too bound up with race to deny some room for a theory of 
representative democracy allowing for the consideration of racially conceived 
interests.150 
Justice Souter’s position argues that the law should follow the experiences in society rather 
then ideals in society. Districting should protect the communities and the development of 
politics in communities rather than ignore the communities and the possibility for 
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politics. If “objective” and “traditional” districting are not neutral or objective standards, 
then state legislators should possess the discretion to create majority-minority districts, 
even if they are “bizarre” in shape. By adhering to the advancement of political equality for 
racial minorities, then the districting process will be guided based on reciprocity for 
ethnic, political, and racial groups. Once community of interests possess political equality, 
at least in proportionality to their population in society, then the groups can engage in 
dialogue over the resources of that state.   
For dialogue to occur between competing political groups, the guiding principle 
must be reciprocity in relation to the proportionality of the population. In the vote 
dilution case of Johnson v. DeGrandy, the Supreme Court rules that proportionality is 
relevant evidence in determining whether or not a districting plan dilutes the voting 
strength of racial minorities.151 Since proportionality is one aspect of a vote dilution claim, 
state legislators ought to consider ways in which to maximize proportionality for the 
political groups throughout the state. As Justice David Souter notes in Shaw I, because of 
the Voting Right Act and Gingles, as well as the historical and political contexts of racial 
polarized voting by citizens, state legislators will always need to consider race when 
creating districting plans to avoid minority vote dilution.152 Since it is permissible, 
                                                
151 Johnson v. DeGrandy, 521 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994). According to Justice O’Connor, proportional is an exact 
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VRA states that, "nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
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according to Justice Stevens in Shaw I, to consider other demographic material and for 
state legislators to “draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, 
for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it 
necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same think for members of the very 
minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection 
Clause.”153 Further, as he implies in Miller v. Johnson, because of the poor historical 
treatment, black citizens ought to receive the same benefits that other groups receive 
through the districting process.154 However, since the Supreme Court states that “bizarre” 
shaped-majority minority districts are unconstitutional, there is a lack of reciprocity in the 
process.  Since all acts of redistricting involve the use of group identity, state legislators will 
possess the authority to create majority-white districts, no matter if they follow or reject 
traditional districting principles.  
The Contradiction of Representational Harm 
 In the “Analytically Distinct” cases, the majority of the Supreme Court relies upon 
two forms of communicative harms in relation to the political process, the 
“representational” harm (or “expressive” harm155) and the “stigmatic” harm. Yet, as the 
dissenters note, the reliance on the notion of “representation harm,” does not correlate to 
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154 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 993 (1995). 
  
155 In Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1053 (1996) Justice Souter discusses draws from the work of Pildes and 
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Richard G. Niemi, “Expressive Harms, ‘Bizarre Districts,’ and Voting Rights,” 506 – 507.  
 
 415 
the politics of apportionment. Relying upon a realist style, the dissenters note that 
“representational harm” is not similar to other forms of segregation, it is not indicative of 
the communication process, it relies on the same principle that the court abhors, it 
contradicts its position in other aspects of apportionment cases (majority-minority 
districts, partisan gerrymandering), and it overlooks the connection between politics and 
race.  
First, Justice O’Connor’s treatment of the ideal types of representation presents an 
inaccurate vision of representation and democracy, especially for racial minorities. By 
arguing that those who favor majority-minority districts because of the “descriptive 
representation” deflects away from the type of representation racial minorities desire, 
especially in the context of racial-bloc voting. While “descriptive representation” plays a 
role in the creation of majority-minority districts, as the fear is without a close connection 
between a representative and his/her constituents would means that the representative 
would not speak for and act on behalf of the constituents, a representative in a majority-
minority district does not possess the luxury of acting on behalf of just the minority 
constituents. David T. Canon notes that white representatives from districts that are 30% - 
40% black can ignore the black constituents if the representative believes they are 
unnecessary to victory; however, a black representative from a district that is 30% - 40% 
white cannot ignore the white constituents since, “they are operating in an institution that 
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is about 86% white and a nation that is 82.5% white.”156 In Johnson v. DeGrandy, Justice 
Kennedy states that the reality of representation is not as black and white as, “the 
assumption that majority-minority districts elect only minority representatives, or that 
majority-white districts elect only white representatives, is false as an empirical matter,”157 
and, further, assumption reflects "the demeaning notion that members of the defined 
racial groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be different from those of other 
citizens."158  
Consider the facts of L.U.L.A.C.  v. Perry, where two of the districts in the Texas 
case did not follow the ideal type of “descriptive representation” that Justice O’Connor 
argues against. In L.U.L.A.C.,, African-American voters in District 24 claimed that the 
state legislators diluted their right to vote because they supported Democratic 
Representative Martin Frost and the redistricting plan prevented them from electing him. 
In South Texas, the Texas Republicans diminished the voice of a Latino voting 
community by eliminating 100,000 Latino voices from District 23 and placing them in 
District 25 in an effort to protect Republican Representative Henry Bonilla, whom the 
Latino voting community in District 23 did not want as a Representative. Both examples 
                                                
156 David T. Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority 
Districts, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 13. In this quote, Cannon paraphrases Lani 
Guinier, “The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success,” 
Michigan Law Review 89 (1991).  
 
157 Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1027 (1994), quoting from the Supreme Court decision Voinovich v. 
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 151-152, 158 (1993).  
 
158 Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1027 (1994), quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 
636, 111 L. Ed. 2d 445, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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show that the ability of a community to elect a candidate of choice does not refer to 
“descriptive representation” but a concept of representation that focuses on the idea that 
the representative shares the same interests and will work to advance the interests of his or 
her constituents.   
 Second, according to the majority’s discussion of  “representational harm,” when 
the state legislators rely on race as the predominant motive to create electoral districts and 
neglects other traditional districting principles, the state legislators send a message to the 
citizens of the state. Yet, as Justice Stevens notes in Miller v. Johnson, regardless of the 
intent of the state legislators, the harm occurs when the citizens of the state receives a 
message that “all or most of the black voters support the same candidate, and, second, if 
the successful candidate ignores the interests of her white constituents.”159 The harm in 
these cases is psychological and, instead of harming only the “outsiders” in the district, 
Justice Stevens notes in Shaw II that the “the supposedly insidious messages that Shaw I 
contends will follow from extremely irregular race-based districting will presumably be 
received in equal measure by all state residents.”160 If there were a problem, it would exists 
throughout the state though the Court’s decision in Hays prevents citizens form outside 
the district to bring forth claims.  
Yet, for Justice Stevens, there is no constitutional principle that, “can discern 
whether a message conveyed is a distressing endorsement of racial separatism, or an 
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inspiring call to integrate the political process.”161 Further, if the majority were correct in 
stating that districting decisions on the basis of race would create an outsider status, then 
the opposite would be true for the racial minorities as racial minorities in majority-white 
districts will be ignored and, if there is harm, the harm does not matter. Yet, the majority 
declines this interpretation, as that is the “natural order” even trough districting. 
Evidently, when the majority establishes a claim against racial classification because it 
treats the individual as a group, then the Conservative majority relies on the same 
principle it abhors to establish that everyone in society, even if they may share the same 
interests of those in the district though they may be of a different race, would be offended 
by the use of race. Further, the conservative majority fails to consider this communicative 
harm in partisan reapportionment where the effects of partisanship where a political 
divide can separate in the same way as a racial divide can. A political minority in a partisan 
district receives the same virtual representation that the white minority receives in a 
majority-minority district. Yet, for the Conservative Justices, that is part of the political 
process.  
The Language of Segregation 
 While the majority of the Court relies on the language of segregation to describe 
the irregularly-shaped majority-minority districts, the dissenters reject the analogy. In Shaw 
I, Justice O’Connor referred to voters of District 1 as being segregated into the district 
based on their race, which implies they received unequal treatment, just as voters were in 
                                                
161 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 925 (1996). Justice Stevens notes that the difference between some residents 
receiving color-blind district making and other citizens that received color-blind districts concerns geography.  
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the case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot. Further, the district amounts to “balkanization,” or a 
“political apartheid” that “reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group 
-- regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live -
- think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the 
poll.”162 By perpetuating stereotypes, the state legislators limit the “multicultural 
democracy” with the “the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress 
and causes continued hurt and injury.”163 
 The implication with these comments is that District 12 compares to the 
segregation at the center of Brown v. Board of Education164 and that the state creates “Black” 
and “White” water fountains because of the public reference of race in the districting 
process.165 Yet, as Justice Souter argues in Bush v. Vera, the complaint is that voters have 
been placed in a district where their vote does not matter as much as it would in another 
district. The complaint is not one of racial “apartheid” but racial integration. Pamela 
Karlan notes that the contested districts in Shaw I were some of the most integrative 
districts in the country.166 Writing about the purpose of bizarrely drawn majority-minority 
districts in Bush v. Vera, Justice Souter states that the districts were dawn not to subjugate 
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166 Pamela S. Karlan, “Our Separatism?” 94. The District in questioned possessed an American-American 
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on the basis of race but to “give a racial minority the same opportunity to achieve a 
measure of political power that voters in general, and white voters and members of ethnic 
minorities in particular, have enjoyed as a matter of course.”167 Since race was used to 
enhance the prospect of a racial minority in participating in the political process, Justice 
Souter notes that it cannot affect an individual or group in the way that de jure 
segregation and does not convey a message about the racial inferiority or outsider status or 
members of the white community.168  
 Since the dissenters reject the language of segregation, they also reject the analogies 
that the majority relies upon to strike down segregation. In Miller v. Johnson, Justice 
Stevens writes that the meaning of the segregation cases concern the “exclusion of black 
citizens from public facilities reserved for whites. In this case, in contrast, any voter, black 
or white, may live in the Eleventh District [of Georgia].”169 He added that in the 
desegregation claims, “legal segregation frustrated the public interest in diversity and 
tolerance by barring African Americans from joining whites in the activities at issue. The 
districting plan here, in contrast, serves the interest in diversity and tolerance by increasing 
the likelihood that a meaningful number of black representatives will add their voices to 
legislative debates.”170 
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The complaint by the voters raises the awareness that racial divisions exist in the 
first place. In objecting to the plan, the plaintiffs preferred a color-blind approach to the 
districting effort though it is unclear if the plaintiffs would be satisfied if this were to 
occur. Justice Stevens write that the creation of a majority-minority district outside of the 
area that contains racially-polarized voting may help reduce the representational harm 
even if race was the predominant factor in creating a bizarrely drawn district since the 
representative will need electoral support from black and white constituencies.171 Karlan 
notes that the complaint that District 12 constitutes “political apartheid” reveals that 
voting is an individualistic and atomistic enterprise as Justice Clarence Thomas describes 
in Holden v. Hall or, even worse, that the subtext to the South African reference concerns 
the idea that what is troubling is the prospect of “African-Americans” possessing power as 
the “segregated district suggests that “only majority-white, and therefore white-controlled, 
jurisdictions can be integrated.”172 While Karlan over-generalizes in her statement, as both 
liberal and conservative groups protested the nature of the majority-minority districts,173 
even Justice Stevens states that the record in Miller v. Johnson reveals what the respondents 
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173 Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Race and Redistricting, 83 – 91. While Liberal Democrats Ruth Shaw and Robinson 
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contest is the inclusion of too many lack voters in the District as drawn.”174 In Shaw II, 
Justice Stevens expresses the same concern, stating that “North Carolina’s districting plan 
served to require these plaintiffs to share a district with voters of a different race. Thus, 
the injury that these plaintiffs have suffered, to the extent that there has been injury at all, 
stems from the integrative rather than the segregate effects of the State’s redistricting 
plan.”175  
Reconciliation through the Development of Community Interests and Self-Government 
 Adopting a realist style on their decisions, the dissenters in the Analytically 
Distinct cases argue that since racial-bloc voting exists, regardless of whether or not the 
majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court acknowledge it, what is necessary is the 
protection of communities of interests and the ability of state legislators to develop 
redistricting plans to meet the needs of the citizens within the state. By accomplishing this 
task, reconciliation may occur through representation, however, because of the history of 
racial-bloc voting and the failure of the majority to provide a voice for the minority, 
reconciliation will not occur without the establishment of political equality for racial 
minorities.  
 Since all redistricting acts requires classification and division, the concern of the 
Supreme Court ought to be in the way in which state legislators consider race rather than 
that the state legislators considered race. According to this view, since voting occurs as a 
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group right, the rule of justice would require equal treatment for groups, especially until 
there can be some form of normalization in economic and social conditions. If the state 
can divide groups based on the paternalistic notion of what is best for the individual, 
communities of interest will continue to suffer.  
 One of the recurring themes in the racial gerrymandering cases is that state 
legislators rely on bizarrely drawn districts to unite communities of interest even if these 
communities of interest are not within a close proximity to one another. While the 
majority of the justices claim that, by linking voters that do not live in close proximity to 
one another, stereotypes voters and sends a stereotypical message that of a certain races 
and ethnicities will “think alike” regardless of immediate geographic interests, the 
dissenters note that the creation of districts by race or ethnicity does not necessarily send a 
negative message but creates and reinforces a felt identity. In Miller v. Johnson, Justice 
Ginsburg states that ethnicity itself binds communities, even people with divergent social 
or economic interests, and there are times when legislators desire to represent districts 
based on shared traditions from ethnic, racial, or social practices.176 In Shaw II, Justice 
Stevens notes that though it was aesthetically “bizarre” in shape, “members of the public as 
well as legislators” urged the separation of urban and rural communities; consequently the 
majority-minority District 12 united voters in urban areas while the majority-minority 
District 1 united voters in cities that contained less than 20,000 people.177 Since the urban 
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black and rural black of North Carolina possess different and competing political 
traditions, Justice Stevens though it best to allow the state legislature to protect those 
interests separately as they rejected plans that created majority-minority districts but did 
not protect communities of interests.178   
 In deferring to legislators about developing districts that protect communities of 
interest, the dissenters follow the judicial topos that legislatures possess the primary 
authority to determine redistricting. The primacy argument allows the Supreme Court to 
defer to the discretionary power of the state legislators when dealing with a delicate 
matter, so long as the state legislators follow the necessary constitutional provisions and 
precedents, but it allows the people to facilitate reconciliation through electoral reform. In 
Miller v. Johnson, Justice Ginsburg follows the civic-republican rhetorical tradition in 
redistricting cases, noting that the process contains political considerations that state 
legislators must consider geographic, economic, historical and political consideration 
when drawing lines and the court’s are ill-equipped to handle these concerns of legislative 
compromise and accountability.179 By striking down these majority-minority districts as 
being unconstitutional, the dissenters argue that the majority of the Supreme Court 
hinders the ability of racial minorities to participate more effectively in the democratic 
process.180 
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By providing access to the political process through majority-minority districts, the 
Justice Souter argues that racial minorities will possess the political equality necessary to 
allow for assimilation and reconciliation. Justice Souter notes that the lesson the Supreme 
Court ought to follow is the integration of ethnicities occurring during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Justice Souter notes that by protecting constituencies on the basis 
of ethnicities, those constituencies allowed their candidates to enter mainstream politics 
and obtain political power for the group.181 By fostering a democratic pluralism, states 
avoided “ethnic apartheid,” leading to the development of, “ethnic participation and even 
a moderation of ethnicity’s divisive effect in political practice. For although consideration 
of ethnicity has not disappeared from the American electorate, its talismanic force does 
appear to have been cooled over time.182 In addition to increasing access to social benefits 
such as education through the political process, the access to political power develops 
political equality and fosters political participation.  
The language of the Supreme Court must focus on developing themes of 
representation that seek to be inclusive for diverse groups since, over time, the integration 
of diverse groups would diminish the ill will between them. Assimilation and 
reconciliation may occur through greater participation in the activities and institutions 
within society: “Voting is not just an expression of political preference; it is an assertion of 
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belonging to a political community.”183 Through the continued developments of 
democracy within political communities, especially in reference to increase voter 
registration and ensuring that votes count and elections matter, the hope is that the use of 
race will follow the path of the use of ethnicity: By protecting race as the political process 
protect ethnicity, communities will use the democratic process to see beyond race.184 
If there are citizens that reject the concept of racial districting, the proper 
procedure for citizens is to convince other citizens that the use of racial is wrong, morally 
or politically, and to vote those state legislators out of office.  In Bush v. Vera, Justice 
Stevens notes that the proper remedy for those who commits this “representational harm” 
is for citizens to elect a representative that is not from his/her ethnic or racial or for the 
citizens to refuse to elect representatives that would refuse to rely on racial 
classifications.185 Stevens adds that even if a “political prediction based on race is 
incorrect, the voters have an entirely obvious way to ensure such irrationality if not relied 
upon in the future: vote for a different party. A legislator relying on racial demographics to 
ensure his or her election will learn a swift lesson if the presumptions upon which that 
reliance was based are incorrect.”186 While these arguments follow the idea expressed in 
Colegrove, there are not the structural constraints to prevent citizens from enacting change. 
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Though citizens who reject the use of race for districting may face constraints because of 
attitudes, the general low number of minorities passed the majority mark that create a 
majority-minority district allows for those opposed to mount a campaign against them. If 
nothing else, a person representing a majority-minority district may not possess the ability 
to “represent” only the racial minority in the district and while need to seek out the 
greatest coalition possible.187  
 The language rejecting the notion of representational harm and accepting group 
representation provides a better vision of the actual electoral process. Instead of cleansing 
the language of representation and hoping that divisions will disappear, regardless of the 
historical disadvantages in society, the dissenters in the analytically case argue that 
integration in the political process will develop through the advancement of political 
equality. Voting law and voting rights are not similar to other forms of law as they concern 
the foundations of our political society. Consequently, because reapportionment and 
redistricting concerns the development of shared power, groups must possess access to 
that power.  
The Color -Blind Constitution & Judicial Ethos : Same As It Ever  Was 
 Discussion of the color-blind Constitution focuses on an ethical debate of 
constitutional interpretation. Specifically, it asks whether or not the government ought to 
create and employ racial classifications and, hence, treat citizens different on the account 
of immutable characteristics. In The Color-Blind Constitution, Andrew Kull argues that 
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Congressional standard of “reasonable” for racial classifications, even if subject to judicial 
veto, is the ghost of racial animosity haunting constitutional interpretation. A 
“reasonable” standard allows for democratic majorities to create “separate but equal” laws 
and provides judges the power of discretion to uphold those programs regardless of 
whether or not these laws discriminate against citizens. Kull writes that “racial 
classifications are so dangerous that they cannot safely be left to legislative discretion not, 
by extension, to a standard of ‘reasonableness’ enforced after the fact by judges.”188  
The implied solution for Kull is to follow the prophetic vision of the early 
advocates for abolition and civil rights, such as Charles Sumner, Wendell Phillips, and 
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, (1896), 
Harlan states: “But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In 
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.”189 By relying on the arguments 
of Justice Harlan, Kull, and other advocates of the color-blind Constitution argue that any 
classification, regardless of context, leads to agitation and distrust between the races.  If 
the government does not need to uphold the law, then Justice Harlan fears there is no 
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need for the people to uphold the law, making it permissible for white citizens to brand 
racial minorities with a “bade of servitude.” While formal slavery would have been 
expelled from American society, the “Separate but Equal” law would, “there would remain 
a power in the States, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the 
blessings of freedom to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens.”190 
 Yet, behind Justice Harlan’s idealism, there is a skeptical view if race relations in 
society. Andrew Kull writes that Harlan’s view is a pessimistic view of human nature and 
the institution of government: “the tools of government we know to be capable of much 
harm, and that we cannot confidently use them for good, should be abjured altogether. 
The experience of the intervening century has not yet proved Harlan wrong.”191 Of course, 
as Tinsley E. Yarbrough writes, Justice Harlan did not write against all race-conscious 
legislation just the race-conscious legislation like segregation that “degraded” race and 
opposed policies “based on the presumption of racial authority.”192 Further, in Plessy, state 
officials ignored the law and perpetuated discrimination and segregation between the 
races. According to Kurt H. Wilson, the meaning of segregation did not concern 
separation but supremacy as, “segregation was… an expression of prejudice, a symbolic 
affirmation of white supremacy.”193 If the original understanding of equal protection failed 
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to persuade some Southerners to alter their attitudes to tolerate and not even accept racial 
minorities, let alone allow racial minorities the political ground to develop equality, there 
may be doubt as to whether a color-blind interpretation, which may diminish the ability of 
a racial group to establish political equality, would allow individuals to “see-past” race.  
Judicial Recognition and Enactment of the Color-Blind Constitution 
In Shaw v. Reno, United States v. Hays, and Shaw v. Hunt, those challenging the 
districts raised the complaint that the use of race in districting violates the color-blind 
Constitution. While there is no conception of a color-blind Constitution in the explicit 
text, the existence of it can be found as an ethical argument about the Constitution itself. 
In Shaw I, the complaint by Robinson Everett claims that the use of color in districting 
denied citizens, whether black or white, diminishes the ability for citizens to “participate 
in a process for electing members of the House of Representatives which is color-blind and 
wherein the right to vote is not abridged on account of race.”194 In United States v. Hays, 
the appellees raised a similar complaint, alleging that voters in Louisiana suffered injuries, 
"to participate in a process for electing members of the House of Representatives which is 
color-blind and wherein the right to vote is not limited or abridged on account of the 
designated race or color of the majority of the voters placed in the designated districts.”195 
During the oral arguments for Shaw II, the counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the 
General Assembly’s use of race constituted a, “failure to obey a constitutional command to 
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legislate in a color-blind manner conveyed a message to voters across the State that ‘there 
are two black districts and ten white districts.’”196 In raising these claims, the strategy was 
to present the Supreme Court with an opportunity to recognize the substantive right of a 
color-blind Constitution as a few of the Justices believed in the idea of a color-blind 
Constitution. 
 By redefining representation to constitute a relationship between the individual 
and the representative, rather than an ethnic, political or racial group and the 
representative, the Conservative Justices desire to incorporate the ideology of the color-
blind constitution into the founding text, the fundamental values, and apportionment 
and districting jurisprudence. Acting as the main proponent for the ideology, Clarence 
Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Holden v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994)197 provides the 
judiciary with an argumentative foundation to end the Reapportionment Revolution. 
Further, Justice Thomas’ opinion in Holden provides an argumentation foundation to 
strike down the Voting Rights Act and institute a color-blind Constitution.198  
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198 In Parents Involved v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. ___,  (2007) the Supreme Court struck down school 
integration in Washington and Kentucky. Speaking for a plurality with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, 
Chief Justice Robert’s wrote that the Court struck down the plan because it relied on race as the 
predominant factor in how the plan characterizes students and failed a narrow reading of strict scrutiny. For 
 432 
 For Justice Thomas, what matters most is the “correct” principle behind the 
constitution and not the reliance on the discretion of the legislators, whether the public 
accepts the decision, whether the law matches the “reality” of society, or the 
materialization of the consequences form a decision. In order for the Supreme Court to 
return to the necessary first principles of the Constitution, the Supreme Court must 
return to the judicial philosophy of legal formalism, at least for its apportionment cases. 
However, before the Supreme Court can return to legal formalism, the Justices must first 
invent the substantive right of color-blindness as the interpretive key to the fourteenth 
amendment.  
 Like Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Harlan, Justice Thomas reestablished the 
dissenting rhetorical tradition that focuses on the judiciary’s involvement into 
reapportionment and redistricting politics. In short, Justice Thomas argues that there are 
numerous theories that discuss effective suffrage and representation as well as the proper 
apportionment of political power in a representative democracy, including his own. If the 
judiciary were to decide the meaning of effective representation, as it did in Baker, 
Wesberry, and Reynolds, then that constitutes a political question as it must determine the 
meaning and dilution of a vote. In Allen v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court made a 
second political decision as it would need to determine the essence of racial vote dilution 
and what would be the best type of electoral district e.g. single-member district multi-
                                                                                                                                           
C.J. Roberts, the constitution is color-blind and, “The way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis race.” In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas also relied on the 
substantive right of a color-blind constitution, invoking the words of Justice Harlan from Plessy. While a 
plurality relied upon the color-blind Constitution, Justice Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote, argued that 
the school plans were not narrowly tailored enough and, consequently, did not pass strict scrutiny.   
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member districts that states and the judiciary should employ.199 Yet, as Justice Thomas 
states, there is no principle that declares single-member districts to be preferred, proper, or 
historically correct method for elections, just a judicial invention to enhance the ability of 
any “numerical minority” to gain political power, to have their representatives mirror the 
thoughts and interests of the constituents, and to allow voters the ability to cast a 
controlling and not influencing vote.200 Once the Supreme Court constitutes equality as 
the primary goal, then it must reconsider its position to ensure political fairness for 
political minorities is on top of the hierarchy, ensuring that state legislators do not dilute 
the votes of racial minorities. Consequence, by entering in the political thicket, the 
Supreme Court handed the federal judiciary the unwarranted authority to “develop 
principles of representative government, for it is only a resort to political theory than can 
enable a court to determine which electoral systems provide the ‘fairest’ levels of 
representation or the most ‘effective’ or ‘undiluted’ votes to minorities.”201 
If the Supreme Court’s power to invent the standards of representative 
government weren’t enough, the Supreme Court’s entrance in Baker created an 
unintended telos of perpetuating racial discrimination. According to Justice Thomas, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gingless allowed state legislators and the judiciary to think 
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about race when redistricting, leading to the tragic assumption that state legislators and 
the judiciary can reinforce the idea that racial and ethnic groups possess distinct political 
interests and provide credence to the view that “race defines political interest,” meaning 
that “members of racial and ethnic groups must all think alike on important matters of 
public policy and must have their own ‘minority preferred’ representatives holding seats in 
elected bodies if they are to be considered represented at all.”202 Because of Gingles, the 
courts and state legislatures can create “racially ‘safe boroughs’… systematically dividing 
the country into electoral districts along racial lines—an enterprise of segregating the races 
into political homelands that amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system of ‘political 
apartheid.’”203 To avoid reprimand form the DOJ, states discriminate against its citizens by 
districting on the basis of race, reinforcing the view that those members of the district 
think alike and “that their interests are so distinct that the group must be provided a 
separate body of representation in the legislature to voice its unique point of view.”204 
Morally scolding in tone, Justice Thomas writes that this discrimination under the 
“assumptions upon which our vote dilution decisions have been based upon should be 
repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of color-blind Constitution.”205  
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  Under the idea of the color-blind Constitution, legislation must possess a telos of 
color-blindness. Even the VRA, which explicitly provides for the protection of racial 
minorities while it prohibits vote dilution and retrogression must advance the telos of the 
color-bind Constitution. Even Justice Kennedy, who believes that some racial 
classifications are constitutionally permissible, argues that the telos of society is the 
development of a color-blind Constitution and those legislative acts under the guide of the 
VRA threatens that ideal. In Miller v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy writes that is the goal of 
society is reconciliation and, "If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial 
democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that 
progress and causes continued hurt and injury.”206 If legislation such as the VRA allows 
state legislators to treat individuals as stereotypes rather then as individuals, Kennedy 
states, “It takes a shortsighted and unauthorized view of the Voting Rights Act to invoke 
that statute, which has played a decisive role in redressing some of our worst forms of 
discrimination, to demand the very racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids.”207In Georgia v. Ashcroft, Justice O’Connor writes that though the judiciary and the 
DOJ, “should be vigilant in ensuring that States neither reduce the effective exercise of the 
electoral franchise nor discriminate against minority voters, the Voting Rights Act, as 
properly interpreted, should encourage the transition to a society where race no longer 
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matters: a society where integration and color-blindness are not just qualities to be proud 
of, but are simple facts of life.”208 
 By invoking the notion of the color-blind Constitution, the Conservative Justices 
attempt to define voting rights and constitutional interpretation to concern the individual 
rather than a group. Relying on the assumed characteristic of the group, when state 
legislators district based on race the state government will send a societal message 
reinforcing the “essential” characteristics and the stereotypes of the group. Yet, in shifting 
the focus from the group to the individual, the logic of the argument states that if race is 
the problem, and the issue of one race embedding supremacy into the law and political 
structures of society is not the problem, then the answer to the problem is to prevent the 
consideration of race, leaving the state legislators and the federal judiciary with the 
simplistic tautology of Chief Justice Roberts, “The way to stop discriminating on the basis 
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”209 By neglecting race or preventing it 
as a viable classification for state legislators and the federal judiciary, the telos is to look 
beyond that which divides and to move beyond the past rather than to relive the 
resentment through each classification. As a strategy, reconciliation is possible if those in 
power avoid developing structures that foster division: “As a practical political matter, our 
drive to segregate political districts by race can only serve to deepen racial divisions by 
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destroying any need for voters or candidates to build bridges between racial groups or to 
form voting coalitions.”210 
 Additionally, underlying the switch from a group right to an individual right and 
from the use of racial classifications to the color-blind Constitution is a reclassification of 
the authority of the judiciary and its role within in a democratic society. In Holder v. Hall, 
Justice Thomas creates a proposition that synthesizes concerns of both Justice Frankfurter 
and the proposition of Justice William Brennan in Baker v. Carr. While Justice Frankfurter 
argued that the judiciary possessed no authority to determine apportionment decisions 
and Justice Brennan offered a people a new method of interpretation and a new 
conception of law, Justice Thomas offers future Supreme Court Justices with a judicial 
map to leave the political thicket. By implying that the Court’s decision in Baker results, 
eventually, in the use of racial classifications by state legislatures, Justice Thomas presents 
to those who support the notion of a color-blind Constitution a means to achieve its 
Constitutional recognition. By arguing that the use of racial characteristics to create 
electoral districts divides the public is an act that is “so repugnant to the Constitution and 
to a free people,” Justice Thomas concludes that the only alternative is the one that sees 
beyond race. To sustain this view, though, the Supreme Court must return to the decision 
in which the Supreme Court erred in principle, Baker v. Carr.  
According to Justice Thomas, since Baker, the Supreme Court increased its 
unwarranted authority to decide redistricting cases and invented political solution after 
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political solution in order to determine the correct form of effective representation. The 
solution then is to retrace the Court’s path, step-by-step, until it over-turns Baker. Since 
Thomas’ position himself as a formalist and not a realist, the consequences of the law 
matters little, only the principle does. In Holder, he writes:   
We would be mighty Platonic guardians indeed if Congress had granted us the 
authority to determine the best form of local government for every county, city, 
village, and town in America. But under our constitutional system, this Court is 
not a centralized politburo appointed for life to dictate to the provinces the 
"correct" theories of democratic representation, the "best" electoral systems for 
securing truly "representative" government, the "fairest" proportions of minority 
political influence, or, as respondents would have us hold today, the "proper" sizes 
for local governing bodies. We should be cautious in interpreting any Act of 
Congress to grant us power to make such determinations.211 
By relying on the Platonic Guardian topos, Justice Thomas argues that the Supreme Court 
violates principles of representative government by determining the form of government 
and the meaning of effective representation. To clarify the problems with the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence, Justice Thomas argues that the Supreme Court initiate an act of 
interpretation that will provide an exit strategy, resulting in the eventually discarding of 
Baker v. Carr. By doing so, the Supreme Court will constitute representation as an 
individual right to vote and place the authority of representation back to into the hands of 
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the state legislators, who will possess the discretion to enact representation but will not be 
able to do so on the basis of race or ethnicity.  
While the Supreme Court has yet to adopt a color-blind reading of the 
Constitution, the Conservative Justices invented other means to reduce the efficacy of the 
Voting Rights Act by redefining and diminishing the scope of §5. When deciding cases 
that concern §5’s retrogression purpose and effect clause, the Supreme Court determines 
that §5 concerns participating in the political process and not winning seats.  In Reno v. 
Bossier, 520 U.S. 471 (1997), the Supreme Court rules, in a 5 – 4 opinion by Justice 
O’Connor, that when the Attorney General or the DOJ reviews a plan under §5, it does 
not need to consider whether or not the plan dilutes the vote of racial minorities as the 
only concern is retrogression.212 In Reno v. Bossier, 528 U.S. 320 (2000), The Court’s 5 –4 
decision by Justice Scalia argues that that §5 of the VRA does not prohibit preclearance of 
a plan that possesses a discriminatory but not retrogressive purpose as the purpose prong 
of §5 only covers retrogressive dilution.213 Finally, in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 
(2004), Justice O’Connor’s 5 – 4 decision weakens further the meaning of retrogression 
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213 Reno v. Bossier, 528 U.S. 320, 328 - 329 (2000), Justice Thomas noted this case was unnecessary as three 
black were elected from majority-white districts. Showing that federal intervention is unnecessary because of 
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districts (354 – 356). Further, Justice Breyer notes that §5 concerned making the situation better (progress) 
not preventing things from getting worse (preserving) (366). If the state relies on a plan to dilute the right of 
blacks to vote but there is no retrogression, then it should not be cleared.   
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and creates a conflict with §5. When the Georgia Governor desired to hold of a 
Republican surge in the state, the Democrats redistricted with an aim to reduce majority-
minority districts to influence districts, increasing the chances of winning more seats 
though, at the same time, increasing the probability that a majority-minority district may 
not elect a candidate of their choice because of racial bloc voting and a low frequency of 
cross-over voting. Like the previous decisions, Justice O’Connor refused to rule that a 
violation of vote dilution under §2 provides evidence for retrogression under §5. If the 
state legislators can increase the chance for blacks to participate in the electoral process 
through the establishment of influence districts throughout the state even if they may lose 
seats, that is not retrogression.214  
For the Conservatives, this change in jurisprudence reflects the need that 
integration and not segregation will lead to political reconciliation since blacks will be in 
influence districts and not majority-minority districts they will need to engage other 
coalitions in the political process. For the liberal justices, the new definition of 
retrogression contradicts the meaning of §5’s command: “The power to elect a candidate 
of choice has been forgotten; voting power has been forgotten. It is hard to see anything 
left of the standard of non-retrogression, and it is no surprise that the Court’s citers 
precedential support for his reconception, consists of a footnote from a dissenting 
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Opinion in Shaw v. Hunt and footnote dictum in a case from the Western District of 
Louisiana.”215 
The Color-Blind Constitution: A Conflicting Ethos of Judicial Restraint 
Rejection of the color-blind constitution, especially in redistricting focus on the 
practical concerns and the rejection of the ideological implications. In Shaw I, even Justice 
O’Connor, in writing for the majority, notes that race-conscious districting is not always 
impermissible, only the race conscious districting that is “so extremely irregular” is 
unconstitutional.216 Justice Blackmun thought the objection to the race-conscious 
districting is particularly ironic since the plan in question sent the first black 
representative to Congress since Reconstruction.217 In Bush v. Vera, Justice Souter argues 
that a commitment to a color-blind Constitution would create further disparities between 
black members of Congress and the black population as a while, stating that majority-
minority districts provide for the inclusion of more voices in the legislative process.218 If 
Justice Thomas’ view of the law were obtainable, these voices would be lost for the benefit 
of “reconciliation,” even as the majority fails repeatedly to speak for the minority. 
While the Conservatives Justices argue on behalf of the color-blind constitution, 
the Liberal Justices find themselves in the same position as Justice Frankfurter was in 
                                                
215 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 495 (2004). 
 
216 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). 
 
217 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 676 (1993). 
 
218 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1050 – 1051 (1996). Justice Souter cites Frank Parker, “The Damaging 
Consequences of the Rehnquist Court’s Commitment to Color-Blindness Versus Racial Justice,” American 
University Law Review 42 (1996): 770-771. 
 
 442 
during Baker: the Court possesses no authority to enact that reading of the Constitution. 
In Shaw II, Justice Stevens attacked the majority for its attempt to articulate a new 
substantive right of color-blindness into the Constitution and in the districting process, 
which depends on the “speculative judicial suppositions about the societal message that is 
be gleaned from race-based districting.”219 Districting, according to Justice Stevens, 
concerns the classification of voters, both black and white, into geographical area and 
there would be very little difference for those who were placed into districts because of 
race and those who were not. 
To attack the concept of the color-blind Constitution and the ethos of the 
Conservative Justices, the dissenters attack the ethos of the Court and the failure to 
adhere to the rhetorical tradition. In his Shaw v. Reno dissenting opinion, Justice Byron 
White writes that the majority’s creation of a new constitutional harm on the basis that a 
districting plan segregates its citizens supports a logic whereby, “race-conscious 
redistricting that ‘segregates’ by drawing odd-shaped lines is qualitatively different from 
race-conscious redistricting that affects groups in some other way.”220 According to Justice 
White, race-conscious districting is constitutionally permissible up until the point it is 
impermissible, meaning that the base-by-case constitutionality rests on the aesthetic 
judgment of the justices, which echoes the constitutionality on Justice Potter Stewart’s 
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seminal phrase, “I know it when I see it.”221 When considering the constitutionality of a 
redistricting plan and providing a new threshold level for judicial skepticism of legislative 
discretion, especially in light of the “analytically distinct” cases, the federal judiciary must 
proceed by a case-by-case basis and examine each district turn on a line-by-line basis, 
questioning the motives of the state legislators with each potentially invidious turn and 
diminishing the ethos of judicial restraint with every case that strikes down cases involving 
vote dilution. 
In Bush v. Vera, Justice Kennedy states that in order to preserve the legitimacy of 
the Supreme Court, the Justices must follow the precedent of the “analytically distinct” 
case, allowing state legislators to follow their decisions and principles that “play an 
important role in defining the political identity of the American voter.”222 Yet, the 
precedent for precedent’s sake argument by Justice Kennedy echoes Justice Frankfurter’s 
argument of authority in Colegrove, which the Supreme Court would later reject in Baker. 
With the progression of cases in the area of the VRA, the Supreme Court may not 
establish a new rhetorical tradition as it did in Baker to combat the expansion of the 
Supreme Court’s authority in this area of case law.   
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Throughout the “analytically distinct” cases and the challenges to §5 of the VRA, 
the dissenting Justices believe that the Courts engage in the expansion of judicial authority 
at the expense of judicial restraint and the discretion of state legislators. The dissenters of 
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer attack the majority for 
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the state legislator when there is no 
constitutional injury.223 In Miller v. Johnson, Justice Ginsburg writes that in the “analytically 
distinct” cases, strict scrutiny will be triggered as the necessary form of judicial review 
when the judiciary believes that “traditional districting principles” has been “given less 
weight than race.”224 Because of this review, state legislators will potentially face a legal 
challenge if they redistrict by creating majority-minority districts to prevent vote dilution 
under the requirements of §2 and, in the process of creating those districts, they rely on 
race as the predominant factor if the district lines represent a “bizarre” standard.225 
Without a clear definition or standard for “race as a predominant factor,” the majority of 
the Supreme Court ensures that the federal judiciary will determine the aesthetics of the 
districting plan. Further, as Justice Stevens notes in Bush v. Vera, the majority of the 
Supreme Court brings the federal judiciary further into the political process that rightly 
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belongs to the discretion of the state legislators, increasing the characterization of the 
Court that it is political and not impartial.226 
For the Supreme Court to require the implementation and justification of sound 
traditional districting principles in the “analytically distinct,” the casual observer would 
note the lack of reciprocity in other areas of the Supreme Court’s redistricting rhetorical 
tradition. In Shaw I, Justice Stevens notes that the Supreme Court has never ruled that 
traditional districting techniques e.g. compactness, contiguity, respecting political 
boundaries, are constitutionally required, and, since there is no justification for why there 
should be a departure in principle for all cases, these techniques should not be required 
for just some of the cases.227 Even when state legislators follow traditional districting 
principles, the federal courts can strike down the districts because they did not follow 
them enough. In Miller v. Johnson, Justice Ginsburg attacks the majority’s decision by 
noting that the design of the district in question provides a sign that the “design reflects 
significant consideration of ‘traditional districting factors (such as keeping political 
subdivisions intact) and the usual political process of compromise and trades for a variety 
of nonracial reasons.’”228 In Bush v. Vera, Justice Souter notes that the problem since Shaw 
I is a problem of pragmatism as the majority of the Supreme Court fails to deliver any 
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adequate and “objective” standards in terms of compactness.229 If the Supreme Court were 
to provide an adequate conception of compact rather than leaving compactness to the 
aesthetic tastes of the Justices and the judiciary, then the majority would have at least 
provided a manageable standard and reconciled its §2vote dilution claims with the 
“analytically distinct” claims. 
Further, the contradiction within the Supreme Court’s ethos occurs as it allows 
state legislators to relying on race when creating majority-white districts. A Constitutional 
requirement of color-blindness would create a double standard between communities of 
interests. Since state legislatures know the racial demographics of the state while 
districting, it would be extremely difficult to avoid relying on the state’s demographics to 
create districts without the use of race. As J. Morgan Kousser argues, “‘Color-Blind’ is a 
the buzzword of opponents of governmental actions to diminish current racial inequality, 
inequality that results from past and continuing governmental action.”230 When 
employing cartographers, the color-blind principle would submerse voters into districts 
and, if the state legislators or citizens could not alter the attitudes that create racial-bloc 
voting, vote dilution would exist without any recourse.231In his dissenting opinion in Bush 
v. Vera, Justice Stevens examines the districts with a level of specificity that Justice 
O’Connor did not by examining the twist and turns of a majority-minority district with 
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twists and turns of a neighboring majority-white district to show while bizarre shaped 
districts are not allowable when race is the “predominant factor” but it is allowable for 
partisan interests or for majority-white districts.232 The irony of the double standard, as 
Justice Stevens notes, is that white citizens will be able to request their position in the 
electoral map to maximize representation though racial minorities will not possess the 
same constitutional authority to do the same if that reside outside of a “natural 
compactness.” Consequently, “the result… involves ‘discrimination’ in a far more concrete 
matter than did the odd shapes that so offended the Court’s sensibilities.”233 
 Complicating the racial gerrymandering and vote dilution cases is the notion racial 
gerrymandering serves as proxy for partisan gerrymandering. Though the Supreme Court 
does not concern itself with partisan gerrymandering cases as there is no manageable 
standard, a notion that itself is quote controversial for members of the Supreme Court, 
John Hart Ely and Samuel Issachaoff argue that partisan redistricting creates a far more 
serious constitutional and representational harm than racial gerrymandering.234 
Throughout the vote dilution and analytically distinct cases, partisan politics guides the 
redistricting process and the redistricting challenges to the point that race and partisan 
interests are inseparable. In Shaw I, Miller, Shaw II, and Vera, the dissenters from each 
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provide a reasonable political motive for developing the districts in question, focusing on 
following the directions of the Attorney General, incumbent protection, legislative trade-
offs, developing communities of interests, and protecting the state from advancements 
from the other political party. For example, in Miller, Justice Ginsburg discusses that on of 
the reasons why the challenged district possesses a bizarre shape is that because a State 
Senator desired a district to include an area in which his son lived so that the son could 
replace the father when the father stepped down.235 Under this consideration, partisan 
interests through the protection of incumbents and the commands of the DOJ would be 
the “predominant” factor in drawing the lines and not race. In Bush v. Vera, Justice 
Stevens examines the history of the challenged districts to show that the Texas State 
Democrats considered where to create new districts in Democratic territories, how to 
move voters to fill the districts and protect incumbents, how to discern political affiliation 
of voters, how to determine voting patters at the precinct level, and how to force the shape 
of the district to meet these ends. Further, he notes that since African-Americans residents 
in a particular community consistently vote for Democrats 97% of the time then it is 
neither irrational nor invidious to conclude that the districts in question were drawn on 
account of partisan interests and not race even is race and partisan interests correlate.236  
Justice Steven concludes by stating, “to the extent that race served as a proxy at all, it did 
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so merely as a means of ‘fine tuning’ borders that were already in particular locations for 
primarily political reasons.”237  
In Shaw II, Justice Steven argues that the partisan interests in the case overpower 
the racial considerations of the case. He notes that Democrats in the North Carolina 
Assembly desired to create only one majority-minority district and Republicans desired 
two but the Democrats followed the mandates from the DOJ to create a second majority-
minority district as it protected the party’s incumbents.238He states that that those bringing 
forth the challenge are Republicans and the district in which they challenge is Democratic. 
Since the original challenge in Blue v. Pope covers partisan gerrymandering, Stevens states 
that the real concern for the plaintiffs is that they do not desire to be represented by a 
Democrat since they prefer Republicans.239 Because of political and ideological differences, 
the plaintiffs’ argument is that the will suffer a “representational harm” since the 
Democratic Congressional Representative will not adhere to the interests of all of the 
voters in the district. Because the partisan gerrymander failed in the district courts and 
because the Democrats drew a district to protect an incumbent and prevent Republicans 
from gaining more seats, Republican citizens challenged the districts on the only grounds 
that they could, claiming that the district constituted a racial gerrymandering. Since the 
Republicans do not need to show that they have been shut out of the process or that the 
representation is not responsive to the needs of the people, the citizens hope that the 
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Court will strike down the district, which may lead to an increase of partisan 
representatives and, further, the ideological imposition of a color-blind constitution that 
may further help representational aims. Because of the close connections between race 
and politics, a group can redistrict without constraints to reduce the influence of a rival 
political party and discriminate against citizens because of political views and, in the 
process, diminish the influence of both a racial minority and a political group.  
 Finally, complicating the ethos of the Conservative majority, the Justices do not 
reconcile the harms of racial gerrymandering with the harms of political gerrymandering 
or the harm in any form of “virtual” representation. While the “bizarre” majority-minority 
districts may cause, but more likely increase, resentment based on racial attitudes as well as 
partisan interests, the Supreme Court does not explicitly address why the resentment 
against majority-minority districts trumps the establishment of political equality for racial 
minorities. From the history of racial bloc voting and the use of racial appeals in campaign 
ads, it is apparent that there is less concern about the resentment that racial minorities 
feel over unresponsive representation. When this power structured is challenged, it 
amounts to a constitutional harm based on a perceived societal message of segregation and 
separation.  
 In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer and, two years later, the 
Justices decided L.U.L.A.C. v. Perry. Even though both of these cases were partisan 
gerrymandering cases, a plurality of the Court ruled in the first case that partisan 
gerrymandering constituted a non-justiciable question and a majority of the Supreme 
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Court found that the Texas Republicans diluted the votes of racial minorities in two 
Southern Texas districts. Acing as the swing vote in both cases, Justice Kennedy’s 
judgment and opinions possess the ability to recognize partisan gerrymandering as an 
unconstitutional cognizable harm or reject the ability to raise a constitutional claim 
concerning vote dilution. In Vieth, Justice Kennedy raises prudential concerns as he does 
not desire the federal judiciary examining every electoral district and create an 
“unprecedented intervention in the American political process.”240In rejecting the partisan 
gerrymandering claims in Vieth, Justice Kennedy argued there are no comprehensive and 
neutral principles to guide districting and that there is no cognizable judicial limitation, 
allowing the judiciary to assume the political and not legal responsibility for districting. In 
his controlling concurrence, Justice Kennedy does not address the differences between 
Vieth and the “analytically distinct” cases and for good reason for if he did, he would need 
to explain the contradiction of judicial involvement in one area of redistricting law but 
judicial restraint in another. For if the principles required in one set of cases are not 
neutral, then they should not be neutral in another set of cases; and if the fear is that 
there will be no way to discern where the judiciary’s power ends for one set of cases, it 
should be clear that there may not be an end in other cases.  
 In L.U.L.A.C. v. Perry, Justice Kennedy states that the plan by Texas Republicans 
violates §2 of the VRA by diluting the votes of a coherent racial minority in the face of 
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different parties run for office.  
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racial bloc voting to protect a Republican candidate that the Latino community would 
have voted out of office and the creation of another Latino opportunity district did not 
correct the original problem. As Ellen D. Katz notes, the Supreme Court’s decision about 
vote dilution rests not with the traditional districting principles but over the fact that the 
Latino community was political active and their districts competitive, allowing for 
discourse to facilitate the election process.241 Justice Kennedy’s conclusions in this case 
suffer from the same crisis in ethos that undermines the analytically distinct cases. As 
Pamela Karlan states, in L.U.L.A.C. Justice Kennedy attempts the same inquiry for a vote 
dilution case that he says cannot be done for a political gerrymandering case.242 John Hart 
Ely notes, the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaw I, which set a standard of “bizarreness” 
and constituted “compactness” as a virtue may be a better standard to contain both racial 
gerrymandering and partisan gerrymandering.243 Yet, for this to occur, the citizens would 
need to elect a President that would nominate enough Supreme Court Justices to 
reestablish an analytical frame to declare partisan gerrymandering justiciable. This would 
need to occur before a President would nominate a Supreme Court Justice who would 
fulfill the “Rule of Five” for the color-blind Constitution.  
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Conclus ion: The Color -Blind Voting Rights  Act 
In June of 1986, the Supreme Court released decisions in Davis v. Bandemer and 
Thornburg v. Gingles, which initiated the Supreme Court’s protection of a group right to 
vote. Seven years after those decisions, the Supreme Court altered its course, protecting 
groups in some cases while rejecting a group right to vote in other cases. Consequently, 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the Justices on the High Court released opinions that 
created a contentious rhetorical tradition. While the goal of the Supreme Court focused 
on the development of common ground to pursue racial reconciliation, ideological 
divisions prevented the Justices from establishing a unified voice to speak for “the people.” 
In order to pursue racial reconciliation, the Conservative Justices argued that 
representation must concern the individual and state legislators must focus on the 
characteristics of the individual, limiting the extent to which groups can receive 
representation as a result of the districting process. At some point, state legislators cross a 
constitutional threshold where districts inflicts a perceived communicative harm on 
citizens even if the five Justices who support this notion are the only ones that “know” 
when legislators cross the line. Conversely, the Liberal Justices on the Court argue that 
political equality for ethnic and racial groups must exist in a redistricting plan prior to 
racial reconciliation. In this view, the Liberal Justices place an unwarranted leap of faith 
that state legislators from states in which racially polarized voting exists will develop 
deliberative space for minorities who have been historically shut out of the political 
process. To diminish the authority of state legislators to conduct redistricting for political 
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groups is to increase, without good reasons, the scope of judicial power. The Conservative 
Justices desire this interpretation on normative grounds while the Liberal Justices reject it 
on empirical grounds. This debate, which the Supreme Court initiated in Shaw I 
continued through the Court’s 2006 decision in L.U.L.A.C. without any resolution. 
Consequently, in the balance of racial reconciliation concerns an interpretive struggle over 
whether or not the Constitution provides a substantive right to a color-blind districting 
process. 
In the legal community, the decisions by the Supreme Court in the analytically 
distinct cases have not been well received. In gauging the reception of the analytically 
distinct cases, consensus reveals that the “bizarre” standard from Shaw I and the 
“Predominant Interest” test from Miller are “incoherent” and “unmanageable.”244 Pamela 
Karlan writes that the Supreme Court’s decision on race and redistricting, “bring to mind 
two of America's most distinctive philosophers, Walt Whitman and Yogi Berra. Whitman 
once proclaimed, ‘Do I contradict myself? Very well then ... I contradict myself; I am large 
... I contain multitudes.’ Yogi, a bit more succinctly, observed that ‘It ain't over ‘til it's 
over,’ and asked, ‘How can you think and hit at the same time?’”245 Karlan states that the 
Court seems to be in a process of “Redrupping” state and congressional districts: 
“reviewing challenged districts one by one and issuing opinions that depend so 
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idiosyncratically on the unique facts of each case that they provide no real guidance to 
either lower courts or legislatures.”246 Richard H. Pildes writes that in one of the most 
controversial courts cases of the 1990s, the Supreme Court “imposed critical, but vague, 
constitutional constraints on the use of race in election-district design,” as the Court set 
out to decide at what point the “use of a permissible consideration of race becomes 
impermissible.247  
The unintentional effect of the case-by-case jurisprudence may be the decrease in 
amount of cases brought before the Supreme Court. Karlan writes that a decade after the 
Court’s decision in Shaw I, in which some but not all uses of race is constitutionally 
permissible, the Court “remains unable to articulate a workable, intelligible regime telling 
the political branches how to act during the most political activity they undertake?”248  
Though vague, Pildes claims that the law stabilized after Shaw as risk averse politicians 
avoided districting plans that would bring litigation since, as a consequence, courts may 
draw their own plans or the political landscape may shift before the case returned from 
litigation.249 Samuel Issacharoff writes that the uncertainty of the law from Gingles to Shaw 
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to Miller develops from the Supreme Court’s decision in Carolene Products’, whose famous 
“Footnote 4” argues that the Supreme Court must intervene when the normal political 
process does not work.250 Luckily for the Justices, they will have another opportunity to 
sort out this mess.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 
 On October 14th, 2008, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in the case of 
Bartlett v. Strickland, 07-689 (2008) the sixth case to reach the Court from redistricting 
efforts by the North Carolina General Assembly. The question in this case concerns §2 of 
the Voting Rights Asks and asks the Supreme Court:  “whether a racial minority group 
that constitutes less than 50% of a proposed district’s population can state a vote dilution 
claims?”1 The case, the results of which will play a significant role for the reapportionment 
battle following the 2010 census, developed from a claim that the General Assembly 
violated the constitutions norm of protecting county integrity by slicing one county into 
two districts in order to comply with §2 of the VRA and protect a district 39% of whom 
are African-American.2   
In terms of its rhetorical tradition, the Supreme Court has failed to reach a 
conclusion as to whether or not a vote dilution claim can be maintained by a minority 
group that does not constitute a majority in the district. In Gingles, the Court states that to 
prove a vote dilution claim, the minority group must be compact enough to constitute a 
majority in a district. In Voinovich v. Quilter, the Supreme Court discussed the possibility 
that a minority group could establish a vote dilution claim if it was not a majority but 
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received cross-over voting though it refused to rule on that claim.3 In L.U.L.A.C. v. Perry, 
the Court held that district 24, a district around Dallas that was represented by D- Martin 
Frost, but split-up to allow for the election of a Republican. State that the African-
American voters did not constitute a majority under Gingles as they only comprised 25,7% 
of the district. However, according to the majority, the group failed to show that it could 
elect a candidate of choice in the Democratic primary even though it regularly comprised 
68% of the vote during the primaries. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy wrote 
that since the district was created for Representative Martin Frost, there was no 
benchmark in place to determine vote dilution since Frost possessed no opposition in a 
primary since his incumbency began. 4 In a similar district an African-American candidate 
failed when he ran against an Anglo-candidate, Anglo-Democrats and not African-
American Democrats control the district.5  
At issue in Strickland v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491; 649 S.E.2d 364 (2008), is whether 
or not a crossover district that was created to enhance the ability of a racial minority 
community to influence election but violated the Whole County Provision of the North 
Carolina Constitution was constitutional.6 Anticipating that the Department of Justice 
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may require a majority-minority district in the Southeastern portion of North Carolina, 
the state legislators created a district that split Pender County but resulted in the creation 
of an “effective black voting district,” that contained an African-American population of 
42.89 percent, and an African-American voting age population of 39.36 percent.”7 
Plaintiffs, who desired that a unified Pender County receive representation, challenged 
this district because it failed to meet the first condition of the Gingles test, which states 
that a minority must be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district.”8  
In its decision, the North Carolina State Supreme Court defined “majority” 
narrowly, focusing on only those citizens who are of voting age since §2 focuses on the act 
of voting.9  As a result of the narrow definition, the North Carolina State Supreme Court 
found that the district in question was not necessary under §2 and the state legislators 
need to follow the Whole County Provision. Unless a minority group can show it 
possesses the voting strength to be a majority, the North Carolina State Supreme Court 
reasons that it cannot be subject to vote dilution.10 Further, if the judges were to rule that 
the influence district in question is necessary under §2 with the crossover voting from 
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whites, then there may be a contradiction in the Gingles test as the district in question 
would not occur within the context of racially polarized voting.11 
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Sarah Parker and Associate, and now current 
Chief Justice, Patricia Timmons-Goodson, who is the first African-American women to 
serve on the North Carolina State Supreme Court, argues that the majority’s definition of 
“majority” exceeds the definition by the Supreme Court as Gingles refuses to qualitatively 
define what constitutes a majority so as to include influence districts and reject a 
mathematical rigidity imposed on state legislators.12 Further, the dissenting justices argue 
that In L.U.L.A.C. Justice Kennedy states, in dicta, that a §2 claim could, in theory, apply 
to minority groups large enough to influence an election with some cross-over voters.13 
This, of course, returns us to the most important question in the recent Supreme Court 
decisions: how much is too much? When the Supreme Court decides Bartlett v. Strickland, 
it must answer how many members of a political group creates a majority and to what 
extent state legislators can employ their discretion to constitute a majority within a district. 
Giving the Supreme Court’s history, the Supreme Court will most likely provide 
another 5 – 4 decision with Justice Kennedy providing the swing vote. While one plurality 
comprised of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito will 
discuss the use of race in districting and another plurality will discuss communities of 
interest and the need to defer to the state legislators since this is a delicate decision. 
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During the oral arguments, the counsel attacking the plan will attempt to persuade Justice 
Kennedy that the Constitution really is color-blind and that the General Assembly created 
the bizarre district with race as the predominant factor, ignoring the traditional and 
constitutional principle of not separating counties. Conversely, the counsel defending the 
plan will say the design of the district is necessary to prevent vote dilution under §2 and, 
possibly, discuss the partisan motivations of the district. Regardless of Justice Kennedy’s 
decisions, Clarence Thomas will write an opinion that cites Holder v. Hall, drawing 
attention for the need for the judiciary to establish a color-blind Constitution and to leave 
apportionment and districting to the legislature, which presents an irony that Justice 
Thomas refuses to comprehend. The only questions that remain are: will Justice Thomas 
finally receive his fifth vote? Will the Court overturn the VRA? Will the Court just 
continue to hollow-out the VRA? Will the Court abandon its “predominant motive” test? 
Or, will Justice Kennedy continue to side with the Liberal Justices because of the 
conflation of race and politics? 
The Supreme Court and the Democratic Exper ience  
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett v. Strickland will be the next moment in 
which the Justices to determine the meaning of the democratic experience for the 
American polity. In this decision, like its other decisions, the Justice will intellectual and 
ideologically grapple with the extension and limitation of voting rights for individuals and 
groups, citizens and state legislators, legislators and justices. The Justices will determine to 
what extent citizens and state legislators can create and sustain a political group in society 
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and to what extent other citizens can prevent the formation of political groups in the 
political process.  The Justices will determine to what extent the state legislators of North 
Carolina must anticipate and comply with federal law even over the requirements of their 
own state’s constitution. 
This dissertation seeks to explore the development of the democratic experience 
and the constitution of American democracy through the Supreme Court’s 
reapportionment and redistricting decisions. For the development of the study of rhetoric, 
this text examines the connection between our political institutions and the development 
of political deliberation, especially in the way in which the Supreme Court of the United 
States transformed our political institutions, legally and morally, from a Constitutional 
Republic to a Constitutional Democracy. First, this dissertation examines the way in 
which our political institutions, such as election and the decisions of the Supreme Court, 
enhance or constrain the ability of the American public to engage in democracy and self-
government. As a heresthetical strategy, state legislators rely on districting to produce 
desired electoral results. Because of its involvement, the Supreme Court reconstituted the 
practice of representation and the protection of representation in our political 
institutions. Second, the study examines the development of an ethos for the American 
democracy. Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in the reapportionment revolution, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions focus on the development of the democratic experience to 
improve upon the quality of public deliberation and the meaning of American democracy. 
Finally, this dissertation examines the creation of a judicial ethos to decide 
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reapportionment and redistricting cases. Throughout the Supreme Court’s decisions, the 
Justices invent and reinvent a rhetorical tradition that concerns the ability of Justice to 
decide apportionment cases. In the process, the Justices develop an authority of when it 
ought to decide cases and when it should abstain from deciding cases. Consequently, the 
development of reapportionment concerns the development of judicial will to decide cases 
and their justifications for deciding or refusing to decide new cases.  
Throughout the development of the American Republic, state legislators have 
employed redistricting as a heresthetical strategy to achieve desired electoral results. The 
infamous redistricting attempt in Massachusetts of 1812 represented a continuation of 
redistricting efforts since Colonial times and a preview of redistricting efforts to come e.g. 
Texas in 2004. While the effects of a redistricting plan are not always predictable, 
especially from election to election, as the results of the infamous 1812 gerrymander lasted 
only one year, the opportunity to gain control of a state legislator, even for the short term, 
provides warrant to attempt a partisan redistricting, especially if one political party can 
coordinate efforts to create a national advantage.  
Though the evils of redistricting is pervasive throughout the history of American 
politics, during the nineteenth century, state and federal legislators and state courts 
developed cures for the political poison. In response to partisan redistricting efforts, state 
legislators in Alabama, Massachusetts, and Maine passed regulations, such as requiring 
contiguity, preserving counties, and rejecting single-member districts. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, state courts entered the political thicket to provide citizens relief in 
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reapportionment and redistricting controversies though, in those decisions, the state 
courts decided the issues based on the constitutional redistricting requirements. Though 
these decisions did not provide sweeping reform, they did establish precedent for judicial 
involvement in election law to protect the voting rights of citizens.  
At the federal level, between 1842 and 1911, Congress passed redistricting acts 
that required contiguous single-member districts that contained equal population and 
were compact. However, after it enacted redistricting legislation in 1911 that renewed 
these requirements, Congress chose not to pass legislation that required state legislators to 
follow certain guidelines. At the same time that Congress passed its last law that contained 
redistricting requirements, the Supreme Court initiated a rhetorical tradition in 
apportionment law as it entered the political thicket in Richardson v. McChesney to declare 
that this case failed to present a justiciable controversy.  
Even though the Supreme Court declined to intervene in Richardson v. 
McChesney, the issue returned to the High Court because of continued neglect of 
apportionment by state legislators. Though the Justices consistently ruled against judicial 
involvement, each time the High Court heard oral arguments in apportionment decisions 
it stepped further and further into the thicket. In Smiley v. Holm, Koenig v. Fylnn, Carroll v. 
Becker, and Wood v. Broom the Supreme Court decided which branch of government could 
participate in the apportionment process, what would happen if a state received additional 
representation or faced cuts in its current representation, and whether or not the 
Congressional standards of 1911 still applied to redistricting. When the Supreme Court 
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decided Colegrove v. Green in 1946, a divided court ruled against judicial interference in 
apportionment law though, historically, this decision just delayed the inevitable. Fourteen 
years after Colegrove, the Supreme Court released its unanimous decision in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot and initiated a new rhetorical tradition that replaced its previous rhetorical 
tradition of judicial abstinence in apportionment law.  
Throughout its rhetorical tradition on apportionment law, the Justices who 
opposed judicial involvement in redistricting argued that reapportionment law presented a 
“political question” and the state legislators possessed the authority to determine the 
meaning of a ballot even if electoral maps created inequalities and favored smaller 
segments of the voting population. However, when City officials from Tuskegee, Al, 
created a districting plan that removed almost the entire African-American population 
from the city’s limits to ensure that they would not receive city services, the Supreme 
Court argued that the actions of the city officials violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Yet, 
according to its previous rhetorical tradition in apportionment law, the decision by the 
City officials constituted a “rational” policy decision and the citizens who were removed 
from the city limits could still “vote” and have their vote “counted” like other citizens. 
Consequently, at issues in Gomillion was not the right to vote but the right to cast a 
meaningful ballot. Though the Supreme Court ruled that this redistricting plan violated 
constitutional standards, the most important aspect of the High Court’s decision was to 
weaken its Pre-Apportionment Revolution rhetorical tradition beyond repair.  
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Sixteen years after its decision in Colegrove, the Supreme Court released its decision 
in Baker v. Carr. The Court’s decision in Baker represents a turning point in 
reapportionment law, the conceptualization of law in society, and the role of the Supreme 
Court in American public life. In Baker, Justice William J. Brennan presents the American 
people with a new vision of the law and, consequently, a new ethos of the Supreme Court. 
Instead of defining reapportionment as a social or political right that depends on the 
judgment of the state legislators, Justice Brennan argues that voting rights are best 
understood as a fundamental right in society that stand above the discretion of state 
legislators. Since the state legislators refused to reapportion to protect the voting rights of 
their constituents it would be necessary for the High Court to protect the Constitutional 
rights of “the people.” Yet, in order to protect the rights of “the people,” Justice Brennan 
diminished the definition of the “political questions” and removed the obstacle to judicial 
involvement in apportionment law as well as other areas of law. 
In addition to redefining apportionment law as a fundamental right, Justice 
Brennan’s decision in Baker presented the American people with a new vision of the law 
and a new authority for the judiciary in American society. After Baker, apportionment law 
would no longer follow Justice Felix Frankfurter’s conception of the law, which argues that 
the Justices must follow correct rules for deciding a case; instead, apportionment law 
would follow the vision of Justice Brennan and Justice William O. Douglas, which argues 
that the law must follow the experiences of the people. While Justice Frankfurter argued 
that “the people” must be vigilant and “sear the consciences” of their representatives, 
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Justice Brennan and Justice Douglas argued that sixty years of experience revealed that the 
vigilance of the people failed to convince state legislators to overlook their interests and 
fairly apportion their respective states.  
By creating a new vision of the law, Justice Brennan offered the American people a 
proposition about the role of the Judiciary in American pubic life. In Baker, Justice 
Brennan argued that because state legislators refused to reapportion their state and failed 
to provide citizens with an effective voice in government, the Court would provide a 
corrective reading of the political process and open up the federal courts to hear 
apportionment cases. However, if the Courts were to hear apportionment cases, the 
judiciary would need to be the final arbitrator of the Constitution, increasing its authority 
over the other branches of government. However, while the Court increased its authority 
to protect the voice of “the people,” the Supreme Court created an ethos of judicial 
restraint and employed apportionment and districting topoi, such as apportionment is the 
primary responsibility of state legislators, to enact this ethos.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Baker provided the foundation for the 
development of the democratic experience. According to Chief Justice Earl Warren, Baker 
and Reynolds v. Sims were the Supreme Court’s most important decisions, even more 
important than Brown v. Board of Education, as the two reapportionment decisions 
restructured power to allow citizens a greater ability to participate in the political process. 
In the Gray v. Sanders, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims, a majority of the Supreme 
Court fulfilled Abraham Lincoln’s promise of democracy by instituting an ideology of 
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political equality in apportionment law. For a majority of the Supreme Court, the 
legitimacy of a democratic government concerns the development and enhancement of 
the democratic experience. Instead of restricting the right to vote and participate in 
government, the majority of Justices argue that the best vision of democracy concerns the 
expansion of the right to vote and the ability of citizens to express their political will and 
engage in self-government through the right to vote.  
By expanding the rights of citizens to participate in government, the Supreme 
Court restricted the ability of state legislators to use their discretion to promote the 
interests of the state before citizens could vote on those interests. Rather than promote the 
interests of a certain segment of society, i.e. the rural interests, at the expense of the polity 
as a whole, the Supreme Court’s Reapportionment Revolution decisions recreate the 
public space of elections to argue that the experience of the American democracy requires 
political space in which citizens can utilize their voice to determine the distribution of 
resources throughout the state. Consequently, with the advancement and development of 
the American democracy, political institutions at the local, state, and federal level could 
no longer be characterized as republican in nature, especially in regards of the ability of 
state legislators to develop “rational” apportionment and districting plans to protect the 
interests of the states.  
While reapportionment cases during the 1960s focused on the development of 
political equality, the cases during the 1970s and 1980s focused on an ideology of political 
fairness, especially in terms of the development of democracy for racial minorities and for 
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political parties. During this time, the Justices rarely, if ever, challenged the Court’s 
decisions in Baker, Wesberry, and Reynolds— the legal and moral foundation of American 
democracy and the institutionalization of political equality— though Justices debated the 
extent to which political fairness should govern the redistricting process. Because political 
equality was malleable enough, citizens possessed an equal voice in the process though this 
voice was not always meaningful, especially in the face of racial and political 
gerrymandering. Though the Justices accepted the tenets of the Reapportion Revolution, 
the debated the ideology of political fairness in regards to representation.  
Conservative Justices argued that representation concerned authorization, where 
the people possessed political equality though democracy was limited to the ability of state 
legislators to filter the process of representation to fit their needs and not necessarily the 
needs of the people’s. For this vision of representation to succeed, voting constituted an 
individual right and not a group right. For example, in Gaffney v. Cummings, Conservative 
Justices allowed state legislators the ability to create an electoral map that provide political 
fairness to the political parties yet, in Davis v. Bandemer, the Conservative Justices argued 
against a conceptualization of political fairness for citizens. In Beer v. United States the 
Conservative Justices expanded voting rights to provide only a minimal level of group 
representation even under protection of the Voting Rights Act. In Mobile v. Bolden, the 
conservative Justices refused to allow for a group right of representation for racial 
minorities. Consequently, in order to expand protection under the VRA for racial 
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minorities, Congress amended §2 to protect group representation for racial minorities, 
which would lead to further controversy during the 1990s and 20002.  
Conversely, the Liberal Justices on the Court argued that representation needed to 
be substantive where the representatives resembled and acted on behalf of the people, 
preserving a close connection between the representative and the group.  Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, Liberal Justices argued that voting concerned the ability of a group to 
represent a candidate of choice and if state legislators threatened that choice it diminished 
the democratic experience. For example, dissents in Gaffney v. Cummings, Beer v. United 
States, and Mobile v. Bolden argued that redistricting maps that diminished the ability of 
groups to participate in the electoral process were unconstitutional. Majority or plurality 
opinions in City of Rome v. United States, Rodgers v. Lodge, Davis v. Bandemer, and Gingles v. 
Thornburg protected the right of groups to participate in the electoral process and believed 
that this group right to representation enhanced the democratic experience necessary to 
sustain the American democracy.  
These competing visions of representation created a disparity of democracy 
enacted within our political institutions. The Conservatives Justices’ vision of 
representation created an ideology of political fairness whereby the state legislators could 
determine what constituted fairness, which usually referred to fairness for the state 
legislators and the political parties to conduct apportionment. The entailment of this view 
was that the political institutions worked best if they featured an elite view of 
representation that diminished the role and voice of the people to deliberate about their 
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government and the distribution of resources. Additionally, the judiciary must allow the 
political institutions to develop this elite view of democracy and the judiciary must abstain 
from encroaching on the power of the partisan groups and political institutions. 
Conversely, the Liberal Justices’ vision of representation constituted an ideology of 
political fairness that fostered the ability of political groups to compete in the democratic 
process. In this view, a democracy works best if citizens can form themselves into groups 
and state legislators represent those groups by resembling them and working to secure 
legislation on their behalf. Consequently, political institutions ought to protect the ability 
of political and racial groups to participate in self-government and, if there are threats to 
that ability, the judiciary must protect that right.  
During the 1990s and 2000s, the Supreme Court’s decisions in reapportionment 
and redistricting focused on an ideology of political reconciliation, especially between 
competing racial groups. Redistricting maps concern not only the division of political 
power within a state but the way in which citizens from different racial groups achieve 
racial reconciliation and integration in the face of racial problems throughout the history 
of the United States. At stake in these decisions is to what degree apportionment and 
districting plans can promote the interests of racial groups and whether or not the 
Constitution contains a color-blind ideology.  
Similarly to the decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, the Justices divided themselves 
according to a political ideology. Conservatives Justices argued that the state must treat 
citizens and individuals rather than as members of a racial group. To stereotype an 
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individual based on immutable characteristics is to threaten the dignity of the person and 
to deny that person constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. To 
avoid this constitutional harm, state legislators must develop redistricting plans where race 
is not the predominant factor. Consequently, to assure the people that race is not a factor, 
the Conservative Justices argue that the legislative and political branches need to interpret 
the Constitution as being color-blind in hopes to reduce the visibility of race in American 
society. By seeing past race in representation, the Conservative Justices desire that race 
disappears as a motivating factor in redistricting plans.  
Conversely, the Liberal Justices argue that racial groups should receive equal 
protection as other ethnic or political groups receive protection. While these Justice hold 
the view that race may always be a factor in political life, the Liberal Justices argue that if 
reconciliation were to occur, it will occur through the integration of ethnic and political 
groups rather than ignoring racial and political groups. As the history of racially polarized 
voting shows without protection for racial minorities, racial minorities will not receive 
political benefits in society as the dominant majority will rely on institutional constraints 
to prevent political equality. Additionally, the Liberal Justices argue against the creation of 
the new substantive right to a color-blind districting process as the creation of the right by 
Conservative Justices violates the limited ethos of the judiciary in apportionment law. 
Further, according to the Liberal Justices, the activism of the Conservative Justices in the 
area of racial gerrymandering contradicts their arguments for judicial abstention and 
legislative supremacy in political gerrymandering cases.  
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 Since the Supreme Court’s entrance in the Reapportionment Revolution, the 
Court reconstituted representation and increased access to political participation. As 
Nathaniel Persily, Thad Kousser, and Patrick Egan note, the decisions by the Supreme 
Court increased the availability of democracy but at a cost of decreasing electoral 
competition and an increase in incumbent protection.14 While in certain instances 
reapportionment plans such as Gaffney v. Cummings concern the creation of proportional 
representation and political fairness for the political parties, this does not mean there is a 
healthy democracy available to the people in Connecticut. Grant M. Hayden writes that 
the Supreme Court’s entrance into the political thicket fulfilled the warnings of Justice 
John Marshall Harlan that the Court would be more and not less involved in 
reapportionment.15 Yet, Without the Supreme Court’s entrance in the Reapportionment 
Revolution, citizens would still be subject to the discretion of the state legislators and the 
country would not adhere in any form to its democratic ideals. Though there is criticism 
of the Court’s involvement in the Reapportionment Revolution, these articles suggests 
that more work needs to be done to expand the democratic experience in the United 
States.   
 
 
                                                
14 Nathaniel Persily, Thad Kousser, and Patrick Egan, “The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote 
on Political Competition and Representation,” North Carolina Law Review 80 (2002): 1300.  
 
15 Grant M. Hayden, “The Supreme Court and Voting Rights: A More Complete Exit Strategy,” North 
Carolina Law Review 83 (2005): 950. 
 
 474 
Future  Research on Rhetor ic and Redis tr icting  
 Throughout the reapportionment and redistricting decisions, further questions 
emerge over how the Supreme Court develops and negotiates the democratic experience 
and possibility for political deliberation to sustain that difference. One area of research 
would be to examine the connection between partisan gerrymandering and the protection 
of first amendment rights. In his concurring opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, Justice Kennedy 
notes that the briefs for the case argue partisan gerrymandering in terms of a violation of 
First Amendment rights. Consequently, Justice Kennedy states “the First Amendment may 
be the more relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymandering.”16 This area of research would examine an attempt to establish 
interpretive dominance by reframing a discussion of voting rights to include a discussion 
over “whether or not political classifications were used to burden a group's 
representational rights.”17 If employers cannot discriminate against employees because of 
their political views, this research would examine to what extent political parties can 
employ the government create burdens or to discriminate against citizens of a state 
because of the views they possess. The research would also examine the entailment of the 
switch from a Fourteenth Amendment basis of law to a First Amendment basis, especially 
for other types of reapportionment and redistricting law.  
 Another area of research would seek to provide a better theoretical foundation 
from the literature on visual rhetoric to discuss the aesthetics of redistricting. Throughout 
                                                
16 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004). 
 
17 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 315 (2004). 
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the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, arguments from aesthetics rather than accountability 
govern the way in which state legislators and citizens engage in debate over redistricting. 
The struggle to determine a valid redistricting plan rests not on the ability to discuss the 
district in terms of the way in which the representative is or is not responsive to the 
constituents in the district but whether or not the normative elements of aesthetics could 
allow for integration or division. Exacerbating the role of the aesthetics, and the 
development of representation for members in society, is the role of technology. Because 
humans rely on technology to precisely shape each turn of a district’s boundaries, state 
legislators possess the ability to enhance or diminish the democratic experience for their 
citizens. This research would examine in detail the ways in which aesthetics define and 
develop the meaning of the democratic experience and find ways to redefine the debate 
over aesthetics to promote a view of democratic accountability that enhances the 
democratic experience.  
 Finally, additional research needs to examine the proposals and consequences of 
“non-partisan” or “impartial” redistricting commissions. During the 2004 elections, 
citizens in California and Ohio rejected ballot initiatives that would turn the responsibility 
for districting to non-partisan agencies. This research would examine the extent to which 
non-partisan review boards create fair representation for citizens as well as political parties, 
e.g. Gaffney v. Cummings, and the ways in which citizens, politicians, and the impartial 
boards attempt to persuade or dissuade voters that these boards should adopt these 
initiatives to reform the political process. This research will provide a great example of 
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how citizens and representatives conceive of democracy as well as how they work to 
persuade the American polity over the ideal form of the American democracy. 
 At the beginning of this dissertation, the poems by Walt Whitman and Langston 
Hughes examine the progression of American democracy and the development of the 
democratic experience. While Whitman speaks of inclusion, Hughes speaks of exclusion. 
The history of voting rights within the United States concerns the expansion of the right 
to vote while opposition groups prevent the development of the meaning of the right to 
vote. The Supreme Court’s decisions in its reapportionment and redistricting decisions 
follow this expansion and exclusion that forms the basis for the constitution of the 
democratic experience in America. 
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